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Introduction	  	  In	   this	   thesis	   the	   concept	   of	   autonomy	   in	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   decisions	   is	   analyzed	  through	  ethical	  and	  legal	  comparative	  approaches	  in	  view	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  field	  is	  one	  of	  the	  main	  fields	  where	  law	  and	  ethics	  are	  so	  closely	  intertwined.	  The	   definition	   of	   advance	   directives	   –	   living	   wills	   and	   the	   appointment	   of	   a	  legal	  proxy	  –	   is	  studied.	   In	  addition,	  Recommendation	  CM/Rec	  (2009)	  11	  and	  the	   “Guide	   on	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   regarding	   medical	   treatment	   in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  situations”	  is	  analysed.	  	   Currently,	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  decisions	  are	  part	  of	   the	  exclusive	  competence	  of	  national	   parliaments.	   Thus,	   different	   parliaments	   have	   adopted	   different	  policies	  underpinned	  by	  different	  moral	  principles.	  What	  follows	  is	  an	  absence	  of	  a	  common	  European	   legal	   framework.	  National	   laws	  on	  advance	  directives	  in	  various	  Western	  European	  countries	  –	  such	  as	  Romance-­‐speaking	  countries	  (Italy,	   France,	   Portugal,	   and	   Spain),	   English-­‐speaking	   countries	   (Ireland	   and	  the	   United	   Kingdom	   of	   Great	   Britain	   and	   Northern	   Ireland),	   and	   German-­‐speaking	  countries	  (Austria,	  Germany,	  and	  Switzerland)	  –	  are	  examined.	  This	  thesis	   seeks	   to	   analyse	   national	   norms	   governing	   advance	   directives	   by	  hypothesising	   the	   reasons	   for	   the	   lack	  of	   a	   common	  attitude	   towards	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  decisions	  and	  to	  identify	  similarities	  and	  differences	  between	  countries,	  in	  addition	   to	   advancing	   some	   proposals	   for	   the	   future	   regarding	   end-­‐of-­‐life	  decisions.	  	   Particular	   attention	   is	   paid	   to	   the	   current	   Italian	   situation	   regarding	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  decisions,	  since	  –	  within	  our	  survey,	  which	  includes	  the	  analysis	  of	  national	   laws	   in	   the	   Romance-­‐,	   English-­‐,	   and	   German-­‐speaking	   countries	   –	  Italy,	  in	  addition	  to	  Northern	  Ireland	  and	  the	  Republic	  of	  Ireland,	  is	  one	  of	  the	  few	  Western	  European	  countries	  being	  analysed	  that	  does	  not	  have	  a	  specific	  law	  governing	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  situations.	  While	  in	  Northern	  Ireland	  the	  biomedical	  community	   adopts	   the	   Mental	   Capacity	   Act,	   and	   in	   Ireland	   the	   Assisted	  
Decision-­‐Making	  (Capacity)	  Bill	  2013	  and	  the	  Advance	  Healthcare	  Decision	  Bill	  2012	  are	  under	  public	  discussion,	   in	   Italy	   the	   issue	  of	   the	  end-­‐of-­‐life	   is	  quite	  complex.	   Herein,	   the	   Italian	   bill	   no.	   2350	   “Provisions	   relating	   to	   therapeutic	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alliance,	  informed	  consent,	  and	  advance	  directives	  for	  treatments”	  –	  approved	  in	   different	   texts	   in	   2009	   by	   the	   Senate	   and	   in	   2011	   by	   the	   Chamber	   of	  Deputies	   –	   is	   criticized	   because	   its	   norms	   are	   considered	   controversial.	  Similarities	  and	  differences	  between	  Bill	  no.	  2350	  and	  the	  eight	  proposal	  bills	  of	   the	  current	   legislation	  –	  which	  began	  on	  15	  March	  2013	  –	  are	  highlighted.	  Additionally,	   the	   judicial	   interpretation	   of	   amended	   Articles	   404–413	   of	   the	  Italian	   Civil	   Code	   –	   which	   introduced	   to	   Italy	   the	   legal	   role	   of	   the	   support	  guardian	   (amministratore	   di	   sostegno)	   –	   is	   examined.	   This	   examination	   is	  fundamental	  because	   Italian	   judges	  have	  applied	   these	  articles	   to	   fill	   the	  gap	  in	   the	   Italian	   legal	   system	   regarding	   the	   role	   of	   the	   legal	   proxy	   in	   the	   dying	  process,	   sometimes	   conferring	   on	   the	   guardian	   powers	   that	   are	   similar	   to	  those	  of	  the	  surrogate.	  	   The	  aim	  of	   the	   thesis	   is	   to	   identify	   the	  common	  European	  standards	   in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  decisions.	  Moreover,	  similarities	  and	  differences	  between	  different	  policies	  will	  be	  pointed	  out.	  Furthermore,	  possible	   suggestions	   for	  modifying	  the	   Italian	   bill	   2350	   by	   taking	   the	   experience	   of	   other	   Western	   European	  countries	  into	  consideration	  will	  be	  made.	  This	  thesis	  is	  divided	  into	  four	  main	  chapters.	  The	  definition	  of	  advance	  directives	   (ADs)	   is	   studied,	   and	   two	   main	   types	   of	   advance	   directives	   are	  distinguished.	   Several	  main	   critiques	  of	   the	   recognition	  of	   the	   significance	  of	  ADs	  –	  such	  as	   life	  having	  an	  intrinsic	  value	  (or	  there	  is	  a	  principle	  of	  sanctity	  of	   life),	   ADs	   distorting	   the	   patient-­‐physician	   trust	   and	  misunderstanding	   the	  social	  role	  of	  physicians	  –	  are	  examined.	  In	  addition,	  in	  cases	  where	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  decisions	  will	   be	   taken	   by	   the	   legal	   proxy,	   some	   results	   of	   empirical	   studies	  have	   shown	   their	   dubious	   motives;	   also,	   the	   possibility	   that	   they	   lose	   their	  capacity	   is	   discussed.	   However,	   although	   these	   problems	   exist,	   this	   thesis	  suggests	   that	   the	   benefits	   of	   ADs	   still	   outweigh	   the	   risks	   because	   advance	  directives	   should	   be	   considered	   an	   instrument	   that	   safeguards	   patient	  autonomy	  and	  highlights	  patient-­‐physician	  trust.	  	   Moreover,	  the	  concept	  of	  relational	  autonomy	  is	  analyzed	  by	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  criticisms	  made	  of	  the	   individualistic	  approach	  to	  autonomy.	  The	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disadvantages	  and	  shortcomings	  of	  living	  wills	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  role	  of	   the	   legal	  proxy	  in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  decisions	  are	  pointed	  out	  through	  ethical	  and	  moral	   reasons.	   In	   addition,	   examples	   from	   the	   legal	   norms	   or	   from	   court	  rulings	   which	   underline	   the	   position	   of	   the	   surrogate	   are	   examined.	  Furthermore,	   the	   results	   of	   empirical	   studies	   are	   laid	   out.	   Different	   court	  rulings	   are	   studied.	   Particular	   attention	   is	   paid	   to	   the	   Italian	   case	   law	   in	  
Eluana	  Englaro,	  since	  Italy	  is	  one	  of	  the	  few	  Western	  European	  countries	  that	  does	  not	  have	  any	  specific	   law	  governing	  advance	  directives.	   In	  addition,	   the	  political	  and	  social	  reaction	  to	  it	  is	  discussed.	  	   The	   main	   results	   of	   Chap.	   1	   regard	   the	   significance	   of	   ADs,	   and	   in	  particular	   the	   role	   of	   the	   legal	   proxy,	   in	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   decisions;	   the	   relational	  approach	  to	  autonomy,	  which	  positively	  contributes	  to	  improving	  the	  patient-­‐physician	   relationship;	   and	   the	   role	   of	   the	   courts’	   rulings	   in	   filling	   the	   gap	  created	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  specific	  legal	  rules	  governing	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  situations.	  The	   position	   of	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe	   and	   of	   the	   European	   Court	   of	  Human	  Rights	  (ECtHR)	  is	  analyzed.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  legal	  reasoning	  done	   by	   the	   ECtHR	   is	   based	   on	   the	   European	   Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights	  (ECHR).	   Nevertheless,	   its	   reasoning	   can	   perfectly	   be	   applied	   to	   the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Biomedicine	  of	   April	   1997	   (the	   so-­‐called	   “Oviedo	   Convention”),	   since	   the	   preamble	   of	  Oviedo	  Convention	  cites	  the	  ECHR,	  and	  the	  convention	  of	  1997	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  
lex	   specialis	   relative	   to	   the	  ECHR	  of	  1950	   in	   the	  biomedical	   field	   (Application	  no.	  8278/1978).	  A	  special	   focus	   is	  given	  to	  the	  latest	  ruling	  of	  the	  ECtHR,	  the	  ruling	  in	  Lambert	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sec.	  2.1.1.1.).	  The	  latest	  documents	  published	  by	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  are	  analyzed.	  More	   precisely,	   Recommendation	   CM/Rec(2009)11	   of	   the	   Committee	   of	  Ministers	   to	   member	   states	   on	   principles	   concerning	   continuing	   powers	   of	  attorney	   and	   advance	   directives	   for	   incapacity	   of	   December	   2009	   and	   the	  
Guide	  on	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  regarding	  medical	  treatment	  in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  
situations	   (hereafter,	   the	   Guide)	   of	   May	   2014	   are	   examined.	   The	  Recommendation	  CM/Rec(2009)11	   is	   studied	  by	  giving	  concrete	  examples	  of	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internal	   legislation	   from	  English-­‐,	  German-­‐,	  and	  Romance-­‐speaking	  countries.	  The	  Guide	   on	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   of	   May	   2014	   is	   analyzed	   through	  ethical	   reasoning	   by	   taking	   into	   consideration	   the	   application	   of	   the	   well-­‐known	   set	   of	   ethical	   principles	   as	   suggested	   by	   the	   US-­‐American	   ethicists	  Beauchamp	   and	   Childress	   (1979)	   and	   the	   role	   of	   the	   parties	   in	   end-­‐of-­‐life	  situations.	   The	   second	   part	   of	   Chap.	   2	   is	   dedicated	   to	   the	   legal	   situation	   in	  English-­‐,	  German-­‐,	   and	  Romance-­‐speaking	   countries.	  Within	   them,	   legislation	  in	  four	  countries	  –	  Spain,	  France,	  England,	  and	  Germany	  –	  is	  analyzed	  in	  detail	  because	   the	   other	   countries	   in	   this	   survey	   take	   a	   similar	   legal,	   ethical,	   or	  political	  approach	  to	  one	  of	  these.	  This	  thesis	  shows	  –	  through	  concrete	  examples	  from	  national	  laws	  –	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  basic	   common	  European	  standard.	  Moreover,	   the	  possibility	  of	  an	  application	  of	  Recommendation	  CM/Rec(2009)11	  by	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  is	  suggested,	  even	  though	  this	  document	  is	  considered	  soft	  law.	  In	   addition,	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   public	   debate	   regarding	   ethical	   issues	   in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  situations	   is	  pointed	  out	   through	  commentary	  on	  the	  Guide.	   In	   the	  conclusion,	  the	  difference	  is	  analysed	  between	  the	  approaches	  taken	  to	  ADs	  in	  national	   policy	   in	   Romance-­‐speaking	   countries	   on	   one	   side	   and	   the	   English-­‐	  and	  German-­‐speaking	  countries	  on	  the	  other:	  this	  analysis	  is	  based	  on	  the	  role	  that	  physicians	  have	  in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  situations.	  A	   particular	   attention	   is	   given	   to	   the	   situation	   in	   Italy	   in	   comparison	  with	   several	   European	   models.	   The	   interpretation	   of	   the	   different	   legal	  concepts	   used	   or	   of	   the	   rules	   established	   in	   the	   Convention	   on	   the	   Rights	   of	  Persons	   with	   Disabilities,	   the	   bioethical	   debate	   regarding	   withdrawing	  alimentation	   and	   hydration	   (ANH),	   the	   rigidity	   forms	   established	   for	   the	  validity	  of	  ADs	  or	  for	  the	  appointment	  of	  a	  surrogate,	  and	  the	  political	  decision	  made	   in	   regard	   to	   cases	   involving	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   surrogate	   for	   the	   patient	  are	  criticized.	  Moreover,	  the	  legal	  interpretation	  of	  amended	  Articles	  404–413	  of	   the	   Italian	   Civil	   Code	   (C.C.),	   introduced	   by	   law	  no.	   6	   of	   9	   January	   2004,	   is	  studied.	   Italian	   judges	   have	   applied	   these	   articles	   to	   fill	   the	   gap	   in	   the	   legal	  system	  regarding	  the	  role	  of	  the	  legal	  proxy	  in	  the	  dying	  process.	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The	  main	   results	   of	   Chap.	   3	   regard	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   position	   of	   the	  Italian	   bioethical	   and	   medical	   communities	   and	   the	   position	   of	   the	  jurisprudence	   in	   recent	   decades.	   This	   investigation	   highlights	   the	   bioethical	  community’s	  change	  of	  approach	  from	  a	  complete	  paternalist	  one	  in	  1993	  to	  a	  liberal	   one	   in	   2014.	   In	   addition,	   the	   jurisprudence	   has	   applied	   Articles	   404–413	  C.C.	  to	  fill	  the	  gap	  in	  the	  Italian	  legal	  system	  regarding	  the	  role	  of	  the	  legal	  proxy	   in	   the	   dying	   process.	   All	   these	   parties	   (bioethical	   and	   medical	  communities	   and	   the	   jurisprudence)	   have	   underscored	   the	   importance	   of	  ad	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Chapter	   1:	   End-­‐of-­‐Life	   Decisions	   and	   the	   Right	   to	  
Autonomy	  
	  
Abstract	  The	   concept	   of	   autonomy	   in	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   decisions	   is	   analyzed	   through	   ethical	  perspective	   and	   case-­‐law	   studies.	   Several	   scholars	   have	   demonstrated	   that	  although	   ethical	   and	   moral	   principles	   are	   often	   considered	   absolute	   and	  unchanging,	   they	   are	   actually	   dynamic	   and	   evolving	   since	   they	   are	   defined	  largely	   by	   society	   and	   medical	   law	   and	   ethics	   are	   necessarily	   influenced	   by	  these	   principles.	   From	   one	   generation	   to	   the	   next	   and	   between	   countries,	  changes	   in	   culture,	   values,	   and	   social	   structure	   have	   resulted	   in	   substantial	  shifts	   in	   the	   limits	  of	  what	   is	  morally	  and	  ethically	  acceptable	  regarding	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  issues	  and	  other	  topics	  in	  bioethics.	  	   In	   addition,	   in	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   decisions	   the	   public	   discussion	   is	   continues	  because	   it	   touches	   upon	   people’s	   most	   intimate	   interests,	   which	   have	  traditionally	  involved	  religious	  and	  other	  personal	  values.	  National	  legislators	  have	   difficulties	   to	   rule	   this	   topic.	   It	   follows	   that	   the	   process	   of	   the	  promulgation	  of	  a	  law	  is	  slower	  compared	  to	  the	  transformation	  of	  the	  society.	  Therefore,	   judges	   have	   substituted	   national	   legislators	   by	   deciding	   in	   single	  case-­‐law.	  The	  definition	  of	  advance	  directives	  –	  living	  wills	  and	  the	  nomination	  of	  a	   legal	   proxy	   –	   is	   studied.	   Although	   several	   main	   criticism	   regarding	   the	  recognition	   of	   the	   significance	   of	   advance	   directives	   –	   such	   as	   life	   having	   an	  intrinsic	   value,	   advance	   directives	   distorting	   the	   patient-­‐physician	  relationship	   and	   misunderstanding	   the	   social	   role	   of	   physicians	   –	   are	  considered,	   this	   contribution	   suggests	   that	   the	  benefits	  of	   advance	  directives	  still	   outweigh	   the	   risks	   because	   advance	  directives	   should	  be	   considered	   the	  main	  instrument	  that	  safeguards	  patient	  autonomy.	  The	   concept	   of	   relational	   autonomy	   is	   analyzed	   by	   taking	   into	  consideration	  the	  critiques	  directed	  at	  the	  individualistic	  and	  liberal	  approach	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1.	  	   The	  connection	  between	  ethics	  and	  law	  in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  decisions	  In	   recent	   decades	   there	   has	   been	   a	   transformation	   of	   the	   scope	   of	  medicine:	  from	  the	  strict	  medical	  concept	  of	  health	  to	  the	  broader	  concept	  of	  well-­‐being	  (World	   Health	   Organisation	   2012),	   where	   the	   approach	   of	   shared	   decision-­‐making	   is	   the	   main	   goal	   (Swetz	   et	   al.	   2014,	   Tibaldi	   et	   al.	   2011,	   and	   Beltran	  1996).	   Before,	   patient	   health	   was	   promoted	   solely	   according	   to	   physicians’	  medical	   and	   scientific	   expertise	   (Devettere	   2010).	   Since	   then,	   the	   patient’s	  right	   to	   self-­‐determination	   has	   increased	   (Gabl	   and	   Jox	   2008)	   and	   several	  European	   legislators	   have	   regulated	   ADs1.	   Therefore,	   physicians	   must	   take	  	  	  	  	  	  1	   Within	   the	   English-­‐,	   German-­‐	   and	   Romance-­‐	   speaking	   countries,	   the	   laws	   on	  advance	   directives	   in	   chronological	   order	   (by	   date	   of	   approval	   by	   the	   national	  parliament)	  are:	  in	  Scotland:	  Adults	  with	  Incapacity	  (Scotland)	  Act	  of	  29	  March	  2000;	  in	  Spain:	  Básica	  reguladora	  de	  la	  autonomía	  del	  paciente	  y	  de	  derechos	  y	  obligaciones	  
en	  materia	  de	  información	  y	  documentación	  clínica’,	  law	  no.	  41	  of	  14	  November	  2002;	  in	   England	   Mental	   Capacity	   Act	   of	   7	   April	   2005	   (the	   same	   legislation	   has	   been	  adopted	   by	   the	   Wales	   Parliament	   on	   13	   March	   2007);	   in	   France	   -­‐	   Loi	   relative	   aux	  
droits	   des	   malades	   et	   à	   la	   fin	   de	   vie,	   law	   no.	   2005-­‐370	   of	   22	   April	   2005	   (However,	  nowadays,	   the	   French	   Senate	   is	   discussing	   a	   new	   Bill	   Loi	   relative	   au	   choix	   libre	   et	  
éclairé	   d'une	   assistance	   médicalisée	   pour	   une	   fin	   de	   vie	   digne	   submitted	   on	   2	  December	   2013,	   bill	   no.	   182);	   in	   Austria:	   Bundesgesetz	   über	   Patientenverfügungen	  
(Patientenverfügungs-­‐Gesetz	   –	   PatVG),	   law	   no.	   55	   of	   8	   May	   2006	   and	  
Sachwalterrechts-­‐Änderungsgesetz	   2006	   –	   SWRÄG	   2006,	   law	   92	   of	   23	   June	   2006;	   in	  Switzerland:	   Schweizerisches	  Zivilgesetzbuch	   (Erwachsenenschutz,	  Personenrecht	  und	  
Kindesrecht)	  of	  19	  December	  2008	  entered	  into	  force	  in	  1	  January	  2013;	  before	  that,	  the	   treatment	  of	   incapacitated	  patients	   fell	  under	  cantonal	   legislation);	   in	  Germany:	  
Drittes	   Gesetz	   zur	   Anderung	   des	   Betreuungsrechts,	   law	   no.	   593	   of	   19	   June	   2009;	   in	  Portugal:	   ‘Regula	  as	  diretivas	  antecipadas	  de	  vontade,	  designateadamente	  sob	  a	  forma	  
de	  testamento	  vital,	  e	  a	  nomeação	  de	  procurador	  de	  cuidados	  de	  saúde	  e	  cria	  o	  Registo	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into	  consideration	  not	  only	  patients’	  health	  but	  also	  their	  wellbeing,	  which	  is	  a	  broader	   concept	   than	   health,	   because	   it	   includes	   patients’	   individual	   and	  subjective	  ideas	  of	  health	  (Wiesemann	  and	  Alfred	  2013).	  	   Recently,	   the	   patient’s	   active	   role	   has	   been	   acknowledged	   in	   several	  international	  conventions,	  such	  as	  the	  European	  Convention	  of	  Human	  Rights	  of	  1950,	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Biomedicine	  of	  April	  1997,	   the	   Hague	   Convention	   on	   the	   International	   Protection	   of	   Adults	   of	   13	  January	  2000,	   and	   the	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights	  of	   the	  European	  Union	  of	  2000,	  which	  from	  1	  December	  2009	  has	  the	  same	  legal	  status	  as	  EU	  Treaties	  (C.	  Cost.	  24	  October	  2007,	  no.	  348	  and	  no.	  349)	  (e.g.,	  see	  Chap.	  2).	  	  Therefore,	   the	   traditional	   approach	   towards	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   decision-­‐making	  in	  Europe	  has	  changed:	  death	  is	  no	  longer	  considered	  a	  natural	  event	  but	  a	  long	  process	  of	  steps	  involving	  medical	  treatment	  where	  the	  definitions	  of	   duty	   of	   care	   and	   quality	   of	   life	   have	   become	   ever	   more	   ambiguous,	  contentious	  and	  controversial	  (Zullo	  2010).	  	   	  The	   advances	   of	   medicine	   have	   brought	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   grey	   zone	  between	   life	   and	   death	   within	   which	   the	   promulgation	   of	   life	   or	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  
Nacional	   do	   Testamento	   Vital’,	   law	   no.	   25	   of	   16	   July	   2012.	   In	   Ireland,	   the	   Assisted	  
Decision-­‐Making	   (Capacity)	   Bill	   2013	   and	   the	  Advance	  Healthcare	  Decision	  Bill	  2012	  are	   under	   public	   consultations.	   There	   is	   no	   statutory	   law	   in	   Northern	   Ireland.	   In	  Italy,	   the	   bill	   2350	   ‘Provisions	   relating	   to	   therapeutic	   alliance,	   informed	   consent	   and	  
advance	   directives	   for	   treatments’	   is	   the	   only	   act	   which	   has	   been	   debated	   by	   the	  Italian	  deputies	  and	  senators	  in	  different	  texts	  in	  2009	  by	  the	  Senate	  and	  in	  2011	  by	  the	  Chamber	  of	  Deputies.	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anticipation	   of	   death	   depend	   on	   the	   individual’s	   or	   the	   doctor’s	   decision	   to	  allow	  or	  reject	  life-­‐sustaining	  treatment.	  New	  medical	  discoveries	  can	  prolong	  the	  life	  of	  a	  patient	  with	  incurable	  disease	  for	  long	  time.	  The	  best	  examples	  are	  those	   of	   patients	   in	   a	   vegetative	   state	  where	   the	   person	   is	   not	   dead	   but	   has	  lost	  mental	  activity	  and	  consciousness	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  1.5.1.	  and	  3.1.1.).	  	  	   Less	   than	   seventy	   years	   ago,	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   decisions	   were	   considered	   a	  taboo	   topic.	   Before	   1965,	   the	   term	   quality	   of	   life	   was	   not	   indexed	   in	   the	  Medline	   database,	   which	   is	   the	   largest	   and	   most	   widely	   used	   index	   of	   the	  medical	   literature	   (Lacroix	   and	  Mehnert	   2002).	   This	   began	   to	   change	   in	   the	  late	  1960s	  in	  the	  USA	  (Forbes	  et	  al.	  2009),	  where	  the	  individualistic	  approach	  to	   is	   common	   than	   in	   Europe.	   In	   1969,	   the	   physician	   Elisabeth	   Kubler-­‐Ross	  published	  her	  book	  entitled	  “On	  Death	  and	  Dying”	  that	   lead	  to	  the	  promotion	  of	  a	  public	  discussion	  about	  the	  roles	  and	  needs	  of	  terminally	   ill	  patients	  and	  their	   families.	   From	   that	   time,	   in	   the	   USA,	   medicine	   has	   moved	   from	   a	  paternalistic	   model	   to	   one	   that	   promotes	   autonomy	   and	   self-­‐determination	  (Teres	  1993).	  Therefore,	   the	  patient-­‐physician’s	   trust	   (Thom	  et	   al.	   2011,	   and	  Thom	  and	  Campbell	  1997)	  and	  the	  psychological	  preparation	  for	  death	  (Karen	  2000)	   have	   been	   considered	   fundamental.	   This	   approach	   has	   been	   further	  been	   supported	   by	   the	   ‘new’	   interpretation	   of	   the	   patient	   autonomy	   as	   a	  relational	   principle.	   This	   new	   interpretation	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   autonomy	   is	  considered	  more	  useful	  than	  the	  previous	  concept	  of	  autonomy	  as	  formal	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  because	  it	  takes	  into	  consideration	  that	  external	  factors	  influence	  the	  individual	  decision	  making	  process	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  2.2.).	  Recently,	  the	  Guide	  on	   the	  decision-­‐making	  process	   regarding	  medical	   treatment	   in	   end-­‐
of-­‐life	  situations	  has	  underlined	  this	  concept	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  2.1.3.).	  In	  addition,	  the	  relational	  approach	  of	  autonomy	  is	  in	  harmony	  with	  the	  empirical	  studies	  that	   highlight	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   surrogate	   in	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   situations	   (e.g.,	  see	   Sect.	   1.4.1.),	  which	  has	   also	   been	  underlined	  by	   the	  Council	   of	   Europe	   in	  the	  Recommendation	  CM/Rec	  (2009)	  11	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  2.1.2.).	  There	   is	   no	   other	   field	   like	   biomedicine	   where	   law	   and	   ethics	   are	   so	  closely	   intertwined.	  Law	  and	  ethics	  create	  a	  web	  of	  duties,	  obligations,	  rights	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and	   recommendations	   (Hoppe	   and	   Miola	   2014).	   In	   medicine,	   the	   types	   of	  obligations	  come	  from	  both	  the	  legal	  and	  the	  ethical	  systems.	  A	  legal	  duty	  can	  be	   prescribed	   in	   the	   law	   or	   in	   the	   medical	   guidelines	   established	   by	   the	  Chamber	   of	   Physicians	   or	   by	   the	   hospital.	   A	   moral	   obligation	   is	   one	   that	  individual	   is	   thought	   to	   have	   towards	   others	   in	   a	   society.	   One	   of	   the	   most	  famous	  legal	  positivists	  of	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  George	  Jellinek	  (1908),	  stated	  that	  “law	  is	  nothing	  other	  than	  the	  ethical	  minimum”.	  The	  scope	  of	  law	  is	  that	  to	  create	  rules	  regarding	  the	  peaceful	  societal	  cohesion.	  It	   follows	  that	  the	  law	  must	  cover	  the	  minimum	  of	  moral	  norms	  required	  for	  this	  cohesion.	  	  In	   addition,	   both	   law	   and	   ethics	   use	   moral	   notions.	   While	   law	   often	  emphasizes	   moral	   notions,	   ethics	   uses	   them	   to	   develop	   an	   argument	   for	   or	  against	   a	   certain	   course	   of	   action.	   Therefore,	   ethics	   would	   not	   be	   possible	  without	  morals	  (Hoppe	  and	  Miola	  2014).	   In	  addition,	   in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  situations,	  the	  law	  is	  based	  on	  the	  moral	  notions	  shared	  in	  that	  specific	  society.	  Also,	  this	  interconnection	  has	  been	   recognized	  by	   judges.	   For	   instance,	   in	   the	   ruling	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  Bland,	  the	  judge	  Hoffmann	  LJ	  stated	  that	  “this	  [end-­‐of-­‐life	  decisions]	   is	   not	   an	   area	   in	   which	   any	   difference	   can	   be	   allowed	   to	   exist	  between	  what	  is	  legal	  and	  what	  is	  morally	  right”	  ([1993]	  1	  All	  ER	  821	  at	  850,	  (1993)	  12	  BMLR	  64	  at	  95).	  This	  view	  was	   further	  supported	  by	   the	  House	  of	  Lords	   in	   the	   opinions	   of	   Lord	   Browne-­‐Wilkinson	   and	   Lord	   Mustill.	   The	  concern	  about	  law	  and	  moral	  values	  in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  situations	  is	  strong	  since	  it	  touches	   upon	   people’s	   most	   intimate	   interests,	   which	   have	   traditionally	  involved	   our	   religious	   convictions	   and	   have	   provoked	   intense	   emotions	  (Manson	  and	  Laurie	  2011).	  This	   interconnection	   is	   facilitated	   also	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   both	   law	   and	  ethics	  use	  the	  same	  conceptual	  categories:	  rules,	  principles,	  rights,	  procedures	  (van	  der	  Burg	  1998).	  Both	  them	  are	  focused	  on	  recent	  medical	  practice	  based	  on	  liberal	  theory,	  in	  which	  autonomy	  and	  patient	  rights	  are	  central,	  and	  not	  on	  ideal	  situations.	  The	  work	  of	  ethicists	   is	  both	  orientated	  at	  and	   influenced	  by	  the	  law.	  This	  could	  seem	  controversial	  because	  while	  legal	  theories	  are	  based	  on	   reasons	   of	   proof	   based	   on	   external	   acts	   rather	   than	   internal	   intentions,	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many	   ethical	   theories	   take	   the	   opposite	   approach	   and	   focus	   on	   the	   internal	  process	  of	  decision	  making.2	  Moreover,	   since	  bioethical	  norms	  are	  principles,	  rules	  could	  be	  achieved	  only	  through	  deductive	  logic	  (Richardson	  2005).	  In	  the	  21st	  century,	  ethicists	  are	  chosen	  as	  experts	  by	  court	  or	  European	  parliaments	   to	   assist	   with	   the	   legal	   regulation	   of	   biomedicine.	   European	  legislators	  have	  highlighted	   the	  close	  relationship	  between	  ethics	  and	   law	  by	  establishing	   bioethical	   committees.	   In	   addition,	   when	   a	   physicians	   have	   to	  deal	  with	   terminal	   ill	   patients,	   they	  do	  not	  only	  need	  medical	  knowledge	  but	  also	   legal	   and	   ethical	   expertize	   (e.g.,	   see	   Sect.	   2.1.3.).	   Recently,	   this	   has	  been	  confirmed	  also	  by	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  in	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  Guide	  on	  the	  
decision-­‐making	  process	  regarding	  medical	  treatment	  in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  situations.	  Studying	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   decision-­‐making	   is	   interesting	   because	   more	   and	  more	  people	   get	   into	   situations	  where	   they	   have	   to	   consciously	   confront	   the	  topic	  of	  dying.	  This	  is	  partly	  due	  to	  a	  general	  increase	  in	  life	  expectancy	  and	  of	  chronic	   and/or	   terminal	   diseases.	   In	   addition,	   there	   is	   a	   medical	   trend	  towards	   early	   diagnosis	   of	   progressive	   conditions.	   Moreover,	   European	  citizens	   pay	   more	   attention	   to	   their	   health	   and	   their	   rights	   in	   end-­‐of-­‐life	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  This	  difference	  seems	  particularly	  emphasized	  in	  case	  of	  euthanasia.	  While	  ethicist	  would	  focus	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  autonomy,	   in	  addition	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  some	  scholars	  will	   go	   beyond	   the	   distinction	   between	   act	   and	   omission,	   lawyer	   would	   consider	  external	   acts	   such	   as	   the	   active	   act	   to	   inject	   a	   high	   doze	   of	   morphine.	   Thus,	   for	  lawyers,	   increasing	   of	   doze	   of	   painkillers	  will	   be	   considered	   –	   except	   the	   countries	  that	  have	   legalized	  euthanasia,	   such	  as	   the	  Netherlands	  and	  Belgium,	   -­‐	  as	  a	  criminal	  offence.	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situations.	   It	   follows	   that	   some	   younger	   people,	   as	   a	   precaution	   against	  unexpected	  illness	  or	  accidents,	  will	  nominate	  a	  surrogate	  (Council	  of	  Europe	  2009).	  	  Acute	   death	   due	   to	   infectious	   disease	   –	   such	   as	   cancer	   and	  cardiovascular	   disease	   –	   has	   been	   replaced	   by	   diseases,	   which	   have	   more	  protracted	  dying	  process.	  Advances	  in	  new	  medical	  technologies	  have	  greatly	  improved	   possibilities	   to	   treat	   seriously	   ill	   patients	   and	   to	   prolong	   life.	  Additionally,	   since	   the	   beginnings	   of	   the	   21	   century	   empirical	   research	   has	  shown	  a	  rise	  in	  life	  expectancy.	  According	  to	  Eurostat,	  over	  the	  past	  50	  years,	  life	   expectancy	  has	   increased	  by	   about	  10	   years	   for	  both	  men	  and	  women	   in	  the	  EU	  zone	  (Eurostat	  2014).	  	  This	   trend	   has	   been	   supported	   by	   several	   factors	   such	   as	   the	  introduction	   of	   public	   health	   care	   services,	   medical	   and	   technological	  progress,	   the	   improvement	   of	   environmental	   conditions,	   improvement	   in	  education,	   healthier	   lifestyles	   and	   an	   overall	   rise	   of	   “socio-­‐economic	   status”.	  Therefore,	   the	   majority	   of	   deaths	   nowadays	   are	   the	   result	   of	   non-­‐sudden	  events	   or	   diseases.3	   Also,	   the	   majority	   of	   people	   in	   Europe	   die	   in	   hospitals,	  from	  which	   it	   follows	   that	   they	   have	   several	   dialogues	  with	   their	   physicians	  about	   the	   last	  period	  of	   their	   life	  (Ashcroft	  2005).	  This	  allows	  the	  patients	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The	  study	  of	  Euroled	  showed	  that	  only	  one	  third	  of	  all	  the	  death	  between	  June	  2001	  and	   February	   2002	   in	   six	   European	   countries	   (Belgium,	   Denmark,	   Italy,	   the	  Netherlands,	   Sweden,	   and	   Switzerland)	   happened	   suddenly	   and	   unexpectedly	   (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  1.2).	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decide	   on	   the	   type	   of	   their	   medical	   treatments	   or	   whether	   to	   withhold	   or	  withdraw	  them.	  	  In	   the	   past,	   death	   and	   the	   process	   of	   dying	   were	   a	   matter	   of	   private	  decision	   done	   within	   the	   specific	   socio-­‐cultural	   and	   religious	   background;	  nowadays,	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  decisions	  have	  become	  a	  matter	  of	  ethical	  debate	  and	  of	  public	  policy.	  The	  increase	  of	  medical	  discoveries,	  which	  has	  been	  followed	  by	  the	   increase	   of	   life-­‐expectancy	   and	   the	   decrease	   of	   sudden	   death,	   has	  stimulated	  national	  legislators	  to	  rethink	  the	  traditional	  legal	  norms	  regarding	  end-­‐of-­‐life	   situations.	   Moreover,	   the	   patient-­‐physician	   trust	   and	   patient	  autonomy	  have	  been	  highlighted.	  	  	  	  	  
1. The	  European	  legal	  models	  analyzed	  	  In	  this	  thesis	  the	  legal	  situation	  in	  Romance-­‐speaking	  countries	  (Italy,	  France,	  Portugal,	   and	   Spain),	   English-­‐speaking	   countries	   (Ireland,	   and	   United	  Kingdom	   of	   Great	   Britain	   and	   Northern	   Ireland),	   and	   German-­‐speaking	  countries	  (Austria,	  Germany,	  and	  Switzerland)	  is	  analyzed.	  However,	  it	  should	  be	   noted	   that	   although	   some	   countries	   give	   legislative	   authority	   concerning	  health	  issues	  to	  their	  regions,	  this	  thesis	  looks	  only	  at	  national	  laws.	  	  	   A	   particular	   attention	   has	   been	   given	   to	   the	   law	   in	   Spain,	   France,	  England,	   and	   Germany,	   since	   these	   countries	   have	   been	   considered	   them	   as	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paradigmatic	   cases,	   because	   the	  other	   countries	   in	   this	   survey	   take	   a	   similar	  legal,	   ethical	   or	   political	   approach	   to	   one	   of	   these.	   The	   Spanish	   law,	   for	  instance,	  has	  been	  used	  as	  a	  model	  by	  the	  Portuguese	  Parliament.4	  The	  Italian	  bill	   of	   2009	   (re-­‐proposed	   in	   2011	   and	   by	   the	   proposal-­‐bill	   2229	   in	   2014)	  shares	   its	  political	  motivation	  with	   the	  previous	  version	  of	   the	  French	   law	  of	  2005,5	  which	  recently	  has	  been	  modified6.	  The	  English	  Mental	  Capacity	  Act	  of	  2005	   recognizes	   similar	   principles	   to	   those	   of	   the	   laws	   of	   the	   other	   English-­‐speaking	   countries.7	   In	   German-­‐speaking	   countries,	   national	   legislators	   have	  
	  	  	  	  	  4	  The	  Portuguese	  law	  no.	  25	  of	  16	  July	  2012	  established	  that	  advance	  directives	  must	  be	  obeyed	  except	   in	  three	  different	  cases	  established	   in	   its	  article	  5	  as	  well	  as	  cases	  that	  are	  similar	  to	  the	  cases	  established	  by	  article	  11,	  section	  3	  of	  the	  Spanish	  law	  no.	  41	  of	  14	  November	  2002.	  	  5	  As	  in	  France,	  the	  Italian	  bill	  no.	  2350	  –	  approved	  with	  modification	  in	  2011	  and	  still	  not	  passed	  –	  was	  the	  result	  of	  the	  case-­‐law	  of	  Eluana	  Englaro.	  6	  The	  Loi	  créant	  de	  nouveaux	  droits	  en	  faveur	  des	  malades	  et	  des	  personnes	  en	  fin	  de	  vie	  is	   more	   liberal	   because	   ADs	   are	   presumed	   to	   be	   legally	   binding	   and	   without	   time-­‐limit.	  	  	  7	   The	   Welsh	   Parliament	   adopted	   the	   same	   act	   as	   England	   on	   13	   March	   2007.	   In	  Northern	  Ireland,	  there	  is	  no	  law	  on	  ADs;	  however,	  the	  bioethical	  community	  asks	  for	  the	   implementation	   of	   the	   English	   Mental	   Capacity	   Act	   of	   2005	   (British	   Medical	  Association	   2007).	   In	   Scotland,	   ADs	   are	   governed	   by	   the	   Adult	   with	   Incapacity	  (Scotland)	   Act	   of	   2000,	   and	   in	   Ireland	   the	   Assisted	   Decision-­‐Making	   (Capacity)	   Bill	  2013	   and	   the	   Advance	   Healthcare	   Decision	   Bill	   2012.	   Both	   these	   acts	   share	   the	  principles	  of	  the	  English	  model,	  since	  both	  focus	  on	  a	  person’s	  capacity	  and	  confer	  a	  similar	  power	  of	  control	  over	  the	  legal	  proxy’s	  activity	  to	  the	  Courts	  and	  to	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  Public	  Guardian.	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adopted	   the	   same	   political	   approach:	   assuming	   that	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   decisions	   are	  an	  individual	  matter,	  they	  have	  modified	  their	  civil	  codes.8	  	   The	   conceptualisation	  of	  dying	   is	   culturally	   located	  within	  a	  particular	  level	   of	   socio-­‐economic	   development,	   cultural	   expectations,	   and	  intergenerational	   relations	   (Grande	   et	   al.	   2009,	   Hales	   et	   al.	   2008,	   Kellehear	  2008,	   Howarth	   2007,	   and	   Seale	   1998)	   (e.g.,	   see	   Sect.	   1.2.).	   In	   addition,	   since	  the	   scope	   of	   law	   is	   the	   individuation	   of	   the	   “ethical	   minimum”,	   different	  legislator	   have	   highlighted	   different	   moral	   values.	   In	   particular,	   the	   Spanish	  law	   of	   2002	   is	   dedicated	   to	   the	   promotion	   of	   information	   in	   the	   field	   of	  health9.	   Nevertheless,	   also	   in	   Spain	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   role	   of	   physicians	  has	   been	   highlighted.	   In	   France,	   the	   previous	   law	   no.	   2005-­‐370	   of	   22	   April	  2005	   has	   been	   considered	   a	   reaction	   to	   the	   case-­‐law	   of	   Vincent	   Humbert,	   a	  tetraplegic	   patient	   who	   publically	   claimed	   the	   right	   to	   euthanasia	   (Pereira	  2007,	   and	  Dupont	   2005).	   The	   previous	   law	   of	   2005	  was	   the	   only	   law	  within	  the	   Romance-­‐,	   English-­‐	   and	   German-­‐countries	   analysed	   that	   directly	  	  	  	  	  	  8	   It	   should	  be	  noted	   that	   in	  Austria	   there	  are	   two	   laws	  governing	  ADs.	  The	   law	  of	  8	  May	  2006,	  Patientenverfügungs-­‐Gesetz	  –	  PatVG,	   regulates	   ‘living	  wills’;	   the	   law	  of	  23	  June	   2006,	   Sachwalterrechts-­‐Änderungsgesetz	   2006	   –	   SWRÄG	   2006,	   rules	   ‘der	  Bevollmächtigte’,	   the	   legal	   proxy	   nominated	   by	   the	   patient	   when	   fully	   competent.	  Only	   the	   law	   of	   23	   June	   2006	   modifies	   the	   Austrian	   Civil	   Code	   by	   introducing	   in	  articles	  284f-­‐284g	  the	  ‘Bevollmächtigte’.	  	  9	  The	  Law	  41	  of	  November	  2002	  emphasize	  the	  right	  to	  health	  information,	  informed	  consent,	  health	  documentation,	  clinical	  records	  and	  other	  clinical	  information;	  rights	  that	  were	   insufficiently	   ruled	   from	   the	   General	   Health	   Law	   of	   1986.	   (Cesáreo	   et	   al.	  2004)	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recognizes	   the	  advisory	  power	  of	  ADs	  and	   the	  only	  one	   that	  has	  modified	   its	  
Code	  de	  la	  Santé	  Publique	  (CSP,	  Public	  Health	  Code).	  This	  law	  has	  adopted	  such	  a	   paternalistic	   approach	   that	   some	   authors	   have	   compared	   the	   situation	   in	  France	  with	  that	  of	  the	  USA	  in	  the	  1990s	  (Rodríguez-­‐Arias	  2007).	  However,	  it	  must	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  new	  law	  of	  2015	  is	  much	  more	  liberal,	  although	  it	  has	  confirmed	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   physician-­‐centred	   approach	   by	   confirming	  the	   ad	   hoc	   collegial	   proceeding	   established	   in	   article	   1111-­‐4,	   section	   5	   and	  article	   1111-­‐13,	   section	   1	   and	   adding	   the	   new	   case	   in	   the	   article	   1111-­‐5-­‐1,	  section	  1	  CSP.	  The	  German	  model	  is	  of	  great	  interest	  because	  the	  law	  presupposes	  the	  legally-­‐binding	   nature	   of	   ADs,	   is	   considered	   rather	   liberal,	   and	   modifies	   the	  
Bürgerliches	  Gesetzbuch	  (BGB,	  civil	   law)	  (Wiesing	  2010).	   In	  addition,	  no	  other	  Western	   European	   legislation	   analyzed	   in	   this	   thesis	   has	   explicitly	  acknowledged	   such	   a	   strict	   decisive	   power	   of	   previously	   uttered	   verbal	  expressions.	   The	   Mental	   Capacity	   Act	   (MCA)	   of	   2005	   reflects	   the	   English	  liberal	   tradition	   –	   which	   goes	   back	   to	   the	   work	   of	   Locke	   (1690)	   and	   Mill	  (1865)	   –	   and	   protestant	   influence	   (Dickenson	   1999).	   Moreover,	   in	   England,	  the	   patient’s	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination	   is	   considered	   fundamental	   by	   the	  bioethical	   community	   (General	   Medical	   Council	   2008,	   and	   General	   Medical	  Council	  2010),	  physicians	  (Horn	  2014)	  and	  judges	  (Airedale	  NHS	  Trust	  [1993]	  2	  WLR	  816;	  Re	  B	  	  [2002]	  2	  All	  ER	  449.;	  Re	  T	  [1992]	  4	  All	  ER	  649.;	  Re	  T	  [1993]	  Fam	   95;	   Re	   C	   [1994]	   1	   All	   ER	   819;	   Re	   MB	   [1997]	   2	   FLR	   426	   (CA)).	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Furthermore,	  the	  Mental	  Capacity	  Act	  shares	  similar	  principles	  with	  the	  other	  English	  speaking	  countries;10	  principles	  that	  have	  been	  used	  as	  model	   for	  the	  new	  bill	  in	  Ireland.11	  	  	  	  	  	  10	   The	   Walsh	   Parliament	   on	   13	   March	   2007	   has	   adopted	   the	   same	   legislation	   as	  England.	   In	   Northern	   Ireland,	   there	   is	   no	   statutory	   law	   ruling	   ADs;	   however,	   the	  bioethical	  community	  asks	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  English	  Mental	  Capacity	  Act	  of	   2005.	   (British	   Medical	   Association	   2007).	   In	   Scotland,	   ADs	   are	   governed	   by	   the	  Adult	  with	   Incapacity	   (Scotland)	  Act	  of	  2000,	  which	   is	   similar	   to	   the	  English	  model.	  Both	   these	   acts	   focus	  on	   citizen’s	   capacity.	   In	   addition,	   both	   these	   acts	   recognize	   to	  the	  jurisdiction	  organ	  similar	  power	  of	  control	  regarding	  the	  legal	  proxy’s	  activity	  (in	  England:	   the	   Court	   of	   protection,	   article	   22-­‐33	   of	   the	   Mental	   Capacity	   Act;	   in	  Scotland:	   the	   power	   of	   the	   sheriff,	   article	   3	   of	   the	   Adult	  with	   Incapacity	   (Scotland)	  Act).	   Furthermore,	   in	   both	   these	   countries,	   a	   third	   party	   (in	   Scotland,	   it	   must	   be	   a	  solicitor)	   certifies	   that	   the	   person	  who	   gives	   the	   power	   of	   attorney	   and	   the	   person	  who	   accept	   this	   power	   have	   understood	   their	   roles	   and	   duties	   (in	   England:	   the	  relationship	   between	   donor-­‐donee	  must	   be	   certified	   article	   7.7.	   Code	   of	   practice	   of	  the	  Mental	  Capacity	  Act;	   in	  Scotland:	   the	  solicitor	  certifies	   the	  relationship	  between	  granter-­‐welfare	   attorney	   ex	   article	   15	   of	   the	   Adult	   with	   Incapacity	   (Scotland)	   Act).	  Moreover,	  the	  ‘surrogate	  will’	  must	  be	  registered	  at	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  Public	  Guardian	  (article	  7.14	  English	  Code	  of	  practice	  of	   the	  Mental	  Capacity	  Act;	   in	  Scotland:	  article	  23	   of	   the	   Adult	   with	   Incapacity	   (Scotland)	   Act).	   In	   both	   these	   English-­‐speaking	  countries,	   an	   independent	   organ	  with	   the	   purpose	   of	   assisting	  with	   information	   or	  advising	   legal	   proxies	   has	   been	   established	   	   (in	   England:	   the	   Independent	   Mental	  Capacity	  Advocate	   Service,	   article	  35-­‐41	  of	   the	  Mental	  Capacity	  Act.	   In	  England	   this	  body	   can	   also	   nominate	   a	   legal	   proxy	   in	   case	   that	   there	   is	   no	   AD;	   in	   Scotland:	   the	  Mental	  Health	  Commission,	  article	  9	  of	  the	  Adult	  with	  Incapacity	  (Scotland)	  Act).	  11	   In	   Ireland,	   the	   Assisted	   Decision-­‐Making	   (Capacity)	   Bill	   2013	   and	   the	   Advance	  Healthcare	  Decision	  Bill	  2012	  are	  under	  public	  discussions.	  However,	  both	  these	  bills	  are	   similar	   to	   the	   Mental	   Capacity	   Act	   2005.	   For	   instance,	   some	   similar	   principles	  between	   the	  Assisted	  Decision-­‐Making	   (Capacity)	  Bill	  2013	  and	   the	  Mental	  Capacity	  Act	  could	  be	  withdrawn.	  First	  of	  all,	  as	  in	  England,	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  bill	  is	  the	  mental	  capacity	  of	   the	  donor.	  The	   relationship	  between	   the	  person	  who	  gives	   the	  power	  of	  attorney	   and	   the	   person	   who	   accept	   this	   power	   is	   defined	   donor-­‐attorney,	   where	  attorney	  is	  called	  the	  ‘donee	  of	  an	  enduring	  power’	  (article	  38).	  Moreover,	  the	  role	  of	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   Particular	  attention	  will	  be	  given	  to	  the	  situation	  in	  Italy.	  Although,	  the	  new	  proposal-­‐bills12	  will	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration,	  the	  main	  analysis	  will	  be	  based	   on	   the	   bill	   2350	   ‘Provisions	   relating	   to	   therapeutic	   alliance,	   informed	  
consent	   and	   advance	   directives	   for	   treatments’	   from	   a	   comparative	   legal	  perspective.	  Although	  this	  bill	  has	  not	  passed	  into	  law,	  this	  act	  is	  the	  only	  bill	  which	  has	  been	  debated	  by	  the	  Italian	  deputies	  and	  senators	  in	  different	  texts	  in	  2009	  by	  the	  Senate	  and	  in	  2011	  by	  the	  Chamber	  of	  Deputies13.	  Additionally,	  none	   of	   the	   new	   proposals	   have	   been	   discussed	   by	   the	   permanent	  commissions	   of	   the	   Italian	   Parliament.	   Moreover,	   one	   of	   the	   latest	   the	  proposal	  –	  that	   from	  Ms.	  Roccella	  and	  others	  on	  26	  March	  2014	  –	  establishes	  exactly	  the	  same	  principles	  as	  the	  controversial	  bill	  of	  2009,	  amended	  in	  2011.	  	  	  	  	  	  the	   judicial	   body	   (which	   will	   be	   exercised	   by	   Circuit	   Courts	   and	   in	   some	   specific	  cases	  by	   the	  High	  Court)	   and	   the	   role	  of	   the	  Public	  Guardian	  have	  been	  underlined.	  As	  in	  England,	  the	  Court	  can	  decide	  directly	  or	  through	  an	  appointment	  of	  a	  decision-­‐making	  representative	  (article	  23;	  in	  England	  this	  person	  is	  called	  ‘deputy’	  ex-­‐article	  16	   of	   the	   Mental	   Capacity	   Act).	   Also,	   the	   role	   of	   the	   Public	   Guardian	   has	   been	  demonstrated	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   power	   of	   attorney	   must	   be	   registered	   at	   the	  Office	  of	  the	  Public	  Guardian	  (article	  43).	  12	  None	  of	  the	  five	  proposals	  from	  the	  Chamber	  of	  Deputies	  has	  yet	  been	  discussed	  by	  the	  XIIth	  Commission	  on	  Social	  Affairs.	  The	  same	  applies	  to	  the	  three	  proposals	  from	  the	   Senate,	   that	   are	   assigned	   to	   but	   not	   yet	   discussed	   by	   the	   XIIth	   Permanent	  Commission	  on	  Hygiene	  and	  Health.	  13	  The	  Italian	  Parliament	  has	  two	  chambers:	  the	  Chamber	  of	  Deputies	  and	  the	  Senate.	  	  In	   Italy,	   a	   draft	   bill	   becomes	   law	   only	   if	   the	   two	   chambers	   approve	   it	   the	   identical	  form.	  Bill	  no.	  2350	  was	  approved	  in	  two	  different	  versions	  by	  the	  Italian	  Parliament:	  in	  2009	  by	  the	  Senate	  and	  in	  2011	  by	  the	  Chamber	  of	  Deputies.	  However,	  it	  should	  be	  highlighted	   that	   constitutional	   bill	   A.S.	   3520,	   which	   is	   being	   debated	   in	   the	   Italian	  Parliament	  at	   the	   time	  of	  writing,	   aims	   to	   change	  Title	  V	  of	   the	   Italian	  Constitution,	  which	  establishes	  the	  organization	  of	  the	  Legislative	  Power.	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Furthermore,	  the	  new	  Italian	  Code	  of	  Medical	  Ethics	  of	  May	  2014	  confirms	  the	  paternalistic	   approach	   of	   bill	   2350	   (e.g.,	   see	   Sect.	   3.1.).	   In	   addition,	   the	  
Circulaire14	  of	  19	  November	  2010	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Health	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Welfare	  State	  and	  Ministry	  of	  Internal	  Affairs	  states	  that	  all	  the	  ADs	  that	  citizens	  have	  deposited	  in	  their	  Municipalities	  are	  ineffective,15	  since	  civil	   status	   and	   register	   offices	   are	   subjects	   that	   fall	   under	   the	   exclusive	  legislation	   of	   the	   State	   (article	   117,	   section	  1,	   let.	   i.	   Italian	  Constitution)	   and	  the	  State	  Parliament	  has	  not	  yet	  established	  the	  principles.	  As	  a	  result,	  all	  the	  local	  laws	  in	  Italy	  that	  govern	  ADs	  are	  null16.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  14	   The	  Circulaire	   is	   an	   internal	   act,	   used	  by	   the	   Italian	  Public	  Administration,	  which	  contains	   recommendations	   regarding	   its	   internal	   operation.	   This	   act	   produces	   legal	  effects	   only	   within	   the	   public	   administration;	   its	   legal	   effects	   cannot	   be	   applied	   to	  citizens	  or	  other	  legal	  persons	  who	  are	  not	  part	  of	  that	  organ.	  15	  According	  to	  the	  Italian	  civil	  law,	  an	  ineffective	  act	  is	  less	  than	  a	  null	  act.	  In	  case	  of	  a	  null	  act,	  the	  production	  of	  legal	  effects	  is	  null	  ex	  tunc,	  but,	  in	  case	  of	  ineffective	  act,	  the	  act	  never	  produced	  any	  legal	  effect.	  16	   The	   National	   Association	   of	   Italian	   Municipalities	   stated	   on	   21	   November	   2010	  that	  the	  Italian	  Municipalities:	  1)	  have	  collected	  the	  certification	  that	  the	  citizen	  has	  written	  an	  AD	  (without	   collecting	   the	  AD);	  and/or	  2)	  have	  collected	   the	  AD;	  and/or	  3)	   have	   established	   AD’s	   forms.	  While	   the	   second	   and	   the	   third	   activities	   could	   be	  considered	  contra	  legem	  since	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  national	  legislation,	  the	  collection	  of	  a	  certification	  where	  the	  citizen	  declares	  that	  he	  or	  she	  has	  written	  an	  AD,	  probably	  also	   by	   stating	   where	   the	   AD	   has	   been	   deposited,	   is	   legal	   since	   the	  Municipality	   is	  offering	   an	   administrative	   service	   regarding	   the	   population	   and	   the	   local	   territory.	  Precisely,	   this	   is	   a	   service	   to	   the	   individual	   and	   to	   the	   community	   established	   in	  article	   13,	   section	   1	   Legislative	   Decree	   267	   of	   18	   August	   2000.	   Moreover,	   as	   a	  reaction	  to	  this	  Circulaire,	  Italian	  Municipalities	  have	  only	  established	  the	  possibility	  to	  collect	  the	  citizens’	  certifications	  that	  they	  have	  written	  an	  AD	  (Govi	  et	  al.	  2013).	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The	   need	   to	   analyze	   different	   laws	   comes	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   several	  European	   studies	   –	   such	   as	   those	   by	   Ethicus,17	   Eureld,18	   Ethicatt,19	   and	  Prisma20	  –	  have	  shown	  the	  range	  of	  approaches	  to	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  decisions.	  These	  studies	   analyzed	   the	   questionnaires	   from	   terminally-­‐ill	   patients	   (Ethicus);	  from	   physicians	   in	   different	   specializations	   in	   which	   death	   is	   common	  (Eureld);	   from	   physicians,	   nurses,	   patients	   and	   their	   families	   (Ethicatt);	   and	  from	  the	  general	  population	  (Prisma).	  	  However,	   it	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   in	  Europe,	   a	   basic	   consensus	   on	   patient	   autonomy	   has	   been	   formulated	   in	   the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  and	  in	  the	  case-­‐law	  of	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights.	  Some	  of	  the	  most	  important	  documents	  from	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  are:	  Guide	  
on	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   regarding	   medical	   treatment	   in	   end-­‐of-­‐life	  	  	  	  	  	  17	   The	   Ethicus	   group	   analyzed	   questionnaires	   from	   patients	   in	   intensive	   care	   units	  (ICUs)	   in	   17	   European	   countries	   (Belgium,	   Czech	   Republic,	   Denmark,	   Finland,	  Germany,	   Greece,	   Ireland,	   Israel,	   the	   Netherlands,	   Portugal,	   Spain,	   Sweden,	  Switzerland,	   Turkey	   and	   the	   United	   Kingdom)	   in	   1999–2000	   (Sprung	   et	   al.	   2008,	  Sprung	  et	  al.	  2008,	  Sprung	  et	  al.	  2007,	  and	  Benbenishty	  et	  al.	  2006)	  	  18	   The	   Eureld	   group	   studied	   questionnaires	   completed	   by	   physicians	   from	  different	  specialisations	   in	   which	   death	   is	   common	   in	   six	   European	   Countries	   (Belgium,	  Denmark,	   the	   Netherlands,	   Sweden,	   and	   Switzerland)	   in	   2001–2002	   (Cohen	   et	   al.	  2008,	  Löfmark	  et	  al.	  2008,	  Buiting	  et	  al.	  2007,	  van	  Delden	  et	  al.	  2006,	  and	  Bilsen	  et	  al.	  2006).	  19	  The	  Ethicatt	   group	  examined	  questionnaires	   from	  physicians	   and	  nurses	  working	  in	   ICUs,	   patients	   who	   survived	   ICU,	   and	   their	   families	   in	   six	   European	   countries	  (Czech	  Republic,	  Israel,	  The	  Netherlands,	  Portugal,	  Sweden,	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom)	  in	  2004.	  (Bülow	  et	  al	  2012,	  Sprung	  et	  al.	  2007,	  and	  Vrakking	  et	  al.	  2007)	  	  20	   The	   Prisma	   group	   studied	   surveys	   completed	   by	   the	   population	   in	   7	   different	  European	  countries	  (England,	  Belgium,	  Germany,	  Italy,	  the	  Netherlands,	  Portugal	  and	  Spain)	  (Daveson	  2013).	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situations	   of	   May	   2014,	   Resolution	   1859	   (2012)	   of	   25	   January	   2012,	  Recommendations	   CM/Rec(2009)	   11	   of	   9	   December	   2009	   and	   R(99)4	   of	   23	  February	  1999,	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Biomedicine	  of	  April	  2007.	  The	  recent	  case-­‐law	  of	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  regarding	  right	  to	  decide	  medical	   treatments	  are:	  applications	  no.	  34806/04;	  no.	  23459/03;	  no.	  2346/02;	  and	  no.	  302/02	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  2.1.).	  	  	  	  
3.	  	   Moving	  beyond	  the	  limits	  of	  individualism	  model	  of	  autonomy:	  the	  
concept	  of	  relational	  autonomy	  The	  concept	  of	  patient	  autonomy	  was	  developed	  in	  USA	  in	  the	  late	  1960s.	  This	  concept	  was	  predominant	  not	   only	   in	  medical	   ethics,	   but	   also	   in	   other	   social	  movements,	   where	   it	   emphasised	   the	   individual’s	   right	   to	   have	   control	   over	  his/her	   body	   and	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process.	   Physicians	   paternalism,	   and	  therefore	   the	   ethical	   principle	   of	   non-­‐maleficence	   and	   beneficence,	   where	  argued.	   Doctors	   were	   not	   allowed	   anymore	   to	   withhold	   information	   from	  patients	  and	  their	  families	  or	  to	  make	  decisions	  based	  on	  their	  perspective	  of	  the	  patient	  physical	  best	   interest.	  Doctors	  were	  viewed	  not	  only	  as	  experts	  of	  medicine,	  but	  also	  as	  professionals	  obliged	  to	  provide	  to	  patients	  –	  consumer	  of	  health	  care	  services	  –	  with	  information	  regarding	  their	  health.	  	  	   Nowadays,	   almost	   half	   a	   century	   after	   the	   enhancement	   of	   patient	  autonomy,	  the	  bioethical	  community	  is	  discussing	  what	  ‘respect	  for	  autonomy’	  should	  be	  considered.	  The	  answer	  depends	  on	  which	  model	  of	  autonomy	  that	  is	   embraced.	   The	   two	  main	  models	   of	   autonomy	   are:	   the	   individualist	  model	  and	  the	  relational	  autonomy.	  	  	   	  The	   traditional	   model	   is	   characterized	   by	   prioritizing	   rational	   over	  emotional	   abilities.	   This	   theory	   is	   based	   on	   the	  writings	   of	   John	   Stuart	  Mills	  (1806–1873)	   and	   Immanuel	   Kant	   (1724–1804).	   The	   Kantian	   approach	  assumes	   the	   individual	   as	   capable	   of	   rational	   reasoning	   to	   do	   and	   to	   decide	  what	   is	  morally	  right	  (Beauchamp	  and	  Childress	  2001).	   Instead,	  Mills	  defines	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autonomy	   through	   a	   negative	   approach:	   autonomy	   is	   the	   freedom	   from	   the	  interference	   by	   others,	   including	   state	   agencies	   (Woods	   2007).	   According	   to	  scholars	   that	   apply	  an	   individualist	   approach,	   “the	  autonomous	  man	   is	  –	   and	  should	   be	   –	   self-­‐sufficient,	   independent,	   and	   self-­‐reliant,	   a	   self-­‐realizing	  individual	  who	   directs	   his	   efforts	   toward	  maximizing	   his	   personal	   gains.	   His	  independence	   is	   under	   constant	   threat	   from	   other	   (equally	   self-­‐serving)	  individuals”	  (Code	  1991).	   In	  other	  words,	   there	   is	  an	  ambivalent	  relationship	  between	  autonomy	  and	  individualism.	  	  	   The	  main	  focus	  of	  the	  individualistic	  model	  is	  the	  rejection	  of	  influence	  of	  external	  factors	  on	  the	  individual	  decision	  making	  process.	  The	  reliance	  on	  the	   opinion	   of	   others	   –	   especially,	   in	   our	   context,	   the	   physicians’	   opinion	   –	  would	  be	  considered	  highly	  suspicious	  (Degner	  1997).	  Rationality	  is	  the	  main	  factor	   of	   this	   cognitive	   approach.	   If	   the	   process	   of	   deciding	   is	   overshadowed	  by	  emotions	  –	  such	  as	  fear,	  anger,	  or	  grief	  –	  one’s	  self-­‐control	  is	  compromised.	  It	   follows	   that	   this	   individual	   is	   not	   autonomous	   anymore.	   The	   role	   of	   the	  physician	   is	   to	   give	   cognitive	   information	   without	   interfering	   with	   the	  individual’s	   decision-­‐making	   process;	   physicians	   should	   not	   give	  recommendations	   but	   only	   neutral	   information	   (Owens	   2013).	   Since	   the	  centre	   is	   in	   the	   individual	   self-­‐determination,	   the	   patient	   should	   be	   self-­‐sufficient	  and	  able	  to	  recognize	  the	  interference	  of	  others	  and	  to	  ignore	  them.	  	   The	   focus	   on	   the	   cognitive	  process	   of	   deciding	   is	   a	   direct	   result	   of	   the	  analytic	   philosophy,	   characterized	   by	   an	   emphasis	   on	   argumentative	   clarity	  and	   precision.	   Etymologically,	   the	   term	   autonomy	  means	   ‘self-­‐rule’	   in	   Greek,	  or	  the	  capacity	  of	  self-­‐determination	  and	  self-­‐government	  (Skilbeck	  and	  Payne	  2005).	   This	   approach	   has	   been	   adopted	   by	   the	   utilitarian	   and	   neoliberal	  schools	   and	   from	   the	  majority	   of	   the	  western	  European	   countries.	  According	  to	  the	  liberal	  interpretation	  of	  autonomy,	  self-­‐determination	  is	  the	  capacity	  to	  make	   decisions	   without	   the	   interference	   of	   external	   factors.	   The	  individualistic	   model	   stresses	   the	   decisional	   capacity:	   the	   reasoning	   behind	  the	   deliberative	   decision	   assumes	   a	   fundamental	   importance	   (Frankfurt	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1989).	   According	   to	   this	  model,	   the	   person	   is	   considered	   a	   ‘rational	   isolated	  thinker’.	  	  	   The	   main	   critiques	   of	   this	   model	   regard	   the	   lack	   of	   influence	   that	  external	   factors	   should	   have.	   Firstly,	   since	   the	   individualist	   model	   does	   not	  allow	   physicians	   to	   give	   personal	   recommendations	   or	   opinions,	   this	  decreases	   the	   patient’s	   trust	   in	   the	   physician	   role	   by	   contributing	   negatively	  to	   the	  ability	   to	   fully	  exercise	  his/her	  autonomy	   (Owens	  2015,	  and	  Entwistle	  2010).	   Secondly,	   the	   traditional	  model	   is	   insensitive	   to	   the	   diverse	   personal	  and	   circumstantial	   differences,	   which	   shape	   the	   patient’s	   decision.	   Several	  studies	   have	   shown	   that	   decisions	   depend	   on	   several	   factors,	   such	   as	   age	  (Gomes	   2011),	   gender	   (Biggs	   	   1998),	   ethnicity	   (Venkatasalu	   et	   al.	   2011,	   and	  Worth	  et	  al.	  2009),	   culture	   (Howarth	  2007),	   availability	  of	   careers	   (Lavoie	  et	  al.	   	   2011),	   family	   dynamism	   (structure	   and	   relationships)	   (Broom	   and	   Kirby	  2013),	  interpersonal	  relationships	  (Rini	  et	  al.	  2011,	  Corrigan	  2004,	  and	  Lewis	  and	  Rook	   1999),	   and	   complexity	   of	   the	   disease	   (Thomas	   et	   al.	   2004).	   A	   neo-­‐liberal	  approach	  to	  autonomy	  fails	  to	  recognize	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  decision	  (Wilson	   et	   al.	   2014).	   Thirdly,	   it	   is	   quite	   difficult	   to	   apply	   the	   individualist	  model	   in	  concrete	  medical	  situations.	  The	  patients’	  capacity	  could	  be	  damage	  when	   they	   undergo	   surgery	   or	   faze	   disability.	   It	   is	   common	   that	   during	  therapy,	   patients	   are	   inconsistent.	   They	   might	   change	   their	   decisions	  according	   to	   the	   prognosis,	  which	  modifies	   their	   prospective	   regarding	  what	  they	  want	   for	   themself.	  Moreover,	   this	  model	  does	  not	  provide	   the	  resources	  to	  evaluate	  the	  ethics	  of	  risky	  patient	  choices	  (Hunt	  and	  Ells	  2011).	  Fourthly,	  the	   reality	  of	  people’s	   lives	   is	  one	  of	   interdependency	   (Zelderloo	  2009).	  This	  leads	   to	   the	   question:	   how	   can	   physicians	   evaluate	   the	   patient’s	   decision	  without	  taking	  into	  consideration	  the	  external	  factors	  that	  shape	  the	  patient’s	  decision	  making	  process?	  	   In	   the	   1980s,	   feminist	   bioethical	   scholars	   started	   to	   question	   the	  individualist	  approach	  of	  autonomy.	  The	  gender	  difference	  emphasises	  certain	  aspects	   of	   moral	   knowledge,	   which	   has	   led	   to	   the	   development	   of	   ethics	   of	  care.	  Autonomy	  was	  seen	  not	  as	  an	  individualist	  moral	  norm	  but	  as	  relational	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autonomy,	   which	   is	   premised	   on	   the	   shared	   conviction	   that	   persons	   are	  socially	   embedded	   and	   that	   their	   identities	   is	   formed	   within	   the	   context	   of	  social	   relationships	   (Mackenzie	   and	   Stoljar	   2000).	   In	   this	   approach,	   social	  relationships	   are	   considered	   fundamental.	   While	   the	   individualist	   model	  considered	   the	   person	   as	   an	   isolated	   island,	   the	   concept	   of	   relational	  autonomy	  highlights	   the	  social	  network	  and	   the	   influence	  of	  external	   factors.	  Social	  relationships	  are	  so	  important	  that	  a	  person	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  ‘second	  person’	  (Baier	   1985).	   Several	   scholars	   have	   distinguished	   these	   two	   types	   of	  autonomy	   also	   as	   internalist,	   focusing	   only	   on	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process,	  and	  externalist,	  which	  considers	  also	  the	  external	  circumstances,	  in	  particular	  the	   social	   relationships.	   Therefore,	   these	   are	   the	   individualistic	   and	   the	  relational	  models	  (Shakespeare	  2015,	  Ashley	  2013,	  and	  Oshana	  2006).	  	   Relational	   autonomy	   is	   an	   ‘umbrella’	   term,	   which	   seeks	   to	   clarify	  personal	   autonomy	   in	   a	   method	   that	   highlights	   the	   role	   of	   cultural	   and	  economic	   factors,	   and	   especially	   the	   role	   of	   social	   relations	   (Mackenzie	   and	  Stoljar	   2000).	   This	   model	   considers	   identity	   and	   interest	   as	   dynamic	   and	  continuously	  shaped	  by	  relationships	  with	  other	  people.	  In	  addition,	  emotions	  are	   not	   undervalued	   and	   the	   dialogue	   with	   the	   physician	   is	   stressed	   as	   the	  only	   way	   to	   allow	   autonomy	   to	   fully	   flourish.	   Through	   the	   relational	  model,	  autonomy	   can	   be	   supported	   on	   a	   broader	   level,	   where	   interpersonal	   and	  external	  factors	  are	  highlighted	  (Biggs	  1998).	  	  	   While	   the	   individualist	   model	   will	   consider	   as	   non-­‐autonomous	   the	  person	  who	  relies	  on	  the	  opinions	  of	  others,	  with	  the	  relational	  model	  it	  is	  not	  unreasonable	   for	   a	  patient	   to	  defer	  his/her	  decision	   to	   another	  person.	  With	  the	  new	  model	  of	  autonomy,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  legal	  proxy	  –	  especially	  that	  of	  the	  surrogate	   –	   is	   accentuated:	   family	   members,	   physicians,	   relatives	   or	   other	  interested	  parties	  have	  the	  moral	  obligation	  to	  co-­‐operate	  to	  help	  the	  patient	  in	   the	   difficult	   decisions	   regarding	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   situations.	   The	   importance	   of	  emotions	   in	   general	   –	   not	   only	   empathy	   –	   is	   crucial,	   especially	   in	   palliative	  care	  (Walter	  2014).	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   In	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   decisions,	   patient-­‐physician	   trust	   and	   dialogue	   are	  fundamental.	  Therefore,	  the	  influence	  coming	  from	  this	  relationship	  should	  be	  considered	   as	   well	   as	   the	   mental	   capacity	   of	   the	   patient.	   People	   behave	  differently	   with	   different	   people;	   several	   case-­‐laws	   have	   demonstrated	   that	  while	  some	  assessors	  have	  considered	  a	  person	  incapable	  –	  since	  there	  was	  a	  lack	   of	   co-­‐operation	   –	   others	   have	   considered	   the	   same	   person	   capable	   to	  decide	  (Wandsworth	  Clinical	  Commissioning	  Group	  [2014]	  EWHC	  990	  (COP);	  Re	   JB	   [2014]	   EWHC	   342	   (COP)).	   The	   relational	   approach	   to	   autonomy	  stimulates	   the	   patient-­‐physician	   partnership.	   Doctors	   will	   share	   all	   the	  information	  with	  the	  patient	  (and	  his/her	  family	  and/or	  relatives)	  and	  spend	  more	  time	  with	  the	  patient.	  This	  approach	  leads	  to	  an	  enhancement	  of	  patient	  autonomy	   (Hunt	   and	   Ells	   2011).	   Obviously,	   it	   entails	   administrative	   and	  economic	  problems	  because	  hospitals	  might	  not	  have	  budgets	  to	  support	  this	  policy.	  	  	   In	   the	   last	   decades,	   several	   scholars	   have	   emphasized	   the	   concept	   of	  relational	   autonomy.	   In	   addition,	   in	   November	   1998,	   twenty-­‐two	   partners	   –	  coming	  mainly	   from	   the	  Romance-­‐speaking	   countries	   –	   signed	   the	  Barcelona	  Declaration	   (policy	  proposals)21.	   Its	   significance	   is	  based	  on	   the	   fact	   that	   this	  document	   is	   a	   philosophical	   and	   political	   agreement	   between	   experts	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  21	   The	   Barcelona	   Declaration	   was	   the	   result	   of	   three	   years	   and	   four	   big	   meetings	  (Copenhagen,	  Sheffield,	  Utrecht,	  and	  Barcelona)	  between	  the	  partners.	  Its	  aim	  was	  to	  stimulate	   the	  public	  debate	  on	   some	  of	   the	  most	   conflict-­‐prone	  questions	   regarding	  within	   Europe	   (and	   not	  within	   E.U.).	   It	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   the	   public	   debate	  was	  acknowledged	  also	  in	  the	  Convention	  of	  Oviedo	  of	  April	  1997.	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bioethics	   and	   bio-­‐law	   from	   many	   different	   countries,	   making	   a	   conceptual	  clarification	  and	  articulation	  of	  major	  ethical	  principles	  (Kemp	  and	  Rendtorff	  2008).	  This	  Declaration	  states	   that	   the	  main	  ethical	  principles	  are	  autonomy,	  dignity,	   integrity,	   and	   vulnerability22.	   The	   combination	   of	   autonomy	   and	  integrity	   leads	   to	   the	   enforcement	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   relational	   autonomy.	  While	  autonomy	  remains	  an	   ideal	  because	  of	   its	   structural	   limitations	  due	   to	  human	  weakness	   and	   dependency	   on	   external	   factors	   or	   lack	   of	   information	  (Rendtorff	   	   2002),	   integrity	   –	  understood	   as	   inviolability	   of	   the	  human	  being	  under	   a	   narrative	   approach	   (e.g.,	   see	   Sect.	   1.4.1.)	   –	   is	   the	   most	   important	  principle	   for	   the	   creation	   of	   patient-­‐physician	   trust,	   because	   it	   requires	  physicians	   to	   listen	   the	   life	   story	   of	   their	   patients	   (Kemp	   et	   al.	   2000).	  Moreover,	  these	  basic	  principles	  are	  promoted	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  solidarity	  and	   responsibility	   (Kemp	   and	   Rendtorff	   2008);	   therefore,	   the	   dialogue	  between	  parties	  is	  essential.	  	  	  	   It	  should	  be	  stressed	  that	   the	  concept	  of	  relational	  autonomy	  has	  been	  interpreted	   in	   several	   different	  ways.	  Nevertheless,	   all	   scholars	   agree	   on	   the	  causal	   role	   that	   the	   personal	   and	   environmental	   circumstances	   might	   have	  upon	   their	   deliberative	   capacity	   of	   a	   person.	   The	   two	   main	   current	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Autonomy	  should	  not	  only	  be	   interpreted	   in	   the	   liberal	   sense	  of	   “permission”	  but	  instead	   as	   a	   set	   of	   five	   different	   capacities	   (principle	   1).	   Dignity	   should	   not	   be	  reduced	   to	   autonomy	   (principle	   2)	   (Knoppers	   1991).	   Integrity	   accounts	   for	   the	  inviolability	   of	   the	   human	   being	   (principle	   3).	   Vulnerability	   concerns	   integrity	   as	   a	  basic	   principle	   for	   respect	   for	   and	   for	   the	   protection	   of	   human	   and	   non-­‐human	   life	  (principle	  4).	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relational	   autonomy	   are:	   procedural	   relational	   autonomy	   and	   substantive	  
relational	  autonomy.	  Procedural	  relational	  autonomy	  considers	  autonomy	  as	  a	  psychological	   process.	   This	   is	   similar	   to	   the	   individualist	   approach.	  Nevertheless,	   it	  differs	   from	   it	  by	  acknowledging	   that	   a	  person’s	  deliberative	  process	   will	   be	   subject	   to	   external	   factors	   such	   as	   social	   relationships	   and	  socialization	   (Ben-­‐Ishai	   2012).	   The	   substantive	   relational	   autonomy	   looks	  beyond	   the	   deliberative	   process	   of	   decision-­‐making	   (Oshana	   2006),	   by	  considering	  the	  broader	  concept	  of	  acting.	  Therefore,	  there	  is	  a	  shift:	  from	  the	  process	   of	   deciding	   to	   the	   broader	   concept	   of	   acting.	   While	   the	   first	   model	  considers	   a	   decision	   a	   mental	   process,	   the	   substantive	   relational	   autonomy	  sees	  it	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  person’s	  interaction	  with	  the	  social	  conditions	  needed	  to	  pursue	  the	  goal.	  	   Probably	   the	  best	   example	   to	  understand	   this	   difference	   is	   the	   case	   of	  an	   elderly	   person	   living	   alone	   at	   an	   isolated	   home	   from	   health	   care	   system	  making	   a	   decision	   about	   whether	   to	   accept	   more	   accessible	   and	   better	  serviced	   accommodation.	   According	   to	   the	   procedural	   relational	   autonomy	  based	   on	   the	   process	   of	   deliberation	   the	   decision	   of	   this	   person	   is	  autonomous.	   However,	   based	   on	   the	   substantive	   relational	   autonomy	  model,	  where	  the	  social	  environment	  is	  fundamental	  and	  takes	  into	  consideration	  the	  all	   acting,	   his/her	   decision	   could	   be	   not	   autonomous.	   This	   depends	   on	   how	  much	   the	   absence	   of	   these	   accommodations	   has	   influenced	   this	   person.	  Linking	  the	  evaluation	  of	  autonomy	  with	  external	  factors	  –	  material	  or	  social	  –	  leads	   to	   the	   question:	   what	   opportunities	   in	   particular	   are	   important	   for	  granting	  agents	  autonomous	  action?	  	   One	   of	   the	   most	   important	   theories	   that	   include	   the	   main	   part	   of	   the	  substantive	  relational	  autonomy	  model	   is	   the	  concept	  of	   ‘capability	  approach	  of	   autonomy’,	   developed	   initially	   by	   Amartya	   Sen	   and	   then	   by	   Martha	  Nussbaum.	   The	   capabilities	   approach	   perceives	   a	   person’s	   capacity	   for	  autonomous	   action	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   capability	   he/she	   has	   to	   achieve	   certain	  states	   that	   they	   recognize	   to	   be	   valuable.	   According	   to	   Sen,	   the	   decision	  depends	   on	   the	   person’s	   capability	   to	   do	   and	   become	   the	   objects	   of	   his/her	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choosing	   through	   the	   conversion	   of	   potential	   capabilities	   into	   actual	  
functionings	   (Sen	   1985).	   This	   view	   is	   shared	   by	   Martha	   Nussbaum	   too	  (Nussbaum	  2000).	  In	  addition	  to	  that,	  she	  stated	  a	  list	  of	  basic	  capabilities	  and	  essential	   functionings	   that	   a	   person	   must	   have	   access	   to	   if	   he/she	   is	   to	   be	  autonomous	   in	   any	   meaningful	   sense.	   One	   of	   them	   is	   the	   ‘capability	   to	   be	  healthy’.	   Being	   healthy	   is	   not	   something	   that	   people	  may	   simply	  want	   but	   a	  precondition	   needed	   by	   citizens	   to	   be	   able	   to	   live	   a	   flourishing	   and	  autonomous	   life	   (Prah	   Ruger	   2010).	   This	   is	   why	   health	   is	   considered	   a	  constitutional	  right	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  2.2.).	  	   Concluding,	   the	   relational	   autonomy	   model	   was	   developed	   by	   the	  feminist	   bioethical	   scholars	   in	   the	   early	   1980s.	   According	   to	   the	   relational	  approach	   to	   autonomy,	   autonomy	   is	   premised	   on	   the	   shared	   conviction	   that	  persons	   are	   socially	   embedded	   and	   that	   their	   identity	   is	   formed	   within	   the	  context	  of	  social	  relationships.	  	   	  
4.	  	   The	  significance	  of	  advance	  directives	  ADs	  should	  be	  considered	  as	  medical	  statements,	  which	  based	  on	  the	  principle	  of	   prospective	   autonomy,	   give	   instructions	   for	   future	  medical	   care	   (De	   Boer	  2010).	  These	  declarations	  are	  executive	  only	  in	  the	  event	  of	  future	  incapacity.	  	  	   With	   the	   recognition	   of	   the	   importance	   of	   ADs,	   a	   patient’s	   position	  evolves	  from	  a	  passive	  role	  of	  personal,	  physical,	  and	  mental	  protection	  to	  an	  active	   role	   of	   freedom	   and	   quality	   of	   life.	   However,	   within	   the	   bioethical	  community	  there	  is	  no	  unique	  definition	  of	  quality	  of	  life.	  Some	  scholars	  think	  that	   this	   concept	   should	   be	   defined	   objectively	   by	   focusing	   on	   the	   physical	  ability	   of	   the	   individual	   to	   function	   within	   the	   society	   (Hunt	   1986);	   others	  argue	   that	   this	   concept	   is	   subjective,	   centered	   on	   personal	   life	   satisfaction	  (Albrecht	   and	   Devlieger	   1999);	   yet	   other	   scholars	   try	   to	   combine	   these	  approaches	  (Shumaker	  and	  Berzon	  1995).	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   Patients	   can	   choose	   between	   several	   medical	   treatments	   or	   they	   can	  refuse	  them.	  The	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  is	  not	  limited,	  because	  in	  the	  legal	  system	  no	   law	   imposes	   a	   duty	   to	   live	   (C.	   Cass.	   16	  October	   2007,	   no.	   21748).	  Therefore,	   there	   is	   no	   physician’s	   “right	   to	   care”	   (C.	   Cass.	   30	   July	   2004	   no.	  14638).	   The	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination	   can	   be	   compromised	   only	   in	   cases	  where	   a	   public	   intervention	   aims	   to	   protect	   others’	   health	   and	   does	   not	  damage,	  but	  improves	  patient’s	  health	  (C.	  Cost.	  22	  June	  1990,	  no.	  307;	  C.	  Cost.,	  23	  June	  1994,	  no.	  258;	  C.	  Cost.,	  18	  April	  1998,	  no.	  118).	  	  	   The	   acknowledgement	   of	   patients’	   values	   and	   preferences	   is	  fundamental.	   This	   could	   be	   achieved	   with	   a	   process	   of	   only	   four	   steps:	  understanding,	   appreciation,	   reasoning	   and	   communicating	   a	   choice	   (Karel	  2007).	   23	   It	   is	   fundamental	   that	   the	   agents	   comprehend	   diagnostic	   and	  treatment-­‐related	  information	  (understanding).	  After	  understanding	  the	  risks	  and	  benefits	  of	  a	  particular	  medical	   treatment,	  patients	  must	  have	   the	  ability	  to	  relate	  them	  to	  their	  own	  future	  eventual	  particular	  situation	  (appreciation)	  by	   comparing	   alternative	   treatments	   in	   a	   logically	   consistent	   manner	  (reasoning).	   At	   the	   end,	   they	   should	   convey	   a	   treatment	   choice	  (communicating	  a	  choice).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  23	  The	  same	  proceeding	  has	  been	  established	  also	  in	  the	  Guide	  on	  the	  decision-­‐making	  
process	  regarding	  medical	  treatment	  in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  situations,	  2014,	  p.	  16-­‐17.	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  2.1.3.)	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4.1.	  	   The	  main	  critiques	  regarding	  the	  recognition	  of	  advance	  directives	  The	  main	  critiques	  of	  the	  recognition	  of	  ADs	  are:	  life	  has	  an	  intrinsic	  value	  (or	  there	   is	   a	   principle	   of	   sanctity	   of	   life);	   they	   distort	   the	   patient–physician	  relationship;	  and	  they	  misunderstand	  the	  social	  role	  of	  physicians.	  In	  addition,	  specific	  criticisms	  have	  been	  made	  of	  ADs	  that	  nominate	  a	  surrogate.	  	   Some	   bioethicists	   claim	   that	   life	   has	   an	   intrinsic	   value.	   Catholic	  bioethicists	  would	  state	  that	  ADs	  infringe	  the	  principle	  of	  the	  sanctity	  of	  life.	  It	  should	   be	   pointed	   out	   that	   the	   concept	   of	   ‘sanctity	   of	   life’	   has	   a	   religious	  connotation	   that	   should	   not	   be	   used	   by	   a	   secular	   state	   (Brock	   2009).	   One	  objection	  derived	  from	  this	  principle	  is	  that	  if	  patients	  have	  the	  right	  to	  decide	  about	  their	  end-­‐of-­‐life,	  life	  will	  be	  less	  valued.	  Sick	  people	  could	  be	  considered	  less	  important	  than	  healthy	  citizens	  (Spoto	  2011).	  People	  with	  disabilities	  and	  old	  patients	  without	  families	  could	  ask	  for	  treatment	  to	  be	  withdrawn	  because	  they	  do	  not	  have	  families	  or	  relatives	  to	  take	  care	  of	  them.	  	  	  	   The	  second	  main	  criticism	  focuses	  on	  the	  patient–physician	  dialogue.	  A	  competent	  patient	  can	  make	  a	  decision	  and	  can	  reconsider	  it	  after	  taking	  into	  account	   physicians’	   advice.	   However,	   an	   incapacitated	   patient	   cannot	   revise	  his/her	   medical	   declarations.	   Furthermore,	   if	   ADs	   are	   general	   or	   vague	   or	  include	  only	  specific	   treatments	   that	  cannot	  be	  applied	  by	  analogy	   to	  a	  given	  medical	   situation,	   there	   will	   be	   difficulties	   in	   interpreting	   patients’	   wishes	  (Teno	  et	  al.	  1998).	  	  	   Physicians’	   social	   role	   could	   be	   considered	   as	   professionals	  who	  want	  to	   keep	   their	   patients	   alive,	   even	   through	   aggressive	   treatment.	   Physicians’	  perceptions	  of	  patients	  who	  could	  have	  written	  ADs,	  but	  did	  not,	  could	  be	  that	  these	   patients	   want	   to	   undergo	   aggressive	   treatment,	   or	   that	   these	   patients	  	  “did	  not	  want	  treatment	  withheld	  under	  any	  circumstances”	  (Kelly	  2006).	  	   Moreover,	   in	   every	   case	   where	   a	   decision	   should	   be	   made	   by	   a	  surrogate,	  proxy	  decisions	  entail	  several	  specific	  problems.	  Patients’	  decisions	  change	   over	   time,	   so	   it	   may	   be	   quite	   difficult	   for	   surrogates	   to	   understand	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patients’	  values	   (Witting	  2008).	  As	   it	  was	  mentioned	   in	  Chap.	  1,	  according	   to	  some	  philosophers,	  such	  as	  Derek	  Parfit	  (1984)	  and	  others	  (Wolf	  et	  al.	  1991),	  personal	   identity	   is	   discontinuous	   over	   time	   and	   place.	   When	   the	   grade	   of	  psychological	   continuity	   falls	   below	   a	   certain	   minimum	   level,	   a	   person’s	  identity	   is	   disrupted,	   and	  we	   can	  no	   longer	   speak	  of	   the	   same	  person	   (Parfit	  1985).	   This	   is	   emphasized	   in	   cases	   of	   patients	   with	   dementia,	   where	   as	   a	  result	  of	  the	  progress	  of	  dementia,	  one	  body	  can	  house	  successive	  selves.	  	  	   In	  addition,	  empirical	  studies	  have	  shown	  that	  some	  surrogates	  –	  due	  to	  clinically	   diagnosed	   conditions,	   such	   as	   stress,	   depression,	   and	   anxiety	   –	   can	  lose	   their	   capacity	   (Siegel	   2008).	   Additionally,	   sometimes	   “some	   may	   have	  dubious	   motives	   in	   that	   they	   are	   looking	   out	   for	   their	   own	   interests	   rather	  than	  the	  patient’s	  interests”	  (Pope	  2012).	  	  	   Although	  these	  problems	  exist,	   it	  should	  be	  suggested	  that	  the	  benefits	  of	  ADs	  still	  outweigh	  the	  risks.	  Further,	  in	  case	  of	  incapacity,	  ADs	  can	  create	  a	  bridge	   between	   patients	   and	   physicians	   (Italian	   Bioethical	   Committee	   2003,	  British	   Medical	   Association	   1995).	   Moreover,	   ADs	   –	   especially	   if	   were	  expressed	   through	   an	   intensive	   dialogue	   with	   doctors	   –	   enhance	   patient’s	  autonomy	  (Hunt	  2001).	  In	  addition,	  only	  the	  recognition	  of	  ADs	  will	  lead	  to	  the	  equal	   treatment	   of	   competent	   and	   incompetent	   patients,	   which	   entails	   an	  application	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  equity.	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5.	  	   The	  two	  forms	  of	  advance	  directives	  Patients	   can	   express	   their	   medical	   declaration	   (basically)24	   in	   two	   different	  forms,	   which	   are	   not	   necessarily	   mutually	   exclusive	   and	   could	   be	  complementary25.	   In	   addition,	   it	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   from	   a	   medico-­‐legal	  prospective,	   these	   types	   of	   ADs	   should	   be	   complementary	  (Bundesärztekammer	   2013,	   President’s	   Commission	   for	   the	   Study	   of	   Ethical	  Problems	  in	  Medicine	  and	  Biomedical	  and	  Behavioral	  Research	  1983).	  
	  	  	  	  	  24	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  the	  various	  types	  of	  AD,	  from	  declarations	  with	  legally	  binding	  power	  (advance	  directives)	  to	  advisory	  opinion,	  where	  wishes	  are	  expressed	  and	   do	   not	   aim	   to	   modify	   other’s	   actions	   (advance	   statements);	   from	   opt-­‐in	  directives	   that	   are	   irrevocable	   (Ulysses	   contract)	   –	   existing	   in	   Scandinavian	  countries	   for	   some	   types	   of	  mental	   disorders	   such	   as	   psychotic	   depression,	   bipolar	  disorder,	  recurrent	  mania	  –	  to	  opt-­‐out	  directives	  that	  are	  always	  revocable	  when	  the	  agent	   is	   of	   sound	   mind	   (living	   wills	   under	   English	   law);	   from	   declarations	   that	  pertain	  only	  to	  medical	  treatments	  (advance	  directives,	  advance	  statements,	  advance	  agreements,	  Ulysses	  contracts)	  to	  declarations	  that	  also	  apply	  to	  other	  issues	  such	  as	  leisure	   activities,	   sleeping	   habits,	   food,	   smoking,	   religious	   activities	   and	   so	   forth	  (advance	   directives	   in	   mental	   health).	   Lastly,	   we	   should	   note	   the	   cases	   of	   advance	  agreements	   and	   Nexum	   contracts,	   where	   patient–physician	   communication	   is	  highlighted,	   and	   there	   is	   an	   agreement	   between	   these	   two	   agents	   that	   in	   case	   of	   a	  Nexum	  contract	  works	  basically	  as	  a	  contract	  (Atkinson	  2007).	  25	  The	  clearest	  distinction	  between	  ‘living	  will’	  and	  nomination	  of	  a	  legal	  proxy	  in	  the	  Portuguese	  law	  no.	  25	  of	  16	  July	  2012	  and	  from	  the	  legal	  situation	  in	  Austria,	  where	  ‘living	  wills’	  and	  the	  nomination	  of	  a	   legal	  proxy	  are	  governed	  by	  two	  different	   laws	  (law	  no.	  55	  of	  8	  May	  2006	  and	  law	  92	  of	  23	  June	  2006).	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   The	  first	  type	  of	  AD	  is	  the	  so-­‐called	  living	  will26.	  The	  term	  “living	  will”	  is	  confusing	  for	  people	  because	  wills	  take	  effect	  only	  after	  an	  agent’s	  death,	  and	  are	   directed	   to	   other	   people	   (Spoto	   2011).	   ADs	   are	   intended	   to	   conform	   a	  physician’s	  acts	  to	  a	   living	  patient’s	  wishes.	  To	  avoid	  this	  confusion,	   it	  should	  be	  better	  to	  use	  the	  term	  instructional	  directives	  or	  treatment	  directives.	  These	  documents	   are	  written	   expressions	   of	   agents’	   preferences	   regarding	   specific	  medical	  treatments	  that	  they	  want	  (to	  consent	  to	  or)	  to	  reject	  in	  case	  of	  future	  incapacity.	   It	   is	   thought	   that	   their	   origin	   could	   be	   the	   “Do	   Not	   Resuscitate”	  orders	  that	  physicians	  used	  to	  write	  in	  patients’	  case	  histories	  after	  discussing	  it	  with	  them	  and	  their	  families	  (Rabkin	  1976).	  Therefore,	   in	  this	  thesis,	   living	  will	  should	  be	  considered	  as	  the	  document	  in	  which	  the	  writer27	  expresses	  his	  or	  her	  preferences	  regarding	  specific	  medical	  treatments	  that	  he	  or	  she	  wants	  to	  consent	  to	  or	  to	  reject	  in	  the	  case	  of	  absence	  of	  future	  capacity.	  	  	  	  	  	  26	   It	   should	  be	  noted	   that	   in	   Sect.	   2.1.2.,	   it	   has	  been	  applied	  a	  different	  definition	  of	  advance	   directives.	   While	   in	   this	   thesis	   the	   meaning	   of	   advance	   directives	   has	   a	  broader	  sense,	   in	  the	  section	  regarding	  the	  study	  of	  the	  Recommendation	  (2009)	  11	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  the	  term	  of	  advance	  directives	  has	  been	  used	  in	  the	  narrow	  sense.	   It	   has	   been	   applied	   this	   methodology	   because	   within	   the	   provision	   of	   the	  Recommendation	   (2009)	   11	   the	   definition	   given	   to	   advance	   directives	   is	   similar	   to	  the	   definition	   that	   it	   has	   been	   given	   to	   ‘living	   wills’,	   one	   of	   the	   two	   main	   types	   of	  advance	  directives.	  27	   Some	  national	   rules	  use	   specific	   legal	  notions	   to	  define	   the	  person	  who	  writes	  an	  AD.	  For	  example,	  in	  England	  and	  in	  the	  Irish	  bill	  the	  term	  ‘donor’	  is	  used	  (article	  9	  of	  the	   Mental	   Capacity	   Act	   of	   2005	   and	   article	   38	   of	   the	   Assisted	   Decision-­‐making	  (Capacity)	   Bill	   2013);	   in	   Spain,	   ‘ortogante’	   (article	   11	   Law	   no.	   41	   of	   14	   November	  2002;	  official	  translation:	   ‘executor’);	  and	  in	  Scotland,	  the	   ‘granter’	  (article	  16	  of	  the	  Adults	  with	  Incapacity	  (Scotland)	  Act	  2000).	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   It	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   in	   case	   of	   clear	   instructional	   directives	   that	  correspond	   perfectly	   in	   concrete	  medical	   situation,	   they	   should	   always	   have	  more	   weight	   in	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   (Council	   of	   Europe	   2014)	   28.	  These	   could	   be	   the	   cases	   of	   chronic	   illnesses	   or	   neurodegenerative	   diseases	  effecting	   cognitive	   faculties.	   In	   these	   cases,	   the	   patient	   has	   received	   all	  medical	   and	   legal	   information	   regarding	   his	   future	   (probable)	   incapacity;	  unfortunately,	  these	  are	  rare	  cases	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  1.4.1.).	  	  	   The	   second	   type	   of	   ADs,	   the	   so-­‐called	   surrogate	   directive,	   is	   a	  written	  document,	   which	   appoints	   a	   surrogate29.	   The	   surrogate	   has	   the	   authority	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  28	   However,	   there	   exist	   some	   cases	   that	   even	   when	   clear	   future	   medical	   directives	  exit,	   the	   Court	   has	   decided	   to	   nominate	   a	   legal	   proxy	   to	   interpret	   them.	   One	   of	   the	  most	  famous	  case	  decisions	  is	  the	  German	  case-­‐law	  Bundesverfassungsgericht:	  2001,	  BVerfG	  NJW	  2002,	  206	  =	  1	  BvR	  618/93,	  2	  August	  2001	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  1.4.1.)	  29	  Some	  of	   the	  phrases	  used	   to	   indicate	   this	   legal	  proxy	  are:	   in	  France,	   ‘personne	  de	  confiance’	   (article	   1111-­‐6	   French	   Public	   Health	   Code;	   official	   translation:	   ‘patient’s	  personal	  advocate’);	  in	  Germany,	  ‘Bevollmächtigte’	  (article	  1901a	  German	  Civil	  Code;	  official	  translation:	   is	   ‘authorised	  representatives’);	   in	  Ireland,	  the	   ‘attorney’	  (article	  38	  Assisted	  Decision-­‐making	   (Capacity)	  Bill	  2013);	   in	  England,	   the	   ‘donee	  of	   lasting	  power	  of	  attorney	  for	  donor’s	  personal	  welfare’	  (article	  9	  of	  the	  Mental	  Capacity	  Act	  of	   2005);	   in	   Scotland	   ‘welfare	   attorney’	   (article	   16	   of	   the	   Adults	   with	   Incapacity	  (Scotland)	   Act	   2000);	   and	   in	   Spain,	   ‘representative’	   (article	   11	   Law	   no.	   41	   of	   14	  November	  2002;	  official	   translation:	   ‘representative’).	   In	   the	  other	  countries,	  where	  we	   did	   not	   find	   an	   official	   translation,	   the	   legal	   notion	   used	   to	   indicate	   this	   legal	  proxy	   are:	   ‘Bevollmächtigte’	   in	   Austria	   (article	   284f	   ABGB);	   ‘fiduciario’	   in	   Italy;	  ‘procurador	   de	   cuidano	   de	   saùde’	   in	   Portugal;	   and	   ‘Vertrauensperson’	   or	  ‘Vorsorgebeauftragter’	   in	   Switzerland	   (article	   378	   ZGB).	   In	   Switzerland,	   the	  surrogate	  could	  be	  nominated	  also	  from	  ‘Vorsorgeauftrag’	  (Precautionary	  Mandate);	  in	   this	   case	   the	   surrogate	   has	   the	   power	   to	   manage	   even	   the	   patient’s	   property.	   A	  surrogate	  nominated	  in	  the	  ‘Vorsorgeauftrag’	  must	  take	  decisions	  about	  the	  patient’s	  health	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  surrogate	  nominated	  in	  the	  ‘Patientenverfügung’.	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make	   health	   care	   decisions	   on	   the	   agent’s	   behalf	   once	   the	   agent	   is	   declared	  incapable.	   The	   surrogate	   is	   an	   “extension”	   of	   the	   patient’s	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination	   (Buchanan	   and	  Brock	  1990).	   Thus,	   the	   patient’	   representative	  must	   suppress	   his	   own	   judgment	   in	   favor	   of	   ‘channeling’	   what	   the	   patients	  would	   have	   done	   (Frolik	   2007-­‐2008).	   The	   surrogate	  must	  make	   the	  medical	  choice	   that	   the	   patient	  would	   have	  made	   if	   he	   or	   she	   had	   been	   capable;	   the	  surrogate	  must	  not	  make	  the	  decision	  for	  himself	  or	  herself.	  Therefore,	  in	  this	  thesis,	  the	  ‘surrogate	  will’	  has	  been	  defined	  as	  the	  document	  that	  nominates	  a	  legal	  proxy	  who	  has	  the	  power	  to	  make	  health	  care	  decisions	  on	  the	  patient’s	  behalf	  once	  he	  or	  she	  lacks	  capacity.	  	  The	   majority	   of	   the	   bioethicists	   agree	   that,	   in	   case	   of	   a	   patient’s	  incapacity,	  medical	  decisions	  at	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  must	  be	  made	  according	  to	  the	  so-­‐called	   three-­‐step	   hierarchy	   in	   the	   following	   order:	   1)	   patient’s	   wishes,	   2)	  substitute	  judgments	  and	  only	  at	  the	  end	  3)	  patient’s	  best	  interest	  (Buchanan	  and	   Brock	   1990).	   In	   the	   first	   case,	   patients	   communicate	   with	   physicians	  through	  instructions	   in	  ADs.	   In	  cases	  of	  medical	   instructions	  that	   fit	  perfectly	  in	   that	   specific	   situation,	   the	   role	   of	   surrogates	   is	   considered	   as	   a	   “mere”	  reporter	  (Braun	  et	  al.	  2009).	  Unfortunately,	   these	  are	  rare	  cases	  because	   it	   is	  quite	   impossible	   for	   people	   without	   a	   medical	   background	   to	   predict	   the	  evolution	   of	   all	   diseases	   and	   to	   establish	   in	   advance	   specific	   medical	  treatments.	   However,	   nowadays,	   this	   hierarchy	   is	   not	   always	   so	   clear30.	  	  	  	  	  	  30	   For	   instance,	   the	   German	   case-­‐law	   BVerfG	   NJW	   2002,	   206	   =	   1	   BvR	   618/93,	   2	  August	   2001,	   the	   article	   25,	   section	   2,	   let.	   b)	   of	   the	  Mental	   Capacity	   Act	   of	   2005	   in	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Therefore,	   a	   combination	   between	   the	   patient’s	   previous	   medical	   directives	  and	  the	  opinion	  of	  a	  legal	  proxy	  has	  a	  stronger	  effect	  (Escher	  2014).	  	   In	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   decision	   making,	   the	   majority	   of	   medical	   decisions	   are	  based	   on	   the	   substitute	   judgment,	  which	  was	   recognized	   for	   the	   first	   time	   in	  the	  USA	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Karen	  Quinlan	  in	  1976	  (70	  N.J.	  10(1976)	  355	  A.2d	  647)	  and	   then	   used	   in	   the	   Italian	   High	   Court	   of	   Cassation	   in	   the	   famous	   case	   of	  Eluana	  Englaro	   in	  2007	   (C.	   Cass.	   16	  October	  2007,	  no.	   21748)	   (e.g.,	   see	   Sect.	  5.1.).	   This	   means	   that	   the	   patient’s	   wishes	   are	   inferred	   from	   his/her	   prior	  statements	   and/or	   behavior.	   The	   surrogate	   must	   take	   into	   account	   any	  evidence	   of	   the	   patient’s	   religious,	   spiritual,	   personal,	   philosophical,	   and	  moral	  beliefs.	  	  	   Only	   when	   a	   surrogate	   does	   not	   have	   all	   the	   information	   needed	   to	  make	   a	   substitute	   judgment	   will	   medical	   decisions	   be	   made	   based	   on	   the	  principle	  of	  the	  patient’s	  best	  interest.	  A	  patient’s	  interest	  must	  not	  be	  limited	  to	   the	   patient’s	   physical	   health,	   but	   must	   consider	   also	   the	   patient’s	   well-­‐being,	   which	   includes	   psychological	   comfort.	   The	   best-­‐interest	   standard	  includes	   objective	   factors	   such	   as	   quality	   of	   life	   or	   life	   expectancy,	   clinical	  standards,	  and	  the	  patient’s	  prognosis.31	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  England	   and	   Wales,	   and	   in	   Ireland,	   article	   6,	   section	   2,	   let.	   b)	   of	   the	   Advance	  Healthcare	  Decision	  Bill	  2012.	  31	   Specifically,	   proxies	  must	   take	   into	   consideration:	   (1)	   the	  patient’s	   present	   levels	  of	   physical,	   sensory,	   emotional,	   and	   cognitive	   function;	   (2)	   the	   quality	   of	   life,	   life	  expectancy,	  and	  prognosis	   for	  recovery	  with	  and	  without	   treatment;	   (3)	   the	  various	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5.1.	  	   Moral	  reasons	  for	  supporting	  the	  role	  of	  the	  legal	  proxy	  in	  end-­‐of-­‐
life	  decisions	  	  Arguments	   for	   the	   importance	  of	   legal	  proxies	   (surrogates	   and	  guardians)	   in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	   decision-­‐making	   will	   be	   put	   forwards.	   After	   examining	   the	  disadvantages	   and	   shortcomings	   of	   living	   wills,	   advantages	   of	   surrogate	   are	  shown	  to	  resolve	  some	  of	  the	  problems	  with	  living	  wills.	  The	  ethical	  reasoning	  of	  the	  legal	  proxy	  (surrogate	  or	  guardian)	  is	  the	  same.32	  	   In	   case	   of	   instructional	   directives,	   commonly	   known	   as	   living	   wills,	  citizens	   express	   their	   preferences	   regarding	   specific	  medical	   treatments	   that	  they	   want	   to	   permit	   or	   to	   reject	   in	   case	   of	   future	   unconsciousness	   (British	  Medical	  Association	  2007).	  This	  kind	  of	  ADs	  entails	  several	  problems.	  First	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  treatment	  options	  and	  the	  risks,	  side	  effects,	  and	  benefits	  of	  each;	  (4)	  the	  nature	  and	  degree	   of	   physical	   pain	   or	   suffering	   resulting	   from	   the	   medical	   condition;	   (5)	  whether	   the	   medical	   treatment	   being	   provided	   is	   causing	   or	   may	   cause	   pain,	  suffering,	   or	   serious	   complications;	   (6)	   the	   pain	   or	   suffering	   to	   the	   patient	   if	   the	  medical	  treatment	  is	  withdrawn;	  and	  (7)	  whether	  any	  particular	  treatment	  would	  be	  proportionate	   or	   disproportionate	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   benefits	   to	   be	   gained	   by	   the	  patient	  vs	  the	  burdens	  caused	  to	  the	  patient	  (Pope	  2011).	  	  32	   An	   example	   that	   shows	   the	   similarities	   between	   surrogate	   and	   guardian	   is	   the	  German	  law	  Drittes	  Gesetz	  zur	  Anderung	  des	  Betreuungsrechts,	  law	  no.	  593	  of	  19	  June	  2009,	  where	   rules	   established	   for	   guardian	   (‘der	  Betreuer’)	   also	   apply	   to	   surrogate	  (‘der	   Bevollmächtigte’)	   (article	   1901a,	   section	   3;	   article	   1901b,	   section	   3;	   article	  1904,	  section	  5	  of	  BGB).	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all,	  many	  of	  these	   instructions	  are	  vague,	  ambiguous	  and	  therefore	  useless	  as	  a	   basis	   for	   treatment	   decisions	   (Neitzke	   2013,	   and	   Fagerlin	   2002).33	   Citizens	  find	   difficulties	   in	   foreseeing	   future	   illness,	   disease	   and	   disability	   and	   what	  their	  medical	  needs	  and	  options	  will	  be	  because	  they	  cannot	  project	  into	  their	  health	  future	  (Rubin	  2010).	  Further	  challenges	  lie	  in	  predicting	  future	  medical	  discoveries	   and	   developments:	   treatment	   options	  might	   change	   between	   the	  time	  the	  living	  will	  is	  written	  and	  the	  time	  at	  which	  it	  is	  exercised	  (Braun	  et	  al.	  2009).	   Moreover,	   this	   kind	   of	   ADs	   does	   not	   consider	   the	   fact	   that	   patients’	  choices	   change	  over	   time	   (Ditto	   et	   al.	   2006),	   particularly	  when	   facing	   severe	  diseases	   (Witting	   et	   al.	   2008,	   and	   Ditto	   et	   al.	   2003).	   Did	   the	   patient’s	  preferences	  change	  over	  time?	  Did	  he	  or	  she	  conscientiously	  amend	  the	  living	  will	  or	  not?	  According	  to	  some	  philosophers,	  such	  as	  Derek	  Parfit	  (1984)	  and	  others	   (Wolf	   et	   al.	   1991),	   personal	   identity	   is	   not	   so	   much	   a	   question	   of	  continuity	   over	   time	   and	  place.	   Livings	  wills	   do	   not	   reflect	  well	   the	   fact	   that	  patients’	   choices	   change	   over	   time34	   and	   particularly	   when	   facing	   severe	  diseases	  (Witting	  2008).	  
	  	  	  	  	  33	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  living	  wills	  usually	  are	  applicable	  in	  cases	  of	  permanent	  and	  irreversible	  medical	   states,	   such	   as	   PVS,	   the	   immediate	   dying	   process,	   or	   advanced	  stages	   of	   dementia.	   Most	   living	   wills	   refer	   to	   these	   statuses	   and	   refuse	   live	  prolonging	  treatment	  if	  such	  situations	  occur.	  	  	  34	   One	   of	   the	   most	   famous	   case	   decisions	   where	   although	   there	   were	   clear	   future	  medical	   directives	   the	  Court	  decided	   to	  nominate	   a	   legal	   proxy	   to	   interpret	   them	   is	  the	   German	   case-­‐law	   Bundesverfassungsgericht:	   2001,	   BVerfG	   NJW	   2002,	   206	   =	   1	  BvR	  618/93,	  2	  August	  2001.	  In	  this	  case	  the	  patient	  was	  a	  competent	  adult	  Jehovah’s	  Witness	   who	   was	   temporarily	   unconscious	   and	   had	   refused	   blood	   transfusion	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   Although	   not	   without	   its	   own	   problems,	   the	   second	   form	   of	   ADs,	   the	  ‘surrogate	   will’,	   gives	   lasting	   power	   for	   health	   care	   affairs	   to	   another	  competent	   citizen,	   whom	   in	   this	   thesis	   will	   be	   called	   the	   ‘surrogate’.	  Surrogates	  must	  understand	  patients’	  wishes	  and	  value	  (Bramstedt	  2003,	  and	  New	  York	  State	  Task	  Force	  on	  Life	  and	  the	  Law	  1987).	  They	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  an	  expression	  and	  extension	  of	  the	  patients’	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination.	  In	  addition,	   surrogates	   must	   make	   the	   medical	   choice	   that	   the	   patients	   would	  have	  made	  if	  they	  had	  been	  capable	  	  (Buchanan	  and	  Brock	  1990).	  	   The	   ‘surrogate	   will’	   is	   the	   best	   option	   to	   resolve	   well-­‐documented	  problems	  that	  arise	  with	  interpretation	  of	  living	  wills	  (Olick	  2014,	  and	  Kish	  et	  	  	  	  	  	  through	  clear	  statements.	  The	  German	  Court	  decided	  to	  nominate	  a	  legal	  proxy	  –	  her	  husband.	  He	  expressed	  doubts	  about	  her	  living	  will,	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  her	  actual	  wish	   had	   changed;	   thus,	   a	   blood	   transfusion	   was	   undertaken.	   The	   German	  Constitutional	   Court	   decided	   that	   it	   was	   correct	   to	   nominate	   a	   legal	   guardian,	   to	  protect	  patient’s	  rights.	   It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  his	  wife	  has	  never	  sued	  her	  husband	  for	  making	  a	  decision	  against	  her	   (apparent)	  wishes.	   In	  2009,	   the	   law	  Drittes	  Gesetz	  
zur	  Anderung	  des	  Betreuungsrechts,	   law	  no.	  593	  of	  19	   June	  2009,	   fixed	  a	  clear	  order	  within	   ADs	   in	   article	   1901b	   BGB,	   which	   states	   that	   in	   case	   of	   patient’s	  unconsciousness	  this	  order	  must	  be	  followed:	  1)	  living	  will	  2)	  treatment	  wishes	  (this	  is	  a	  specific	  German	  concept	  that	  refers	  to	  specific	  oral	  declaration	  that	  matches	  the	  patient’s	   actual	   medical	   situation)	   3)	   presumed	   wishes	   4)	   patient’s	   best	   interest	  (which	   in	  Germany	   is	  understood	  according	   to	  objective	  medical	   criteria).	  Although	  living	  wills	  are	  considered	  the	  primary	  way	  to	  determine	  patients’	  wishes,	  the	  law	  is	  entirely	  dedicated	  to	  the	  role	  of	  legal	  proxy	  (surrogate	  and	  guardian).	  Moreover,	  the	  legal	   proxy	   “must	   examine	   whether	   these	   determinations	   correspond	   to	   the	   current	  
living	   and	   treatment	   situation”.	   (Article	   1901a,	   section	   1	   B.G.B.).	   Finally,	   even	   in	  Germany	  –	  where	   the	   law	   is	   clear	   regarding	   the	  order	  within	  AD	  –	   several	   scholars,	  such	   as	   Stephan	   Sahm,	   Christian	   Zieger	   and	   Klaus	   Dörner,	   criticize	   the	   absolute	  direct	  application	  of	  living	  wills	  without	  taking	  into	  consideration	  other	  elements.	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al.	   2001).	   Furthermore,	   since	   ADs	   are	   understood	   as	   a	   culturally	   embedded	  tool	  of	  self-­‐interpretation	  (Schicktanz	  et	  al.	  2010,	  and	  Schicktanz	  et	  al.	  2009)35,	  his	   role	  has	  been	  highlighted	   since	  1982	   in	  USA	   (President’s	  Commission	   for	  the	   Study	   of	   Ethical	   Problems	   in	   Medicine	   and	   Biomedical	   and	   Behavioral	  Research	  1982),	  then	  in	  1998	  in	  England	  (General	  Medical	  Council	  1998),	  and	  recently	  in	  Italy	  (National	  Council	  of	  Bioethics	  2014).	  	  Instructional	   directives	   interpreted	   by	   a	   surrogate	   who	   additionally	  takes	   into	   account	   the	   patient’s	   values	   and	   preferences	   avoids	   all	   the	  problems	  connected	  with	  changes	  of	  opinions	  from	  the	  moment	  of	  drafting	  the	  ‘living	   will’	   to	   that	   of	   its	   execution.	   Moreover,	   due	   the	   fact	   that	   patients’	  preferences	  change	  during	   the	  course	  of	  a	  disease	  (Carmel	  and	  Mutran	  1999,	  Berger	  and	  Majerovitz	  1998,	  and	  Ditto	  et	  al.	  2003),	   the	  surrogate	  has	  greater	  opportunity	  to	  establish	  the	  actual	  patient’s	  wishes	  compared	  with	  the	   ‘living	  will’,	  which	  is	  a	  fixed	  document	  written	  at	  a	  particular	  time.	  This	  fact	  has	  been	  contemplated	   by	   national	   Court’s	   ruling	   (BVerfG	   NJW	   2002,	   206	   =	   1	   BvR	  618/93)	   and	   by	   national	   legislator36	   that	   have	   considered	   surrogate’s	  judgment	  fundamental.	  
	  	  	  	  	  35	   In	   addition	   some	   studies	  have	  demostrated	   this	   connection:	   (Pecanac	   et	   al.	   2014,	  Carrion	  et	  al.	  2013a,	  Carrion	  et	  al.	  2013b).	  36	   In	   Germany,	   the	   law	   is	   directed	   to	   the	   role	   of	   legal	   proxies	   (guardian	   and	  surrogate).	   According	   to	   article	   1901a,	   section	   1	   Bürgerliches	   Gesetzbuch	   (BGB,	  German	   Civil	   Code)	   the	   legal	   proxy	   must	   examine	   whether	   these	   determinations	  correspond	   to	   the	   current	   living	   and	   treatment	   situation.	   In	   addition,	   in	   England,	  article	  25,	  section	  2,	  let.	  b)	  of	  the	  Mental	  Capacity	  Act	  of	  2005	  states	  that	  previous	  AD	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Moreover,	  empirical	  researches	  have	  shown	  that	  patients	  mostly	  would	  prefer	   to	   leave	   health	   decisions	   to	   others37.	   In	   addition,	   generally	   patients	  prefer	  to	  nominate	  a	  surrogate	  to	  interpret	  their	  wishes	  rather	  than	  decide	  in	  advance	  regarding	  their	  medical	  treatments38.	  	  	   The	  concept	  of	  surrogacy	  highlights	  the	  narrative	  approach	  to	  personal	  identity,	   which	   sees	   lives	   and	   biographies	   as	   stories	   (Macintyre	   2007).	   In	  addition,	   all	   the	   solutions	   offered	   to	   the	   problem	  of	   personal	   identity,	  which	  do	   not	   consider	   the	   narrative	   dimension	   fail	   (Ricoeur	   1995).	   Further,	   the	  narrative	   approach	   fits	   nicely	   with	   the	   substitute	   judgment	   principle	  (Steinbock	   2009).	   The	   surrogate	   must	   take	   the	   decision	   that	   best	   continues	  the	   themes	   of	   the	   patient’s	   life	   narrative	   (Brody	   2003,	   and	   Blustein	   1999).	  
	  	  	  	  	  is	   not	   valid	   if	   after	   the	   donor	   has	   conferred	   to	   the	   lasting	   power	   of	   attorney	   the	  authority	   to	   give	   or	   refuse	   consent	   to	   the	   treatment	   to	  which	   the	   advance	   decision	  relates.	  The	  same	  legal	  reasoning	  has	  been	  established	  in	  Ireland	  (article	  6,	  section	  2,	  let.	   b)	   of	   the	  Advance	  Healthcare	  Decision	  Bill	   2012).	  Moreover,	   in	   France,	   the	   new	  article	  1111-­‐4,	  section	  3	  Code	  de	   la	  Santé	  Publique	  (CSP,	  French	  Public	  Health	  Code)	  modified	   on	  March	   2015	   states	   that	   in	   case	   of	   hospitalization,	   it	   is	   proposed	   to	   the	  patient	   to	   designate	   a	   surrogate.	   This	   designation	   is	   valid	   for	   the	   duration	   of	  hospitalization,	   unless	   the	   patient	   decides	   otherwise.	   As	   it	   is	   seen,	   the	   French	   law	  considers	  the	  surrogate’s	  decision	  fundamental.	  37	  In	  USA,	  two	  big	  studies	  regarding	  the	  implementation	  of	  ADs	  were	  done	  during	  the	  last	  decade	  of	   the	  second	  millennium.	  These	  studies	  have	  shown	   that	  patients	   leave	  their	   health	   decisions	   to	   their	   family	   and	   physician	   instead	   of	   having	   their	   own	  preferences	  expressly	   followed	  (70.8%	  in	  HELP	  and	  78.0%	  in	  SUPPORT).	   (Puchalski	  et	  al.	  2000,	  Tsevat	  et	  al.	  1998,	  and	  Teno	  et	  al.	  1997).	  38	   In	   the	   SUPPORT	   study,	   two-­‐thirds	   of	   ADs	  were	   a	   ‘surrogate	   will’	   (Hawkins	   et	   al.	  2005,	  Teno	  et	  al.	  1997,	  and	  Sehgal	  1992).	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Therefore,	   if	   the	   patient	   was	   always	   a	   strong	   autonomous	   individual	   who	  valued	   an	   active	   life,	   the	   story	   is	   better	   concluded	   by	   a	   chapter	   telling	   of	   a	  quick	   death	   from	   natural	   causes,	   rather	   than	   being	   kept	   alive	   for	   years	   in	  vegetative	  state	  (Blustein	  1999).	  	  	   This	   approach	   fits	   perfectly	   in	   Mediterranean	   areas	   where	   people	  identify	   strongly	   with	   their	   communities	   and	   therefore	   it	   is	   easier	   for	  surrogates	  to	  know	  how	  patients	  would	  have	  decided	  had	  they	  been	  conscious	  (Spinsanti	   1992).	   Moreover,	   empirical	   researches	   have	   shown	   that	   in	  Southern	   Europe	   patients’	   family	   are	   typically	   given	   more	   information	   than	  patients	   themselves	   (Menaca	   et	   al.	   2012)	   −	  which	   could	   be	   explained	   by	   the	  traditional	   Catholic	   approach	   to	   truth	   −	   and	   where	   the	  majority	   of	   informal	  caregivers	   are	   patients’	   relatives	   (Costantini	   et	   al.	   2008,	   Rossi	   et	   al.	   2007,	  Toro	  et	  al.	  2007).	  	  	  
6.	  	   The	  position	  of	  national	  courts	  in	  some	  of	  the	  most	  important	  case-­‐
laws	  	  	  Here,	   some	   of	   the	   most	   important	   case-­‐law	   in	   some	   Western	   European	  countries	   will	   be	   exposed.	   Medical	   law	   is	   influenced	   by	   moral	   issues,	   which	  depend	  on	  the	  society	  (e.g.,	   see	  Sect.	  1.1.1.).	  The	  process	  of	   the	  promulgation	  of	   a	   law	   is	   slower	   compared	   to	   the	   transformation	   of	   the	   society.	   Therefore,	  judges	   have	   substituted	   national	   legislators	   by	   ruling	   in	   single	   case-­‐law.	  Moreover,	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  national	  case-­‐law	  is	  important	  because	  “bio-­‐law	  is	  determined	  by	  a	  large	  degree	  of	  openness	  (….)	  of	  the	  judicial	  system	  to	  the	  outside	  world	  of	  politics	  and	  culture”	  (Rendtorff	  	  2002).	  	  	   Since	  different	  societies	  might	  highlight	  different	  moral	  values,	  national	  case-­‐law	  can	  differ	  from	  each	  other.	  For	  instance,	  in	  all	  the	  English-­‐,	  German-­‐,	  and	   Romance-­‐speaking	   countries	   –	   except	   the	   UK	   and	   Austria	   –	   dignity,	  integrity	   and	   human	   rights	   are	   explicitly	   written	   into	   the	   constitution.	  However,	   in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  Austria,	   legislators	  are	  more	  focused	  on	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autonomy	   (Rendtorff	   	   2002).	   It	   should	  be	   recalled	   that	   dignity	   should	  not	   be	  reduced	  to	  autonomy	  (principle	  2	  of	  the	  Barcelona	  Declaration,	  and	  Knoppers	  1991)	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  1.2.).	  	  	   Traditionally,	  the	  law	  has	  protected	  the	  physician’s	  autonomy.	  This	  has	  recently	  been	  confirmed	  by	   the	  Portuguese	   law	  of	  2012	   that	  has	  codified	   the	  medical	   objection	   (article	   9	   law	   25	   of	   16	   July	   2012).	   In	   last	   decades,	   the	  promotion	  of	  patient	  autonomy	  has	  been	  highlighted	  by	  several	  scholars	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  1.2.	  and	  1.3.).	  As	   it	  has	  been	  explained	  above,	   the	  approach	  towards	  patient	  autonomy	  has	  changed:	  from	  the	  neo-­‐liberal	  and	  utilitarian	  approach	  –	  which	   is	   based	   on	   the	   cognitive	   process	   of	   deciding	   –	   to	   the	   relational	  approach	   of	   autonomy	   –	   which	   not	   only	   considers	   the	   patient’s	   mental	  capacity	   but	   external	   factors	   as	  well,	   especially	   the	   patient’s	   social	   network.	  While	   according	   to	   the	   individualist	  model	   of	   autonomy	   doctors	   should	   give	  ‘neutral’	  information,	  the	  new	  approach,	  based	  on	  the	  ethics	  of	  care,	  demands	  physicians	   to	  engage	   in	  a	  broader	  dialogue	  and	   take	  on	  a	  more	  active	   role.	   It	  follows	  that	  doctors	  frequently	  find	  themselves	  operating	  in	  an	  atmosphere	  of	  legal	  uncertainty.	  Thus,	  within	   this	   triangular	  relationship	  –	  medicine,	  ethics,	  and	   law	   –	   the	  major	   purpose	   of	  medical	   jurisprudence	   is	   to	   break	   down	   any	  barriers	  of	  latent	  hostility	  (Manson	  and	  Laurie	  2011).	  	   In	   France,	   the	   two	   most	   important	   case-­‐law	   are	   the	   case	   of	   Vincent	  Humbert	  (Trib.	  Boulogne	  sur	  Mer,	  27	  February	  2006)	  and	  of	  Vincent	  Lambert	  (e.g.,	   see	   Sect.	   2.1.1.1.).	  These	   two	   cases	   are	   in	   contrast	  with	  each	  other.	  The	  case-­‐law	   of	  Mr.	   Vincent	  Humbert	   is	   really	   interesting	   since	   the	   previous	   law	  ruling	   ADs,	   law	   no.	   2005-­‐370	   of	   22	   April	   2005	   (the	   so-­‐called	   Leonetti	   law),	  was	   considered	   a	   political	   reaction	   to	   it	   (Horn	   2013).	   	   Mr.	   Humbert	   was	   a	  tetraplegic	  patient	  who,	  through	  the	  media,	  publically	  claimed	  the	  right	  to	  die.	  Since	  the	  local	  authorities	  did	  not	  grant	  his	  wish,	  his	  mother	  injected	  him	  with	  a	   high	   dose	   of	   barbiturates	   that	   plunged	   her	   son	   into	   a	   coma.	   Then,	   Dr.	  Chaussoy,	   decided	   to	   withdraw	   the	   life-­‐sustaining	   treatment.	   In	   addition,	   to	  ensure	   that	   Mr.	   Humbert	   would	   have	   not	   continued	   to	   live	   in	   a	   vegetative	  state,	   Dr.	   Chaussoy	   decided	   to	   inject	   him	  with	   potassium	   chloride.	   After	  Mr.	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Humbert’s	   death,	   his	   mother	   and	   his	   physician	   were	   incriminated	   for	  “administration	   of	   toxic	   substances”	   and	   for	   “poisoning	  with	   premeditation”.	  Finally,	   the	   case	  was	   dismissed	   in	   2006	  with	   neither	   being	   found	   guilty	   of	   a	  crime.	  While	  Mr.	  Vincent	  Humbert	  in	  2003	  demanded	  the	  right	  to	  die,	  in	  2014	  the	  family	  of	  Mr.	  Vincent	  Lambert	  sought	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  ECtHR	  regarding	  the	   discontinuity	   of	   the	   artificial	   nutrition	   and	   hydration	   (application	   no.	  46043/14)	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  2.1.1.1.).	  	  	   In	   Germany,	   the	   most	   important	   case-­‐law	   regarding	   end-­‐of-­‐life	  decisions	  are	  the	  case-­‐law	  of	  1994	  (BGH	  1StR	  357/94)	  and	  2003	  (BGH	  XII	  ZB	  2/03)	   where	   the	   judicial	   decisions	   have	   emphasised	   the	   primacy	   of	   the	  patient’s	  will.	   It	   should	  be	  noted	   that	   from	   the	   end	  of	   the	  1890s	   the	  German	  courts	  have	  protected	  patient	  autonomy.	  Recently,	   the	  German	   jurisprudence	  has	   gone	   even	   beyond	   the	   traditional	   legal	   distinction	   of	   act	   and	   omission	  (BGH	  2	   StR	   454/09).	   By	   taking	   into	   account	   that	   some	   ethicists	   have	   argued	  that	   there	   is	   no	   intrinsic	   moral	   difference	   between	   killing	   and	   letting	   die	  (Deutsch	   and	   Spickhoff	   2008,	   Kuhse	   1998,	   Perrett	   1996,	   Boyle	   1977	   and	  Rachels	   1975)39	   and	   the	   legal	   principle	   of	   unity	   of	   the	   legal	   system,40	   the	  Bundesgerichtshof	   has	   stated,	   by	   applying	   the	   theory	   of	   some	   scholars,	   that	  this	   distinction	   is	   not	   based	   on	   the	   external	   actions.	   The	  German	  High	   Court	  	  	  	  	  	  39On	  the	  contrary:	  (Beauchamp	  1989,	  Childress	  1985,	  and	  Maguire	  1984)	  40	  The	  principle	  of	  unity	  of	   the	   legal	  system	  should	  be	  considered	   in	  both	  horizontal	  and	  vertical	  approaches.	  Therefore,	   rules	  between	  civil	   and	  criminal	   law	  should	  not	  contrast.	  Either	  should	  contrast	  constitutional	  norms	  with	  legal	  rules.	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applies	   the	   legal	   reasoning	   coming	   by	   the	   interpretation	   of	   article	   1	   (human	  dignity)	  and	  article	  2	  (personal	  freedom)	  of	  the	  German	  Constitution.	  It	  should	  be	   underlined	   that	   in	   this	   ruling,	   the	   Court	   states	  more	   precisely	   that	   active	  euthanasia	  and	  any	  kind	  of	  act	  that	  short	  life	  are	  illegal.	  	   In	   England,	   some	   of	   the	  most	   important	   case-­‐law	   are	   Bland	   (Airedale	  NHS	  Trust	  v.	  Brand	  [1993]	  AC	  789)	  and	  Re	  T	  ([1992]	  4	  All	  ER	  649).	  In	  the	  case	  of	   Bland,	   the	   English	   court	   rejected	   the	   substituted	   judgment	   doctrine	   by	  highlighting	   the	  principle	  of	  patient’s	  best	   interest.	  Traditionally,	   the	  English	  common	  law	  has	  recognized	  to	  the	  British	  Crown,	  under	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘parens	  patriae	   jurisdiction’,	   the	   power	   to	   protect	   incapable	   citizens	   (Butler	   v.	   Free-­‐man,	   E.	   1756.	   Amb.	   301).	   	   According	   to	   the	   principle	   of	   the	   patient’s	   best	  interest,	   doctors	   can	   withdraw	   medical	   treatment	   when	   it	   is	   not	   in	   the	  patient’s	   best	   interest	   prolong	   his	   or	   her	   life	   with	   ‘no	   affirmative	   benefit’.	  Moreover,	   in	   this	   case-­‐law	   it	   was	   stated	   that	   withdrawing	   treatment	   –	  although	  it	  is	  a	  physical	  act	  –	  from	  a	  legal	  prospective	  should	  be	  considered	  as	  an	   omission.	   While	   there	   is	   no	   moral	   or	   logical	   difference	   between	   act	   and	  omission,	  the	  legal	  distinction	  exits	  since	  otherwise,	  doctors	  would	  never	  start	  a	   medical	   treatment	   because	   they	   could	   never	   withdraw	   it.	   Furthermore,	   in	  the	  Re	  T.,	  the	  court	  has	  decided	  that	  it	  is	  unlawful	  to	  administer	  life-­‐saving	  or	  life-­‐prolonging	  treatment	  in	  disregard	  of	  an	  anticipatory	  refusal.	  	  	  	  
6.1.	  	   Withdrawing	   treatment	   from	   incompetent	   patients	   in	   Italy:	  the	  
case	  of	  Eluana	  Englaro	  	  In	  Italy,	  bioethical	  debates	  about	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  decision	  making	  has	  increased	  in	  the	   last	   decades.	   This	   is	   the	   result	   of	   new	  medical	   discoveries	   (e.g.	   see	   Sect.	  1.1.),	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Italian	  National	  Bioethics	  Committee,	  decreased	  influence	   of	   the	   Roman	   Catholic	   Church	   within	   Italian	   society,	   the	   new	  interpretation	   of	   article	   32	   of	   the	   Italian	   Constitution	   and	   the	   importance	  given	  by	  the	  media	  to	  cases	  connected	  with	  refusal	  of	  medical	  treatment.	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   In	   	   1990,	   a	   Prime	   Minister’s	   Decree	   led	   to	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	  Italian	  National	  Bioethics	  Committee	   as	   an	  advisory	  body	   to	   the	  Government	  composed	  of	   experts	   in	   the	  medical,	   ethical	   and	   legal	   field.	  The	  debate	  about	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  decision-­‐making	  started	  only	  in	  the	  last	  decade	  of	  the	  last	  century.	  Before	  this	  time	  the	  Roman	  Catholic	  Church,	  that	  condemning	  such	  decisions,	  has	  had	  a	  big	  influence	  in	  the	  Italian	  society	  (Griffith	  2008).	  	   Article	  32	  of	  the	  Italian	  Constitution	  recognizes	  the	  ‘right	  to	  health’	  that	  grants	  patients	   the	  right	   to	  consent	  or	  even	  withhold	  medical	   treatment.	  The	  right	  to	  health	  is	  safeguarded	  as	  “a	  fundamental	  right	  of	  the	  individual	  and	  as	  a	  
collective	  interest”	  and	  can	  be	  limited	  only	  “under	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  law”.	  	   It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  highlight	  the	  role	  of	  the	  media’s	  attention	  on	  the	  case	   of	   Eluana	   Englaro	   who	   was	   in	   a	   vegetative	   state	   for	   more	   than	   fifteen	  years	   and	   the	   controversy	   following	   the	   final	   decision	   of	   the	   Court	   of	  Cassation.	   Since	   article	   32	   of	   the	   Italian	   Constitution	   recognizes	   the	   ‘right	   to	  health’,	   patients	   have	   the	   right	   to	  withhold	   or	  withdraw	  medical	   treatments.	  As	   it	   was	   confirmed	   from	   the	   Italian	   Constitutional	   Court	   (C.	   Cort.	   26	   June	  2002),	   medical	   treatments	   have	   to	   protect	   not	   only	   the	   patients’	   health	   but	  also	   their	   dignity.	   Further,	   according	   to	   decision	   307/1990	   of	   Italian	  Constitution	  Court,	  this	  right	  can	  only	  be	  limited	  when	  the	  medical	  treatment	  protects	  not	  only	  the	  health	  of	  the	  single	  patient	  but	  also	  that	  of	  all	  the	  society.	  These	  are	  the	  cases	  of	  vaccination	  of	  a	  population	  or	  the	  cases	  of	  caregiving	  in	  the	   context	   of	   HIV.	   This	   limitation	   must	   be	   predicted	   and	   specified	   by	   the	  national	  law.	  In	  addition,	  any	  kind	  of	  assistance	  during	  death	  or	  euthanasia	  is	  considered	   illegal.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   assistance,	   physicians	   will	   be	   liable	   for	  homicide	  by	  request	  of	   the	  victim	  (article	  579	  Penal	  Code;	  P.C.)	  or,	   in	  case	  of	  incompetent	  patient,	  for	  intentional	  homicide	  (article	  575	  P.C.).	  	  The	   complexity	   of	   legal	   and	   ethical	   issues	   concerning	   withdrawing	  treatment	   from	   an	   incompetent	   patient	   arises	   from	   the	   need	   to	   reconstruct	  the	  patient’s	  will.	  The	  majority	  of	  lawyers	  believe	  that	  withdrawing	  treatment	  cannot	   be	   punished	   because	   despite	   the	   facts	   being	   similar	   to	   those	   of	  homicide	   by	   request	   of	   the	   victim	   (article	   579	   P.C.),	   there	   is	   the	   exculpation	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act	  of	  fulfilment	  of	  duty	  (article	  51	  P.C.)	  (Canestrari	  2003).	  However,	  a	  part	  of	  the	   legal	   community	   argues	   that	   humans	   do	   not	   have	   the	  moral	   right	   to	   die	  and	   therefore	   in	   case	   of	   incompetent	   patient,	   even	   if	   the	   patient	   has,	   during	  some	  point	  of	  his	  life	  given	  consent,	  there	  is	  the	  necessity	  to	  save	  patient’s	  life	  (article	  54	  P.C.).	   In	  these	  cases	  the	  doctor	  is	  neither	  liable	  for	  kidnapping	  nor	  duress	  (articles	  605,	  610	  and	  613	  of	  P.C.)	  (Iadecola	  2003).	  	   In	   Italy,	   the	   most	   famous	   case	   of	   withdrawing	   treatment	   from	   an	  incompetent	   patient	   is	   that	   of	   Eluana	   Englaro	   (25	   November	   1970	   –	   9	  February	   2009)	   from	   Lecco,	   who	   following	   a	   car	   accident,	   entered	   into	   a	  vegetative	  state	  on	  the	  18	  January	  1992.	  The	  case	  of	  Englaro	  is	  also	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  Quilan	  in	  the	  USA.	  In	  1999,	  Mr.	  Beppino	  Englaro	  asked	  for	  the	  first	  time	  the	   Tribunal	   of	   Lecco	   to	   discontinue	   hydration	   and	   nutrition	   supplying.	   The	  Tribunal	   of	   Lecco	   (1	  March	  1999)	   and	   then	   the	  Court	   of	  Appeal	   of	  Milan	   (31	  December	  1999)	  dismissed	  the	  case	  because	  of	   the	  absence	  of	  any	   legislation	  regarding	  withdrawing	   treatment	   from	  an	   incompetent	   patient.	   According	   to	  the	   judges	   article	   2	   of	   the	   Italian	   Constitution	   gives	   absolute	   and	   imperative	  protection	  of	  the	  right	  to	  life.	  	  The	  Court	  of	  Cassation	  (10	  April	  2005	  –	  ordinance)	  dismissed	  the	  case	  in	   2005	   based	   on	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   support	   guardian	   (amministratore	   di	  
sostegno)	   (e.g.,	   see	   Sect.	   3.4)	   to	   confirm	   withdrawing	   treatment	   as	   the	  patient’s	  own	  decision.	  Even	  after	  Franca	  Alessio	  was	  appointed	  as	  a	  support	  guardian,	  the	  Tribunal	  of	  Lecce	  declined	  Mr.	  Englaro’s	  second	  request	  to	  stop	  life-­‐sustaining	   treatment	  based	  on	   the	   fact	   that	   an	   incompetent	  patient	   lacks	  the	   right	   to	   reject	   medical	   treatment.	   Moreover,	   according	   to	   this	   ruling,	  supplied	   hydration	   and	   nutrition	   is	   not	   a	   medical	   treatment	   but	   basic	   care	  (Trib.	  Lecco	  20	  December	  2005).	  	  The	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   of	   Milan	   (16	   December	   2006)	   reversed	   the	  Tribunal’s	   ruling	   by	   declaring	   that	   everyone	   has	   the	   right	   to	   reject	   medical	  treatment,	   but	   in	   this	   concrete	   case,	   the	   evidence	  was	   insufficient	   to	   clearly	  indicate	   that	   Ms.	   Eluana	   Englaro	   would	   have	   wanted	   to	   terminate	   her	  medically	   supplied	   nutrition	   and	   hydration.	   Mr.	   Beppino	   Englaro	   continued	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his	   legal	   battle	   and	   on	   16	   October	   2007	   the	   Court	   of	   Cassation	   decided	   that	  judges	  can	  authorize	  the	  removal	  of	  life-­‐sustaining	  treatment	  for	  patients	  who	  have	  been	  declared	   incompetent	  when	   two	  conditions	  are	  met:	   (1)	   it	   is	   clear	  that	  the	  patient	  is	  in	  a	  persistent	  vegetative	  state	  and	  (2)	  it	  can	  be	  determined	  by	   clear	   and	   convincing	   evidence,	   from	   the	   patient’s	   representative,	   that	   the	  patient	   would	   not	   wish	   to	   be	   kept	   alive	   through	   artificial	   means,	   based	   on	  knowledge	  of	  the	  patient’s	  lifestyle,	  personality	  and	  conviction.	  The	  same	  legal	  reasoning	   has	   been	   recently	   adopted	   by	   the	   Italian	   Council	   of	   State	   in	   its	  ruling	  of	  2	  September	  2014,	  no.	  4460.	  The	  Court	  of	  Cassation	  did	  not	  enter	  into	  the	  medical	  or	  legal	  definition	  of	   persistent	   or	   permanent	   vegetative	   state,	   in	   addition	   to	   not	   giving	   a	  definition	   of	   medical	   futility.	   According	   to	   the	   Multi-­‐society	   Task	   Force	   on	  PVS,	  persistent	  vegetative	  state	  is	  a	  result	  of	  a	  patient’s	  vegetative	  state	  of	  one	  month	  after	  acute	  traumatic	  or	  non-­‐traumatic	  brain	  injury,	  which	  concludes	  in	  a	   permanent	   state	   if	   the	   patient	   has	   been	   vegetative	   for	   one	   year	   (Ashwal	  1994).	  Also,	  the	  English	  case-­‐law	  of	  Bland	  ([1993]	  1	  All	  ER	  821	  at	  850,	  (1993)	  12	   BMLR	   64	   at	   95)	   confirms	   that	   the	   irreversible	   vegetative	   state	   one	   year	  later	   the	   injury.	   In	   addition,	   in	   the	   first	   six	   months	   of	   persistent	   vegetative	  state,	  every	  effort	  should	  be	  made	  at	  rehabilitation.	   In	  the	  case-­‐law	  of	  Eluana	  Englaro,	  the	  Court	  did	  not	  have	  doubts	  that	  she	  was	  in	  a	  permanent	  vegetative	  case	  because	  she	  has	  been	  in	  that	  state	  for	  several	  years.	  The	   judges	   did	   not	   give	   a	   definition	   of	   futile	   treatment	   because	   this	  would	   have	   raised	   several	   problems.	   Within	   this	   category,	   there	   are	   three	  types	   of	   futility:	   ‘physiological	   futility’,	   ‘quantitative	   futility’	   and	   ‘evaluative	  futility’	   (Campbell	   2012).	   While	   the	   first	   classification	   of	   futility	   describes	  situations	  without	  any	  physical	  benefit,	   the	  other	   two	  raise	  ethical	  problems.	  The	  so-­‐called	   ‘quantitative	   futility’	  defines	  a	  really	   low	  probability	  of	  medical	  benefits;	  and	  the	  case	  of	  ‘evaluative	  futility’	  is	  even	  more	  complex.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  medical	  treatment	  could	  achieve	  benefits	  for	  the	  patient’s	  health,	  but	  there	  is	   disagreement	   if	   these	   benefits	   would	   also	   contribute	   to	   the	   patient’s	  wellbeing.	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Therefore,	  the	  two	  main	  requisites	  to	  be	  fulfilled	  were	  the	  condition	  of	  vegetative	   state	   and	   the	   reconstruction	   of	   the	   patient’s	   past	  wishes.	  Without	  thorough	   consideration,	   the	   court	   stated	   that	   “artificial	   nutrition	   and	  hydration	  through	  nasogastric	   tube	  constitutes	  medical	   treatment”.	  The	  main	  problem	  in	  this	  case-­‐law	  was	  to	  understand	  the	  patient’s	  desire	  and	  the	  role	  of	  ADs	   in	   the	   Italian	   legal	   system.	  ADs	  play	  down	   the	  distinction	  between	  basic	  and	   medical	   treatment	   or	   that	   between	   proportional	   and	   excessive	   medical	  invasion	   (Lecaldano	   2005).	   It	   should	   further	   be	   noted,	   that	   the	   concept	   of	  ‘actual	  wish’	  should	  not	  be	  chronologically	  limited	  to	  the	  nearest	  future,	  but	  it	  should	   be	   considered	   as	   the	   last	   wish	   of	   the	   patient	   (Giunta	   1991).	  Additionally,	  ADs	  cannot	  be	  considered	  as	  part	  of	  the	  concepts	  of	  ‘right	  to	  die’	  or	   euthanasia	   (Balestra	   1992).	   This	   is	   confirmed	  by	   empirical	   evidence	   from	  the	  Netherlands.	  There,	  euthanasia	  is	  legal	  and	  there	  exist	  two	  different	  types	  of	   advance	   directives:	   one	   for	   the	   medical	   treatment	   that	   the	   person	   would	  like	   or	   would	   not	   like	   to	   have	   in	   case	   of	   incompetence	   which	   can	   be	  considered	   as	   part	   of	   informed	   consent	   and	   the	   other	   concerning	   euthanasia	  (Vezzoni	   2005).	   The	   same	   results	   come	   from	   the	   examination	   of	   the	   legal	  situation	   in	   Belgium.	   While	   advance	   directives	   are	   legally	   binding	   and	   not	  limited	  in	  time,	  advance	  directives	  that	  request	  euthanasia	  shall	  be	  only	  taken	  into	  consideration	  if	  they	  were	  written	  in	  the	  last	  five	  years.	  	  The	   role	   of	   advance	   directives	   has	   been	   recognized	   by	   the	   Italian	  National	   Bioethics	   Committee	   on	   February	   1992	   and	   included	   in	   the	   Italian	  Medical	   Ethics	   Code	   (e.g.,	   see	   Sect.	   3.1.).	   According	   to	   advice	   given	   from	   the	  Italian	   National	   Bioethics	   Committee	   (2003),	   even	   in	   cases	   of	   planning	   of	  medical	   treatment	   from	   a	   patient	   who	   is	   suffering	   from	   a	   chronic	   illness,	  advance	   directives	   are	   not	   reliable.	   According	   to	   this	   advice,	   advance	  directives	  cannot	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  blinding	  force.	  The	  doctor	  has	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  patient’s	  wishes,	  but	  he	  is	  not	  obliged	  to	  follow	  them.	  	  After	  examining	  all	  the	  facts,	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  of	  Milan	  (9	  July	  2008)	  accepted	   Mr.	   Beppino	   Englaro’s	   request	   to	   discontinue	   artificially	   supplied	  hydration	   and	   nutrition.	   It	   should	   be	   mentioned	   that	   the	   final	   part	   of	   the	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ruling	   was	   written	   with	   the	   help	   of	   a	   palliative	   care	   expert.	   This	   expert	  prescribed	  how	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  treatment	  had	  to	  be	  carried	  out	  in	  practice.	  This	   fact	  shows	  the	  strong	   interconnection	  between	  medicine,	  ethics	  and	   law	  in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  decisions	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  2.5.).	  In	   its	   ruling,	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeals	   also	   reminded	   the	   two	   well-­‐known	  European	   law-­‐cases	   involving	   judicial	   permission	   for	  withdrawing	  ANH	   from	  PVS	   patients:	   Hervé	   Pierra	   (France)	   and	   Tony	   Bland	   (United	   Kingdom).	   In	  addition	  to	  them,	  the	  Italian	  court	  could	  have	  referred	  to	  the	  cases	  of	  Kristina	  in	  Norway,	  and	  Schiavo	  in	  the	  United	  States	  (In	  re	  Schiavo,	  90-­‐2908GD-­‐003).	  	  Indeed,	  the	  Englaro	  case	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  Schiavo.	  Both	  of	  them	  were	  in	  a	  vegetative	  state	  for	  several	  years	  –	  Englaro	  for	  17	  years	  and	  Schiavo	  for	   15	   years	   –	   and	   both	   of	   them	  were	   kept	   alive	   through	   ANH.	  Moreover,	   in	  both	   cases,	   the	   legal	   proceedings	   were	   long	   and	   the	   courts	   issued	   several	  rulings.	   In	   addition,	   in	   both	   cases	   the	   governments	   reacted	   by	   passing	   legal	  norms	   to	   stop	   the	   execution	   of	   the	   courts’	   decisions	   to	   withdraw	   ANH.	  Furthermore,	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   of	   Florida	   and	   the	   Italian	   Constitutional	  Court	   were	   involved:	   both	   courts	   had	   to	   interpret	   the	   principle	   of	   separate	  powers	  within	  the	  State.	  	  	  	  However,	   while	   in	   USA,	   all	   the	   rulings	   were	   in	   harmony,	   in	   Italy	  different	  courts	  expressed	  different	  positions.	  Moreover,	  while	   in	  Schiavo	   the	  patient’s	  husband	  had	  a	  different	  opinion	   than	  his	  wife’s	   family’s,	   in	  Englaro,	  all	  of	   the	  patient’s	   friends	  as	  well	  as	  her	   father	  shared	   the	  same	   idea:	  Eluana	  Englaro	  would	  not	  have	  wanted	   to	   live	   in	   that	   condition.	   Furthermore,	  while	  Terri	  Schiavo	  died	  14	  days	  after	   the	  withdrawal	  of	  ANH,	  Eluana	  Englaro	  died	  only	  87	  hours	  after	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  ANH.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  case	  of	  Englaro	   appears	   to	   be	   the	   first	   documented	   death	   occurring	   after	   an	  unexpectedly	   short	   time	   following	   the	   withdrawal	   of	   ANH	   (Moreschi	   et	   al.	  2013).	  Following	   that,	   political	   reactions	   were	   immediate.	   The	   Italian	  Parliament	   accused	   the	   Cassation	   in	   front	   of	   the	   Constitutional	   Court	   for	  violating	   the	   principle	   of	   separation	   between	   powers	   recognised	   from	   the	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combination	   of	   articles	   70,	   101,	   section	   2,	   and	   102,	   section	   1	   of	   the	   Italian	  Constitution.	   As	   is	   well	   known,	   in	   civil	   law	   countries,	   the	   courts	   should	  interpret	  and	  not	   create	   law.	  Meanwhile,	   the	  Constitutional	  Court	   (8	  October	  2008,	  no.	  334	  –	  Ordinance)	  defended	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Cassation	  as	  being	  an	  alternative	  logic-­‐legal	  interpretation	  and	  not	  an	  attack	  on	  the	  Italian	  law.	   As	   a	   reaction	   of	   this	   ruling,	   on	   6	   February	   2009,	   the	   Italian	   Council	   of	  Ministers	  approved	  a	  decree-­‐law	  (decree-­‐law	  no.	  36),	  which	  is	  a	  law	  approved	  from	   the	   government	   in	   extraordinary	   cases	   of	   necessity	   and	   urgency,	   with	  the	  goal	  of	  blocking	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  artificial	  nutrition	  to	  Eluana	  Engaro.	  	  This	  decree-­‐law	  was	  not	  signed	   from	  the	   Italian	  President	  on	  the	  basis	  that	   it	   did	   not	   have	   the	   character	   of	   an	   extraordinary	   case	   of	   necessity	   and	  urgency	  needed	  from	  article	  77	  of	  the	  Italian	  Constitution.	  Furthermore,	  at	  the	  time,	  a	  bill	   to	   regulate	  artificial	  nutrition	  and	  hydration	  was	  being	  discussed.	  In	   addition,	   this	   law	   was	   a	   ‘specific’	   law	   to	   interrupt	   the	   effect	   of	   the	  Cassation’s	   decision	   with	   respect	   to	   Eluana	   Englaro.	   The	   result	   was	   an	  institutional	   crisis,	   which	   was	   overcome	   only	   when	   the	   Prime	   Minister	  decided	  to	  change	  the	  decree-­‐law	  into	  a	  bill,	  bill	  2350,	  which	  was	  immediately	  approved	   by	   the	   Italian	   Senate	   on	   March	   2009,	   but	   which	   the	   Chamber	   of	  Deputies	  revised	  it	  on	  July	  2011	  (e.g.,	  see	  Chap.	  3).	  	  	   In	  the	  middle	  of	  this	  political	  debate	  some	  associations	  asked	  the	  ECtHR	   to	   intervene	   since	   according	   to	   them	   there	   had	   been	   a	   violation	   of	  articles	   2,	   3	   and	  6,	   section	  1	   of	   the	  ECHR.	  The	  ECtHR	   stated	   that	   since	   these	  parties	  were	  not	  part	  of	   the	  original	   legal	  proceeding	   in	   Italy	  and	  since	   there	  was	   not	   a	   direct	   violation	   of	   their	   rights,	   the	   ECtHR	   could	   not	   take	   into	  consideration	   their	   applications	   (Application	   nos.	   55185/08,	   55483/08,	  55516/08,	  55519/08,	  56010/08,	  56278/08,	  	  58420/08	  and	  58424/08).	  	  Eluana	   Englaro	   passed	   away	   on	   9	   February	   2009,	   after	   her	  percutaneous	   endoscopic	   gastrostomy	   tube	   was	   removed.	   The	   autopsy	  revealed	  that	  Eluana	  Englaro	  died	  without	  any	  evident	  signs	  of	  suffering.	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Summary	  The	   change	   of	   the	   approach	   towards	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   decision-­‐making	   has	   been	  exposed:	   from	   a	   traditional	   one	   where	   the	   decision	   was	   made	   among	   the	  family	   members	   to	   a	   new	   approach	   where	   the	   significance	   of	   the	   national	  policy	  ruling	  ADs	  has	  been	  underlined.	  	  	   The	   jurisprudence,	   the	   bioethical	   and	   the	   medical	   communities	   have	  pointed	   out	   the	   significance	   of	   ADs	   as	   instruments	   to	   enhance	   patient	  autonomy.	  Besides,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  legal	  proxy	  has	  been	  considered	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  resolve	   the	   problems	   regarding	   the	   implementation	   of	   directives	   expressed	  through	   written	   documents	   in	   concrete	   medical	   practice.	   Several	   examples	  from	   the	  national	   laws	  of	  England,	  Wales,	  Germany	   and	  France	   and	   the	   Irish	  Bill	  2012	  have	  been	  given	  to	  show	  the	  codification	  of	  this	  principle.	  	  	   In	   addition,	   the	   evolution	   of	   patient	   autonomy	   has	   been	   investigated.	  While	  the	  individualist	  approach	  to	  autonomy	  rejects	  the	  influence	  of	  external	  factors,	   the	   relational	   autonomy	   accepts	   them,	   in	   addition	   to	   highlighting	  patient-­‐physician	  communication.	  	  	   Furthermore,	   the	   role	   of	   the	   jurisprudence	   to	   safeguard	   patient	  autonomy	  has	  been	  illustrated	  through	  the	  study	  of	  concrete	  case-­‐law.	  As	  it	  is	  well-­‐known,	   the	  process	   of	   the	  promulgation	  of	   a	   law	   is	   slower	   compared	   to	  the	  transformation	  of	  the	  society.	  This	  is	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	   decisions	   the	   public	   discussion	   is	   continues	   and	   national	   legislators	  have	   difficulties	   to	   rule.	   But,	   on	   the	   other	   side,	   judges	   have	   an	   obligation	   to	  rule.	   It	  derives	   that	  national	   judges,	  by	  making	  an	  extensive	   interpretation	  of	  fundamental	  human	  rights,	  have	  substituted	  national	  parliaments	  by	  ruling	  in	  single	  case-­‐law.	  	   Concluding,	   in	   the	   last	  decades,	   there	  has	  been	  a	   transformation	  of	   the	  approach	   towards	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   decisions.	   This	   has	   influenced	   the	  conceptualization	   of	   patient	   autonomy	   through	   individualistic	   or	   relational	  approaches.	   Since	   the	   process	   of	   the	   promulgation	   of	   a	   law	   is	   slower	  compared	   to	   the	   transformation	   of	   the	   society,	   judges	   have	   assumed	   an	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important	   role	   by	   “creating”	   laws,	   also	   in	   countries	   that	   are	   part	   of	   the	   civil	  law	  system.	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Chapter	   2:	   Advance	   Directives	   in	   some	   Western	  
European	  Countries	  
	  
Abstract	  	  The	   European	   bioethical	   background	   of	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   decisions	   is	   studied	   by	  examining	   some	   of	   the	   most	   important	   case-­‐law	   of	   the	   European	   Court	   of	  Human	   Rights	   and	   some	   of	   the	  most	   important	   documents	   published	   by	   the	  Council	   of	   Europe.	  Moreover,	   national	   laws	   on	   advance	   directives	   in	   various	  Western	  European	  countries	  are	  analyzed.	  	   The	  Recommendation	  CM/Rec	  (2009)	  11	  and	  the	  Guide	  on	  the	  decision-­‐
making	   process	   regarding	   medical	   treatment	   in	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   situations	   are	  analysed	   through	   an	   interdisciplinary	   approach.	   In	   particular,	   the	  Recommendation	   CM/Rec	   (2009)	   emphasizes	   the	   common	   European	  standards	   regarding	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   decisions	   and	   might	   be	   applied	   by	   the	  European	   Court	   of	   Human	   Rights,	   although	   it	   is	   considered	   a	   soft-­‐law.	  Moreover,	   the	   Guide	   on	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   regarding	   medical	  
treatment	   in	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   situations	   stimulates	   the	   ethical	   debate	   among	   the	  public.	  	   	  	   As	   it	   was	   demonstrated	   above,	   ethics	   and	   law	   are	   developed	  within	   a	  certain	   society.	   Different	   societies	   call	   attention	   to	   different	   moral	   values.	  Although	   a	   basic	   common	   European	   standard	   that	   safeguards	   patient	  autonomy	  exists,	  European	  policies	  differ	  from	  each	  other.	  Thus,	  national	  laws	  on	   advance	   directives	   in	   various	   Western	   European	   countries	   –	   such	   as	  Romance-­‐speaking	   countries	   (Italy,	   France,	   Portugal,	   and	   Spain),	   English-­‐speaking	   countries	   (Ireland,	   and	   United	   Kingdom	   of	   Great	   Britain	   and	  Northern	   Ireland),	   and	   German-­‐speaking	   countries	   (Austria,	   Germany,	   and	  Switzerland)	   –	   are	   studied	   with	   the	   purpose	   of	   identifying	   the	   main	   moral	  principles	  protected	  by	  the	  national	  legislator.	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1.	  	   The	   Council	   of	   Europe	   on	   the	   right	   to	   refuse	   medical	   treatment	  
within	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe:	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  
and	  Biomedicine	  of	  April	  1997	  The	   legal	   situation	  within	   the	  Council	   of	   Europe	   and	   in	   some	  of	   the	  Western	  European	   countries	   is	   studied.	   While	   the	   first	   part	   of	   it	   is	   dedicated	   to	   the	  situation	   within	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe	   –	   case-­‐law	   studies,	   analysis	   of	   the	  Recommendation	  CM/Rec	  (2009)	  11	  and	  of	  the	  Guide	  of	  2014	  –	  in	  the	  second	  part	  the	  situation	  in	  Spain,	  France,	  England	  and	  Germany	  is	  examined.	  	  	   The	   basic	   common	   European	   standard	   in	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   situations	   is	  demonstrated	  through	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  main	  case-­‐laws	  decided	  by	  the	  European	   Court	   of	   Human	   Rights,	   and	   analysis	   of	   the	   Recommendation	  CM/Rec	  (2009)	  11	  and	  of	  the	  Guide	  of	  2014.	  A	  particular	  attention	  is	  given	  to	  the	   case-­‐law	   of	   Lambert	   (Application	   no.	   46043/14)	   decided	   in	   June	   2015.	  This	   case-­‐law	   underlines	   the	   bioethical	   discussion	   regarding	   the	  withdrawal	  of	   ANH	   from	  an	   unconscious	   patient.	  Moreover,	   by	   giving	   concrete	   examples	  from	   the	   national	   laws,	   it	   is	   concluded	   that	   the	   European	   Court	   of	   Human	  Rights	   can	   apply	   the	   Recommendation	   CM/Rec(2009)11.	   This	   document,	  although	  it	  is	  considered	  a	  soft-­‐law,	  shows	  the	  common	  European	  background	  in	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   decisions.	   In	   addition,	   in	   the	   examination	   of	   the	   Guide,	   it	   is	  highlighted	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   involvement	   of	   the	   patient’s	   family	   and	  relatives	  in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  decisions,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  weightiness	  of	  the	  patient-­‐physician	  communication.	  	  	   In	   the	   second	  part,	   the	  different	   approaches	   in	   the	  national	  policies	  of	  ADs	   between	  Romance-­‐speaking	   countries	   on	   one	   side,	   and	   on	   the	   other	   the	  English-­‐	   and	  German-­‐speaking	   countries,	   is	   delineated.	  This	  division	   is	  made	  based	  on	  the	  level	  of	  protection	  of	  patient	  autonomy	  and	  the	  role	  of	  physicians	  in	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   situations.	   Although	   all	   the	   policies	   analyzed	   safeguard	   patient	  autonomy,	   the	   Romance-­‐speaking	   countries	   differ	   from	   the	   other	   groups	  (English-­‐	   and	   German-­‐speaking	   countries)	   since	   the	   national	   parliaments	   of	  the	  Romance-­‐speaking	   countries	   also	   highlight	   the	   significance	   of	   the	   role	   of	  physicians.	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   The	   importance	   of	   the	   European	   Convention	   of	   Human	   Rights	   and	  Biomedicine41	   of	   April	   1997	   (hereafter,	   the	   Convention)	   is	   discussed.	   The	  
Convention	   has	   implemented	   in	   the	   biomedical	   field	   the	   well-­‐known	   set	   of	  ethical	   principles	   as	   suggested	   by	   US-­‐American	   ethicists	   Beauchamp	   and	  Childress	   (1979),	   which	   has	   been	   established	   in	   general	   in	   the	   European	  Convention	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (ECHR)42.	  	  	   For	  several	  decades,	   the	  Council	  of	  Europe43	  has	  been	  concerning	   itself	  with	   problems	   regarding	   mankind	   as	   a	   result	   of	   advances	   in	   medicine	   and	  biology.	   It	   has	   always	   recognized	   the	   ambivalent	   nature	   of	   many	   of	   these	  advances.	  On	  one	  side,	  they	  could	  be	  used	  for	  a	  better	  life;	  on	  the	  other,	  some	  of	  these	  developments	  could	  potentially	  take	  a	  dangerous	  turn,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  distortion	   of	   the	   original	   objectives.	   Therefore,	   with	   its	   new	   complexity	   and	  extensive	  ramifications,	  science	  presents	  a	  dark	  side	  or	  a	  bright	  side	  according	  to	  how	  it	  is	  used	  (Explanatory	  Report	  164/1996,	  par.	  2).	  	  	  	  	  	  41	   The	   exact	   name	   of	   this	   convention	   is	   “Convention	   for	   the	   Protection	   of	   Human	  Rights	  and	  Dignity	  of	  the	  Human	  Being	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  Application	  of	  Biology	  and	  Medicine:	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Biomedicine”.	  42	  In	  concrete,	  the	  principle	  of	  autonomy	  –	  established	  in	  article	  8	  of	  the	  ECHR	  –	  has	  been	  recognized	  in	  articles	  5	  and	  6	  of	  the	  Convention	  of	  Oviedo.	  The	  articles	  2	  and	  3	  of	   the	   ECHR,	   which	   recognized	   the	   principles	   of	   beneficence	   and	   non-­‐maleficence,	  have	   been	   transferred	   in	   articles	   2	   and	   4	   of	   the	   “new”	   convention.	   In	   addition,	   the	  Convention	  of	  Oviedo	  has	  added	  the	  principle	  of	  justice	  (article	  3),	  which	  was	  further	  developed	   in	   the	   Rec	   (2003)	   24	   of	   the	   Committee	   of	   Ministers	   of	   the	   Council	   of	  Europe	  on	  the	  organisation	  of	  palliative	  care.	  	  43	   The	   Council	   of	   Europe	   is	   not	   an	   organ	   of	   the	   European	   Union.	   However,	   they	   do	  share	  the	  same	  values:	  human	  rights,	  democracy	  and	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	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   The	   preparatory	   work	   of	   the	   Convention	   started	   in	   1992	   and	   it	   was	  opened	   for	   signature	   on	   4	   April	   1997	   in	  Oviedo	   (Spain)44.	   This	   is	   the	   reason	  why	  this	  convention	  is	  known	  also	  as	  the	  ‘Oviedo	  Convention’.	  According	  to	  its	  article	   33,	   the	   Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights	   and	   Biomedicine	   entered	   into	  force	   in	   December	   1999,	   after	   the	   fifth	   ratification,	   that	   of	   Spain.	   Until	   now,	  this	  treaty	  has	  been	  ratified	  by	  29	  members	  states45.	  	  	   The	   ‘Oviedo	   Convention’	   comes	   from	   a	   general	   framework	   that	   was	  already	   agreed	   upon	   by	   the	   European	   bioethical	   community.	   This	   is	   why	   its	  preparatory	   work	   was	   concluded	   within	   few	   years46.	   This	   can	   be	   easily	  understood	   by	   reading	   its	   preamble,	   where	   other	   international	   conventions	  focussed	   in	   the	   protection	   of	   human	   rights	   have	   been	   mentioned.	   It	   follows	  	  	  	  	  	  44	   During	   the	   drafting	  work	   the	   terms	   “bioethics”	   and	   “life	   sciences”	  were	   replaced	  with	   more	   specific	   terms.	   The	   term	   “bioethics”	   was	   replaced	   by	   the	   term	  “biomedicine”	  in	  order	  to	  show	  the	  connection	  between	  human	  dignity	  and	  integrity	  and	  the	  application	  of	  biology	  and	  medicine.	  Moreover,	  the	  phrase	  “life	  sciences”	  was	  substituted	  with	  a	  narrow	  concept	  of	   “application	  of	  biology	  and	  medicine”,	   thereby	  excluding	   animal	   and	  plant	   biology	   insofar	   as	   they	  do	  not	   concern	  human	  medicine	  or	  biology.	  45	   The	   29	   Member	   States	   that	   have	   ratified	   the	   Convention	   of	   Human	   Rights	   and	  Biomedicine	   are:	   Albania,	   Bosnia	   and	  Herzegovina,	   Bulgaria,	   Croatia,	   Cyprus,	   Czech	  Republic,	   Denmark,	   Estonia,	   Finland,	   France,	   Georgia,	   Greece,	   Hungary,	   Iceland,	  Latvia,	  Lithuania,	  Republic	  of	  Moldova,	  Montenegro,	  Norway,	  Portugal,	  Romania,	  San	  Marino,	   Serbia,	   Slovak	  Republic,	   Slovenia,	   Spain,	   Switzerland,	   “The	   former	  Yugoslav	  Republic	  of	  Macedonia”,	  and	  Turkey.	  	  46	  However,	  problems	  that	  could	  be	  not	  resolved	  in	  an	  international	  agreement	  (such	  as	  the	  legal	  statues	  of	  the	  human	  embryo	  and	  foetus)	  were	  addressed	  at	  the	  national	  level,	   but	   their	   regulation	   must	   be	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   principles	   of	   this	  Convention.	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that	   the	  Convention	   does	   not	   replace	   them	   but	   it	   can	   be	   used	   as	   a	   source	   of	  interpretation	  of	  the	  other	  international	  treaties.	  	  	   The	   ‘Oviedo	   Convention’	   is	   the	   first	   international	   legally	   binding	  comprehensive	  multilateral	  treaty	  addressing	  biomedical	  human	  rights	  issues.	  Although	   there	   existed	   other	   international	   documents,	   this	   is	   the	   first	   treaty	  where	   these	   rights	   have	   been	   developed	   and	   assembled	   in	   one	   single	  multilateral	  binding	  instrument	  entirely	  devoted	  to	  biomedical	  development47.	  For	   the	   first	   time	   in	   the	   international	   debate	   there	   is	   a	   link	   between	   human	  rights	   and	   biomedicine	   (Andorno	   2005).	   Before	   it,	   the	   academia	   and	  professional	   regulators	   were	   accustomed	   to	   viewing	   medical	   ethics	   and	  international	  human	  rights	  law	  as	  distinct	  normative	  systems	  (Faunce	  2005).	  	  	   The	  ‘Oviedo	  Convention’	  was	  born	  with	  the	  political	  intention	  to	  protect	  human	  rights.	  This	   is	  why	   it	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  precise	  and	  detailed	  solution	  to	  the	  most	  complex	  bioethical	  dilemmas	  such	  as	  the	  legal	  status	  of	  the	  human	  embryo,	   abortion,	   physician	   assisted	   suicide	   (PAS)	   or	   euthanasia.	   This	   is	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  47	   Before	   1997,	   there	   were	   international	   binding	   Treaties	   that	   protected	   specific	  areas	  of	  human	  rights	  such	  as	  the	  Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Fundamental	   Freedoms	   of	   4	   November	   1950;	   the	   Convention	   for	   the	   Protection	   of	  Individuals	  with	  regard	  to	  Automatic	  Processing	  of	  Personal	  Data	  of	  28	  January	  1981	  or	   the	   Convention	   on	   the	   Rights	   of	   the	   Child	   of	   20	   November	   1989.	   Furthermore,	  UNESCO	  or	  other	  international	  bodies	  have	  developed	  “soft	  law”	  agreements,	  such	  as	  Declarations	   and	   Recommendations.	   The	   most	   important	   of	   these	   international	  agreements,	  which	  do	  not	  have	  a	  legally-­‐binding	  force,	  are	  the	  Declaration	  approved	  from	   UNESCO	   is	   the	   Universal	   Declaration	   of	   Human	   Rights	   proclaimed	   by	   the	  General	  Assembly	  of	   the	  United	  Nations	  on	  10	  December	  1948,	   and	   the	  Declaration	  of	  Helsinki	  “Ethical	  Principle	  for	  Medical	  Research	  involving	  Human	  Subjects”.	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political	   strategy	  which	  has	   the	   aim	   to	   find	  minimum	  European	   standards	   in	  the	   field	   of	   biomedicine	   that	   are	   accepted	   by	   all	   involved	   countries;	  without	  this	  strategy	  the	  Convention	  would	  have	  never	  been	  adopted.	  	  	   Furthermore,	   this	   convention	   has	   shown	   the	   synergic	   relationship	  between	   human	   rights	   in	   general	   and	   the	   right	   to	   health,	   which	   are	   closely	  related	   to	   upon	   the	   enjoyment	   of	   other	   human	   rights.	   Although	   there	   are	  different	  social	  and	  cultural	  backgrounds,	  setting	  common	  standards	  in	  health	  legislation	   is	   indeed	   possible	   because	   patients’	   needs	   presuppose	   that	  “principles	   transcend	   local	   diversity”	   (Sokalska	   2005).	   However,	   only	   with	  this	   convention,	   the	   codification	   of	   bio-­‐law	   has	   acquired	   political	   status	  (Andorno	   2002).	   This	   Convention	   has	   been	   considered	   as	   the	   «first	   steps	  towards	  the	  elaboration	  of	  an	  international	  biomedical	  law»	  (Andorno	  2002).	  	   The	   Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights	   and	   Biomedicine	   has	   adopted	   a	  pragmatic	  approach	  (Braun	  2000).	  According	  to	  its	  article	  27,	  States	  that	  have	  ratified	  it	  are	  not	  allowed	  to	  adopt	  a	  lower	  level	  of	  protection	  of	  human	  rights	  than	  those	  that	  have	  been	  recognized	  by	  the	  Convention.	  So,	  internal	  law	  of	  the	  parties	  shall	  conform	  to	  this	  treaty	  which	  may	  be	  achieved	  either	  by	  applying	  directly	   the	   Convention's	   provisions	   to	   domestic	   law	   or	   by	   enacting	   the	  necessary	   legislation	   to	   give	   effect	   to	   them.	   Moreover,	   in	   case	   of	   conflict	  between	   two	   international	   binding	   instruments,	   the	   principle	   that	   should	   be	  applied	   is	   not	   lex	   posterior	   derogat	   legi	   priori	   or	   lex	   specialis	   derogat	   legi	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generali,	  but	  the	  convention	  should	  be	  applied	  which	  is	  more	  beneficial	  to	  the	  individual	  concerned48.	  	  	   The	  protection	  of	  human	  rights	  in	  this	  convention	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  best	  strategy	   for	   regulating	   biomedical	   research	   and	   practice	   at	   a	   transnational	  level.	  This	  is	  not	  surprising,	  since	  human	  rights	  are	  viewed	  in	  our	  fragmented	  world	  as	   the	   last	  expression	  of	  a	  universal	  ethics	  (Thomaska	  2001),	  or	  as	   the	  lingua	  franca	  of	  international	  relations	  (Knowles	  2001).	  	  	  	   As	   it	   is	   well-­‐known,	   medical	   discoveries	   interfere	   with	   our	   life	   every	  day.	   Therefore,	   this	   convention	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   lex	   specialis	   of	   the	   ECHR	   of	  1950	  (Application	  no.	  8278/1978).	  The	  main	  aim	  of	  the	  ‘Oviedo	  Convention’	  is	  that	   to	   use	   the	   principle	   of	   the	   ECHR	   to	   protect	   human	   rights	   in	   the	   field	   of	  biomedicine.	  Moreover,	  according	  to	  article	  31,	  protocols	  may	  be	  concluded	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  48	   It	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   the	  United	  Nations	   Secretary	  General	   has	   set	   up	   a	  United	  Nations	   Interagency	  Committee	  on	  Bioethics	  which	   is	   focused	  on	  ensuring	  harmony	  within	  international	  commitments.	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specific	   fields49.	  So,	   this	  sort	  of	  up-­‐dating	  of	  protection	  of	  human	  rights	  could	  come	  through	  the	  emanation	  of	  new	  protocols50.	  	  	   The	   benefits	   that	   new	   medical	   and	   biological	   discoveries	   should	   be	  affirmed	   on	   three	   level	   of	   protection:	   the	   individual,	   the	   society	   and	   the	  humankind	   in	   general.	   The	   interest	   of	   individuals	   is	   considered	   higher	   than	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  society	  or	  science	  (article	  2).	  Only	  in	  precise	  situations	  and	  under	   strict	   conditions,	   the	   general	   interest	   can	   take	   priority	   (article	   26,	  section	  1).	  	   The	   main	   contribution	   of	   this	   convention	   is	   the	   involvement	   of	   the	  public	  debate	  on	  the	  protection	  of	  human	  rights	  in	  the	  field	  of	  biomedicine.	  On	  a	   national	   level,	   there	   exist	   specific	   institutions,	   such	   as	   committees	   or	  councils	   on	   bioethics	   (ex.	   France,	   Denmark,	   Italy	   and	   Portugal)	   or	   different	  organisations,	   that	  usually	   focus	  on	  a	  specific	  bioethical	   topic	   (ex.	  UK)	  or	   the	  regulation	   of	   biomedical	   matters	   is	   decentralized	   (ex.	   Germany	   where	   the	  “Länder”	  organize	  public	  debates).	  	  	  	  	  	  49	   Until	   now	   there	   are	   four	   protocols:	   Protocol	   on	   cloning,	   Protocol	   on	  Transplantation,	   Protocol	   on	   Bioethical	   Research,	   and	   Protocol	   on	   Genetic	   Testing	  for	   Health	   Purposes.	   From	   the	   preparatory	   work	   of	   this	   Convention,	   the	   role	   of	  protocols	   was	   underlined.	   The	   Recommendation	   No.	   1160/1991	   states	   that	   the	  convention	  in	  bioethics	  should	  contain	  general	  principles	  and	  additional	  protocols	  on	  specific	  areas.	  This	  was	  a	  political	  decision;	   this	   convention	  should	  have	  had	   legally	  binding	   force	   and	   should	   have	   been	   accepted	   from	   all	   the	   members	   of	   Council	   of	  Europe	  that	  have	  different	  socio-­‐cultural-­‐religious	  backgrounds.	  50	   Article	   29	   of	   the	  European	  Convention	   on	  Human	  Rights	   and	  Biomedicine	   should	  be	  interpreted	  in	  the	  same	  prospective.	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   Public	   consultation	   in	   the	   field	   of	   biomedicine	   is	   considered	  fundamental	  because	  in	  this	  area	  decisions	  are	  taken	  on	  three	  different	  levels	  –	   individual,	  medical	   and	   legal	  –	   that	   are	   closely	   intertwined.	  Citizens	  decide	  for	   themselves;	  but	   to	  be	  able	   to	  do	   that,	   this	  does	  not	  have	   to	  be	  prohibited	  by	   the	   law	   and/or	   also	   by	   the	  medical	   community.	   If	   the	   law	   considers	   it	   as	  illegal	  or	  the	  medical	  community	  considers	  it	  as	  unethical,	  citizens	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  perform	  their	  decisions.	  	  This	   is	   the	   reason	   why,	   in	   1994,	   a	   preliminary	   draft	   version	   of	   the	  convention	  was	  open	   for	  public	   consultation.	  Additionally,	   article	  28	   codifies	  the	   importance	   of	   public	   discussion.	   However,	   in	   this	   international	  convention,	  public	  debate	  is	  not	  completely	  open51.	  	  	   The	  Convention	   is	  important	  because	  it	  avoids	  economic	  competition	  in	  biomedicine;	   providing	   legally	   binding	   norms	   for	   all	   States	   that	   ratified	   it,	  economic	   completion	   or	   ‘medical	   tourism’	   in	  medicine	   and	   biology	  would	   be	  eluded	   because	   in	   all	   these	   countries	   there	   is	   the	   same	   level	   of	   human	  protection.	   In	   an	   economic	   crisis	   such	   as	   the	   one	   of	   recent	   years,	   economic	  competition	  in	  biomedicine	  could	  be	  a	  concrete	  risk.	  
	  	  	  	  	  51	  The	  Convention	  on	  Human	  rights	  and	  Biomedicine	  does	  not	  allow	  a	  public	  debate	  on	   some	   principle	   such	   as	   the	   prohibition	   of	   carrying	   out	   a	   medical	   operation	  without	  the	  free	  and	  informed	  consent	  of	  the	  person	  involved	  (article	  5),	  the	  right	  of	  inform	   consent	   (article	   10)	   or	   the	   prohibition	   of	   sex	   discrimination	   in	   genetic	   tests	  (article	  12).	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   The	   absence	   of	   a	   direct	   legal	   action	   from	   individuals	   and	   the	   lack	   of	  sanctions	   are	   the	   major	   flaws	   of	   this	   convention.	   However,	   with	   the	   aim	   to	  cover	   these,	   article	   29	   recognizes	   the	   possibility	   of	   the	   ECtHR	   giving	   an	  interpretation	   of	   the	   present	   convention	   without	   direct	   reference	   to	   any	  specific	   proceedings	   pending	   in	   a	   court	   if	   this	   is	   asked	   from	   one	   of	   the	  governments	  of	  a	  party	  –	  after	  having	  informed	  the	  other	  parties	  –	  or	  from	  the	  Steering	  Committee	  on	  Bioethics.	  	  	   Concluding,	   the	   European	   Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights	   and	  Biomedicine	  –	  which	  should	  be	  considered	  a	  pragmatic	  unfinished	  document	  –	  is	   the	   first	   international	   legally	   binding	   comprehensive	   multilateral	   treaty	  addressing	  human	  rights	  issues	  in	  biomedicine.	  It	  provides	  basic	  standards	  in	  the	  biomedical	   field	   that	  have	  been	  recognized	  by	   the	  ECtHR	  as	   fundamental.	  In	   addition,	   it	   avoids	   economic	   competition	   in	   biomedical	   research	   and	  stimulates	  public	  debate	  and	  political	  agreement	  in	  the	  field	  of	  biomedicine.	  	  	  	  
1.1.	  	   The	  interpretation	  of	  the	  right	  to	  refuse	  medical	  treatments	  by	  the	  
European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  	  The	  application	  by	  the	  ECtHR	  of	  Chapter	  II	  of	  the	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  and	   Biomedicine	   of	   April	   1997,	   and	   in	   particular	   the	   right	   to	   refuse	  medical	  treatments,	  will	  be	  analyzed.	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Chapter	  II	  of	  the	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Biomedicine	  of	  April	  1997	   is	   dedicated	   to	   informed	   consent.	  Within	   this	   chapter,	   article	   9,	   which	  recognizes	  the	  importance	  of	  prospective	  autonomy,	  is	  important.	  This	  article	  states	   that	   “the	   previously	   expressed	  wishes	   relating	   to	   a	  medical	   intervention	  
by	  a	  patient	  who	  is	  not,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  intervention,	   in	  a	  state	  to	  express	  his	  
or	  her	  wishes	   shall	  be	   taken	   into	  account”.	  The	  Explanatory	  Report	  explains	   it	  preciously	  without	  giving	  several	  details	  regarding	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  phrase	  “shall	   be	   taken	   into	   account”52.	   Therefore,	   the	   role	   of	   the	   ECtHR	   in	   filling	   the	  meaning	   of	   it	   has	   been	   considered	   fundamental.	   The	   same	   aim	   has	   the	  Recommendation	  CM/Rec	  (2009)	  11	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  2.1.2.)	  and	  the	  Guide	  on	  the	  
decision-­‐making	   process	   regarding	   medical	   treatment	   in	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   situations	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  2.1.3.).	  	   Although	  the	   legal	  reasoning	  done	  by	  the	  ECtHR	  is	  based	  on	  the	  ECHR,	  this	   can	   perfectly	   be	   applied	   to	   the	   interpretation	   of	   Chapter	   II	   of	   the	  Convention	  for	  several	  reasons.	  Firstly,	  article	  3	  of	  the	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights	   of	   the	   European	   Union	   200053	   has	   established	   patient	   autonomy	   as	   a	  fundamental	  requirement	  in	  the	  field	  of	  medicine.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  52	   Par.	   69	   of	   the	   Explanatory	   Report	   of	   the	   Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights	   and	  Biomedicine	   states	   that	   the	   previously	   expressed	   wishes	   relating	   to	   a	   medical	  intervention	   by	   a	   patient	   who	   is	   not,	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   intervention,	   in	   a	   state	   to	  express	  his	  or	  her	  wishes	  shall	  be	  taken	  into	  account.	  53	   Five	  EU-­‐Members	   (Italy,	   Luxemburg,	   the	  Netherlands,	   Sweden	  and	  Poland)	  which	  signed	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Biomedicine	  on	  4	  April	  1997	  (except	  Poland	  that	  signed	  it	  on	  7	  May	  1999)	  have	  not	  ratified	  it.	  The	  main	  reason	  of	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   Moreover,	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Biomedicine	  has	   been	   applied	   directly	   by	   the	  ECtHR54,	   even	   against	  Member	   States	   of	   the	  Council	   of	   Europe	   who	   have	   not	   signed	   it	   (Application	   no.	   53924/00)	   or	  against	   Member	   States	   that	   have	   signed	   but	   not	   ratified	   it	   (Application	   no.	  8278/1978).	   Furthermore,	   the	   convention	   of	   Oviedo	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   lex	  
specialis	   of	   the	   European	   Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights	   of	   1950	   (Application	  no.	   8278/1978,	   Guide	   on	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   regarding	   medical	  treatment	   in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  situations	  of	  May	  2014).	   In	  addition,	   the	  preamble	  of	  ‘Oviedo	  Convention’	  cites	  the	  ECHR.	  
	  	  	  	  	  the	  absence	  of	  this	  ratification	  is:	  for	  the	  Netherlands,	  Sweden	  and	  Poland	  article	  18	  of	   this	   Convention;	   for	   Luxemburg,	   article	   22;	   the	   Italian	   Parliament	   has	   approved	  the	  application	  of	  this	  convention,	  but	  the	  Government	  has	  not	  deposit	  the	  signature.	  However,	   no	   reasons	  why	   Italy	   did	   not	   deposit	   the	   instrument	   of	   ratification,	  were	  founded	   (Goffin	   2008).	   It	   should	   be	  noted	   that	   the	   standards	   of	   the	  Convention	  will	  be	   applied	   to	   these	   countries	   for	   two	   main	   reasons.	   First	   of	   all,	   article	   3	   of	   the	  Charter	   of	   Fundamental	   Rights	   of	   the	   European	   Union	   of	   2000,	   has	   the	   same	   legal	  value	  of	  the	  EU-­‐Treaties,	  established	  informed	  consent	  (C.	  Cost.	  24	  October	  2007,	  no.	  348	  and	  no.	  349).	  Secondly,	  even	  if	  the	  Convention	  could	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  soft-­‐law,	  the	   ECtHR	   has	   applied	   it	   in	   interpreting	   international	   treatments,	   even	   agreements	  that	  are	  not	  legally-­‐binding	  (Application	  no.	  14038/88).	  	  54According	   to	   the	   “Research	  Report:	   	  Bioethics	  and	   the	  case-­‐law	  of	   the	  Court”,	  which	  is	   the	  most	   recent	   report	   published,	   the	  European	  Court	   of	  Human	  Rights	   has	   cited	  the	   European	   Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights	   and	   Biomedicine	   of	   April	   1997	   eleven	  times,	   eight	   times	   related	   to	   consent	   in	   medical	   treatments:	   Application	   no.	  25781/94,	  par.	  221;	  Application	  no.	  61827/00,	  par.	  58;	  Application	  no.	  6339/05,	  par.	  40;	   Application	   no.	   74300/01;	   Application	   no.	   52515/99,	   par.	   56;	   Application	   nos.	  45901/05	  and	  40146/06,	  par.	  31;	  Application	  no.	  27915/06,	  par.	  35;	  Application	  no.	  27617/04,	  par.	  83;	  Application	  no.	  18968/07,	  pars.	  76-­‐77.	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   Through	   a	   non-­‐originalist	   interpretation55,	   the	   ECtHR	   has	   always	  considered	   fundamental	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   ethical	   principle	   of	   patient	  autonomy	  and	  consequentially	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination.	  This	  protection	  comes	   from	   the	   combined	   interpretation	   of	   article	   2	   (right	   to	   life),	   article	   3	  (freedom	   from	   torture	   and	   other	   inhuman	   or	   degrading	   treatment	   or	  
punishment)	  and	  especially	  of	  article	  8	  (right	  to	  respect	   for	  private	  and	  family	  
life).	   Further,	   in	   case	   of	   refusing	   medical	   treatment	   for	   personal	   religious	  conviction,	   article	   9	   (freedom	   of	   thought,	   conscience	   and	   religion)	   must	   be	  applied	  (Application	  no.	  302/02).	  	  	   The	   right	   to	   decide	   about	   one’s	   personal	   future	   in	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   decision	  making	  was	   recognized	   for	   the	   first	   time	   in	   the	   famous	   case	   of	   Pretty	   v.	   the	  United	   Kingdom,	   where	   the	   court	   states	   that	   the	   imposition	   of	   medical	  treatment	  without	   consent	  would	   interfere	  with	  a	  person's	  physical	   integrity	  in	  a	  manner	  capable	  of	  engaging	  the	  rights	  protected	  by	  article	  8	  (Application	  no.	  2346/02,	  par.	  63).	  	  	   The	  term	  ‘private	  life’	  used	  in	  article	  8	  of	  the	  ECHR	  is	  a	  broad	  concept;	  encompassing,	   inter	   alia,	   the	   right	   to	   personal	   autonomy	   and	   personal	  development	   (Application	   no.	   44599/98,	   par.	   47)	   or	   a	   person’s	   physical	   and	  psychological	   integrity	   (Application	   no.	   5410/03,	   par.	   107).	   A	   patient’s	  	  	  	  	  	  55	   The	   non-­‐originalist	   interpretation	   means	   that	   these	   are	   rights	   which	   are	   not	  expressly	   mentioned	   in	   the	   text	   but	   which,	   it	   is	   proposed,	   should	   nevertheless	   be	  ‘read	   into’	   it.	   According	   to	   them,	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination	  should	  be	  not	  theoretical	  and	  illusory.	  (Letsas	  2010)	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decision	   is	   valid	   only	   in	   cases	  where	   the	   decision	   has	   been	   taken	   freely	   and	  with	   full	   understanding	   of	   the	   medical	   consequences	   (Application	   no.	  31322/07)	   and	   the	   patient	   have	   been	   a	   competent	   adult	   (Application	   no.	  45076/05).	  Otherwise,	  physicians	  should	  act	  according	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  the	  patient’s	  best	  interest.	  	  	   The	  State	  –	  in	  balancing	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  and	  the	  patient’s	  best	   interest	   –	   has	   a	   positive	   obligation	   to	   protect	   personal	   autonomy	   in	  concrete	   situation	   (Application	   no.	   11562/05).	   Recently,	   on	   5	   June	   2015	   the	  ECtHR	   has	   return	   to	   this	   problem	   (Application	   no.	   46043/14).	   Any	  intervention	   against	   individual	   autonomy	   must	   be	   justified	   as	   being	   “in	  accordance	  with	   the	   law”	   and	   “necessary	   in	   a	   democratic	   society”	   for	   one	   or	  more	   of	   the	   legitimate	   aims	   listed	   therein	   (Application	   no.	   27617/04,	   par.	  183).	  	   Medical	  intervention	  without	  the	  patient’s	  consent	  is	  an	  infringement	  of	  the	   right	   to	   respect	   for	   private	   life	   (article	   8	   ECHR)	   (Applications	   nos.	  45901/05,	   40146/06,	   par.	   75;	   and	  no.	   61827/00,	   par.	   75)	   and,	   in	   particular,	  the	   right	   to	  physical	   integrity	   (Applications	  no.	   2346/02,	   par.	   61	   and	  63;	  no.	  61827/00,	   par.	   70;	   no.	   24209/94,	   par.	   33;	   and	   no.	   8978/80,	   par.	   22).	   The	  violated	   right	  must	   be	   practical	   and	   effective	   and	   not	   theoretical	   or	   illusory	  (Application	   no.	   27617/04,	   par	   191;	   and	   no.	   6289/73,	   par.	   24).	   In	   addition,	  the	  infringement	  could	  be	  classified	  as	  torture	  (ex.	  article	  3	  ECHR)	  only	  in	  case	  there	  is	  a	  minimum	  level	  of	  severity,	  which	  depends	  case	  by	  case	  (Application	  no.	  2627/09,	  par.	  58;	  and	  no.	  33394/96,	  par.	  24).	  	   Consent	   is	   not	   only	   necessary	   in	   cases	   of	   urgency.	   According	   to	   the	  ECtHR,	  there	  is	  no	  urgency	  if	  the	  medical	  situation	  was	  either	  deteriorating	  or	  was	   likely	   to	   deteriorate	   or	  when	   the	   patient	  was	   in	   any	   pain	   or	   discomfort	  (Application	  nos.	  45901/05	  and	  40146/06,	  par	  79).	  Moreover,	  a	  measure	  that	  is	   therapeutically	   necessary	   cannot	   in	   principle	   be	   regarded	   as	   inhuman	   and	  degrading	  (Application	  no.	  54810/00,	  par.	  112;	  and	  no.	  52515/99,	  par.	  82).	  	   Concluding,	   patient	   autonomy	   and	   the	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination	  regarding	  medical	  treatment	  has	  always	  been	  protected	  by	  the	  ECtHR	  through	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a	   non-­‐originalist	   interpretation	   of	   article	   2	   (right	   to	   life),	   article	   3	   (freedom	  
from	   torture	   and	   other	   inhuman	   or	   degrading	   treatment	   or	   punishment)	   and	  especially	  of	  article	  8	  (right	  to	  respect	  for	  private	  and	  family	  life)	  of	  the	  ECHR.	  In	   addition,	   when	   deciding	   regarding	   the	   incapable	   patient,	   the	   ECtHR	   has	  declared	   that	   all	   the	  parties	   involved	   should	  make	   the	  decision	  based	  on	   the	  patient’s	   wishes,	   by	   taking	   into	   consideration	   the	   patient’s	   situation	   as	   a	  whole.	   The	   Cartesian	   dualism	   –	   defended	   by	   René	  Descartes	   (Howard	   2003)	  and	  which	  established	  the	  dual	  existence	  of	  man	  (matter	  and	  mind)	  –	  does	  not	  find	   any	   place	   in	   these	   rulings.	   Therefore,	   the	   ECtHR	   has	   implemented	   the	  interpretation	  of	  article	  1	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  WHO	  of	  1946	  which	  states	  that	  “health	  is	  a	  state	  of	  complete	  physical,	  mental	  and	  social	  well-­‐being	  and	  not	  
merely	  the	  absence	  of	  disease	  or	  infirmity”.	  	  	  	  
1.1.1.	  	  Comments	   on	   the	   case-­‐law	   of	   Vincent	   Lambert:	   the	   rulings	   of	   the	  
Conseil	  d’État	  and	  of	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  The	   French	   case-­‐law	   of	   Vincent	   Lambert	   has	   been	   commented.	   Although	   the	  main	  argument	  has	  been	  examined	  through	  a	  legal	  perspective,	  the	  concept	  of	  artificial	  nutrition	  and	  hydration	  (ANH)	  will	  be	  explained	  by	  applying	  medical	  and	   ethical	   approaches.	   	   The	   understanding	   of	   this	   concept	   through	   an	  interdisciplinary	   approach	   is	   fundamental	   since	   its	   medical	   classification	  influences	  the	  ethical	  and	  especially	  the	  legal	  reasonings.	  	  	   After	  exposing	  the	  facts,	  the	  rulings	  coming	  from	  the	  Conseil	  d’État	  and	  from	  the	  ECtHR	  have	  been	  commented	  through	  a	  legal	  comparative	  approach.	  In	  particular,	  article	  2	  (right	  to	  life)	  of	  the	  ECHR	  of	  1950,	  especially	  the	  State’s	  positive	  obligation	  to	  protect	  citizen	  lives,	  will	  be	  analyzed.	  In	  the	  conclusions,	  the	  positions	  of	  the	  Conseil	  d’État	  (Applications	  no.	  375081,	  375090,	  375091)	  and	  of	  the	  ECtHR	  (Application	  no.	  46043/14)	  have	  been	  underlined.	  
	   Vincent	   Lambert	   was	   a	   tetraplegic	   patient	   at	   Châlons-­‐en-­‐Champagne	  Hospital	   and	   then,	   from	   June	   2009	   and	   on,	   in	   Berck-­‐sur-­‐Mer.	   In	   2011	   his	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condition	  was	  characterised	  as	  minimally	  conscious	  and	  in	  2014	  as	  vegetative.	  As	  a	  result,	  he	  received	  ANH.	  	  	   After	   the	   collegial	   proceeding	   established	   in	   article	   37	   of	   the	   French	  Code	  of	  Medical	  Ethics	  (e.g.	  see	  Sect.	  2.3.2.),	  and	  by	  involving	  the	  patient’s	  wife	  in	   it,	   Dr.	   Karigen	   decided	   in	   early	   2013	   to	   withdraw	   the	   patient’s	   nutrition.	  This	   medical	   decision	   was	   overruled	   by	   the	   judge	   of	   the	   Châlons-­‐en-­‐Champagne	  Administrative	  Court,	  who	  granted	  the	  request	  to	  resume	  feeding	  and	   hydrating	   Lambert.	   Nevertheless,	   in	   December	   2013,	   after	   a	   second	  
collegial	   proceeding,	   Dr.	   Karigen	   decided	   again	   to	   withdraw	   Lambert’s	  nutrition.	   The	   patient’s	   family	   opposed	   it	   again	   by	   making	   a	   further	   urgent	  application	  to	  the	  Châlons-­‐en-­‐Champagne	  Administrative	  Court.	  The	  court,	  on	  January	  2014,	  decided	  to	  suspend	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  Lambert’s	  nutrition.	  One	  of	   the	   applicants	   and	   the	   Reims	   University	   Hospital	   appealed	   against	   that	  judgment	  to	  the	  urgent-­‐applications	  judge	  of	  the	  Conseil	  d’État,	  which	  decided	  on	  24	  June	  2014.	  	  
	   One	   day	   before	   the	   ruling	   of	   the	  Conseil	   d’État,	   the	   parents	   of	   Vincent	  Lambert	   (Mr	  Pierre	   Lambert	   and	  Mrs	  Viviane	  Lambert),	   his	   half-­‐brother	   (Mr	  David	  Philippon)	  and	  his	  sister	  (Mrs	  Anne	  Tuarze)	  made	  an	  application	  to	  the	  ECtHR	   by	   relying	   on	   the	   violation	   of	   Article	   2	   (right	   to	   life)	   Article	   3	  (prohibition	  of	  torture	  and	  of	  inhuman	  or	  degrading	  treatment)	  Article	  8	  (right	  
to	   respect	   for	   private	   and	   family	   life)	   and	   article	   6,	   section	   1	   (right	   to	   a	   fair	  
hearing).	  The	  ECtHR	  decided	  on	  5	  June	  2015.	  
	   The	  main	  legal	  question	  that	  the	  Conseil	  d’État	  and	  then	  the	  ECtHR	  had	  to	  examine	  is	  if	  the	  artificially	  supplied	  nutrition	  and	  hydration	  to	  a	  patient	  in	  a	   vegetative	   state	   may	   be	   considered	   a	   medical	   treatment	   that	   can	   be	  withdrawn.	   Before	   commenting	   these	   rulings	   from	   a	   legal	   perspective,	   the	  medical	   classification	  of	  ANH	  and	   its	   consequences	   should	  be	  briefly	   studied	  by	   applying	   an	   interdisciplinary	   approach	   because	   its	   medical	   classification	  influences	  the	  legal	  consequences.	  	  	   Within	   going	   to	   repeat	   parts	   of	   this	   thesis,	   it	   should	   be	   reminded	   that	  the	   European	   bioethical	   community	   classifies	   ANH	   as	   medical	   treatment	   or	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general	   medical	   management.	   In	   addition,	   some	   official	   documents	   identify	  nutrition	  done	   through	  medical	  machines	   basic	   care	   (e.g.	   see	   Sect.	   1.5.1.	   and	  3.1.1.).56	   It	   follows	   that	   if	   ANH	   is	   considered	   basic	   care	   and	   there	   is	   the	  patient’s	   request	   to	  withdraw	   it,	   physicians	  would	   be	   liable	   for	   homicide	   by	  request	   of	   the	   victim,	  which	   in	   several	   countries	   is	   considered	   as	   a	   criminal	  offence.	   Obviously,	   all	   scholars	   –	   even	   when	   they	   consider	   ANH	   a	   medical	  treatment	   –	   agree	   that	   the	  withdrawal	   of	   ANH	  without	   the	   patient’s	   request	  will	   be	   considered	   an	   intentional	   homicide,	   except	   when	   continuing	   it	   is	  considered	  a	  futile	  or	  disproportionate	  treatment	  (Lecaldano	  2005).	  
	   Starting	   now	   with	   the	   legal	   analysis	   of	   this	   ruling,	   the	   Conseil	   d’État	  stated	  that	  ANH	  fell	  into	  the	  category	  of	  treatment	  that	  could	  be	  withheld.	  The	  ruling	  clarified	  three	  main	  points.	  First	  of	  all,	  the	  law	  no.	  2005-­‐370	  of	  22	  April	  2005	  applies	   to	  every	  patient	  –	  consumer	  of	   the	  French	  health	  care	  system	  –	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  patient	  is	  considered	  in	  on	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  situation.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  56	   Italian	   Bill	   2350	   discussed	   by	   the	   Senate	   on	   26	   March	   2009	   and	   than	   from	   the	  Chamber	  of	  Deputies	  on	  12	  July	  2011	  and	  never	  passed	  into	  a	  law	  and	  re-­‐proposed	  as	  a	   draft	   –bill	   by	   the	   Deputies	   Ms.	   Roccella	   and	   others	   on	   26	   March	   2014;	   Italian	  Commission	  of	  Bioethics,	  “Alimentation	  and	  The	  nutrition	  and	  hydration	  for	  patients	  in	   a	   persistent	   vegetative	   state”	   (2005)	  http://www.palazzochigi.it/bioetica/testi/PEG.pdf;	   Technical	   and	   Scientific	  Commisison	  on	  “Vegetative	  state	  and	  minimum	  conscious	  state”	  established	  with	  the	  Italian	   Ministerial	   Decree	   of	   12	   September	   2005	  http://www.aduc.it/generale/files/allegati/cure_stato_vegetativo.pdf.	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   The	  Conseil	   d’État	   based	   its	   decision	  on	   the	  originalist	   interpretation57	  of	  the	  law	  no.	  2005-­‐370	  of	  22	  April	  2005	  Loi	  relative	  aux	  droits	  des	  malades	  et	  
à	   la	   fin	   de	   vie,	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘Leonetti	   Act’.	   The	   law	   no.	   2005-­‐37058,	   has	  modified	   the	   previous	   law	   no.	   2002-­‐303	   of	   4	   March	   2002	   Loi	   relative	   aux	  
droits	   des	  malades	   et	   à	   la	   qualité	   du	   système	   de	   santé.	  The	   former	   law	   stated	  that	  patients	  have	   the	   right	   to	   refuse	   ‘‘a’’	   treatment	  without	   identifying	  what	  would	   have	   happen	   if	   the	   treatment	   was	   considered	   a	   life-­‐sustaining	  treatment	  at	  the	  end	  of	   life.	  The	  law	  of	  2005	  gives	  citizens	  the	  right	  to	  refuse	  “every”	   kind	   of	   treatment.	   Therefore,	   since	   the	   ‘Leonetti	   Act’	   states	   that	   all	  citizens	  have	  the	  right	  to	  refuse	  “every”	  kind	  of	  treatment	  there	  are	  no	  reasons	  why	  these	  rules	  should	  not	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  case	  of	  withdrawing	  ANH.	  	  	   Secondly,	   treatment	   can	   be	   withdrawn	   in	   case	   of	   unreasonable	  obstinacy,	   interpreted	  as	  a	   treatment	  that	   is	   futile	  or	  disproportionate	  or	  has	  “no	  other	  effect	  than	  to	  sustain	  life	  artificially”.	  Thirdly,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  although	  the	  patient	   is	   in	  a	  minimally	  conscious	  state	  or	   in	  vegetative	  state	  –	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  Originalist	   theories	   attempt	   to	   link	   interpretation	   to	   the	   time	   when	   the	   law	  was	  enacted.	   This	   style	   of	   interpretation	   brings	   certainty	   into	   law.	   Within	   originalist	  theories	  there	  are	  two	  different	  groups:	  textualism.	  which	  focusses	  on	  the	  meaning	  of	  words	   and	   intentionalism,	   which	   emphasis	   the	   drafting	   history	   of	   the	   bill	   (Letsas	  2010).	  58	   It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  French	  law	  of	  2005,	  Loi	  relative	  aux	  droits	  des	  malades	  
et	  à	  la	  fin	  de	  vie	  of	  22	  April	  2005,	  has	  been	  modified	  on	  March	  2015,	  by	  the	  Loi	  créant	  
de	  nouveaux	  droits	  en	   faveur	  des	  malades	  et	  des	  personnes	  en	   fin	  de	  vie.	   It	  seems	  that	  the	   new	   law	   is	  more	   liberal	   because	   advance	   directives	   are	   presumed	   to	   be	   legally	  binding	  and	  not	  time-­‐limited.	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which	  means	   that	   the	  patient	   cannot	  exercise	  his	  own	  autonomy	  directly	   –	   it	  does	  not	   justify	  by	   itself	   that	  doctors	  should	  withdraw	  ANH.	  Physicians	  must	  take	   into	   consideration	   not	   only	   medical	   criteria,	   but	   also	   the	   patient’s	  previous	   wishes	   and	   preferences.	   In	   case	   that	   there	   is	   no	   ‘living	   will’,	   the	  surrogate	   and	   the	   patient’s	   family	   and	   relatives	   should	   be	   involved.	   Only	  where	   the	  patient’s	  ADs	   are	  unknown,	   the	  principle	   in	  dubio	  pro	   vida	   should	  be	  applied.	  	  	  	   Regarding	  the	  reconstruction	  of	  the	  patient’s	  wishes,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	   Vincent	   Lambert	   had	   not	   nominated	   a	   surrogate.	   Nonetheless,	   doctors	  involved	  his	  wife.	  French	  doctors	  correctly	  applied	  the	  rules	  established	  in	  the	  Public	  Health	  Code	  (article	  1111-­‐13	  and	  article	  1111-­‐6	  CSP)	  because	  the	  legal	  system	   should	  be	   seen	   as	   a	  whole.	   The	  previous	   version	   of	   article	   1111-­‐1359	  stated	  that	  in	  case	  of	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  surrogate,	  family	  should	  be	  involved.	  In	  addition,	  article	  1111-­‐6	  CSP	  states	  that	  a	  surrogate	  can	  be	  a	  parent,	  a	  relative	  or	  a	  doctor.	  The	  statements	  of	  Mr.	  Lambert’s	  wife	  were	  precise	  and	  had	  been	  confirmed	  by	  one	  of	  Mr.	  Lambert’s	  brothers.	  	  	   Before	   ruling,	   the	   Conseil	   d’État	   required	   not	   only	   the	   report	   by	   Dr.	  Karigen	  –	  as	  it	  is	  established	  in	  article	  37	  of	  the	  French	  Code	  of	  Medical	  Ethics	  –	   but	   also	   asked	   other	   public	   organs	   (such	   as	   from	   the	   National	   Medical	  Academy,	   the	   National	   Ethics	   Advisory	   Committee	   and	   the	   National	   Medical	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  new	  law	  of	  March	  2015,	  Loi	  créant	  de	  nouveaux	  droits	  en	  
faveur	  des	  malades	  et	  des	  personnes	  en	  fin	  de	  vie,	  has	  abrogated	  article	  1111-­‐13	  CSP.	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Council	   and	   Mr	   Leonetti,	   the	   rapporteur	   for	   the	   Act	   of	   22	   April	   2005)	   to	  submit	   their	  reports.	  This	  decision	  confirms	  that	   the	  medical	  classification	  of	  ANH	   influences	   the	   ethical	   and	   legal	   reasoning.	   Moreover,	   the	   Conseil	   d’État	  had	   examined	   the	   case	   sitting	   as	   a	   full	   court,	   which	   was	   highly	   unusual	   in	  injunction	   proceedings.	   This	   shows	   the	   seriousness	   that	   the	   French	   judges	  have	  given	  this	  case-­‐law.	  	  	   On	   24	   June	   2014,	   the	   Conseil	   d’État	   concluded	   that	   all	   the	   conditions	  imposed	  by	  the	  law	  no.	  2005-­‐370	  of	  22	  April	  2005	  had	  been	  met	  and	  that	  the	  doctor’s	   decision	   to	   withdraw	   the	   artificial	   nutrition	   and	   hydration	   was	  lawful.	  
	   The	  case-­‐law	  of	  Lambert	  was	  brought	   in	   front	  of	  the	  ECtHR	  on	  23	  June	  2014.	  The	  applications	  claimed	  that	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  ANH	  is	  a	  breach	  of	  the	  State’s	   obligation	   to	   safeguard	   the	   lives	   of	   citizens	   (article	   2).	  Moreover,	   the	  deprivation	   of	   nutrition	   and	   hydration	  might	   constitute	   a	   torture	   (article	   3)	  and	   also	   infringe	   Vincent	   Lambert’s	   physical	   integrity	   (article	   8).	  Furthermore,	   the	   doctor	  who	   had	   taken	   the	   decision	   had	   not	   been	   impartial	  (article	  6,	  section	  1).	  	   Before	  deciding	  the	  merit	  of	  this	  case-­‐law,	  the	  ECtHR	  has	  made	  several	  preliminary	   thoughts.	   First	   the	   court	   highlighted	   that	   health	   has	   been	  protected	  as	  a	  fundamental	  human	  right.	  Moreover,	  the	  importance	  of	  advance	  directives	   (ADs)	  has	  been	  highlighted	   in	   several	  parliaments	  of	   the	  members	  of	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe.	   Also,	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe	   has	   underlined	   the	  common	  European	   standards	   regarding	   this	   issue	   in	   several	   documents	   such	  as	  the	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Biomedicine	  of	  April	  1997	  (article	  9),	  the	   Recommendation	   CM/Rec	   (2009)	   11	   of	   December	   2009	   (e.g.,	   see	   Sect.	  2.1.2.)	   and	   the	   Guide	   on	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   regarding	   medical	  treatment	  in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  situations	  of	  May	  2014	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  2.1.3.).	  	   The	   main	   arguments	   of	   the	   ruling	   of	   5	   June	   2015	   regard	   the	  interpretation	   of	   article	   2	   ECHR.	   Judges	   based	   their	   decision	   on	   the	   ground	  that	  article	  2	  of	  the	  ECHR	  establishes	  both	  negative	  and	  positive	  obligation	  to	  the	  State.	  The	  State	  must	  refrain	  from	  the	  “intentional”	  taking	  of	  life	  (negative	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obligations),	   in	  addition	   to	  safeguard	   the	   lives	  of	   those	  within	   its	   jurisdiction	  (positive	   obligations).	   All	   parties	   agreed	   that	   there	   is	   a	   distinction	   between	  the	   intentionally	   taking	   of	   a	   life	   (PAS	   and	   euthanasia)	   and	   therapeutic	  abstention	   (withdrawing	   of	   medical	   treatment).	   Moreover,	   the	   government	  highlighted	  that	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  withdraw	  is	  not	  that	  to	  put	  an	  end	  to	  life,	  but	  to	  discontinue	   a	   form	   of	   treatment	   which	   was	   refused	   by	   the	   patient	   directly	  (through	   ‘living	  will’)	   or	   indirectly	   (through	   the	   application	  of	   the	   substitute	  judgment	   theory),	   or	   this	   treatment	   is	   considered	   –	   from	   a	   medical	  prospective	  –	  as	  an	  unreasonable	  obstinacy.	  Thus,	  the	  ECtHR	  stated	  that	  there	  is	  no	  violation	  of	  the	  State’s	  negative	  obligation	  (par.	  124).	  	   Regarding	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  State’s	  positive	  obligation	  established	  in	  article	  2	  of	  the	  ECHR,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  this	  is	  not	  the	  first	  time	  that	  the	  ECtHR	  has	  dealt	  with	  this	  issue	  (e.g.	  see	  Sect.	  2.1.).	  Analyzing	  the	  violation	   of	   the	   state’s	   positive	   obligation	   established	   in	   article	   2,	   the	  ECtHR	  stated	   that	   there	   is	   no	   general	   agreement	   among	   the	   member	   States	   of	   the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  about	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  ANH	  (par.	  74).	  	  	   The	  medical	  classification	  of	  ANH	  and	  its	  ethical	  and	  legal	  consequences	  are	   still	   an	   important	   European	   bioethical	   topic.	   Recently,	   the	   Guide	   on	   the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  regarding	  medical	  treatment	  in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  situations	  published	   by	   the	   Committee	   on	   Bioethics	   of	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe	   on	   May	  2014	  has	  underlined	  the	  ethical	  and	  legal	  discussion	  regarding	  ANH.	  Although	  the	   Guide	   takes	   any	   official	   position	   regarding	   this	   topic,	   it	   states	   that	   this	  technique	   implies	   choices	   concerning	   medical	   procedures	   and	   devices	  (perfusion,	   feeding	   tubes).	   This	   is	   an	   important	   statement	   because	   since	  medical	   procedures	   and	   devices	   are	   involved,	   it	   follows	   that	   this	   ‘medical	  preceding’	  cannot	  be	  classified	  –	  under	  a	  medical	  approach	  –	  as	  basic	  care.	  	  	   While	   there	   is	   no	   general	   bioethical	   agreement	   regarding	   the	  classification	  of	  ANH	  (e.g.,	   see	  Sect.	  3.1.1.),	  different	  European	  policies	   ruling	  ANH	  highlight	  different	  moral	  values,	  which	  has	  led	  to	  diverse	  legal	  rules.	  For	  instance,	   the	   French,	   Italian	   and	   English	   legislators	   have	   ad	   hoc	   rules	  regarding	   this	   issue.	   In	   France,	   ANH	  will	   be	   withdrawn	   –	   after	   applying	   the	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collegial	  proceeding	  established	  in	  article	  37	  of	  the	  Code	  of	  Medical	  Ethics	  –	  if	  the	  treatment	  has	  no	  effect	  other	  than	  the	  artificial	  maintenance	  of	  life	  (article	  1111-­‐5-­‐1	  CSP).	  In	  Italy,	  ANH	  must	  be	  maintained	  until	  the	  end	  of	  life,	  except	  in	  cases	  where	   they	   are	   no	   longer	   efficacious	   in	   providing	   the	   patient	  with	   the	  nutritional	  elements	  necessary	  for	  the	  essential	  physiological	  functions	  of	  the	  body.	  Moreover,	  ANH	   cannot	  be	  withdrawn	   through	  ADs	   (article	   3,	   section	  3	  Bill	   2350	   repeated	   in	   the	   same	   form	   by	   the	   proposal-­‐bill	   2229	   of	   26	   March	  2014).	   In	   England	   and	  Wales,	   life-­‐sustaining	   treatment	   –	   and	   therefore	   also	  ANH	  –	   can	  be	  withdrawn	   through	  ADs	   if	   it	   is	   stated	   in	  writing	  and	  signed	  by	  the	  donor	  or	  by	  somebody	  else	  in	  the	  donor’s	  presence	  or	  under	  his	  directives	  (article	  25	  MCA).	  	  	   But,	   all	   the	   member	   states	   of	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe	   agree	   on	   the	  importance	  of	   the	  patient’s	  wishes	   in	   the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  does	  exist	  (par.	  147).	  Within	  them,	  different	  policies	  have	  been	  applied.	  For	   instance,	   in	  Western	  Europe,	  all	  the	  English-­‐,	  German-­‐,	  and	  Romance-­‐speaking	  countries	  –	  except	   Ireland,	   Italy,	   and	   Northern	   Ireland	   –	   have	   enacted	   national	   ad	   hoc	  legislations	   on	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   decisions.	   All	   these	   parliaments	   have	   established	  that	   ADs	   are	   legally	   binding.	   Nevertheless,	   although	   all	   these	   countries	  emphasize	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   patient’s	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination,	   in	  Romance-­‐speaking	   countries	   the	   ethical	   principles	   of	   beneficence	   and	   non-­‐maleficence	  are	  legally	  acknowledged	  as	  well.	  	   Since	   within	   the	   member	   states	   of	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe	   there	   is	   no	  agreement	  regarding	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  ANH,	  and	  different	  policies	  ruling	  ADs	  highlight	   different	   ethical	   values,	   in	   the	   ruling	   of	   Lambert,	   the	   ECtHR	   stated	  that	   States	   have	   a	   margin	   of	   appreciation	   regarding	   the	  means	   of	   striking	   a	  balance	  between	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  patients’	  right	  to	  life	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  their	  right	  to	  respect	  for	  their	  private	  life	  and	  their	  personal	  autonomy	  (par.	  148).	  The	  ECtHR	  emphasizes	  that	  neither	  from	  article	  2	  nor	  from	  its	  case-­‐law	  could	  be	  deducted	   that	  States	  must	   follow	  a	  specific	  procedure	  regarding	   the	  determination	  of	  this	  balance	  (par.	  162).	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   While	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   patients’	   right	   to	   life	   had	   been	   achieved	  through	  the	  application	  of	  the	  principle	   in	  dubio	  pro	  vida,	  the	  safeguarding	  of	  the	  patients’	  right	  to	  respect	  for	  their	  private	  life	  and	  their	  personal	  autonomy	  has	  been	  established	  through	  the	  recognition	  of	   the	   importance	  of	  ADs,	  ruled	  by	  the	   law	  no.	  2005-­‐370	  of	  22	  April	  2005,	  and	  then	  modified	  on	  March	  2015.	  In	   this	   concrete	   case,	   the	   French	   legislator	   has	   found	   the	   ‘right’	   balance	  between	  these	  rights	  through	  the	  ad	  hoc	  collegial	  proceeding	  established	  in	  R.	  4127-­‐37	  CSP	  and	  in	  article	  37	  of	  the	  French	  Code	  of	  Medical	  Ethics.	  	  	   On	  5	   June	  2015,	   the	  ECtHR	   stated	   that	   since	   there	  was	  no	   violation	   of	  article	   2,	   the	   withdrawal	   of	   ANH	   cannot	   constitute	   torture	   (article	   3).	  Moreover,	   the	   complaint	   raised	   by	   the	   applicants	   under	   Article	   8	   was	  absorbed	  by	   those	  raised	  by	   them	  under	  Article	  2	  (par.	  184).	   In	  addition,	   the	  Court	  considered	  that	  the	  complaints	  raised	  by	  the	  applicants	  under	  Article	  6	  section	  1,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  had	  not	  been	  dealt	  with	  already	  under	  Article	  2,	  were	  manifestly	  ill-­‐founded	  (par.	  186).	  	  	   Concluding,	  the	  medical	  classification	  of	  ANH	  influences	  the	  ethical	  and	  legal	   reasoning.	   This	   is	   why	   the	   Conseil	   d’État	   asked	   not	   only	   the	   report	  prepared	  by	  Dr.	   Karigen	   (the	  Mr.	   Lambrant’s	   physician),	   but	   also	   invited	   the	  National	   Medical	   Academy,	   the	   National	   Ethics	   Advisory	   Committee	   and	   the	  National	   Medical	   Council	   and	   Mr	   Leonetti	   (the	   rapporteur	   for	   the	   Act	   of	   22	  April	  2005)	  to	  submit	  general	  observations.	  	   Ruling	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   situations	   is	   difficult.	   Therefore,	   the	   Conseil	   d’État	  had	   examined	   the	   case	   sitting	   as	   a	   full	   court,	   which	   was	   highly	   unusual	   in	  injunction	   proceedings.	   In	   addition,	   since	   in	   civil-­‐law	   system	   le	   juge	   est	   la	  
bouche	  de	  la	  loi	  (“the	  judge	  is	  the	  mouth	  of	  the	  law”),	  the	  French	  legislator	  on	  March	   2015	   had	   to	   modify	   the	   law	   of	   2005	   by	   ruling	   ad	   hoc	   the	   case	   of	  treatments	  that	  have	  no	  effect	  as	  the	  only	  artificial	  maintenance	  of	  life	  (article	  1111-­‐5-­‐1	  Public	  Health	  Code).	  	   The	   ECtHR	   in	   its	   ruling	   on	   5	   June	   2015	   underlined	   the	   difference	  between	   the	   state’s	   positive	   and	  negative	   obligations.	  Regarding	   the	  positive	  obligations,	   the	   court	   ruled	   that	   States	   have	   a	   margin	   of	   appreciation	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regarding	   the	   means	   of	   striking	   a	   balance	   between	   the	   protection	   of	   the	  patients’	   right	   to	   life	   and	   the	   protection	   of	   their	   right	   to	   respect	   for	   their	  private	  life	  and	  their	  personal	  autonomy.	  	  	   The	  French	  legislator	  has	  found	  the	  ‘right’	  balance	  between	  these	  rights	  through	  the	  ad	  hoc	   collegial	  proceeding	  established	   in	  R.	  4127-­‐37	  CSP	  and	   in	  article	   37	   of	   the	   French	   Code	   of	   Medical	   Ethics.	   Nevertheless,	   physicians	  should	  not	   focus	  on	   the	  abstract	  qualification	  of	  ANH	  as	  a	   futile	   treatment	  or	  not,	   but	   rather	   answer	   the	   question	   to	  what	   extent	   this	   treatment	   benefits	   a	  
specific	   patient	   in	   a	   specific	   condition	   by	   taking	   into	   consideration	   the	  patient’s	   wellbeing,	   a	   concept	   which	   is	   boarder	   than	   simply	   the	   aspect	   of	  physical	   health	   since	   it	   also	   includes	   the	   subjective	   idea	   of	   what	   constitutes	  health.	  	  
	  
	  
1.2.	  	   The	  Recommendation	  CM/Rec	  (2009)	  11	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  The	   Recommendation	   CM/Rec	   (2009)	   11	   adopted	   by	   the	   Committee	   of	  Ministers	  based	  on	  article	  15	  of	  the	  Statue	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  has	  been	  studied	   by	   giving	   some	   examples	   from	   national	   legislations	   from	   English-­‐,	  German-­‐	  and	  Romance-­‐speaking	  countries.	  Although	  this	  recommendation	  is	  a	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soft	   law60,	   it	   is	   the	   first	   document	   on	   a	   European	   level,	   which	   provides	  guidance	   for	   member	   states	   in	   the	   reform	   of	   laws	   allowing	   provision	   to	   be	  made	  for	  future	  incapacity	  (Explanatory	  Report,	  par.	  13).	  	   This	   document	   is	   composed	   of	   a	   preamble	   and	   seventeen	   principles,	  which	   are	   divided	   into	   three	   main	   parts:	   scope	   of	   application,	   continuing	  powers	  of	  attorney,	  and	  advance	  directives.	  The	  second	  part	  is	  the	  longest	  for	  two	  main	  reasons.	  Firstly,	  several	  scholars	  have	  highlighted	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  legal	  proxy	  that	  interprets	  the	  patient’s	  advance	  medical	  directives	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	   1.4.1.).	   Secondly,	   the	   power	   of	   attorney	   is	   a	   contract	   that	   has	   been	  traditionally	  used	  in	  European	  legal	  systems.	  However,	  their	  use	  in	  health	  care	  decisions	   is	   new	   and	   some	   previous	   European	   legislation	   established	   the	  forfeiture	   of	   the	   right	   to	   represent	   the	   granter	   once	   the	   he	   or	   she	   has	   lost	  capacity	   and/or	   competency.61	   Therefore,	   specific	   rules	   are	   needed	   for	  providing	  their	  adaptation	  in	  the	  field	  of	  health.	  	  Although	  the	  aim	  of	   this	  recommendation	   is	  much	  broader	   than	  health	  care	   –	   since	   it	   also	   covers	   decisions	   regarding	   welfare,	   and	   economic	   and	  financial	  matters	   –	   in	   this	   paragraph	   only	   those	   provisions	   that	   are	   relevant	  for	   health	   care	   issues,	   especially	   after	   the	   declaration	   of	   the	   patient’s	  	  	  	  	  	  60	   The	   term	   soft	   law	   refers	   to	   quasi-­‐legal	   instruments	   that	   do	   not	   have	   any	   legally	  binding	  force.	  Their	  infringement	  does	  not	  imply	  any	  kind	  of	  sanction.	  	  	  61	  Some	  examples	  are:	  in	  England,	  article	  1	  of	  the	  Enduring	  Powers	  of	  Attorney	  Act	  of	  26	   June	  1985;	   in	  France,	   article	  2003	  Civil	  Code;	   in	   Italy,	   article	  1728	  Civil	  Code;	   in	  Portugal,	  article	  1174	  Civil	  Code;	  and	  in	  Spain,	  article	  1732	  Civil	  Code.	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incapacity,	   will	   be	   studied.	   For	   this	   reason,	   the	   paragraph	   2.1.2.1.	   will	   be	  exclusively	   dedicated	   to	   the	   provisions	   regarding	   the	   power	   of	   attorney	   for	  health,	  welfare	  and	  other	  personal	  matters.	  	   The	  goal	  of	  this	  recommendation	  is	  the	  promotion	  of	  self-­‐determination	  (principle	  1).	  This	   is	  not	  surprising,	  since	  the	  value	  of	  advance	  directives	   lies	  in	   the	   promotion	   of	   the	   ethical	   principle	   of	   patient	   autonomy	   and	  consequently	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  (e.g.,	  see	  Chap.	  1).	  	  The	   term	   “incapacity”	   differs	   from	   the	   term	   “legal	   incapacity”.	  “Incapacity”	  is	  limited	  to	  what	  might	  be	  termed	  “factual	  incapacity”.	  These	  are	  the	  cases	  of	  a	  person	  in	  a	  coma	  or	  in	  a	  persistent	  vegetative	  state	  or	  a	  patient	  in	   severe	   dementia	   or	   a	   profound	   learning	   disability	   (formerly	   “mental	  handicap”).	   “Legal	   incapacity”,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   is	   a	   sanction	   given	   by	   the	  national	   courts	   in	   case	   of	   a	   criminal	   offence	   or	   bankruptcy.	   It	   refers	   to	   the	  diminution	   by	   law	   of	   an	   adult’s	   rights	   and	   status.	   Citizens	   with	   disabilities	  must	  never	  have	  such	   legal	   incapacity	   imposed	  upon	   them	  by	  reason	  of	   their	  disabilities62.	  	  	   In	  the	  preamble,	  different	  international	  and	  regional	  documents	  related	  to	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   rights	   of	   incapable	   adults	   have	   been	  mentioned63.	   In	  	  	  	  	  	  62	   This	   principle	   has	   been	   established	   in	   Recommendation	   N°	   R(99)4	   (principle	   3)	  and	   in	   the	   United	   Nations’	   Convention	   on	   the	   Rights	   of	   Persons	   with	   Disabilities	  (article	  12.2).	  63	   In	   addition	   to	   the	   Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights	   and	   Biomedicine	   and	   to	   the	  Recommendation	  R(99)4,	  which	  will	  be	  analyzed	   into	  details,	   the	   	  Recommendation	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particular,	   special	   attention	   has	   been	   given	   to	   the	   Convention	   on	   Human	  Rights	   and	   Biomedicine	   and	   to	   the	   Rec	   (99)4	   of	   23	   February	   199964.	   The	  additional	   value	  of	   the	  Rec	   (2009)	  11	  compared	   to	   the	  Convention	  of	  Oviedo	  	  (article	  9)	  is	  based	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  document	  takes	  into	  consideration	  all	  kinds	  of	  advance	  medical	  treatments65.	  	  The	   recommendation	   of	   2009	   considers	   the	   Recommendation	   N°	  R(99)4	   a	   “valuable	   and	   up-­‐to-­‐date	   international	   instrument”	   in	   this	   field.	   In	  fact,	  the	  working	  party	  “Incapable	  Adults”66	  had	  the	  task	  of	  complementing	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  CM/Rec	  (2009)	  11	  mentions	  the	  United	  Nations’	  Convention	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Persons	  with	  Disabilities	  of	  13	  December	  2006	  (especially	  Article	  12);	  the	  Hague	  Convention	  on	  the	   International	  Protection	  of	  Adults	  of	  13	   January	  2000	  (especially	  Articles	  15,	  16	   and	   38);	   Convention	   for	   the	   Protection	   of	   Human	   Rights	   and	   Fundamental	  Freedoms;	  and	  the	  Recommendation	  Rec(2006)5.	  	  64	   This	   Recommendation	   is	   the	   result	   of	   the	   Group	   of	   Specialists	   on	   Incapable	   and	  Other	  Vulnerable	  Adults,	  later	  renamed	  the	  Group	  of	  Specialists	  on	  Incapable	  Adults,	  set	  up	  in	  1995	  after	  the	  3rd	  European	  Conference	  on	  Family	  Law	  entitled	  “Family	  Law	  in	   the	   Future”,	   held	   in	   Cadiz,	   Spain,	   in	   April	   1995.	   The	  Recommendation	  N°	  R(99)4	  has	   been	   applied	   by	   the	   European	   Court	   of	   Human	   Rights	   in	   three	   judgments:	  Application	  No.	  54797/00,	  Application	  No.	  44009/05	  and	  Application	  No.	  11223/04.	  Moreover,	  this	  Court	  has	  considered	  this	  Recommendation	  as	  a	  document	  that	  shows	  the	  common	  European	  standard	  in	  this	  area	  (Application	  No.	  44009/05,	  par.	  95).	  	  65	  Article	  9	  states	  that	  “previously	  expressed	  wishes	  (….)	  shall	  be	  taken	  into	  account”.	  Therefore,	  the	  Convention	  of	  Oviedo	  focuses	  only	  on	  advance	  medical	  directives,	  and	  nothing	  has	  been	  established	  regarding	  the	  nomination	  of	  the	  surrogate.	  In	  addition,	  the	   explanatory	   report	   of	   the	   Convention	   of	   Oviedo	   does	   not	   define	  what	   “shall	   be	  taken	  into	  account”	  means	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  2.1.).	  66	   The	   Working	   Party	   “Incapable	   Adults”	   of	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe	   was	   set	   up	   in	  autumn	  2006.	   It	  was	  comprised	  of	   international	  experts	   from	   legal	  practice	  who	  act	  independently	  of	  the	  governments.	  The	  main	  focus	  of	  this	  working	  party	  has	  been	  the	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Recommendation	   N°	   R(99)4	   by	   drawing	   up	   a	   new	   recommendation	   to	   deal	  with	   advance	   directives	   and	   continuing	   powers	   of	   attorney.	   This	   is	   why	   in	  only	   two	   years,	   the	   working	   party	   presented	   the	   first	   preliminary	   draft	  recommendation	  and	  a	  preliminary	  explanatory	  memorandum.	  The	   main	   difference	   between	   these	   two	   documents	   regards	   their	  approach:	   the	   1999	   recommendation	   deals	   with	   measures	   of	   protection	  provided	   by	   competent	   authorities	   (i.e.,	   courts)	   while	   the	   new	   instrument	  covers	   decisions	   made	   privately	   by	   the	   concerned	   persons	   themselves.	  Therefore,	   the	   Rec	   (99)4	   deals	   with	   measures	   of	   protection	   provided	   by	  courts.	   In	   case	   of	   a	   nomination	   of	   a	   legal	   proxy	   by	   the	   court	   for	   incapable	  adults,	   the	  national	  parliaments	  have	  applied	  the	  “monistic”	  approach,	  –	  such	  as	  in	  German-­‐	  and	  English-­‐speaking	  countries,	  –	  or	  the	  “pluralistic”	  one,	  –	  such	  as	  in	  Romance-­‐speaking	  countries.	  The	  Rec	  (2009)	  11	  deals	  with	  the	  figure	  of	  the	  surrogate67;	  it	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  cases	  where	  a	  person	  is	  capable	  and	  needs	   support	   to	   exercise	   his	   or	   her	   rights.	   This	   policy	   avoids	   judicial	   and	  administrative	   proceedings,	   is	   fasters	   and	   it	   further	   promotes	   the	   ethical	  principle	  of	  autonomy.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  protection	   of	   adults	   who,	   for	   various	   reasons,	   are	   temporarily	   or	   permanently	  incapacitated	  to	  act	  without	  aid	  from	  others.	  Its	  last	  meeting	  took	  place	  in	  September	  2008.	  	  67	   Regarding	   the	   phrases	   used	   to	   indicate	   the	   ‘surrogate’	   in	   English-­‐,	   German-­‐	   and	  Romance-­‐speaking	  countries,	  please	  see	  note	  29).	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In	  this	  recommendation,	  the	  definition	  regarding	  advance	  directives	  has	  been	  defined	  in	  a	  narrow	  sense	  as	  “instructions	  given	  or	  wishes	  made”	  by	  the	  capable	  person	   (principle	  2)68.	   	  This	  definition	   is	   similar	  –	  but	  not	   equal	   –	   to	  the	  term	  of	  “living	  wills”	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  1.4.).	  Therefore,	  the	  notion	  of	  advance	  directive	  is	  the	  one	  that	  is	  given	  in	  this	  recommendation.	  This	  is	  why	  the	  short	  expression	  ADs	  will	  not	  be	  used.	  Differently	  from	  the	  part	  dedicated	  to	  the	  power	  of	  attorney,	  in	  part	  III	  health	   issues	   are	  mentioned	   first.	   This	   shows	   that	   advance	  directives,	  within	  the	   definition	   given	   above,	   have	   been	   well	   accepted	   by	   scholars	   mostly	  regarding	  health	  issues.	  These	  documents	  are	  always	  unilateral	  acts,	  which	  do	  not	  establish	  a	  contract	  with	  any	  other	  person.	  Physicians	  or	  surrogates69	  can	  interpret	   or	   ascertain	   them;	   however,	   this	   does	   not	   constitute	   a	   contract.	  Furthermore,	   these	   documents	   are	   effective	   only	   in	   case	   of	   the	   granter’s	  incapacity.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  68	  Please	  notice	  that	  in	  this	  thesis,	  it	  has	  been	  applied	  a	  broader	  definition	  of	  advance	  directives.	   For	   more	   information	   regarding	   it,	   please	   see	   Chap.1.3.	   The	   only	  exception	   to	   this	   rule	   occurs	   in	   this	   paragraph	   (Sect.	   2.1.2.)	   with	   the	   aim	   to	   stay	  coherent	  with	  the	  Rec	  (2009)	  11.	  	  69	   Since	   advance	  directives	   are	  documents	  used	   to	   implement	   the	  patient–physician	  relationship,	   it	   follows	   that	   the	   final	   decision	   as	   to	   their	   execution	   lies	   with	   the	  physician	   in	   charge.	   Notwithstanding,	   the	   law	   can	   establish	   a	   direct	   exception.	   For	  instance,	   in	   Germany,	   the	   law	   explicitly	   states	   that	   the	   legal	   proxy	   (guardian	   or	  surrogate)	   must	   examine	   whether	   these	   determinations	   correspond	   to	   the	   current	  living	  and	  treatment	  situation	  (article	  1901a,	  section	  1	  BGB).	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States	   should	   decide	   to	   what	   extent	   advance	   directives	   should	   have	  binding	   force	   (principle	   15)70.	   This	   includes	   the	   possibility	   to	   introduce	  professional	   assistance,	   which	   should	   be	   considered	   as	   a	   recommended	   or	  even	   compulsory	   step71	   or	   to	   establish	   a	   written	   form72.	   In	   addition,	   States	  should	  address	   the	   issue	  of	   situations	   that	   arise	   in	   the	   event	  of	   a	   substantial	  	  	  	  	  	  70	   Currently	   all	   the	   English-­‐,	   German-­‐	   and	   Romance-­‐speaking	   countries	   have	  established	  legally-­‐binding	  force	  of	  advance	  directives.	  The	  old	  version	  of	  the	  French	  law	   of	   2005	   established	   an	   advisory	   force	   of	   advance	   directives.	   In	   Italy,	   all	   new	  proposals	  –	  expect	  proposals	  2350	  and	  2229	  –	  establish	   the	   legally-­‐binding	   force	  of	  ADs.	   The	   proposals	   13	   (article	   21,	   section	   1),	   1298	   (article	   3,	   section	   2),	   and	   2264	  (article	  2,	  section	  4)	  state	  it	  directly;	  the	  other	  proposals	  establish	  it	  indirectly.	  	  71	  In	  Austria:	  in	  case	  of	  legally-­‐binding	  advance	  directives,	  the	  advice	  the	  physician	  is	  needed	   (14	   law	   8	   May	   2006,	   Patientenverfügungs-­‐Gesetz	   –	   PatVG).	   In	   addition	   the	  citizen	  must	   sign	   the	   advance	   directive	   in	   front	   of	   the	   lawyer,	   a	   notary	   or	   a	   legally	  qualified	   employee	   of	   the	   patient	   groups	   (article	   6);	   in	   England	   and	   Wales:	   the	  presence	   of	   a	   witness	   is	   needed	   (article	   25,	   section	   6,	   let.	   d);	   currently	   in	   France,	  nothing	   has	   been	   established,	   but	   in	   the	   following	  months	   the	   Council	   of	   the	   State	  will	   publish	   a	   degree	   with	   the	   condition	   of	   validity	   and	   confidentiality	   of	   advance	  directives	   (article	   1111-­‐11	   CSP);	   in	   Portugal:	   in	   case	   of	   advance	   directives	   through	  the	  model	   of	   the	  National	  Register	   of	   Living	  Wills,	   the	   need	   of	   the	   employer	   of	   this	  public	   organ	   or	   of	   the	   Noter	   is	   needed;	   or	   in	   case	   of	   a	   handwritten	   living	   will	   the	  advice	   of	   a	   physician	   is	   necessary	   (article	   3);	   in	   Spain,	   most	   Autonomous	  Communities’	   regulations	   establish	   several	   formal	   requirements.	   (Navarro-­‐Michel	  2005);	   in	   Italy,	   the	  proposals	  2350	  (article	  3,	   section	  1	  and	  article	  4,	   section	  1)	  and	  2229	   (article	   3,	   section	   1	   and	   article	   4,	   section	   1)	   establish	   the	   need	   of	   a	   medical	  advice.	   Instead,	   the	   proposal	   443	   establishes	   the	   need	   of	   the	   advice	   of	   a	   Noter	   and	  that	   of	   the	   physician	   (article	   13);	   the	   proposal	   1298	   requires	   the	   presence	   of	   two	  witnesses	  (article	  3,	  section	  7);	  and	  the	  proposal	  2264	  states	  that	  the	  ADs	  should	  be	  written	   in	   front	   of	   the	   public	   employer	   of	   the	   Municipality	   Register	   of	   Advance	  Directives	  (article	  2,	  section	  3).	  72	   Currently	   all	   the	   English-­‐,	   German-­‐	   and	   Romance-­‐speaking	   countries	   have	  established	  a	  written	  form	  of	  ‘living	  will’	  (e.g.	  see	  Sect.	  2.2.).	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change	  in	  circumstances73.	  This	  is	  a	  repetition	  of	  par.	  21	  of	  explanatory	  report	  of	  the	  Convention	  of	  Oviedo.	  Moreover,	  principle	  15	  states	  that	  advance	  directives	  which	  do	  not	  have	  binding	   force	   should	   be	   treated	   as	   statements	   of	   wishes	   to	   be	   given	   due	  respect.	  The	  use	  of	  the	  term	  “due	  respect”	  is	  stronger	  than	  the	  phrase	  “shall	  be	  taken	   into	   consideration”,	   used	   in	   article	   9	   of	   the	   Convention	   of	   Oviedo	  (Andorno	   2010)74.	   Several	   State	   policies,	   although	   they	   do	   not	   directly	  recognize	   the	   legally-­‐binding	   force	   of	   advance	   directives,	   use	   different	  expressions	  that	  suggest	  that	  advance	  directives	  are	  indeed	  legally	  binding.75	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  73	   While	   the	   Iberian	   Parliaments	   –	   in	   Portugal	   (article	   5)	   and	   in	   Spain	   (article	   11,	  section	   3)	   –	   establish	   it	   in	   general,	   in	   Austria	   (article	   10,	   section	   1,	   nr.	   1	   of	   8	  May	  2006,	  Patientenverfügungs-­‐Gesetz	  –	  PatVG),	  in	  England	  and	  Wales	  (article	  25,	  section	  4	  let	  c)),	  and	  in	  Italy	  [proposals	  13	  (article	  21,	  section	  1),	  1432	  	  (article	  1,	  section	  1,	  let.	  h)),	  1298	  (article	  3,	  section	  2),	  and	  2264	  (article	  2,	  section	  4)],	  advance	  decisions	  will	  not	  be	  applied	  in	  case	  that	  there	  has	  been	  a	  medical	  discovery	  or	  a	  change	  in	  the	  patient’s	   pathology	   that	   if	   the	   patient	   had	   known	   them,	  would	   have	   changed	   his	   or	  her	  medical	   instructions.	   In	  France,	   this	  option	  could	  derive	   from	  the	   interpretation	  of	   the	   new	   article	   1111-­‐11	   CSP,	   which	   states	   that	   these	   documents	   shall	   not	   be	  applied	  in	  cases	  that	  are	  manifestly	  inappropriate	  (article	  1111-­‐11	  CSP).	  In	  Germany,	  this	   problem	   has	   been	   resolved	   by	   given	   to	   the	   legal	   proxy	   the	   power	   to	   examine	  whether	   these	   determinations	   correspond	   to	   the	   current	   living	   and	   treatment	  situation	  (article	  1901a,	  section	  1	  BGB).	  74	  However,	   it	   must	   be	  mentioned	   that	   the	   French	   version	   of	   this	   recommendation	  uses	  the	  same	  expression	  that	  appears	  in	  the	  Convention	  of	  Oviedo.	  75	   For	   instance:	   in	   Italy	   [proposals	   13	   (article	   21),	   1298	   (article	   3,	   section	   6),	   and	  2264	   (article	  2,	   section	  2)]	   through	  different	   expressions	  which	  has	   in	   common	   the	  use	   of	   the	   verb	   ‘rispettare’;	   in	   France,	   the	   phrase	   used	   is	   ‘s’imposent	   au	   médecin’	  (new	  version	  of	   the	  article	  1111-­‐11,	  section	  3	  CSP);	  and	   in	  Switzerland,	   through	  the	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Advance	  directives	  may	  be	  made	  in	  writing	  or	  may	  be	  expressed	  orally	  to	  family	  members,	  medical	  staff	  or	  others.	  The	  form	  of	  advance	  directives	  has	  been	   left	   to	   the	   decision	   of	   national	   parliaments	   (principle	   16).	   States	   can	  establish	   that	   only	   certain	   types	   of	   advance	   directives	   have	   legally-­‐binding	  force,	   and	   the	   other	   types	   have	   only	   advisory	   force,	   such	   as	   in	   Austria76;	   or	  States	  can	  establish	  that	  every	  types	  of	  expressed	  wishes	  have	  legally-­‐binding	  force,	   such	   as	   in	   Germany	   (e.g.,	   see	   Sect.	   2.5.1.).	   If	   the	   advance	   directive	  regards	  health	   issues,	  State	  policy	  can	  take	   into	  consideration	  requiring	   from	  citizens	   that	   they	  acquire	  certain	   information	   from	  a	  physician,	  a	   lawyer	  or	  a	  Noter	   (e.g.,	   see	   supra	   note	   71).	   Moreover,	   the	   State	   can	   establish	   a	   national	  register	  regarding	  advance	  directives.77	  
	  	  	  	  	  expression	  ‘die	  Ärztin	  oder	  der	  Arzt	  entspricht	  der	  Patientenverfügung’	  (article	  372,	  section	  2	  ZGB).	  	  76	   In	   Austria	   ADs	   can	   be	   legally-­‐binding	   or	   not.	   In	   case	   of	   legally	   binding	   AD,	   the	  interested	   party	   must	   receive	   complete	   medical	   information	   by	   the	   physician	   and	  legal	   information	   by	   the	  Noter.	   In	   addition,	   this	   document	   is	   valid	   for	   five	   years;	   if	  not	   renewed	   with	   the	   same	   formalities,	   it	   will	   have	   only	   an	   advisory	   power.	   This	  document	  may	  be	  registered	  in	  the	  Austrian	  Chamber	  of	  Nataries.	  77	   In	   Austria	   (article	   284g	   ABGB);	   in	   England	   and	   Wales	   (article	   13);	   in	   France	  (article	  1111-­‐6,	  section	  1	  CSP);	  in	  Ireland	  (article	  50);	  in	  Portugal	  (article	  14,	  section	  1);	   in	   Switzerland	   (370,	   section	   3	   ZGB).	   In	   Germany,	   this	   possibility	   has	   been	  established	   directly	   only	   regarding	   ‘living	   wills’	   (article	   1901a,	   section1);	   in	   Spain,	  this	   has	   been	   recognized	   for	   all	   kind	   of	   ‘prior	   wishes’	   (article	   11,	   section4).	   The	  Scottish	   legislator	   has	   established	   several	   causes	   of	   termination	   of	   the	   power	   of	  attorney	  (article	  25),	  but	  has	  not	  established	  directly	  the	  possibility	  of	  revocation.	  In	  Italy,	   the	   revocation	   has	   been	   established	   in	   all	   the	   proposals	   [Proposals	   2350	  (article	  4,	  section	  4),	  5	  (article	  12),	  13	  (article	  25),	  443	  (article	  15),	  1142	  (article	  13),	  1298	   (article	  3,	   section	  7),	  proposal	  2229	   (article	  4,	   section	  4),	   and	  2264	   (article	  4,	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An	   advance	  directive	   shall	   be	   revocable	   at	   any	   time78	   and	  without	   any	  formalities79	   (principle	   17).	   This	   should	   be	   a	   direct	   consequence	   of	   their	  change	   of	   view	   (Explanatory	   Report,	   par.	   185).	   Citizens	   must	   have	   the	  opportunity	   to	   revoke	   the	   advance	   directive	   even	   in	   cases	   when	   these	  documents	  are	  legally	  binding.	  The	  revocation	  can	  be	  done	  as	  long	  as	  the	  adult	  is	   still	   capable.	   If	   the	   document	   is	   already	   entered	   into	   a	   register,	   it	   is	  necessary	  to	  register	  the	  revocation.	  	  	  	  
1.2.1.	  	  	   Provisions	   regarding	   the	   power	   of	   attorney	   for	   health,	  
welfare	  and	  other	  personal	  matters	  Part	  II	  of	  the	  Recommendation	  CM/Rec	  (2009)	  11,	  composed	  of	  principles	  3	  to	  13,	  has	  been	  dedicated	  to	  continuing	  powers	  of	  attorney.	  This	  part	  reflects	  the	  trend	   in	   legislation	   towards	   giving	   priority	   to	   the	   establishment	   of	   private	  
	  	  	  	  	  section	   4)],	   except	   proposal	   1432.	   All	   these	   proposals	   establish	   the	   revocation	  regarding	  all	   kind	  of	   advance	  directives	  without	  distinguishing	  between	   ‘living	  will’	  and	  ‘surrogate	  will’.	  78	   The	   countries	   that	   establish	   this	   principle	   are:	   in	   England	   and	  Wales	   (article	   24,	  section	  3);	   in	  France	   (article	  1111-­‐11,	   section	  2	  CSP);	   in	  Portugal	   (article	  8,	   section	  3);	  in	  Switzerland	  (371,	  section	  3	  ZGB);	  for	  the	  other	  states,	  supra	  note	  77.	  79The	   countries	   that	   establish	   this	   principle	   are:	   in	   England	   and	  Wales	   (article	   24,	  section	   4	   and	  5	   and	   article	   25,	   section	   2,	   let	   c);	   in	   Italy	   (article	   25	   proposal	   13);	   in	  Germany	  (article	  1901a,	  section	  1	  BGB).	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continuing	  powers	  of	   attorney	  over	  public	  measures	  of	   protection80.	   In	   other	  words,	   national	   legislators	   should	   consider	   the	   role	   of	   surrogate	   more	  important	  than	  that	  of	  the	  guardian81.	  	  The	   recommendation	   defines	   “continuing	   power	   of	   attorney”	   as	   “a	  mandate	   given	   by	   a	   capable	   adult	   with	   the	   purpose	   that	   it	   shall	   remain	   in	  force,	   or	   enter	   into	   force,	   in	   the	   event	   of	   the	   granter’s	   incapacity”	   (principle	  2.1).	  This	  definition	   incorporates	   several	   types	  of	  attorneys,	  not	  only	  powers	  of	  attorney	  that	  continue	  after	  the	  granter’s	  incapacity,	  but	  also	  the	  powers	  of	  attorney	   which	   enter	   into	   force	   after	   granter’s	   incapacity	   has	   been	  established82.	  	  While	   power	   of	   attorney	   for	   economic	   and	   financial	   matters	   could	   be	  utilized	   for	   both	   these	   types,	   the	   powers	   of	   attorney	   for	   health,	   welfare	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  80	   This	   policy	   is	   in	   accordance	   with	   Principle	   5	   of	   Recommendation	   No.	   R	   (99)	   4,	  which	   states	   that	   “no	  measure	   of	   protection	   should	   be	   established	   for	   an	   incapable	  adult	  unless	  the	  measure	  is	  necessary”.	  	  81	  Generally,	  this	  principle	  is	  presumed.	  However,	  in	  Ireland	  (article	  22,	  section	  2),	  in	  Italy	   [proposals	   13	   (article	   20,	   section	   1),	   1298	   (article	   3,	   section	   4),	   and	   2264	  (article	   2,	   section	   5)],	   in	   England	   (article	   19,	   section	   1),	   and	   in	   Switzerland	   (article	  378,	   section	   1	   ZGB)	   this	   has	   been	   established	   directly.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   the	   new	  French	   law	  of	  March	  2015	  has	  established	   that	   in	  case	  of	  a	  public	  measure,	   it	   is	   the	  court	  that	  will	  decide	  if	  the	  person	  should	  be	  continued	  to	  be	  assisted	  by	  this	  person	  or	   by	   the	   surrogate	   the	   patient	   has	   nominated	   (article	   1111-­‐6,	   section	   4	   CSP).	   The	  same	  conclusion	  was	  derived	  in	  Scotland	  too	  (article	  24,	  section	  2).	  82	   This	   difference	   has	   been	   shown	   even	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   bankruptcy	   of	   the	  attorney	  will	  end	  economic	  powers,	  but	  not	  welfare	  powers.	  The	  same	  principle	  has	  been	   expressly	   recognized	   established	   in	  England	   and	  Wales	   (article	   13,	   section	  3),	  in	  Scotland	  (article	  16,	  section	  7)	  and	  in	  Ireland	  (article	  49,	  section	  5,	  let.	  c)).	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other	  personal	  matters	  can	  be	  given	  only	  after	  the	  declaration	  of	  the	  granter’s	  incapacity	   (Explanatory	  Report,	  par.	  57	  and	  88).	   In	   case	  of	   continuing	  power	  designed	   to	   enter	   into	   force	   in	   the	   event	   of	   the	   granter’s	   incapacity,	   States	  should	   consider	   how	   incapacity	   should	   be	   determined	   and	   what	   evidence	  should	   be	   required	   (principle	   7).83	   According	   to	   the	   Guide	   on	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   regarding	   medical	   treatment	   in	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   situations	   (p.16)	  (e.g.	   see	   Sect.	   2.1.3.),	   the	   patient’s	   incapacity	   should	   be	   assessed	   by	   an	  impartial	  expert.	  In	  addition,	  this	  proceeding	  should	  be	  documented.	  In	  most	  States,	  a	  continuing	  power	  of	  attorney	   is	  unilateral	  at	   the	   time	  of	   granting	   and	   requires	   the	   acceptance	   from	   the	   attorney.84	   The	   granter	  should	   have	   the	   opportunity	   to	   nominate	  more	   than	   one	   surrogate85.	   Two	  or	  more	   surrogates	  may	  be	   the	   solution	   to	  undue	   concentration	  of	  power,	   or	   to	  reduce	   the	   risk	   of	   family	   dispute	   (Explanatory	   Report,	   par.	   98).	   Usually,	   the	  attorney	   has	   to	   be	   an	   individual,	   natural	   person,	   but	   it	  might	   also	   be	   a	   legal	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  In	  Italy	  [Proposals	  2350	  (article	  3,	  section	  5),	  5	  (article	  10,	  section	  2),	  443	  (article	  14,	  section	  2),	  1142	  (article	  11,	  section	  2),	  and	  proposal	  2229	  (article	  3,	  section	  5)]	  a	  medical	   team	  has	  been	  established	   to	   certify	   it.	   In	  England	  and	  Wales	   (article	  3),	   in	  Ireland	   (article	   3),	   and	   in	   Scotland	   (article	   1,	   section	   6)	   a	   definition	   of	   what	  constitutes	   incapacity	   has	   been	   given.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   the	   Portuguese	   Parliament	  has	  established	  what	  constitutes	  ‘capacity’	  (article	  4).	  84	   In	   Italy,	   the	   proposals	   2350	   (article	   6,	   section	   1)	   and	   2229	   (article	   6,	   section	   1)	  require	  the	  sign	  of	  the	  surrogate.	  In	  England,	  article	  25	  establishes	  that	  the	  surrogate	  must	  sign	  his	  nomination	  in	  case	  of	  withdrawing	  life-­‐prolonging	  treatment.	  	  85	   England	   is	   the	   only	   country	   in	   our	   study	   to	   enshrine	   this	   possibility	   (article	   10,	  section	   4).	   The	   maximum	   number	   of	   LPAs	   is	   5	   (article	   6	   The	   Lasting	   Powers	   of	  Attorney,	  Enduring	  Powers	  of	  Attorney	  and	  Public	  Guardian	  Regulations).	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person86.	  States	  can	  restrict	  this	  right	  by	  suggesting	  who	  can	  be	  nominated	  as	  a	  surrogate87	  or	  by	  establishing	  who	  cannot	  be	  a	  surrogate88	   (principle	  4).	   In	  addition,	   the	   granter	   can	   establish	   some	   directives89	   or	   predict	   some	  exclusion90.	  Moreover,	  the	  granter	  must	  always	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  revoke	  this	  power	  (principle	  6)91.	  A	  balance	  between	  the	  ethical	  principle	  of	  autonomy	  and	  the	  protection	  of	   life	   should	   be	   found.	   Therefore,	   States	   can	   introduce	   a	   system	   of	  certification,	   and/or	   registration	   and/or	   notification	   (principle	   8)92.	   This	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  86	  Switzerland	  is	  the	  only	  state	  where	  a	  legal	  person	  can	  be	  nominated	  as	  a	  surrogate	  (article	  360	  ZGB).	  	  87	  For	  example,	  in	  France:	  article	  1111-­‐6	  CSP	  states	  that	  a	  surrogate	  can	  be	  a	  parent,	  a	  relative	  or	  the	  attending	  physician.	  88	  For	  example,	  in	  England	  article	  10,	  section	  1	  states	  that	  the	  surrogate	  must	  be	  over	  18	  years	  old;	   further,	  section	  7.10	  of	  the	  Code	  of	  Practice	  of	  the	  Mental	  Capacity	  Act	  states	   that	  people	  working	  as	  a	  paid	  care	  workers	   (such	  as	  a	  care	  home	  manager)	  –	  with	   only	   few	   exceptions	   –	   shall	   not	   be	   appointed	   as	   an	   attorney;	   and	   in	   Portugal,	  article	  11,	   section	  2	  states	   that	  surrogates	  must	  be	   fully	  competent,	   therefore,	  not	  a	  minor,	  interdição	  (interdict)	  or	  inabilitação	  (inability).	  	  89	  This	  is	  in	  harmony	  with	  Principle	  9	  of	  the	  Recommendation	  No.	  R	  (99)	  4.	  	  90	  Any	  such	  exclusions	  should	  be	  kept	  to	  a	  minimum	  (Explanatory	  Report,	  par.	  94).	  	  91	   In	   Austria	   (article	   284g	   ABGB);	   in	   England	   and	   Wales	   (article	   13);	   in	   France	  (article	  1111-­‐6,	  section	  1	  CSP);	  in	  Ireland	  (article	  50);	  in	  Portugal	  (article	  14,	  section	  1);	  in	  Switzerland	  (370,	  section	  3	  ZGB).	  	  92	   In	   English-­‐speaking	   countries	   [in	   England	   and	   Wales	   (article	   58,	   section	   1),	   in	  Ireland	   (article	   48,	   section	   1),	   and	   in	   Scotland	   (article	   6,	   section	   1)]	   the	   Public	  Guardian	   is	   responsible	   for	   establishing	   and	   maintaining	   a	   national	   register	   of	  surrogates.	   In	  Austria,	   the	   legally-­‐binding	   advance	  directive	   should	  be	   registered	   in	  the	   Austrian	   Chamber	   of	   Notaries	   (282f	   ABGB).	   In	   Switzerland,	   the	   advance	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necessary	  due	  the	   fact	   that	  –	  especially	   in	  case	  of	  continuing	  power	  designed	  to	  enter	   into	   force	   in	   the	  event	  of	   the	  granter’s	   incapacity	  –	   the	  granter	   loses	  the	   control	   upon	   the	   attorney.	   In	   addition,	   several	   empirical	   studies	   have	  shown	   the	   disadvantages	   regarding	   the	   surrogate	   (e.g.,	   see	   Sect.	   1.3.1.).	  However,	   it	   must	   be	   noted	   that	   the	   granter	   has	   calculated	   this	   risk	  (Explanatory	  Report,	  par.	  160)	  and	  has	  decided	  to	  nominate	  a	  surrogate	  (e.g.,	  see	   Sect.	   1.3.1.).	   The	   certification,	   registration	   or	   notification	  may	   constitute	  alternative	  solutions,	  or	  may	  supplement	  each	  other	  (Explanatory	  Report,	  par.	  130).	   Furthermore,	   States	   should	   protect	   the	   granter	   by	   establishing	  ad	   hoc	  norms	   in	   respect	   of	   resolving	   conflict	   of	   interest	   (principle	   11)	   and	  supervision	   (principle	   12)	   93.	   In	   these	   cases,	   national	   parliaments	   by	   taking	  	  	  	  	  	  directives	   should	   be	   registered	   in	   the	   card	   of	   the	   insurance	   (article	   371,	   section	   2	  ZGB).	  In	  France,	  the	  new	  law	  of	  March	  2015	  gives	  to	  the	  Council	  of	  State	  the	  duty	  to	  decide	  on	  the	  conservation	  of	  these	  documents	  (1111-­‐11,	  section	  4	  CSP).	  In	  Germany,	  no	   national	   register	   has	   been	   established	   either	   for	   advance	   directive	   nor	   for	   the	  attorney.	   In	   Iberian	   countries	   –	   in	   Portugal	   (article	   15,	   section	   1)	   and	   in	   Spain	  (article	  11,	  section	  5)	  –	  national	  Ministries	  of	  Health	  are	  responsible	  for	  running	  the	  national	   register	   of	   ADs.	   The	   same	   has	   been	   established	   in	   Italy	   [proposal	   2350	  (article	   8,	   section	   1)	   and	   proposal	   2229	   (article	   8)];	   on	   the	   contrary,	   the	   proposal	  443	  gives	  this	  role	  to	  the	  National	  Chamber	  of	  Notaries	  (article	  16)	  and	  the	  proposal	  1298	  demands	  this	  duty	  to	  the	  Commission	  for	  Control	  constituted	  in	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Health	  (article	  7).	  	  93	   For	   instance:	   in	  English-­‐speaking	   countries	   this	   role	  has	  been	   given	   to	   the	  Public	  Guardian	   [in	   Ireland	   (article	   56);	   in	   England	   and	  Wales	   (article	   58),	   an	   in	   Scotland	  (article	  9)].	  In	  Italy,	  this	  role	  has	  been	  given	  to	  the	  physician’s	  in	  charge	  [proposals	  5	  (article	  9,	  section	  1)	  and	  1142	  (article	  10,	  section	  1)]	  or	  to	  the	  Court	  of	  Guardianship	  [proposal	  443	  (article	  11,	  section	  1)].	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into	   consideration	   the	   principle	   of	   self-­‐determination	   should	   minimize	   the	  provision	  for	  judicial	  or	  other	  intervention	  (Explanatory	  Report,	  par.	  167).	  Concluding,	   the	   Rec	   (2009)	   11	   shows	   the	   common	  European	   standard	  in	  this	  area.	  In	  addition,	  it	  has	  influenced	  the	  other	  legislators	  that	  until	  2009	  have	   not	   passed	   legislation	   on	   advance	   directives.	   All	   the	   Parliaments	   in	   the	  English-­‐,	   German-­‐	   and	   Romance-­‐speaking	   countries	   have	   recognized	   the	  significance	   of	   patient	   autonomy	   and	   the	   nomination	   of	   a	   surrogate.	   Within	  them,	  national	  parliaments	  in	  the	  English-­‐speaking	  countries	  have	  established	  similar	   principles	   with	   this	   recommendation.	   In	   Scotland,	   the	   law	   is	   mainly	  focussed	   on	   the	   activities	   and	   the	   role	   of	   the	   legal	   proxies,	   such	   as	  guardian	  and	   the	  continuing	  or	  welfare	  power	  of	  attorney.	  Moreover,	   the	  new	   Irish	  Bill	  of	   2013	   is	   completely	   focused	   on	   the	   role	   and	   activities	   of	   the	   legal	   proxies,	  such	   as	   the	   decision-­‐making	   assistant,	   the	   co-­‐decision-­‐maker,	   the	   decision-­‐
making	  representative,	  the	  informal	  decision-­‐maker,	  and	  the	  enduring	  power	  of	  
attorney.	  In	  England	  and	  in	  Wales	  (article	  25,	  section	  2,	  let.	  b))	  and	  in	  the	  Irish	  bill	   2012	   (article	   6,	   section	   2,	   let.	   b)),	   the	   role	   of	   the	   surrogate	   has	   been	  highlighted	  by	  establishing	  that	  a	  previous	  ‘living	  will’	  is	  not	  valid	  if	  the	  donor,	  after	   having	  written	   the	   ‘living	  will’,	   has	   created	   a	   lasting	   power	   of	   attorney	  which	   confers	   the	   authority	   on	   the	   donee	   to	   give	   or	   refuse	   consent	   to	   the	  treatment	  to	  which	  the	  advance	  decision	  relates.	  Therefore,	  although	  is	  a	  soft-­‐
law,	  the	  ECtHR	  could	  apply	  this	  recommendation	  as	  well.	  	  	  
1.3.	  	   The	   Guide	   on	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   regarding	   medical	  
treatment	  in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  situations	  The	   Guide	   on	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   regarding	   medical	   treatment	   in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	   situations	   (hereafter,	   the	   Guide)	   published	   by	   the	   Committee	   on	  Bioethics	  of	   the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  on	  May	  2014	  has	  been	  analyzed	  by	   taking	  into	   consideration	   the	   Convention	   of	   Oviedo,	   and	   the	   Recommendations	  Rec(2003)24	   and	   Rec(2009)11.	   In	   addition,	   some	   examples	   from	   national	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legislations	   from	   the	  English-­‐,	  German-­‐	  and	  Romance-­‐speaking	  countries	  will	  be	  given	  to	  illustrate	  and	  support	  these	  guidelines.	  	  The	  Guide	   is	  composed	  of	   four	  chapters.	   Its	  goal	   is	   the	   implementation	  of	   the	  principles	  established	   in	   the	  Convention	  of	  Oviedo	  (e.g.,	   see	  Sect.	  1.1.),	  further	   enhanced	   by	   the	   Recommendation	   CM/Rec	   (2009)	   11	   (e.g.,	   see	   Sect.	  1.1.2.).	   While	   the	   Convention	   of	   Oviedo	   focuses	   on	   the	   concept	   of	   “previous	  expressed	  wishes”	  and	  the	  Recommendation	  (2009)	  11	  identifies	  special	  rules	  regarding	  the	  power	  of	  attorney,	  the	  Guide	  takes	  into	  consideration	  both	  them	  and	  also	  the	  role	  of	  the	  patient’s	  family	  and	  relatives.	  	  It	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   this	   guide	   does	   not	   take	   an	   official	   position	  regarding	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   issues.	   This	   would	   have	   been	   challenging	   since	   within	  the	   Council	   of	   Europe	   there	   is	   no	   ethical	   consensus,	   especially	   with	   its	  enlargement	  with	   the	   East	   European	   countries	   (Fan	   1997).	   The	  main	   goal	   of	  this	  guide	   is	  to	  help	  the	  medical	  staff	  with	  the	  reflection	  on	  ethical	  principles	  regarding	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  decisions.	  	  Furthermore,	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   is	   a	   difficult	   topic	   that	   involves	   not	   only	  physicians	   and	   patients,	   but	   also	   patients’	   families94.	   This	   has	   led	   to	   the	  conceptualization	  of	   the	  transitional	  palliative	  care	  approach,	  where	  patients,	  their	   families	   and	   health	   care	   team	   confront	   together	   the	   conceptualized	  	  	  	  	  	  94	   The	   support	   to	   the	   family	   has	   been	   recognized	   as	   a	   guiding	   principle	   also	   in	   the	  Recommendation	   Rec	   (2003)24	   of	   the	   Committee	   of	   Ministers	   of	   the	   Council	   of	  Europe	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threat	  of	  possible	   imminent	  death	  (Nebel	  2011,	  Thomas	  2002,	  Harding	  2003,	  Goldberg	   2010).	   Therefore,	   the	   Guide	   could	   be	   also	   used	   –	   as	   a	   source	   of	  information	  –	  by	  patients	  and	  their	  families	  or	  relatives.	  	  	   The	   transformation	  of	   the	   conceptualization	  of	   the	  palliative	   care	   is	   in	  harmony	  with	   the	  new	  concept	  of	   autonomy.	  According	   to	   the	   individualistic	  and	   liberal	   approach	   to	   autonomy	   physicians	   should	   give	   only	   cognitive	  information	  without	  interfering	  with	  the	  individual’s	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  This	   decreases	   the	   patient’s	   trust	   in	   the	   physician	   role	   (Owens	   2015,	   and	  Entwistle	  2010)	  With	  the	  interpretation	  of	  autonomy	  as	  a	  relational	  principle,	  family	   dynamism	   (structure	   and	   relationships)	   (Broom	   and	  Kirby	   2013)	   and	  interpersonal	   relationships	   (Rini	   et	   al.	   2011,	   Corrigan	   2004,	   and	   Lewis	   and	  Rook	  1999)	  are	  considered	  important	  as	  well	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  1.2.).	  	  This	  is	  why	  the	   Recommendation	   CM/Rec	   (2009)	   11	   (e.g.,	   see	   Sect.	   2.1.2.)	   and	   the	  Guide	  highlight	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  social	  network	  of	  the	  patient.	  	  In	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  decisions,	  three	  concepts	  are	  involved,	  which	  are	  decision,	  autonomy	   and	   end-­‐of-­‐life.	   The	  word	   “decision”	   comes	   from	   the	   Latin	   de	   and	  
caedere,	  which	  etymologically	  means	  deciding,	  cutting	  off,	  or	  cleaving.	  Instead,	  the	  Greek	  word	  auto-­‐nomos,	  where	   ‘autonomy’	  comes	   from,	  means	   “living	  by	  one's	  own	  laws”.	  Regarding	  the	  expression	  ‘end-­‐of-­‐life’,	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  has	   decided	   to	   take	   the	   French	   term	   established	   in	   the	   Société	   Française	  
d’Accompagnement	   et	  de	   Soins	  Palliatifs	   (French	  Terminal	   and	  Palliative	  Care	  Society),	   which	   means	   that	   death	   is	   imminent	   and	   inevitable	   (Steering	  Committee	  on	  Bioethics	  2008).	  End-­‐of-­‐life	  decision	  is	  a	  difficult	  topic	  that	  involves	  different	  parties	  and	  the	  application	  of	  ethical,	  medical	  and	  legal	  principles.	  It	  includes:	  withholding	  or	   withdrawing	   potentially	   life-­‐prolonging	   treatment	   (such	   as	   mechanical	  ventilation,	   tube-­‐feeding,	  and	  dialysis),	  alleviation	  of	  pain	  or	  other	  symptoms	  that	   could	   have	   as	   a	   side	   effect	   hastening	   death	   (such	   as	   administration	   of	  opioids,	  benzodiazepines,	  or	  barbiturates)	  and	  even	  physician-­‐assisted	  suicide	  (PAS)	  or	  euthanasia	  (Steering	  Committee	  on	  Bioethics	  2008).	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In	  this	  guide,	  PAS	  or	  euthanasia	  have	  not	  been	  addressed.	  The	  ratio	  of	  it	  has	   been	   that	   only	   few	   countries	   –	   such	   as	   the	   Netherlands,	   Belgium,	  Luxemburg,	  Switzerland	  (and	  to	  some	  extent,	  Germany95)	  –	  have	  legally	  ruled	  these	   types	   of	   medical	   activities.	   However,	   some	   reasons	   to	   include	   these	  medical	  practices	  could	  be	  given.	  Firstly,	  the	  title	  of	  this	  guide	  regards	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  situations	  in	  general.	  Besides,	  the	  Guide	  has	  been	  based	  on	  the	  two	  reports	  presented	  during	  the	  symposium	  of	  2010,96	  and	  these	  reports	  –	  especially	  the	  one	   presented	   by	   Professor	   Lucie	   Hacpille	   –	   have	   included	   PAS	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  Before	  November	  2015,	  in	  Germany,	  PAS	  was	  not	  legally	  prohibited	  by	  the	  national	  law.	   Nevertheless,	   Chamber	   of	   Physicians	   of	   some	   Lands	   –	   such	   as:	  Mecklenburg-­‐Western	  Pomerania,	  Saxony,	  Lower	  Saxony,	  Thuringia,	  and	  Hesse	  –	  have	  prohibited	  it	  through	   disciplinary	   sanctions	   in	   the	   Medical	   Ethics	   Codes.	   However,	   it	   should	   be	  noted	   that	   recently	   the	  German	  Parliament	  has	  modified	  article	  217	  of	   the	  Criminal	  Code.	   The	   Entwurf	   eines	   Gesetzes	   zur	   Strafbarkeit	   der	   geschäftsmäßigen	   Förderung	  
der	   Selbsttötung	   of	   6	   November	   2015	   passed	   through	   the	   positive	   votes	   of	   360	  members.	  This	  bill	  was	   introduced	   for	   the	   first	   time	  on	  13	  November	  2014	  and	  was	  discussed	   for	   the	   first	   time	   on	   2	   July	   2015.	   The	   bill	   allows	   assisted	   suicide	   if	   the	  individuals	   who	   offer	   to	   help	   someone	   with	   suicide	   do	   not	   do	   that	   “on	   business	  terms”	   (geschäftsmäßig);	   otherwise	   they	   will	   face	   up	   to	   three	   years	   in	   prison	   or	   a	  fine.	   The	   main	   critique	   of	   this	   regulation	   regards	   the	   ambiguous	   language	   used.	  Several	  politicians	  have	  been	  discussed	  the	  meaning	  of	  geschäftsmäßig.	  One	  of	  them,	  the	   former	   Justice	  Minister	  Brigitte	  Zypries,	   said	   that	   the	  new	  regulation	   “will	   open	  an	  era	  of	  great	  legal	  uncertainty”.	  96	  The	  Steering	  Committee	  on	  Bioethics	  on	  30	  November	  and	  1	  December	  2010	  had	  organized	   the	   symposium	   on	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   regarding	   medical	  treatment	   in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  situations.	  This	  symposium	  was	  based	  on	  two	  reports	  –	  one	  by	   Professor	   Lucie	   Hacpille	   on	   “Medical	   decisions	   in	   end-­‐of-­‐	   life	   situations	   and	   the	  ethical	   implications	   of	   the	   available	   options”	   and	   the	   other	   by	   Professor	   Roberto	  Andorno	  entitled	   “The	  previously	  expressed	  wishes	   relating	   to	  health	  care	  Common	  principles	  and	  differing	  rules	  in	  national	  legal	  systems”.	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euthanasia.	   Moreover,	   some	   ethicists	   have	   argued	   that	   there	   is	   no	   intrinsic	  moral	   difference	   exists	   between	   killing	   and	   letting	   die	   (Perrett	   1996,	   James	  1975,	   Boyle	   1977,	   Kuhse	   1998)97.	   Also,	   the	   wrongful	   killing	   could	   not	   be	  justified	   based	   on	   the	   difference	   between	   action	   and	   omission	   (The	  President’s	   Commission	   for	   the	   Study	   of	   Ethical	   Problems	   in	   Medicine	   and	  Biomedical	  and	  Behavioural	  Research	  1993,	  Bundesgerichtshof	  25	  June	  2001).	  Furthermore,	  some	  European	  studies	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  1.1.2.)	  have	  demonstrated	  that	  PAS	  and	  euthanasia	  are	   common	   in	  medical	  decisions.	   In	  addition,	   these	  highly	  debated	  medical	  practices	  should	  have	  been	  included	  in	  the	  Guide	  since	  this	  guide	  is	  not	  a	  legally	  binding	  document	  for	  the	  member	  states.	  	  When	   faced	  with	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   decisions,	   physicians	   are	   obliged	   to	  make	  decisions	  according	  to	  the	  state	  of	  science.	  This	  is	  quite	  a	  challenge	  because	  in	  the	   last	   decades	   the	  number	  of	   articles	   published	  has	   increased	  drastically98.	  In	   addition,	   medical	   treatments	   depend	   on	   the	   individual	   patient’s	   reaction	  (Jasmeet	  2008).	  Therefore,	  the	  communication	  between	  the	  medical	  team	  and	  the	   patient,	   or	   in	   case	   of	   his	   or	   her	   incapacity	  with	   the	   legal	   representative,	  
	  	  	  	  	  97	  On	  the	  contrary:	  Oddie	  1997,	  Childress	  1985,	  Maguire	  1984,	  Beauchamp	  1989.	  	  98	  MEDLINE,	  maintained	  by	  the	  National	  Library	  of	  Medicine	  (NLM),	  is	  the	  largest	  and	  most	  widely	  used	  index	  of	  the	  medical	  literature.	  (Lacroix	  and	  Mehnert	  2002).	  A	  total	  of	   8.1	  million	   journal	   articles	  were	  published	   in	  MEDLINE	  between	  1978	  and	  2001.	  Between	   1978	   to	   1985	   and	   1994	   to	   2001,	   the	   annual	   number	   of	   MEDLINE	   articles	  increased	   46%,	   from	   an	   average	   of	   272,344	   to	   442,756	   per	   year,	   and	   the	   total	  number	  of	  pages	  increased	  from	  1.88	  million	  pages	  per	  year	  during	  1978	  to	  1985	  to	  2.79	  million	  pages	  per	  year	  between	  1994	  and	  2001.	  (Druss	  and	  Marcus,	  2005).	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the	   surrogate	   and/or	   his	   or	   her	   family	   should	   be	   considered	   fundamental	  (Thom	  and	  Campbell	  1997,	  Thom	  et	  al.	  2011).	  	  During	   this	   process,	   these	   parties	   should	   take	   into	   consideration	   the	  well-­‐known	   set	   of	   ethical	   principles	   as	   suggested	   by	   US-­‐American	   ethicists	  Beauchamp	  and	  Childress	   (1979).	  These	   four	  ethical	  principles	  are	  explained	  in	  chapter	  II	  of	  this	  guide.	  The	  respect	  of	  patient	  autonomy	  means	  the	  respects	  for	  his	  or	  her	  advance	  directives	  (Lawrence	  and	  Brauner	  2009).	  	  Moreover,	  autonomy	  does	  not	  imply	  the	  right	  for	  the	  patient	  to	  receive	  every	   treatment	   he	   or	   she	  may	   request	   (R	   (Burke)	   [2005]	   EWCA	   Civ	   1003),	  even	  in	  cases	  where	  a	  constitutional	  right	  to	  health	  exists,	  such	  as	  in	  Italy	  (e.g.,	  see	   Sect.	   1.1.).	   This	   has	   been	   established	   in	   par.	   50	   of	   the	   Recommendation	  Rec(2003)24.	  The	   principles	   of	   beneficence	   and	   non-­‐maleficence,	   established	   in	  articles	   2	   and	   4	   of	   the	   Convention	   of	   Oviedo,	   refer	   to	   the	   doctor’s	   dual	  obligation	   to	   seek	   to	  maximize	   the	   potential	   benefit	   and	   to	   limit	   as	  much	   as	  possible	   any	   harm	   that	   might	   arise	   from	   a	   medical	   intervention	   (p.10).	   It	  follows	  that	  physicians	  should	  deliver	  only	  appropriate	  treatments	  and	  should	  withdraw	   disproportionate	   treatments	   (Keown	   1997,	   Whiting	   1995-­‐1996).	  Therefore,	  when	  physicians	  decide	  to	  deliver	  a	  medical	  treatment	  they	  should	  take	   into	   consideration	   the	   relationship	   between	   risk-­‐benefits	   and	   patient’s	  expectation.	   Although	   there	   could	   be	   objective	   medical	   criteria	   that	   suggest	  that	   this	   treatment	   is	   proportionate,	   physician	   should	   consider	   the	   whole	  patient’s	  situation.	  This	   is	  why	  recently	   the	  ethical	  and	   legal	  debate	  has	  been	  focused	   on	   the	   patient-­‐physician’s	   trust	   (Thom	   et	   al.	   2011,	   Thom	   and	  Campbell	  1997).	  	  While	   treatment	   could	   be	   withdrawn	   –	   in	   case	   of	   disproportionate	  treatments	  –	  patient-­‐care	  should	  never	  stop.	  The	  Guide	  distinguishes	  between	  the	  concepts	  of	   ‘care’	  and	  of	   ‘treatment’.	  Treatment	  aims	  to	  cure	  the	  patient’s	  illness	  or	  to	  act	  on	  its	  causes	  to	  reduce	  the	  impact	  on	  the	  patient’s	  wellbeing.	  Care	  includes	  them,	  and	  also	  other	  type	  of	  actions,	  which	  do	  not	  need	  medical	  skills	   (for	   instance,	   personal	   hygiene	   and	   comfort).	   	  When	   related	   to	   end-­‐of-­‐
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life,	   treatment	   and	   care	   are	   intended	   to	   improve	   the	   patient’s	   quality	   of	   life.	  Within	  the	  bioethical	  community	  there	  is	  no	  unique	  definition	  of	  quality	  of	  life	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  1.1.).	  	  The	  fourth	  principle	  of	  medical	  ethics	  –	  justice	  –	  has	  been	  recognized	  in	  article	   3	   of	   the	   Convention	   of	   Oviedo.	   In	   health	   care	   system,	   justice	   means	  equitable	  access	  to	  health	  care.	  Therefore,	  this	  principle	  implies	  that	  available	  resources	   should	   be	   distributed	   as	   fairly	   as	   possible99.	   Since	   longevity	   has	  increased	   (European	   Commission	   2012)	   and	   European	   countries	   have	   cut	  their	   public	   budgets	   (Leider	   2012),	   informal	   care	   at	   home	   has	   become	   an	  important	   source	   of	   containing	   the	   public	   expenditure	   in	   the	   health	   care	  system100.	   This	   is	   why	   the	   Rec(2003)24	   recognizes	   the	   significance	   of	   the	  informal	  care	  and	  considers	  the	  public	   intervention	  in	  palliative	  care	  through	  care	   facilities	   only	   in	   case	   when	   caregivers	   in	   the	   home	   become	  overburdened101.	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  99	  Principle	  8	  European	  Charter	  of	  Medical	  Ethics	  100	   The	   informal	   care	   reduces	   with	   25%	   the	   potential	   demand	   for	   health	   care	  services.	  (Brugiavini	  and	  Jappelli,	  2010)	  101	   Setting	   and	   Services,	   Recommendation	   Rec(2003)24	   of	   the	   Committee	   of	  Ministers	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  p.11-­‐12	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1.3.1.	  	  Guidelines	   regarding	   the	   main	   parties	   in	   the	   decision-­‐making	  
process	  	  The	   Guide	   has	   been	   dedicated	   to	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   by	  distinguishing	   two	   main	   parties.	   On	   one	   hand,	   the	   role	   of	   patients,	   their	  surrogates	   or	   legal	   representatives	   has	   been	   crystallized;	   on	   the	   other,	  physicians,	  care	  teams	  and	  clinical	  ethics	  committee.	  	  The	   Guide	   has	   adopted	   a	   patient-­‐centered	   approach.	   In	   case	   of	   a	  competent	   patient,	   he	   or	   she	   must	   make	   the	   decision	   him-­‐	   or	   herself.	  Obviously,	   the	   patients	   have	   the	   opportunity	   to	   consult	   not	   only	   their	  physicians	   in	   charge,	   but	   also	   others.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   competent	   patient	  shall	  make	   the	   final	  decision.	   In	   case	  of	   children	  or	   incapable	   adults	   that	   are	  conscious	   (e.g.	   see	   Sect.	   2.1.2.),	   their	   involvement	   in	   the	   decision-­‐making	  process	  according	  to	  their	  level	  of	  comprehension	  is	  required	  (p.	  16-­‐17).	  This	  policy	   reflects	   not	   only	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination,	   but	  also	   a	   deontological	   principle.	   	   In	   case	   of	   an	   unconscious	   patient,	   medical	  decisions	   at	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   must	   be	   made	   according	   to	   the	   so-­‐called	   three-­‐step	  
hierarchy.	  However,	  nowadays,	   this	  hierarchy	   is	  not	   always	   so	   clear	   (e.g.,	   see	  Sect.	   1.4).	   In	   addition,	   empirical	   studies	   have	   shown	   that	   for	   both	   staff	   and	  families,	   consideration	   of	   a	   patient’s	   best	   interests	   generally	   took	   priority	  over	   the	   patient’s	   wishes	   (Karasz	   2010).	   Therefore,	   a	   combination	   between	  the	  patient’s	  previous	  medical	  directives	  and	  the	  opinion	  of	  a	  legal	  proxy	  has	  a	  stronger	  effect	  (Escher	  2014).	  In	   addition,	   by	   taking	   into	   consideration	   principle	   1,	   section	   2	   of	   the	  Rec	   (2009)11,	   in	   case	   that	   the	  decision	   should	  be	  made	  by	  a	   legal	  proxy,	   the	  attorney	  nominated	  by	  the	  conscious	  citizen	  should	  be	  preferred	  compared	  to	  the	   legal	   proxy	   nominated	   by	   the	   judge	   (e.g.,	   see	   Sect.	   2.1.2.).	   This	   policy	  avoids	   judicial	   and	   administrative	   proceedings,	   is	   faster	   and	   it	   further	  promotes	   the	   ethical	   principle	   of	   autonomy	   (Explanatory	   Report	  Recommendation	   CM/Rec	   (2009)	   11,	   par.	   49).	   This	   ratio	   has	   been	   adopted	  directly	  by	  some	  national	  parliaments;	  however,	  the	  Scottish	  Legislator	  or	  the	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new	  French	  law	  of	  March	  2015	  seem	  to	  not	  follow	  this	  principle	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  2.1.2.).	  This	   guide	   leaves	   all	   requirements	   for	   advance	   directives	   to	   the	  national	   legislation.	   Currently,	   all	   the	   national	   parliaments	   in	   the	   English,	  German	  and	  Romance-­‐speaking	  countries	  –	  except	  Italy,	  Ireland	  and	  Northern	  Ireland	  –	  have	  legally-­‐backed	  advance	  directives.	  Moreover,	  since	  the	  advance	  directives	   in	   written	   form	   have	   failed	   their	   expectation	   (Jox	   et	   al.	   2008,	  Michalowski	  2005,	  Fagerlin	  and	  Schneider	  2004,	  Prendergast	  2001,	  and	  Teno	  et	   al.	   1997),	   with	   the	   aim	   to	   reconstruct	   patient’s	   wishes,	   this	   guide	   has	  recognized	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  legal	  proxy	  and	  family	  or	  close	  relatives.	  	  As	   it	   has	   been	   mentioned	   above,	   the	   Guide	   considers	   the	   role	   of	  physicians,	   care	   teams	   and	   clinical	   ethics	   committees.	   In	   addition,	   this	   guide	  stimulates	   the	   implementation	   of	   an	   ex-­‐post	   review	   of	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   decisions.	  The	  objective	  of	   it	   is	  not	  to	  control	   the	  work	  of	   the	  physician,	  but	  should	  aim	  to	  enhance	  their	  own	  understanding	  of	  such	  situations	  in	  the	  future.	  	  	  Some	  of	   the	  members	  of	   the	   care	   team	   include	  nurses,	   care	   assistants,	  psychologists,	   and	   members	   of	   paramedical	   professions,	   such	   as	  physiotherapists.	   They	   are	   in	   constant	   contact	   with	   the	   patient.	   Therefore,	  they	   have	   a	   closer	   relationship	   with	   the	   patient	   than	   the	   physician	   and	  (generally)	   recognize	   signs	   of	  medical	   futility	   sooner	   than	   doctors	   (Zerwekh	  2005).	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   The	   exchange	   of	   information	   between	   doctors,	   especially	   in	   difficult	  medical	   decisions,	   has	   been	  one	   of	   the	   leitmotifs	   of	   Chapter	   III	   of	   this	   guide.	  This	   policy	   has	   been	   adopted	   by	   the	   French	   legislator	   in	   2005	   and	   again	  repeated	  with	  the	  new	  law	  of	  March	  2015102.	  The	   focus	   of	   this	   guide	   is	   to	   help	   the	   care	   team	   to	   combine	   medical	  information	  with	  ethical	  principles.	  With	  the	  aim	  to	  help	  them	  in	  this	  process,	  clinical	   ethics	   committees	   are	   constituted.	  Within	   the	   English-­‐,	   German-­‐	   and	  Romance-­‐speaking	   countries,	   the	   Italian	   legislator	   has	   codified	   their	  importance	   in	   the	  proposal	  5	  of	  15	  March	  2013	  and	  proposal	  1142	  of	  4	   June	  2013103.	  	   It	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   this	   guide	   highlights	   the	   ethical	   and	   legal	  discussion	  regarding	  ANH	  and	  sedation	  in	  terminal	  phase.	  Although	  in	  none	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  102	   The	   law	  of	   2005	  has	   recognized	   in	   cases	   established	   in	   article	   1111-­‐4,	   section	   5	  and	  article	  1111-­‐13,	   section	  1	  CSP	  an	  ad	  hoc	   collegial	  proceeding	   (R.	  4127-­‐37	  CSP).	  The	  new	  law	  of	  2015	  has	  added	  another	  case	  in	  article	  1111-­‐5-­‐1,	  section	  1	  CSP.	  103	   In	   concrete,	   in	   case	   of	   unconscious	   patient	   where	   either	   advance	   directive	   no	  patient’s	   legal	  proxy	  or	   family	  or	  relatives	  exits,	   the	  decision	  should	  be	  made	  by	  the	  internal	   clinical	   ethics	   committee	   	   [proposals	   5	   (article	   4,	   section	   4)	   and	   proposal	  1142	  (article	  5,	  section	  4)].	  Moreover,	  in	  case	  that	  there	  is	  a	  contract	  between	  people	  that	  should	  give	  the	  consent	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  unconscious	  patient,	  the	  decision	  should	  be	  made	  by	  the	   internal	  clinical	  ethics	  committee	   	   [proposals	  5	  (article	  8,	  section	  1)	  and	   proposal	   1142	   (article	   9,	   section	   1)].	   Furthermore,	   physicians	   have	   the	  possibility	  to	  not	  execute	  a	  patient’s	  living	  wills	  in	  case	  that	  the	  ethical	  committee	  of	  the	   hospital	   expresses	   its	   opinion	   that	   patient’s	   current	   medical	   situation	   do	   not	  correspond	  with	  the	  situation	  the	  patient	  took	  into	  account	  at	  the	  time	  of	  issuing	  the	  living	  will	  due	   to	   the	  new	  medical	  discovery	  [proposals	  5	  (article	  10,	  section	  5)	  and	  proposal	  1142	  (article	  11,	  section	  5)].	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these	  issues	  the	  Guide	  takes	  any	  official	  position,	  regarding	  artificial	  nutrition	  and	   hydration	   –	   without	   distinguishing	   between	   nasograstrofic	   or	  adminalgastrofic	   –	   it	   states	   that	   this	   technique	   implies	   choices	   concerning	  medical	   procedures	   and	   devices	   (perfusion,	   feeding	   tubes)	   (e.g.,	   see	   Sect.	  5.1.1.	   and	   3.1.1.).	   The	   same	   conclusion	   has	   been	   reached	   by	   the	   British	  Medical	  Association	   (2007).	   From	   this	  premise,	   it	   derives	   that	   these	  kinds	  of	  care	  cannot	  be	  classified	  as	  basic	  care.	  Regarding	  sedation	   in	   terminal	  phase,	  the	   Guide	   highlights	   that	   the	   purpose	   of	   sedation	   is	   not	   to	   shorten	   life.	   In	  addition,	  the	  ethical	  debate	  regarding	  the	  use	  of	  this	  treatment	  for	  alleviating	  psychological	  or	  existential	  suffering	  has	  been	  reflected.	  	  	   Before	   concluding	   it	   should	   be	   mentioned	   that	   this	   Guide	   does	   not	  mention	   the	   particular	   cases	   of	   persistent	   or	   permanent	   vegetative	   state;	  either	   it	   gives	  a	  definition	   regarding	   the	  concept	  of	   futile	   treatment	   (e.g.,	   see	  Sect.	  1.5.1.	  and	  3.1.1.).	  	   Concluding,	   it	   should	   be	   said	   that	   the	   main	   value	   of	   the	   Guide	   on	   the	  
decision-­‐making	   process	   regarding	   medical	   treatment	   in	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   situations	  consists	   in	   the	   explanation	   of	   the	   four	   ethical	   principles	   in	   the	   end-­‐of-­‐life	  issues.	   This	   document	   does	   not	   take	   any	   official	   position	   regarding	   debated	  bioethical	   topics,	   such	   as	   sedation	   or	   artificial	   nutrition	   and	   hydration.	  However,	  its	  usefulness	  consists	  in	  underlying	  that	  ANH	  cannot	  be	  qualified	  as	  basic	   care	   because	   it	   states	   that	   this	   technique	   implies	   choices	   concerning	  medical	   procedures	   and	   devices.	   In	   addition,	   the	   Guide	   makes	   a	   distinction	  between	  medical	  treatment	  and	  patient	  care	  in	  general	  and	  it	  brings	  again	  the	  attention	   to	   the	   application	   of	   the	   patient-­‐centered	   approach.	   A	   review	   of	  previous	  decisions	   could	  help	   the	  process	  of	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   situations.	  Generally,	  national	  laws	  in	  the	  German-­‐,	  English-­‐	  and	  Romance-­‐speaking	  countries	  are	  in	  harmony	  with	  these	  guidelines.	  	  	  	  
2.	  	   	  Advance	   directives	   in	   English,	   German,	   and	   Romance-­‐speaking	  
countries:	  similarities	  and	  differences	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In	  all	   the	  countries	  studied,	  health	   is	  considered	  a	  constitutional	   right.104	  The	  extent	   of	   its	   protection	   varies	   from	   country	   to	   country:105	   its	   varies	   from	   a	  ‘negative	   obligation’	   of	   the	   state	   to	   not	   to	   endanger	   citizens’	   health	   –	   as	   in	  Ireland	  –	  to	  the	  highest	  extent	  of	  protection	  of	  a	  ‘right	  to	  health’	  –as	  in	  Italy.	  In	  all	   these	  countries,	  citizens	  have	  the	  right	   to	  refuse	  medical	   treatments.106	  All	  the	  countries	  studied	  except	   Italy,	   Ireland	  and	  Northern	   Ireland	  have	   legally-­‐backed	  ADs	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  1.1.3.).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  104	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  United	  Kingdom	  of	  Great	  Britain	  and	  Northern	  Ireland	  has	  an	   ‘unwritten	   constitution’.	   Nevertheless,	   health	   is	   considered	   so	   important	   that	   in	  England,	   on	   March	   2012	   the	   Department	   of	   Health	   published	   the	   National	   Health	  Service	   Constitution	   for	   England;	   a	   document	   that	   aims	   to	   regulate	   health	   care	  throughout	  England.	  	  105	   Health	   is	   safeguarded	   as	   the	   ‘right	   not	   to	   have	   one's	   health	   endangered	   by	   the	  State’	   in	   Ireland	   (preamble	   of	   the	   Constitution	   and	   Government	   of	   Ireland);	   as	   a	  ‘legislative	   power’	   given	   to	   the	   federal	   state	   in	  Austria	   (article	   10)	   and	   in	   Germany	  (article	   74);	   as	   a	   result	   of	   enjoyment	   of	   the	   environment	   in	   France	   (article	   1	   of	   the	  Chapter	   for	   the	   environment);	   as	   a	   right	   or	   access	   to	   health	   care	   in	   Switzerland	  (article	  41);	  as	  a	  ‘protection	  of	  health’	  in	  Portugal	  (article	  64)	  and	  Spain	  (article	  43);	  and	  as	  a	  ‘right	  to	  health’	  in	  Italy	  (article	  32).	  106	  Only	   in	   Italy,	   citizens	   have	   the	   right	   to	   demand	   for	  medical	   treatment;	   in	   all	   the	  other	   countries,	  medical	   treatment	   can	  be	  denied	   –	  despite	  patients’	   requests	   –	   not	  only	   because	   these	   medical	   treatments	   are	   considered	   as	   futile,	   but	   also	   for	   other	  legally	   defined	   reasons,	   for	   instance	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   allocation	   of	   scarce	  resources.	   Physicians	   have	   the	   right	   to	   withdraw	   medical	   treatment	   in	   case	   that	  these	   are	   patently	   futile	   and	   excessively	   burdensome	   to	   the	   patient	   (Par.	   50,	  Explanatory	  memorandum	  of	  the	  Recommendation	  Rec(2003)24	  of	  the	  Committee	  of	  Ministers	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe).	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   Although	   these	   countries	   share	   a	   basic	   consensus	   regarding	   the	   broad	  concept	  of	  the	  protection	  of	  patient	  autonomy,107	  different	  policies	  emphasize	  different	  values.	  In	  English	  and	  German-­‐speaking	  countries,	  patient	  autonomy	  has	   been	   considered	   fundamental;	   its	   protection	   has	   been	   achieved	   through	  supporting	   people	   who	   lack	   capacity	   (in	   English-­‐speaking	   countries)108	   or	  through	   underlining	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   patient’s	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination	   (in	   German-­‐speaking	   countries).109	   In	   Romance-­‐speaking	  countries,	  although	  patient	  autonomy	  is	  been	  recognized,	  a	  physician-­‐centred	  	  	  	  	  	  107	   Several	   scholars,	   including	   A.	   E.	   Buchanan,	   D.	   W.	   Brock,	   N.	   Rhoden,	   and	   R.	  Dworkin,	   have	   highlighted	   the	   importance	   of	   advance	   directives	   in	   end-­‐of-­‐life	  decisions.	  According	   to	   two	  of	   them,	   “advance	  directives	  are	  not	  merely	  evidence	  of	  what	   will	   be	   good	   for	   the	   later	   incompetent	   patient	   (which	   may	   be	   rejected	   when	  better	  evidence	  comes	  along),	  but	  are	  acts	  of	  self-­‐determination”	  	  (Buchanan	  and	  Brock	  1990).	  108	   In	   England:	   Joint	   Committee	   on	   the	   Draft	   Mental	   Incapacity	   Bill,	   “Draft	   Mental	  Incapacity	   Bill	   (1st	   Report,	   Session	    2002-­‐03,	   HL	   189-­‐I)”	  http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt/jtdmi.htm;	   in	   Ireland:	   Minister	   of	  State	   at	   the	   Department	   of	   Health	   (Deputy	   Kathleen	   Lynch)	   “Assisted	   Decision-­‐Making	   (Capacity)	   Bill	   2013:	   Second	   Stage”	  http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/debates%20authoring/debateswebpack.nsf/takes/dail2013120300037?opendocument#KK00700;	   and	   in	   Scotland:	   Scottish	   Law	  Commission,	   “Report	   on	   Incapable	   Adults	   (Part	   1)’,	   (Scot	   Law	   Com	   No	   151)”	  http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/publications/reports/1990-­‐1999/.	  109In	   Austria:	   Judiciary	   Committee.	   “Report	   of	   the	   law	   2006	   -­‐	   SWRÄG	   2006”,	  http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXII/I/I_01511/fname_063771.pdf;	   in	  Germany:	   Legal	   Commetee.	   “Reccomentation	   of	   the	   legal	   Commetee”,	  http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/133/1613314.pdf	   ;	   	   and	   in	   Switzerland:	  Swiss	   National	   Advisory	   Commission	   on	   Biomedical	   Ethics.	   “Opinion	   17/2011”,	  http://www.nek-­‐cne.ch/fileadmin/nek-­‐cne-­‐dateien/Themen/Stellungnahmen/en/NEK-­‐CNE_Advance_Directives.pdf.	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approach110	  and	  disadvantages	  of	  the	  implementation	  of	  ADs111	  have	  also	  been	  emphasized.	   Of	   these	   last,	   the	   Italian	   parliament	   has	   adopted	   the	   most	  paternalistic	  approach.112	  	   Legislators	   are	   aware	   that	   laws	   cannot	   foresee	   every	   detail	   of	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   decisions.	   Therefore,	   some	   countries	   have	   empowered	   public	   bodies	   to	  discipline	   and	   manage	   national	   registers	   of	   ADs,113	   or	   just	   of	   surrogates;114	  	  	  	  	  	  110	  In	  France:	  articles	  1111-­‐4	  and	  1111-­‐13;	  in	  Italy	  (bill	  2350):	  article	  7	  bill	  2350;	  in	  Portugal:	  articles	  5	  and	  9;	  in	  Spain:	  article	  11,	  section	  3.	  111	  In	  France:	  National	  Assembly,	  2008,	  ‘Mission	  d'évaluation	  de	  la	  loi	  n°	  2005-­‐370	  du	  22	  avril	  2005	  relative	  aux	  droits	  des	  malades	  et	  à	  la	  fin	  de	  vie	  n°	  1287’.	  Retrieved	  18	  march	   2015,	   http://www.assemblee-­‐nationale.fr/13/dossiers/mission_fin_vie.asp;	  	  in	   Italy:	   National	   Commette	   of	   Bioethics,	   2003,	   ‘Dichiarazioni	   anticipate	   di	  trattamento’.	   Retrieved	   18	   march	   2015,	  http://www.governo.it/bioetica/testi/Dichiarazioni_anticipate_trattamento.pdf	   In	  the	   Iberian	   countries	   risks	   arising	   from	   the	   implementation	   of	   ADs	   are	   highlighted	  through	   a	   strict	   bureaucratic	   model.	   In	   particular,	   in	   Spain	   most	   Autonomous	  Communities’	   regulations	   establish	   several	   formal	   requirements	   (Navarro-­‐Michel	  2005).	   The	   same	   strict	   bureaucratic	   model	   is	   used	   in	   the	   Portuguese	   law	   of	   2012	  (Pereira	  2013).	  112	   Bill	   2350	   was	   drafted	   under	   the	   Catholic	   Bioethics	   group:	   phrases	   such	   as	  ‘protection	  of	  life’,	  ‘extraordinary	  treatment’	  –	  a	  term	  rejected	  by	  secular	  bioethicists	  –	   ‘prohibition	  of	  any	  kind	  of	  euthanasia’	  –	  a	  term	  which	  never	  appears	   in	  the	  Italian	  Penal	   Code	   –	   appear	   as	  major	   principles	   in	   article	   1	   of	   this	   bill.	   However,	   the	   new	  draft-­‐bills	   –	   except	  draft-­‐bill	   2226	  –	  have	   adopted	  a	   liberal	   approach	   (e.g.,	   see	   Sect.	  1.1.3.	  and	  Chap.	  3).	  113	   In	   Italy	   (article	   8,	   section	   1),	   in	   Portugal	   (article	   15,	   section	   1),	   and	   in	   Spain	  (article	   11,	   section	   5)	   national	  Ministries	   of	   Health	   are	   responsible	   for	   running	   the	  national	  register	  of	  ADs.	  In	  France,	  the	  new	  law	  of	  March	  2015	  gives	  to	  the	  Council	  of	  State	  the	  duty	  to	  decide	  about	  the	  conservation	  of	  these	  documents	  (1111-­‐11,	  section	  4	  CSP)	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other	   have	   nominated	   a	   public	   body	   responsible	   for	   the	   implementation	   of	  these	  general	  norms;115	  and	  some	  legislators	  have	  established	  a	  national	  code	  of	   practice116	   or	   code	   of	   medical	   ethics117	   as	   an	   instrument	   to	   implement	  national	   law.	   Furthermore,	   in	   all	   these	   countries,	   national	   physicians’	  councils118	  govern	   the	  patient–physician	  relationship:	   in	  case	  of	   infringement	  
	  	  	  	  	  114	  In	  England	  (article	  58,	  section	  1),	  in	  Ireland	  (article	  48,	  section	  1),	  and	  in	  Scotland	  (article	   6,	   section	   1)	   the	   Public	   Guardian	   is	   responsible	   for	   establishing	   and	  maintaining	  a	  national	  register	  of	  surrogates.	  115	  In	  Austria,	  the	  Federal	  Minister	  of	  Justice	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	   Sachwalterrechts-­‐Änderungsgesetz	   2006	   –	   SWRÄG	   2006,	   law	   23	   June	   2006,	  governing	   the	   role	   of	   surrogate,	   and	   the	   Federal	   Minister	   of	   Health	   and	  Women	   in	  agreement	  with	  the	  Federal	  Minister	  of	  Justice	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	   the	   Patientenverfügungs-­‐Gesetz	   –	   PatVG,	   law	   of	   8	   May	   2006,	   governing	   ‘living	  wills’.	  116	   In	   English-­‐speaking	   countries	   the	   ‘Code	   of	   practice’	   is	   to	   be	   established:	   in	  England,	   by	   the	   Lord	   Chancellor	   (article	   42	   of	   the	  Mental	   Capacity	   Act	   of	   2005);	   in	  Ireland,	   the	  current	  version	  of	   the	  Bill	  emphasizes	   the	   importance	  of	   the	  role	  of	   the	  Public	   Guardian	   (article	   63	   of	   the	   Assisted	   Decision-­‐Making	   (Capacity)	   Bill	   2013);	  and	   in	   Scotland	   by	   the	   Scottish	   Ministers	   (article	   13	   of	   the	   Adult	   with	   Incapacity	  (Scotland)	  Act	  of	  2000).	  	  117	   In	   France,	   rules	   established	   in	   the	   Code	   of	   Medical	   Ethics	   can	   be	   considered	   an	  integral	   part	   of	   the	   French	   Public	   Health	   Code.	   These	   rules	   would	   become	   legally	  binding	  only	  if	  upheld	  by	  a	   judicial	  review	  by	  the	  French	  Council	  of	  State	  (according	  to	  the	  preamble	  of	  the	  Code	  of	  Medical	  Ethics).	  	  118	   The	   exact	   names	   of	   the	   national	   councils	   of	   physicians	   are:	   in	   Austria,	   the	  Chamber	   of	   Physicians;	   in	   France,	   the	   National	   Medical	   Council;	   in	   Germany,	   the	  Chamber	   of	   Physicians;	   in	   Ireland,	   the	   Medical	   Council;	   in	   Italy,	   the	   National	  Federation	   of	   Associations	   of	   Physicians	   and	   Dentists;	   in	   Portugal,	   the	   Medical	  Association;	   in	   Spain,	   the	   General	   Council	   of	   Medical	   Colleges;	   in	   Switzerland,	   the	  Medical	  Association;	  and	  in	  UK,	  the	  General	  Medical	  Council.	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of	  these	  rules,	  disciplinary	  sanctions	  are	  established	  directly119	  or	  indirectly120	  by	  them.	  	   All	   national	   parliaments	   in	   English-­‐,	   German-­‐	   and	   Romance-­‐speaking	  countries	  have	  recognized	  the	  right	  of	  patients	  to	  self-­‐determination.	  ADs	  are	  not	   limited	   in	   time;	   however,	   some	   exceptions	   to	   this	   rule	   have	   been	   found.	  Austria	  (article	  7,	  section	  1,	   law	  of	  8	  May	  2006),	  Portugal	  (article	  7,	  section	  1	  law	   of	   16	   July	   2012),	   and	   the	   Italian	   Bill	   (article	   4,	   section	   3	   Bill	   2350	   and	  article	   4,	   section	   3	   draft-­‐bill	   2229)	   limit	   the	   period	   of	   validity	   of	   ADs121.	   All	  these	  countries	  have	   implemented	  a	  time	  limit	  of	  5	  years.	   It	  seems	  that	  these	  legislators	  have	  adopted	   the	  philosophy	  of	  Derek	  Parfit	   (1984),	  who	  believes	  personal	   identity	   is	   not	   merely	   a	   question	   of	   physical	   continuity	   over	   time	  
	  	  	  	  	  119	   The	   disciplinary	   sanction	   in	   case	   of	   infringement	   of	   these	   rules	   is	   established	  directly:	   in	   Austria	   by	   article	   12,	   section	   3	   Code	   of	   Conduct	   of	   2014;	   in	   France	   by	  article	  110	  of	  the	  Code	  of	  Medical	  Ethics;	   in	  Italy	  by	  article	  2	  Code	  of	  Medical	  Ethics	  of	  2014;	  in	  Portugal	  by	  article	  155	  Code	  of	  Medical	  Ethics	  of	  2008;	  in	  Spain	  by	  article	  2	   Code	   of	   Medical	   Ethics	   of	   2011;	   and	   in	   Switzerland	   by	   articles	   43–49	   Code	   of	  Medical	  Ethics	  of	  2014.	  120	   Disciplinary	   sanctions	   for	   infringement	   of	   these	   rules	   could	   derive	   from	   the	  interpretation	   of:	   in	   Germany,	   the	   preamble	   of	   the	   Code	   of	   Conduct	   of	   2011;	   in	  Ireland,	   the	   combination	   of	   article	   2,	   section	   2	   and	   article	   3	   of	   the	   Guide	   to	  Professional	   Conduct	   and	   Ethics	   for	   Registered	   Medical	   practitioners;	   and	   in	   UK,	  articles	  72-­‐76	  of	  the	  Good	  Medical	  Practice.	  	  121	   The	   old	   version	   of	   the	   French	   law	   established	   that	   advance	   directives	   have	   a	  validity	  of	  3	  years.	  Nevertheless,	  they	  could	  be	  renewed	  by	  a	  simple	  signature	  of	  the	  existing	  document	   (Article	  1111-­‐18	  Code	  de	   la	  Santé	  Publique).	  On	   the	  contrary,	   the	  new	  version	  of	   the	  French	  Law	  of	  2015	  does	  not	  establish	  any	   time-­‐limited	  of	   these	  documents.	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(e.g.,	   see	   Sect.	   1.3.1.).	   Moreover,	   these	   policies	   base	   their	   rationale	   on	   the	  results	  of	   some	  empirical	   research	   that	   show	  patients’	  decisions	  change	  over	  time	  (Lingler	  et	  al.	  2010,	  Witting	  et	  al.	  2008,	  Ditto	  et	  al.	  2003).	  	   Moreover,	   rules	   for	   ADs	   have	   generally	   been	   established	   in	   distinct	  legal	  texts.	  France	  and	  German-­‐speaking	  countries	  are	  exceptions	  to	  that	  rule.	  France	  is	  the	  only	  country	  in	  this	  study	  that	  has	  modified	  its	  Code	  de	  la	  Santé	  
Publique	  (CSP,	  Public	  Health	  Code).	  Austria,122	  Germany,	  and	  Switzerland	  have	  modified	   their	   civil	   codes.	   It	   is	   notable	   that	   the	   political	   decision	   to	   include	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  decisions	  in	  either	  public	  code	  or	  civil	  code	  is	  in	  itself	  an	  important	  moral	   choice:	  public	   codes	  regulate	  citizens’	  activities	   in	  connection	  with	   the	  organs	  of	   the	  state,	  and	  civil	   law	  rules	  citizens’	  dealings	  with	  each	  other.	  The	  decision	  to	  include	  the	  regulation	  of	  ADs	  in	  public	  law	  expresses	  some	  kind	  of	  external	   control	   of	   citizens’	   health	   care	   decisions.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	  modification	   of	   the	   civil	   code	   –	   for	   instance	   in	   German-­‐speaking	   countries	   –	  demonstrates	  that	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  decisions	  are	  considered	  a	  private	  matter	  for	  the	  individual	  sphere.	  	  	   In	  all	  the	  countries	  surveyed,	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  role	  of	  a	  surrogate	  in	   health	   care	   decisions	   has	   been	   established.	   This	   recognition	   is	   important	  because	  some	  previous	  rules	  did	  not	  allow	  the	  power	  of	  attorney	  of	  personal	  welfare	  and	  established	  the	  forfeiture	  of	  the	  right	  to	  represent	  the	  person	  who	  	  	  	  	  	  122	   The	   Austrian	   parliament	   has	   modified	   its	   civil	   code	   only	   with	   respect	   to	   the	  nomination	  of	  a	  surrogate.	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had	  given	  the	  power	  once	  the	  mandator	  had	  become	  incapable	  or	  incompetent	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  2.1.2.).	  	  Sometimes,	   the	   law	   on	   ADs	   mostly	   concerns	   the	   surrogate,123	   or	  highlights	   the	   role	   of	   surrogate.124	   In	   some	   cases,	   national	   laws	   specify	   who	  can	   be	   nominated	   as	   a	   surrogate;125	   in	   others,	   parliaments	   have	   established	  who	  cannot	  be	  a	  surrogate.126	  In	  general,	  every	  competent	  physical	  person	  can	  be	  nominated	  as	  surrogate.	  Further,	  in	  Switzerland,	  a	  legal	  person	  can	  also	  be	  nominated	  as	  a	  surrogate	  (article	  360	  ZGB),	  which	  is	  the	  only	  such	  case	  in	  the	  countries	  studied.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  123	   In	   Germany,	   the	   law	   is	   directed	   to	   the	   guardian	   (‘der	   Betreuer’).	   Nevertheless,	  these	   rules	   are	   applied	   to	   the	   surrogate	   (‘der	   Bevollmächtigte’)	   (article	   1901a,	  section	   3;	   article	   1901b,	   section	   3;	   article	   1904,	   section	   5	   of	   BGB).	   In	   Scotland,	   the	  law	  rules	  the	  activity	  of	  the	  legal	  proxies	  (guardian	  and	  continuing	  or	  welfare	  power	  of	   attorney);	   same	  with	   the	   new	   bill	   of	   2013	   in	   Ireland	   (decision-­‐making	   assistant,	  co-­‐decision-­‐maker,	   decision-­‐making	   representative,	   informal	   decision-­‐maker,	   and	  enduring	  power	  of	  attorney).	  124	  According	  to	  article	  25,	  section	  2,	  let.	  b)	  MCA	  of	  2005	  the	  previous	  AD	  is	  not	  valid	  if,	   after	   the	   donor	   has	   conferred	   lasting	   power	   of	   attorney	   the	   authority	   to	   give	   or	  refuse	   consent	   to	   the	   treatment	   to	   which	   the	   advance	   decision	   relates.	   The	   same	  legal	   reasoning	   has	   been	   established	   in	   Ireland	   (article	   6,	   section	   2,	   let.	   b)	   of	   the	  Advance	  Healthcare	  Decision	  Bill	  2012).	  125	   For	   example,	   in	   France:	   article	   1111-­‐6	   CSP	   states	   that	   a	   surrogate	   could	   be	   the	  parent,	  a	  relative	  or	  the	  attending	  physician.	  126	   For	   example,	   in	   England	   article	   10,	   section	   1	   states	   that	   the	   surrogate	   must	   be	  more	   than	   18	   years	   old;	   further,	   section	   7.10	   of	   the	   Code	   of	   Practice	   of	   the	  Mental	  Capacity	  Act	  states	  that	  people	  working	  as	  a	  paid	  care	  workers	  (such	  as	  a	  care	  home	  manager)	  –	  with	  only	  few	  exceptions	  –	  shall	  not	  be	  appointed	  as	  an	  attorney;	  and	  in	  Portugal,	   article	   11,	   section	   2	   states	   that	   surrogates	   must	   be	   fully	   competent,	  therefore,	  not	  a	  minor,	  interdict	  or	  incapacitated	  person.	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In	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   surrogate,	   some	   national	   parliaments	   have	  established	   a	   fixed	   order	   of	   precedence,	   which	   highlights	   the	   importance	   of	  the	  patient’s	  family;127	  others	  have	  empowered	  an	  independent	  public	  body	  to	  nominate	  a	  surrogate	  in	  specific	  cases	  established	  by	  law.128	  The	  first	  approach	  could	  be	  effective	  in	  Mediterranean	  areas	  where	  empirical	  studies	  have	  shown	  that	   patients’	   family	   are	   typically	   given	   more	   information	   than	   patients	  themselves	  (Costantini	  et	  al.	  2006,	  Robin	  et	  al.	  2003),	  and	  where	  the	  majority	  of	  informal	  caregivers	  are	  relatives	  of	  the	  patient	  (Costantini	  et	  al.	  2008,	  Rossi	  et	   al.	   2007,	   Toro	   et	   al.	   2007).	   The	   second	   approach	   is	   more	   effective	   in	  societies	  where	  a	  high	  rate	  of	  divorce	  exists.129	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  127	   In	   France,	   article	   1111-­‐13	   CSP	   (the	   order	   is:	   surrogate,	   family,	   living	   wills);	   in	  Italy,	  article	  6,	  section	  8	  bill	  2350,	  which	  refers	  to	  book	  II,	  title	  II,	  chapter	  I	  and	  II	  (it	  is	   quite	   complicated;	   but	   (in	   general)	   the	   order	   is:	   children	   and	   spouse,	   siblings,	  parents);	   in	  Switzerland,	  article	  378	  ZGB	  (the	  order	  is:	  surrogate,	  person	  nominated	  in	   ‘der	  Vorsorgeauftrag’,	  guardian,	  spouse	  or	  registered	  partner,	  person	  living	  in	  the	  same	  household	  who	  regularly	  assists	  the	  incapable	  person,	  children	  if	  they	  regularly	  assist	   the	   incapable	   person,	   parents	   if	   they	   regularly	   assist	   the	   incapable	   person,	  brothers	  and	  sisters	  if	  they	  regularly	  assist	  the	  incapable	  person);	  in	  Spain:	  article	  9,	  section	   3	   law	   of	   November	   2002	   states	   that	   if	   the	   patient	   is	   incapable	   and	   has	   no	  legal	  representative	  –	  even	  a	  surrogate	  –	  informed	  consent	  will	  be	  granted	  by	  virtue	  of	  relationship	  or	  de	  facto.	  	  128	   In	   England,	   after	   nomination	   by	   the	   Independent	  Mental	   Capacity	   Advocate,	   the	  surrogate	   must	   ascertain	   the	   donor’s	   wishes	   (article	   36,	   section	   2	   let.	   c	   Mental	  Capacity	   Act);	   in	   Scotland,	   the	   Mental	   Welfare	   Commission	   can	   provide	   a	   welfare	  attorney	  when	  requested	  to	  do	  so	  (article	  9,	  section	  1,	   let.	  g	  of	   the	  of	   the	  Adult	  with	  Incapacity	  (Scottish)	  Act).	  129	  Eurostat.	   “Crude	  marriage	  rate,	   selected	  years,	  1960–2012”	  demonstrates	   that	   in	  2011	   the	   rate	   of	   divorce	   in	   UK	   is	   2.1	   and	   in	   Italy	   is	   0.9.	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   In	  case	  of	  conflicts	  regarding	  the	  execution	  of	  ADs,	  a	  judge’s	  ruling	  will	  be	   sought.	   However,	   in	   Italy,	   in	   Portugal,	   in	   Scotland,	   and	   in	   Switzerland,	   in	  certain	  cases	  decisions	  are	  taken	  by	  another	  public	  body.130	  	   In	  no	  state	  policy	  studied	  has	  patient	  autonomy	  been	  denied.	  However,	  in	  Romance-­‐speaking	  countries,	  while	  the	  patient’s	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  has	   been	   considered	   important,	   the	   physician’s	   duty	   of	   care	   and	   the	   ethical	  principles	   of	   beneficence	   and	   non-­‐maleficence	   have	   been	   also	   taken	   into	  account.	  	  	  	  
3.	  	   Advance	  Directives	  in	  Romance-­‐speaking	  counties	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-­‐explained/index.php/Marriage_and_divorce_statistics.	  130	  In	  Italy,	  the	  first	  version	  of	  bill	  2350	  established	  an	  internal	  medical	  committee	  to	  resolve	  the	  conflict	  between	  surrogate	  and	  physician	  with	  a	  decision	  that	  would	  have	  had	  no	   legal	  binding	  force	  for	  physicians	  (article	  7,	  section	  3	  bill	  2350).	   In	  Portugal,	  only	   in	   case	   of	   medical	   conscientious	   objection,	   the	   hospital	   must	   find	   the	   best	  solution	  with	  other	  hospitals	  or	  physicians	  (article	  9	  law	  no.	  25	  of	  16	  July	  2012).	  The	  Portuguese	   Law	   of	   AD	   is	   the	   only	   law	   in	   our	   study	   that	   explicitly	   establish	  medical	  conscientious	   objection	   in	   law.	   In	   Scotland,	   in	   case	   of	   conflicts	   between	   surrogate	  and	   physician,	   the	   decision	   will	   be	   taken	   by	   the	   ‘nominated	   medical	   practitioner’	  from	   the	   Mental	   Welfare	   Commission	   (article	   50,	   section	   4	   Adults	   with	   Incapacity	  (Scotland)	   Act).	   In	   Switzerland,	   the	   Adult	   Protection	   Authority	   will	   be	   in	   charge	   in	  cases	  where:	   1)	   ADs	   are	   not	   carried	   out;	   2)	   the	   patient’s	   interest	   is	   endangered	   or	  not	  well	  protected;	  3)	  ADs	  do	  not	  express	  the	  patient’s	  free	  will	  (Article	  373,	  section	  1	  ZGB).	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The	   legal	   situation	   in	   Romance-­‐speaking	   countries,	   especially	   Spain	   and	  France,	  has	  been	  analyzed	  in	  detail.	  In	  both	  these	  countries	  patient	  autonomy	  has	  been	  considered	  an	  important	  factor;	  notwithstanding,	  physicians’	  role	  in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	   decisions	   and	   disadvantages	   arising	   from	   the	   implementation	   of	  ADs	  are	  highlighted.	  Of	   the	   Romance-­‐speaking	   countries,	   Spain	   was	   the	   first	   country	   to	  regulate	   ADs.	   Compared	   with	   the	   other	   countries	   studied,	   the	   Spanish	   rules	  are	  the	  most	  precise:	  in	  just	  one	  article,	  ADs	  are	  established	  in	  all	  their	  details	  regarding	   surrogates,	   form,	   effectiveness,	   and	   the	   national	   register.131	   It	  should	   be	   mentioned	   that,	   compared	   to	   the	   other	   Romance-­‐speaking	  countries,	  the	  Spanish	  law	  takes	  the	  most	  liberal	  approach.	  	  	   In	  France,	   law	  no.	  348	  of	  17	  March	  2015	  has	   confirmed	   the	  physician-­‐centred	   approach	   of	   the	   law	   2005-­‐370	   of	   22	   April	   2005,	   which	   has	   been	  considered	  a	  reaction	  to	  the	  case-­‐law	  of	  Vincent	  Humbert,	  a	  tetraplegic	  patient	  who	  publically	   claimed	   the	   right	   to	   euthanasia	   (Pereira	   2007,	  Dupont	   2005).	  France	   is	   the	   only	   country	   in	   our	   study	   that	   has	   modified	   its	   Public	   Health	  Code.	  	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  131	  However,	   the	  Parliaments	  of	   the	  Autonomous	  Communities	   can	   establish	   further	  detailed	  rules	  (Navarro-­‐Michel	  2005).	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3.1.	  	   Advance	  Directives	  in	  Spain	  	  In	   Spain,	   the	  Básica	   reguladora	   de	   la	   autonomía	   del	   paciente	   y	   de	   derechos	   y	  
obligaciones	   en	  materia	   de	   información	   y	   documentación	   clínica	  of	  November	  2002	   governs	   ADs.	   The	   Spanish	   law	   was	   considered	   as	   a	   model	   for	   the	  Portuguese	  law	  of	  2012.132	  	   Article	   11,	   section	   3	   limits	   the	   patient	   autonomy.	   This	   section	  exemplifies	   the	   physician-­‐centred	   approach.133	   According	   to	   it,	   prior	  medical	  
	  	  	  	  	  132	   Article	   5	   of	   the	   Portuguese	   law	   no.	   25	   of	   16	   July	   2012	   is	   similar	   to	   article	   11,	  section	  3	   of	   the	   Spanish	   law	  no.	   41	  of	   14	  November	  2002.	  Article	   5	   states	   that	  ADs	  are	  not	   applied	   in	   case	  of:	   1)	   instructions	   contrary	   to	   the	   law,	  public	   order	  or	   good	  medical	   practices	   (the	   Spanish	   law	   uses	   the	   term	   ‘instructions	   that	   are	   contrary	   to	  the	   law,	   or	   to	   the	   lex	   artis’);	   2)	   instructions	   that	   could	   provoke	   the	   commission	   of	  crimes	   established	   in	   articles	   134	   and	   135	   of	   the	   Criminal	   Code;	   3)	   instructions	   in	  which	  the	  executor’s	  will	  is	  not	  clearly	  and	  unequivocally	  expressed	  (the	  Spanish	  law	  describes	  instructions	  which	  fail	   to	   ‘correspond	  to	  the	  situation	  the	  interested	  party	  was	  considering	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  stating	  them’).	  133	  The	  physician-­‐centred	  approach	  of	  the	  law	  41	  is	  also	  expressed	  elsewhere.	  Article	  5,	   section	   3	   (repeated	   in	   article	   9,	   section	   3,	   let.	   A)	   considers	   physicians’	   opinion	  essential.	   Physicians	   –	  without	   oversight	   from	  another	   impartial	   public	   organ	  or	  by	  an	   internal	   body	  within	   the	   hospital	   –	   can	   decide	   that	   patients	   lack	   the	   capacity	   of	  understanding.	   For	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   this	   policy	   it	   should	   be	   remembered	  that	  the	  Spanish	  legislature	  of	  2002	  took	  as	  a	  model	  the	  law	  of	  Catalonia	  no.	  21	  of	  29	  December	   2000.	   According	   to	   the	   Catalan	   law	   physicians	   can	   establish	   a	   patient’s	  incompetency	  (article	  7,	   section	  2,	   let.	  A).	  This	   rule	  has	   two	  main	  problems.	  First	  of	  all,	   it	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   there	   is	   a	   difference	   between	   the	   legal	   concept	   of	  ‘competency’	  and	  the	  clinical	  and	  ethical	  concept	  of	   ‘capacity’.	  To	  be	  competent	  is	  to	  have	  sufficient	  mental	  capacity	   for	  a	  given	  task,	  and	   is	  a	  question	  of	   fact,	  not	  of	   law.	  (Steinbock	   2009).	   Secondly,	   physicians	   can	   never	   establish	   the	   incompetence	   of	   a	  person,	  which	  needs	  a	  judicial	  proceeding.	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instructions	   contrary	   to	   the	   law	   or	   to	   the	   ‘lex	   artis’134	   –	   understood	   as	   ‘good	  medical	   practices’	   –	   or	   that	   do	  not	   correspond	  with	   the	   situation	   the	  patient	  took	   into	  account	  at	   the	   time	  of	   issuing	   them,	  should	  not	  be	  applied.135	  While	  the	   meaning	   of	   ‘instructions	   that	   are	   contrary	   to	   the	   legal	   code’	   is	   clear,136	  doubts	  have	  been	  raised	  in	  the	  other	  two	  cases.	  In	  accordance	  with	  this	  law,	  article	  36,	  section	  4	  of	  the	  Code	  of	  Medical	  Ethics	   states	   that	   doctors	   must	   apply	   a	   patient’s	   ADs,	   except	   when	   these	  directives	  are	  contrary	  to	  good	  medical	  practice.	  Since	  the	  General	  Council	  of	  Medical	   Colleges	   is	   responsible	   for	   defining	   the	   meaning	   of	   ‘good	   medical	  practices’,137	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  Spanish	  legislator	  has	  given	  to	  this	  public	  body	  –	  	  	  	  	  	  134	   It	   must	   be	   underlined	   that	   Andalucía	   is	   the	   only	   Autonomous	   Community	   that	  does	  not	  establish	  this	  kind	  of	  limitation:	  article	  7	  of	  the	  Andalucía	  law	  5	  of	  9	  October	  2003,	   Ley	   de	   declaración	   de	   voluntad	   vital	   anticipada,	   states	   that	   the	   patient’s	  instructions	   will	   prevail	   over	   any	   physician’s,	   family	   member’s	   or	   surrogate’s	  opinion.	  135	   It	   should	  be	  noted	   that	   the	  AD	  will	   remain	   valid	   in	   such	   a	   case,	   but	   that	   specific	  petition	  will	  not	  be	  applied.	  In	  all	  these	  cases,	  prior	  instructions	  do	  not	  have	  legally-­‐binding	  force,	  but	  shall	  be	  taken	  into	  account.	  	  136	   As	   in	   all	   the	   Romance-­‐speaking	   countries,	   ADs	   can	   contain	   only	   negative	  obligation	   of	   ‘non	   facere’	   against	   physicians.	   So,	   no	   instructions	   for	   assistance	   in	  suicide	  or	  euthanasia	  (article	  143	  Spanish	  Penal	  Code)	  will	  be	  executed.	  137	  In	  its	  2009	  publication	  ‘Conceptos	  ‘Atención	  Médica	  al	  Final	  de	  la	  Vida’’	  (‘Concepts	  of	   ‘Health	   Care	   at	   end-­‐of-­‐life’’),	   the	   General	   Council	   of	   Medical	   Colleges	   of	   Spain	  defines	   ‘good	   medical	   practices’	   as	   proportional	   therapeutic	   treatments	   that	   avoid	  abandonment,	  futile	  treatment,	  or	  directly	  shortening	  life	  (section	  2.9).	  Moreover,	  in	  its	   document	   of	   May	   2010,	   ‘El	   Consentimiento	   informado	   en	   la	   práctica	   medica’	  (‘Informed	   Consent	   in	   Medical	   Treatments’),	   ‘good	   medical	   practices’	   has	   been	  considered	  as	  the	  obligation	  to	  identify	  in	  each	  treatment	  the	  scientific,	  the	  technical,	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which	   represents	   physicians’	   interests	   –	   the	   right	   to	   decide	   which	   medical	  directives	  will	  be	  applied.	  	  Although	   in	   other	   countries	   a	   patient’s	   instructions	   against	   ‘good	  medical	   practice’	   have	   no	   effect,	   the	   Spanish	   statute	   explicitly	   enshrines	   this	  principle	  in	  the	  national	  law.	  This	  policy	  does	  not	  take	  into	  consideration	  that	  historically	  physicians	  have	  been	  criticized	  for	  paternalism	  and	  for	  wishing	  to	  have	  control	  over	  their	  patients’	  health	  (Devettere	  1995).	  	  In	  addition,	  ADs	  that	  do	  not	  correspond	  to	  the	  situation	  the	  writer	  was	  considering	   at	   the	   time	   of	   stating	   are	   not	   applied.	   This	   limitation	   has	   raised	  several	   problems.	   It	   is	   quite	   impossible	   to	   predict	   all	   the	   possible	   diseases	  that	   entail	   incapacity	   and	   all	  medical	   treatments	   that	   could	   be	   used	   in	   these	  cases.	  Moreover,	  some	  ADs	  are	  vague	  and	  ambiguous	  (Holley	  2005);	  others	  are	  too	  specific	  and	  are	  not	  applicable	  in	  the	  concrete	  medical	  situation	  (Fagerlin	  et	  al.	  2002).	  Further,	  some	  prior	  medical	  instructions	  do	  not	  focus	  on	  medical	  conditions	   or	   illnesses,	   but	   on	   their	   effects	   (Olick	   2014).	   In	   all	   these	   cases	   a	  strict	   interpretation	   of	   article	   11,	   section	   3	   requires	   that	   the	   ADs	   not	   be	  executed.	   Since	   the	   law	   does	   not	   establish	   the	   person	   responsible	   for	  examining	   whether	   these	   prior	   wishes	   correspond	   to	   the	   current	   living	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  the	   legal	   and	   the	  deontological	   aspects	   (p.	  11).	  Therefore,	   in	  defining	   ‘good	  medical	  treatment’,	  the	  medical	  scientific	  and	  technical	  knowledge	  are	  considered	  essentials.	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treatment	  situation,138	  and	  ADs	  are	  documents	  used	  to	  implement	  the	  patient–physician	   relationship	   (British	  Medical	   Association	   1995),	   it	   follows	   that	   the	  final	  decision	  as	  to	  their	  execution	  lies	  with	  the	  physician	  in	  charge.	  	  	   Article	   11	   of	   the	   Spanish	   law	   of	   November	   2002	   recognizes	   the	  importance	  of	  ADs.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  Spanish	  Parliament	  of	  2002	  has	  adopted	  a	   physician-­‐centered	   approach:	   its	   section	   3	   explicitly	   establishes	   that	  instructions	  against	   ‘good	  medical	  practice’	  shall	  not	  be	  applied,	  and	  this	   law	  does	   not	   establish	   a	   neutral	   medical	   person	   to	   interpret	   the	   patient’s	   prior	  instructions.	  	  	  
3.2.	  	   Advance	  Directives	  in	  France	  	  In	  France,	  the	  Loi	  relative	  aux	  droits	  des	  malades	  et	  à	  la	  fin	  de	  vie	  of	  April	  2005,	  modified	   by	   the	   Loi	   créant	   de	   nouveaux	   droits	   en	   faveur	   des	   malades	   et	   des	  
personnes	  en	  fin	  de	  vie	  of	  March	  2015,	  governs	  ADs.	  	  The	   ethical	   principles	   of	   beneficence	   and	   non-­‐maleficence	   are	  emphasized	  in	  several	  parts	  of	  this	  law;	  this	  is	  why	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  competent	  patient,	   the	   patient	   must	   repeat	   the	   refusal	   of	   medical	   treatments	   within	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  138	   In	  Germany,	   the	   law	  explicitly	  states	   that	   the	   legal	  proxy	  (guardian	  or	  surrogate)	  must	   examine	   whether	   these	   determinations	   correspond	   to	   the	   current	   living	   and	  treatment	  situation	  (article	  1901a	  BGB).	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reasonable	  time,	  also	  by	  asking	  another	  physician	  (article	  1111-­‐4,	  section	  2	  of	  CSP).139	  	  The	  physician-­‐centered	  approach	  of	   this	   law	  could	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  strong	   influence	   of	   Rousseau’s	   philosophy	   of	   the	   social	   contract	   on	   French	  legal	   culture	   (Horn	   2014).	   Rousseau	   stated	   that	   every	   individual’s	   opinions	  and	   preferences	   are	   subject	   to	   the	   general	   will	   that	   represents	   the	  community’s	  interests	  (Rousseau	  1762).	  According	  to	  the	  report	  of	  the	  French	  Bioethical	   Committee,	   physicians	   are	   considered	   to	   be	   representatives	   of	  society	   and	   should	   be	   allowed	   to	   make	   rational	   decisions	   on	   behalf	   of	   sick	  citizens	   (French	   National	   Medical	   Council	   2000).	   Thus,	   French	   doctors	   will	  make	   their	   decisions	   based	   on	   ‘professional	   consensus’	   or	   ‘medical	   criteria’	  and	  not	  based	  on	  the	  patient’s	  wishes	  (Horn	  2014).	  	  Moreover,	   the	   French	   National	   Medical	   Council	   has	   the	   power	   to	  integrate	  the	  French	  Public	  Health	  Code	  through	  the	  Code	  of	  Medical	  Ethics.140	  Although	   these	   rules	   can	   be	   adopted	   only	   in	   disciplinary	   proceedings,	   the	  French	  Council	  of	  State	  –	  after	  a	  judicial	  review	  –	  could	  establish	  their	  legality.	  Even	  legislatures	  of	  the	  English-­‐speaking	  countries	  allows	  other	  public	  organs	  to	   implement	   their	  national	   acts	   regarding	   end-­‐of-­‐life	  decisions;	   but	   in	   those	  countries,	   detailed	   rules	   come	   from	   bodies	   not	   biased	   towards	   physicians	  (e.g.,	  see	  supra	  note	  117).	  	  	  	  	  	  139	  The	  French	  law	  does	  not	  define	  the	  meaning	  of	  ‘all	  that	  is	  possible’.	  140	  Preamble	  and	  article	  110	  of	  the	  new	  Code	  of	  Medical	  Ethics	  of	  November	  2013.	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In	   addition,	   this	   law	   has	   established	   an	  ad	   hoc	   collegial	   proceeding	   in	  two	   cases	   (R.	   4127-­‐37	   CSP).	   The	   first	   case	   is	   the	   case	   of	   limitation	   or	  withdrawal	   of	   treatments	   where	   there	   is	   a	   risk	   of	   death	   (article	   1111-­‐4,	  section	  5	  CSP);	  the	  second	  is	  the	  limitation	  or	  withdrawal	  of	  disproportionate	  treatments,	   or	   treatments	   which	   aim	   is	   to	   prolong	   life	   artificially	   (article	  1111-­‐13,	   section	   1	   CSP)141.	   In	   these	   cases,	   no	   decision	   to	   limit	   or	   withdraw	  treatment	   can	  be	   taken	  before	  other	  doctors	  have	  been	   consulted.	  Moreover,	  the	  decision	  is	  taken	  by	  the	  doctor	  treating	  the	  patient	  after	  consultation	  with	  the	   healthcare	   team.142	   In	   these	   cases	   the	   physician	   should	   also	   consult	   the	  patient’s	   directives,	   or	   in	   absence	   of	   them,	   the	   patient’s	   surrogate	   or	   family	  (article	  1111-­‐4	  CSP).143	  	  	   France,	   like	   Spain,	   has	   adopted	   a	   physician-­‐centered	   approach.	  However,	   the	   French	   parliament	   has	   adopted	   a	  more	   conservative	   approach	  	  	  	  	  	  141	  This	  policy	  has	  been	  confirmed	  by	   the	  new	  French	   law	  of	  2015,	  which	  abrogated	  article	   1111-­‐13	   and	   added	   article	   1111-­‐5-­‐1	   CSP	   that	   states	   that	   the	   collegium	  proceeding	   must	   be	   applied	   in	   case	   the	   treatment	   has	   no	   effect	   other	   than	   the	  artificial	  promulgation	  of	  life.	  142	  Article	  37	  Code	  of	  Medical	  Ethics.	  143	  The	  previous	  version	  of	  article	  1111-­‐4	  CSP,	  into	  force	  from	  April	  2005	  until	  March	  2015,	  stated	  that	  the	  patient’s	  directives	  are	  considered	  only	  when	  there	  is	  neither	  a	  surrogate	  nor	  family	  members	  to	  consult.	  This	  policy	  follows	  French	  cultural	  norms,	  where	   (generally)	   families	   do	   not	   defer	   to	   the	   patient’s	   directives,	   and	   many	  physicians	   do	   not	   consider	   a	   patient’s	   living	   wills	   as	   a	   significant	   factor	   in	   their	  decisions.	   An	   empirical	   study	   conducted	   in	   December	   2009	   showed	   that	   ADs	   were	  written	  by	  only	  1.5%	  of	  patients,	  and	  only	  72%	  of	  physicians	  considered	  them	  to	  be	  significant	  in	  reaching	  their	  decisions	  (Pennec	  et	  al.	  2012).	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since	   an	   ad	   hoc	   collegial	   proceeding	   has	   been	   established	   in	   two	   cases.	  Additionally,	   doctors	   must	   do	   all	   that	   is	   possible	   to	   convince	   competent	  patients	  not	  to	  refuse	  medical	  treatments.	  
	  
	  
4.	  	   Advance	  Directives	  in	  English-­‐speaking	  countries	  	  The	   legal	   situation	   in	   English-­‐speaking	   countries,	   in	   particular	   in	   England,	  where	  the	  patient’s	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  has	  been	  considered	  the	  major	  principle	  underlying	  ADs,	  has	  been	  analysed.	  	  In	   England,	   the	   Mental	   Capacity	   Act	   of	   April	   2005	   governs	   ADs,	   and	  reflects	   the	   English	   liberal	   tradition	   –	  which	   goes	   back	   to	   the	  work	   of	   Locke	  (1690)	   and	   Mill	   (1865)	   –	   and	   protestant	   influence	   (Dickenson	   1999).	  Moreover,	   in	   England,	   the	   patient’s	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination	   has	   been	  considered	   fundamental	   by	   both	   the	   bioethical	   community	   (General	   Medical	  Council	   2008)	   and	   the	   judiciary	   (e.g.,	   see	   Sect.	   1.5.).	   All	   laws	   of	   the	   United	  Kingdom	  apply	   similar	  principles	   in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  decision-­‐making;144	  principles	  	  	  	  	  	  144	  Regarding	  the	  citizen’s	  capacity,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Public	  Guardian,	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  Code	  of	  Practice,	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  independent	  organ	  to	  assist	  with	  information	  or	  advices	   legal	  proxies	  see	  Sect.	  2.1.2.	  and	  2.2.	  Moreover,	  acts	   in	  both	  Scotland	  and	  England	   confer	   on	   the	   relevant	   judicial	   body	   a	   similar	   power	   of	   control	   over	   legal	  proxies	   (in	   England,	   the	   Court	   of	   protection,	   articles	   22–33	   of	   the	   Mental	   Capacity	  Act;	   in	   Scotland:	   the	   power	   of	   the	   sheriff,	   article	   3	   of	   the	   Adult	   with	   Incapacity	  (Scotland)	   Act).	   Furthermore,	   in	   both	   these	   countries,	   a	   third	   party	   (in	   Scotland,	   a	  solicitor)	   certifies	   that	   the	   person	  who	   gives	   the	   power	   of	   attorney	   and	   the	   person	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that	   have	   been	   used	   as	   a	  model	   for	   the	   Assisted	   Decision-­‐Making	   (Capacity)	  Bill	  2013	  in	  Ireland.145	  	  	  
	  
4.1.	  	   Advance	  Directives	  in	  England	  	  In	  England,	   the	  MCA	  of	  April	   2005	  governs	  ADs.	  The	   liberal	   approach	  of	   this	  act	   is	   reflected	   in	   the	   procedural	   norms	   regarding	   ‘living	   wills’,	   in	   the	  codification	  of	   the	   ‘new’	  definition	  of	   the	   term	   ‘patient’s	  best	   interest’,	   in	   the	  creation	   of	   the	   lasting	   power	   of	   attorney	   (LPA),	   and	   in	   the	   creation	   of	   the	  Court	  of	  Protection.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  who	   accept	   this	   power	   have	   understood	   their	   roles	   and	   duties	   (in	   England,	   the	  donor–donee	  relationship	  	  must	  be	  certified	  as	  per	  article	  7.7	  of	  the	  Code	  of	  practice	  of	   the	   Mental	   Capacity	   Act;	   in	   Scotland,	   the	   solicitor	   certifies	   the	   relationship	  between	   granter–welfare	   attorney	   according	   to	   article	   15	   of	   the	   Adult	   with	  Incapacity	  (Scotland)	  Act).	  	  145	  Regarding	  the	  citizen’s	  capacity,	  the	  role	  of	  Public	  Guardian,	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  Code	  of	  Practice,	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  independent	  organ	  to	  assist	  with	  information	  or	  advices	  legal	  proxies	  see	  Sect.	  2.1.2.	  and	  2.2.	  In	  addition,	  in	  Ireland,	  as	  in	  England,	  the	  relationship	   between	   the	   person	   who	   gives	   the	   power	   of	   attorney	   and	   the	   person	  who	   accept	   this	   power	   is	   defined	   as	   a	   donor–attorney	   relationship,	   where	   the	  attorney	   is	   called	   the	   ‘donee	   of	   an	   enduring	   power’	   (article	   38).	   Furthermore,	   the	  role	   of	   the	   judicial	   body	   (which	   is	   exercised	   through	   Circuit	   Courts	   and	   in	   some	  specific	   cases	   by	   the	   High	   Court)	   and	   the	   role	   of	   the	   Public	   Guardian	   have	   been	  underlined.	  As	  in	  England,	  the	  Courts	  can	  decide	  directly	  or	  through	  an	  appointment	  of	  a	  decision-­‐making	  representative	   (article	  23	  Assisted	  Decision-­‐Making	   (Capacity)	  Bill	   2013;	   in	   England	   this	   person	   is	   called	   ‘deputy’	   as	   per	   article	   16	   of	   the	   Mental	  Capacity	  Act).	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   In	  England,	   the	  refusal	  of	  medical	   treatments	  through	  living	  wills	  must	  be	  in	  written	  form.146	  In	  addition,	  when	  refusing	  life-­‐prolonging	  treatment	  this	  document	  must	  be	  signed	  by	  the	  writer	  –	  or	  by	  another	  person	  at	  the	  writer’s	  direction	   –	   in	   presence	   of	   a	   witness	   who	   must	   also	   sign	   it,	   or	   at	   least	  acknowledge	   the	   donor’s	   signature	   (article	   25).	   Further,	   when	   withdrawing	  ANH	  from	  a	  patient	  in	  a	  persistent	  vegetative	  state	  (PVG)	  –	  a	  patient	  who	  is	  in	  a	  vegetative	  state	  for	  longer	  than	  6	  months	  –	  or	  in	  a	  condition	  similar	  to	  PVG,	  a	  declaration	   by	   the	   court	   should	   be	   sought	   (e.g.,	   see	   Sect.	   1.5).	   However,	   ADs	  refusing	  basic	  care147	  is	  not	  legally	  binding.	  	  Contrary	   to	   the	   continental	   definition	   of	   the	   term	   ‘patient’s	   best	  interest’,	   where	   the	   term	   refers	  mainly	   to	   objective	  medical	   criteria	   such	   as	  diagnosis,	   prognosis,	   life	   expectancy,	   and	   the	   nature	   of	   pain	   (Pope	   2011),	   in	  England,	   this	   term	   also	   refers	   to	   the	   patient’s	   past	   and	   present	   wishes	   and	  feelings	   (article	   4,	   section	   6,	   letter	   a).	   This	   policy	   codifies	   the	   decisions	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  146	  Section	  5.45	  of	  the	  Code	  of	  Practice	  of	  Mental	  Capacity	  Act.	  However,	  according	  to	  section	  9.24	  of	  the	  Mental	  Capacity	  Act	  Code	  of	  Practice	  in	  case	  of	  a	  person	  unable	  to	  write,	  a	  family	  member	  or	  the	  physician	  can	  record	  their	  oral	  statements.	  Further,	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  donor’s	  signature	  is	  needed,	  another	  person	  can	  sign	  on	  the	  donor’s	  behalf	  and	  in	  their	  presence.	  147	  Basic	  care	  comprises	  all	  treatments	  designed	  to	  provide	  comfort	  to	  the	  patient	  or	  alleviate	   symptoms	   or	   distress.	   This	   includes	  warmth,	   shelter,	   hygiene	   (such	   as	   the	  management	   of	   incontinence),	   the	   offer	   of	   oral	   nutrition	   and	   hydration,	   and	   the	  provision	  of	  analgesia.	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English	   courts	   since	   the	   turn	   of	   the	   millennium.148	   Therefore,	   the	   English	  principle	   of	   the	  patient’s	   best	   interest	   is	   close	   to	   the	  principle	   of	   substituted	  judgement149	   in	   the	   continental	   Europe.	   Although	   this	   is	   not	   equal	   to	   the	  theory	  of	  substitutive	   judgment,	  medical	   treatment	  should	  be	   taken	  based	  on	  the	  ‘patient	  point	  of	  view’	  (Aintree	  University	  Hospitals	  NHS	  Foundation	  Trust	  [2013]	  UKSC	  67,	  §45,	  §24.).	  	  	   The	  MCA	  introduced	  the	  LPA	  for	  the	  donor’s	  welfare.	  The	  attorney	  must	  be	   registered	   with	   the	   Public	   Guardian.	   In	   England,	   citizens	   have	   the	  opportunity	  to	  choose	  more	  than	  one	  surrogate;	  and	  when	  they	  do	  so	  they	  can	  choose	  the	  procedural	  rules	  (article	  10,	  section	  4).150	  Therefore,	  England	  is	  the	  only	  country	  in	  this	  study	  to	  explicitly	  enshrine	  in	  national	  law	  the	  possibility	  established	   in	   principle	   4,	   section	   2	   of	   the	   Recommendation	   CM/Rec	   (2009)	  11	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  2.2.2.).	  	  
	   In	   the	   cases	   where	   there	   is	   no	   LPA	   for	   the	   donor’s	   welfare,	   but	   the	  donor	  has	  given	  an	  LPA	  for	  their	  property	  and	  affairs,	  this	  latter	  donee	  should	  be	  consulted	  about	  health	  care	  decisions	  (section	  5.49	  of	  the	  Code	  of	  Practice	  	  	  	  	  	  148	  Re	  A	   [2000]	  1	  F.L.R.	  193	  and	  Simms	  v.	   Simms	  and	  another	   [2003]	  1	  All	  E.R.	  669.	  These	   rulings	   included	   in	   the	   concept	  of	   ‘best	   interest’	   emotional	   and	  other	  welfare	  issues.	  Beforehand,	  ‘best	  interest’	  was	  limited	  to	  objective	  medical	  criteria	  F.	  v.	  West	  Berkshire	  Health	  Authority	  [1989]	  2	  All	  ER	  545.	   	  149	  The	  substituted	  judgement	  doctrine	  was	  rejected	  by	  the	  English	  courts	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Tony	  Bland	  in	  1993	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  1.5)	  150	   The	   maximum	   number	   of	   LPAs	   is	   5	   (article	   6	   The	   Lasting	   Powers	   of	   Attorney,	  Enduring	  Powers	  of	  Attorney	  and	  Public	  Guardian	  Regulations).	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of	   the	   Mental	   Capacity	   Act).	   Instead,	   for	   patients	   with	   no	   LPA	   or	   close	  relatives,	  an	  independent	  mental	  capacity	  advocate	  must	  be	  consulted	  (Article	  25	  Mental	  Capacity	  Act	   in	  accordance	  with	   section	  5.49	  and	  Chapter	  X	  of	   the	  Code	  of	  Practice	  of	  the	  Mental	  Capacity	  Act.)	  	  	   When	   there	   is	   conflict	   between	   surrogate	   –	   or	   other	   people	  representing	  the	  patient	  –	  and	  physicians	  regarding	  the	  patient’s	  best	  interest	  and	   medical	   treatment,	   the	   Court	   of	   Protection	   can	   decide	   directly	   or	   by	  appointing	  a	  person,	  called	   the	  deputy151	   (articles	  45–53	  MCA).	   In	  some	  cases	  the	  Court	  of	  Protection	  is	  absolutely	  required	  to	  intervene.152	  	   In	   England,	   prior	   medical	   instructions	   are	   legally	   binding.	   Patients’	  wishes	   are	   prioritized	   by	   the	   ‘new’	   interpretation	   of	   ‘patient’s	   best	   interest’.	  Moreover,	   health	   care	   decisions	   are	   considered	   a	   private	   matter,	   where	   the	  decision	  of	  the	   judge	  –	  through	  the	   ‘new’	  Court	  of	  Protection	  –	  will	  be	  sought	  only	   if	   required	   or	   if	   there	   is	   a	   conflict	   regarding	   the	   patient’s	   best	   interest	  and	  medical	  treatment.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  151	  The	  political	  decision	  of	  the	  English	  parliament	  of	  2005	  is	  that	  the	  donee	  must	  be	  considered	  more	   important	   than	   the	   deputy	   because	   the	   LPA	   for	   welfare	   enhances	  patient	  autonomy.	  This	  is	  why	  the	  deputy	  can	  under	  no	  circumstances	  refuse	  consent	  to	   life	   sustaining	   treatment	   (article	   20,	   section	   5);	   but	   the	   donee	   can	   if	   explicitly	  authorized	  (articles	  11	  section	  7	  letter	  c	  and	  11	  section	  8	  letter	  a).	  	  	  152	   The	   decision	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Protection	   is	   required	   in	   case	   of	   serious	   medical	  decisions	   for	   incapable	   patients	   in:	   1)	   withdrawing	   ANH	   for	   a	   patient	   in	   PVS;	   2)	  proposed	   non-­‐therapeutic	   sterilisation;	   and	   3)	   other	   cases	   involving	   ethical	  dilemmas	   in	   untested	   areas,	   or	   where	   there	   are	   otherwise	   irresolvable	   conflicts	  between	   professionals,	   or	   between	   professionals	   and	   family	   members.	   (Shickle	  2006)	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5.	  	   Advance	  Directives	  in	  German-­‐speaking	  countries	  	  The	   legal	   situation	   in	   German-­‐speaking	   countries,	   in	   particular	   in	   Germany,	  where	   the	   patient	   autonomy	   has	   been	   considered	   the	   major	   principle,	   has	  been	  examined.	  	  In	  Germany,	  the	  law	  Drittes	  Gesetz	  zur	  Änderung	  des	  Betreuungsrechts	  of	  July	  2009	  regulates	  ADs,	  and	  is	  mainly	  devoted	  to	  the	  rights	  and	  duties	  of	  legal	  proxies.	   As	   in	   England,	   a	   patient’s	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination	   is	   considered	  essential	   by	   both	   the	   bioethical	   community	   (Neitzke	   et	   al.	   2006)	   and	   the	  Federal	  Court.153	  Germany,	   as	  well	   as	  Austria	   (only	   regarding	   the	  nomination	  of	  a	  surrogate)	  and	  Switzerland,	  have	  introduced	  norms	  regarding	  ADs	  in	  their	  civil	  codes.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  153	   The	   Federal	   Court	   recognized	   the	   importance	   of	   substitutive	   judgment	  (Bundesgerichtshof:	   1994,	   BGHSt	   40,	   257	   (263)=BGH	   1	   StR	   357/94,	   13	   September	  1994)	  and	  established	   the	  binding	  nature	  of	  advance	  directives	  (Bundesgerichtshof:	  2003,	   BGHZ	   154,	   205	   (217)=XII	   ZB	   2/03,	   17	   March	   2003)	   before	   the	   German	  Parliament	  ruled	  it	  on	  2009.	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5.1.	  	   Advance	  Directives	  in	  Germany	  	  In	  Germany,	  the	  Drittes	  Gesetz	  zur	  Änderung	  des	  Betreuungsrechts	  of	  July	  2009	  regulates	   ADs.	   The	   liberal	   approach	   of	   this	   law	   becomes	   apparent	   in	   the	  absence	   of	   formal	   norms	   regarding	   the	   composition	   of	   ADs,	   in	   the	   binding	  force	   of	   previously	   verbally-­‐expressed	   specific	   treatment	  preferences,	   and	   in	  giving	   the	   power	   to	   the	   Court	   of	   Guardianship	   in	   cases	   of	   disagreement	  between	  the	  attending	  physician	  and	  the	   legal	  proxy	  concerning	  the	  patient’s	  wishes.	  	   This	   law	   is	   considered	   rather	   liberal	   (Wiesing	   et	   al.	   2010),	   which	   is	  probably	   the	   result	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   issue	   of	   ADs	   was	   a	   bottom-­‐up	  development,	   as	   a	   societal	  movement	   resulting	   in	   the	   demand	   for	   a	   political	  decision	  (Evans	  et	  al.	  2012).	  While	   in	  2002	  only	  2.5%	  of	  German	  citizens	  had	  an	  AD	  (Schroder	  et	  al.	  2002),	   in	  2007	  –	   two	  years	  before	   the	  approval	  of	   the	  final	   law	  regarding	  ADs	  –	  this	  number	  increased	  to	  approximately	  10%	  (Lang	  and	  Wagner	  2007,	  Lang	  et	  al.	  2007).	  As	  a	  consequence	  of	  this	  liberal	  approach	  to	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  decision-­‐making,	  no	  national	   register	   for	  ADs	   in	  general	  –	  as	   in	  Spain,	  Portugal,	  or	  Italy	  –	  or	  for	   ‘surrogate	  wills’	   in	  particular	  –	  as	  in	  English-­‐speaking	  countries	  –	  has	  been	  established.	  Neither	   the	  role	  of	  physicians	  nor	  risks	   arising	   from	   the	   implementation	   of	   ADs	   –	   as	   in	   Romance-­‐speaking	  countries	  –	  has	  been	  considered.154	  
	  	  	  	  	  154	  It	  should	  be	  mention	  that	  during	  the	  parliamentary	  discussion	  two	  opposing	  bills	  adopting	   a	  more	   conservative	   approach	  were	   discussed.	   These	   bills	  were	   proposed	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  
	   142	  
	   The	   law	  presupposes	   the	   legally-­‐binding	   nature	   of	   ADs	   (Wiesing	   et	   al.	  2010).	   The	   wishes	   of	   a	   patient	   unable	   to	   consent	   must	   be	   sought	   on	   three	  different	  levels,	  in	  decreasing	  order	  of	  precedence:	  1)	  living	  wills;	  2)	  formerly	  expressed	  treatment	  wishes	  (Behandlungswünsche);	  and	  3)	  presumed	  wishes.	  Only	   living	  wills	   are	   required	   as	   a	  written	   document;	   no	   legal	   obligation	   for	  notarization	   of	   medical	   information	   has	   been	   established.	   Also,	   oral	  declarations	  are	  legally	  valid	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  2.1.2.).	  	   In	   cases	  of	  disagreement	  between	  a	   surrogate	  and	  a	  physician	  about	   a	  patient’s	  wishes,	   the	  courts	  must	  be	   involved.	  According	   to	  article	  1904	  BGB,	  the	  Courts	  of	  Guardianship	  (Betreuungsgericht),	  are	  only	  responsible	  for	  cases	  of	   conflicts	   between	   guardian	   (or	   surrogate)	   and	   physicians	   in	   charge	   of	   the	  patient	  concerning	  patient	  preferences.	  This	  is	  a	  codification	  of	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  civil	  court	  of	  the	  Federal	  Court	  of	  Justice	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  1.5.	  and	  2.5.)	  that,	  in	   2003,	   stated	   that	   withholding	   or	   withdrawing	   treatment	   does	   not	   need	   a	  court’s	  approval	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  cases	  in	  which	  physicians	  and	  patient’s	  legal	   proxy	   disagree	   about	   the	   patient’s	  will.	   The	   court	   then	   has	   to	   establish	  the	  patient’s	  wishes.	  	   In	   Germany,	   as	   in	   England,	   ADs	   are	   legally	   binding.	   Health	   care	  decisions	  have	  been	  considered	  to	  belong	  to	  the	  personal	  sphere	  and	  a	  judge’s	  ruling	  will	  be	  sought	  only	   in	  cases	  of	  conflicts	  regarding	  the	  patients’	  wishes.	  	  	  	  	  	  by	  Wolfgang	  Bosbach	  (Christian	  Democrat)	  and	  by	  Wolfgang	  Zöller	  (Christian	  Social	  Union).	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Summary	  The	   common	   European	   standard	   in	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   situations	   has	   been	  demonstrated	   through	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   European	   Convention	   on	   Human	  Rights	   and	   Biomedicine,	   the	   Recommendation	   CM/Rec	   (2009)	   11	   and	   the	  
Guide	  on	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  regarding	  medical	  treatment	  in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  of	  May	  2014.	   In	   addition,	   the	  different	   approaches	   in	   the	  national	  policies	   of	  ADs	   between	   Romance-­‐,	   English-­‐,	   and	   German-­‐speaking	   countries	   has	   been	  delineated	  by	  examined,	  particularly	  the	  policies	  in	  Spain,	  France,	  England	  and	  Germany.	  	   The	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Biomedicine	  is	  the	  first	  international	   legally	   binding	   comprehensive	   multilateral	   treaty	   addressing	  human	   rights	   issues	   in	   biomedicine.	   It	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   lex	   specialis	   of	   the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  of	  1950	  (Application	  no.	  8278/1978).	  In	   addition,	   the	   Recommendation	   CM/Rec	   (2009)	   11	   shows	   the	   common	  European	  standard	  in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  decisions.	  Therefore,	  the	  European	  Court	  on	  Human	  Rights	  might	   apply	   this	   recommendation,	   although	   it	   is	   considered	   a	  
soft-­‐law.	  Moreover,	  the	  main	  value	  of	  the	  Guide	  on	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  
regarding	   medical	   treatment	   in	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   situations	   consists	   in	   the	  explanation	  of	  the	  four	  ethical	  principles	  in	  the	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  issues.	  In	  addition,	  the	  Guide	  makes	  a	  distinction	  between	  medical	   treatment	  and	  patient	  care	   in	  general	   and	   it	   brings	   again	   the	   attention	   to	   the	   application	   of	   the	   patient-­‐centered	  approach.	  	  	   In	   the	   second	   part	   of	   Chap.	   2,	   the	   detailed	   analysis	   of	   the	   policies	   of	  Spain,	   France,	   England	   and	   Germany	   has	   shown	   the	   different	   approach	  towards	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   decisions.	   Spain	   and	   France	   –	   although	   safeguard	   the	  patient’s	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination	   –	   have	   adopted	   a	   physician-­‐centered	  approach.	  In	  Spain,	  since	  the	  law	  does	  not	  establish	  the	  person	  responsible	  for	  examining	   whether	   the	   prior	   wishes	   correspond	   to	   the	   current	   living	   and	  treatment	   situation	   and	   ADs	   are	   documents	   used	   to	   implement	   the	   patient–physician	   relationship,	   it	   follows	   that	   the	   final	   decision	   as	   to	   their	   execution	  lies	   with	   the	   physician	   in	   charge.	   Moreover,	   the	   French	   parliament	   has	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Chapter	  3:	  Advance	  Directives	   in	   Italy:	   ethical	   and	   law	  
comparative	  approaches	  	  
	  
Abstract:	  The	  current	  Italian	  ethical	  and	  legal	  situation	  regarding	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  decisions	  is	  analyzed	   because	   the	   Italian	   situation	   regarding	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   is	   quite	   complex	  and	   controversial.	   The	   current	   position	   of	   the	   Italian	   bioethical	   and	  medical	  communities	  and	  of	  the	  national	  jurisprudence	  are	  exposed	  since	  in	  Italy	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  ad	  hoc	  law	  governing	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  situations.	  	   The	   Italian	   Bill	   no.	   2350	   ‘Provisions	   relating	   to	   therapeutic	   alliance,	  
informed	  consent	  and	  advance	  directives	  for	  treatments’	  –	  approved	  in	  different	  texts	   in	   2009	   by	   the	   Senate	   and	   in	   2011	   by	   the	   Chamber	   of	   Deputies	   –	   is	  criticized	   by	   taking	   into	   consideration	   the	   outcomes	   of	   the	   previous	   part	   of	  this	  scientific	  work.	  Similarities	  and	  differences	  between	  Bill	  no.	  2350	  and	  the	  eight	  proposal-­‐bills	   of	   the	  new	   legislation	  are	  also	  highlighted.	   Since	   this	  bill	  protects	   the	   ethical	   principle	   of	   sanctity	   of	   life,	   it	   grants	   advance	   directives	  advisory	  force,	   limits	  their	  application	  in	  time	  and	  does	  not	  allow	  the	  validity	  of	   oral	   declarations.	   This	   political	   decision	   limits	   patient	   autonomy.	  Furthermore,	   there	   are	   doubts	   about	   the	   constitutionality	   of	   this	   bill,	  especially	   with	   respect	   to	   articles	   2,	   13	   and	   32	   of	   the	   Italian	   Constitution,	  related	  to	  the	  right	  of	  self-­‐determination.	  	  	   Moreover,	   the	   judicial	   interpretation	   of	   amended	   articles	   404-­‐413	   of	  the	  Italian	  Civil	  Code	  –	  which	  introduced	  to	  Italy	  the	  legal	  role	  of	  the	  support	  guardian	   (amministratore	   di	   sostegno)	   –	   is	   examined.	   Italian	   judges	   apply	  these	  articles	   to	   fill	   the	  absence	   in	   the	   Italian	   legal	  system	  regarding	   the	  role	  of	   the	   legal	   proxy	   in	   the	   dying	   process.	   Although	   Italy	   is	   not	   part	   of	   the	  common	   law	   legal	   system	   –	   and	   therefore	   the	   principle	   of	   precedent	   is	   not	  applied	  –	   the	   interpretation	  of	   these	  articles	   is	  considered	  by	  national	   judges	  as	   a	   manoeuvre	   to	   underline	   the	   role	   of	   the	   legal	   proxy	   in	   end-­‐of-­‐life	  situations	  and	  to	  safeguard	  patient	  autonomy.	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1.	   The	   current	   situation	   in	   Italy:	   the	   position	   of	   the	   bioethical	   and	  
medical	  communities	  	  Although	  Italy	  does	  not	  have	  a	  specific	  Law	  governing	  advance	  directives,	  Bill	  2350	  “Provisions	  relating	  to	  therapeutic	  alliance,	  informed	  consent	  and	  advance	  
directives	  for	  treatments”	  recognizes	  the	  importance	  of	  ADs	  in	  the	  Italian	  legal	  system.	  However,	  similarities	  and	  differences	  between	  the	  new	  proposal-­‐bills	  and	   article	   6	   of	   bill	   2350	   are	   highlighted	   (e.g.,	   see	   Sect.	   1.1.3.).	   As	   in	   France	  with	   the	   previous	   law	   of	   2005	   (Pereira	   2007,	   Dupont	   2005)155,	   this	   bill	   has	  been	  a	  political	  reaction	  of	  a	  case-­‐law,	  that	  of	  Eluana	  Englaro.	  Its	  goal	  has	  been	  the	   ‘protection	   of	   life’	   (De	   Luca	   et	   al.	   2012);156	   thus,	   risk	   coming	   by	   the	  implementation	  of	  AD	  has	  been	  highlighted.	  	  After	   examining	   the	   current	   position	   of	   the	   Italian	   bioethical	   and	  medical	  communities,	  the	  Italian	  Bill	  no.	  2350	  has	  been	  critiqued	  according	  to	  the	   results	   coming	   from	   the	   previous	   part	   of	   this	   thesis.	   The	   juridical	  interpretation	   of	   amended	   articles	   404–413	   of	   the	   Italian	   Civil	   Code	   (C.C.),	  introduced	  by	   law	  no.	  6	  of	  9	   January	  2004,	   is	   examined.	  The	   investigation	  of	  the	   documents	   published	   by	   the	   Italian	   bioethical	   community	   reveals	   the	  change	  of	  approach	  regarding	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  decisions:	  from	  a	  paternalist	  one	  to	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  155	   The	  Loi	   relative	   aux	   droits	   des	  malades	   et	   à	   la	   fin	   de	   vie,	   law	  no.	   2005-­‐370	   of	   22	  April	   2005	   has	   been	   considered	   as	   a	   political	   reaction	   of	   the	   case-­‐law	   of	   Vincent	  
Humbert.	  (Pereira	  2007,	  and	  Dupont	  2005)	  156	  The	  phrase	  ‘protection	  of	  life’	  appears	  three	  times,	  where	  two	  of	  them	  in	  the	  main	  inspired	  principles	  of	  this	  bill	  (article	  1,	  section	  1,	  let	  A	  and	  C).	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liberal	   approach.	   Moreover,	   the	   juridical	   interpretation	   of	   articles	   404–413	  C.C.	   shows	   how	   judges	   concretely	   protect	   patient	   autonomy,	   sometimes	   by	  going	  beyond	  the	  textual	  interpretation	  of	  these	  articles.	  The	  current	  position	  of	   the	   Italian	  bioethical	  and	  medical	  communities	  are	  exposed.	  The	   interpretation	  of	   the	  different	   legal	  concepts	  used	  –	  such	  as	  advance	  directives	  or	  execution	  of	  them	  in	  case	  of	  permanent	  unconsciousness	  without	  cortical	  and	  subcortical	  brain	  activity	  –	  are	  analyzed.	  In	  addition,	  the	  correct	  interpretation	  of	  the	  rules	  established	  in	  the	  Convention	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	   Persons	   with	   Disabilities	   are	   included.	   The	   Italian	   bioethical	   debate	  regarding	  withdrawing	  alimentation	  and	  hydration	  is	  exposed	  and	  the	  rigidity	  forms	  established	  for	  the	  validity	  of	  advance	  directives	  are	  criticized.	  Further,	  the	  strict	  formalities	  established	  for	  the	  nomination	  or	  the	  substitution	  of	  the	  surrogate,	   the	   possibility	   to	   nominate	   only	   one	   surrogate,	   the	   uncertainty	   of	  sanctions	   in	  case	  of	  violation	  of	  rules	  recognized	   in	   this	  bill,	  and	   the	  political	  decision	   made	   in	   case	   of	   absence	   of	   patient’s	   surrogate	   show	   the	   lack	   of	  protection	   of	   patient	   autonomy.	  Moreover,	   the	   non-­‐existence	   of	   an	   impartial	  authority	   to	   resolve	   disagreement	   between	   surrogate	   and	   physicians	   or	   to	  control	   surrogate’s	   activity	   it	   further	   demonstrates	   the	   absence	   of	  safeguarding	   of	   patient’s	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination.	   The	   juridical	  interpretation	  of	  amended	  articles	  404–413	  C.C.	  is	  investigated.	  Italian	  judges	  have	  applied	  these	  articles	  to	  fill	  the	  gap	  in	  the	  legal	  system	  regarding	  the	  role	  of	  the	  legal	  proxy	  in	  the	  dying	  process,	  sometimes	  by	  going	  beyond	  the	  literal	  and	  teleological	  interpretation	  of	  them.	  	   Before	   analyzing	   the	   Bill	   no.	   2350	   and	   the	   eight	   new	   proposal-­‐bills	  deposited	   in	   the	   parliamentary	   commissions,	   since	   there	   is	   a	   lack	   of	   ad	   hoc	  law,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  examine	  the	  position	  of	  the	  Italian	  jurisprudence,	  of	  the	  bioethical	   community	  and	  of	   the	  medical	   community.	  Currently,	   from	  a	   strict	  Italian	   legal	   point	   of	   view,	   an	   AD	   should	   be	   considered	   as	   a	   unilateral	   act	   –	  declaration	   of	   intent	   (Canestrari	   2003)	   –	  which	   produces	   legal	   effects	   in	   the	  non-­‐pecuniary	   individual	  sphere:	   its	  aim	   is	   to	  (consent	   to	  or	   to)	  reject	   future	  medical	   treatment	   in	   case	   of	   an	   agent’s	   incapacity.	  ADs	   are	   an	   application	   of	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the	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination	   recognized	  by	   the	   Italian	  Constitutional	  Court	  (Cost.	   C.	   15	  December	   2008,	   no.	   438)	   from	   the	   combination	   of	  Articles	   2,	   13	  and	   32,	   section	   2	   of	   the	   Italian	   Constitution.	   As	   the	   Constitutional	   Court	   has	  underlined,	   the	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination	   differs	   from	   the	   right	   to	   health	   –	  guaranteed	   by	   Article	   32,	   section	   1	   –	   	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   is	   broader	   and	  involves	  patient	  autonomy.	  	  	   In	   Italy,	   ADs	   can	   be	   made	   only	   by	   people	   with	   full	   competency.	  Furthermore,	   simple	   opinions	   or	   declarations	   that	   do	   not	   aim	   to	   produce	   a	  legal	  effect	  on	  relationships	  with	  physicians	  must	  not	  be	  considered	  (C.	  Cass.	  23	  February	  2007	  no.	  4211).	  Physicians	  must	  pay	  close	  attention	   to	  patients’	  medical	   declarations,	   because	   on	   one	   hand	   they	   should	   not	   take	   into	  consideration	   simple	   opinions,	   but	   on	   the	   other,	   they	   must	   be	   aware	   that	  patients’	   preferences	   change	   during	   the	   course	   of	   a	   disease	   (Carmel	   and	  Mutran	  1999,	  Berger	  1998,	  Marion	   et	   al.	   1994).	  However,	   in	   case	  of	   patients	  with	  dementia,	  previous	  ADs	  should	  remain	  in	  force,	  because	  critical	  interests	  deserve	  priority	  over	  experiential	  interests.157	  	  	   Finally,	   the	   ruling	   no.	   4211	   of	   23	   February	   2007	   of	   the	   High	   Court	   of	  Cassation	   should	   be	   mentioned.	   This	   ruling	   states	   that	   in	   case	   of	   a	   risk	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  157	  According	  to	  Dworkin,	  there	  should	  be	  a	  difference	  between	  critical	  interest,	  those	  that	   determine	   personal	   goal	   of	   life,	   and	   experiential	   interest,	   those	   that	   entail	  experience	   pleasure,	   pain,	   happiness	   or	   other	   feeling	   (Dworkin	   1986).	   In	   cases	   of	  patients	   with	   dementia,	   empirical	   research	   has	   shown	   that	   advance	   directives	   are	  considered	  valid,	  but	  their	  effectiveness	  seems	  marginal	  (de	  Boer	  et	  al.	  2010).	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death	   the	   patient’s	   ruling	   must	   be	   expressed,	   unequivocal,	   concrete	   and	  informed.	   Thus,	   an	   abstract,	   ideological	   refusal	   where	   the	   agent	   does	   not	  envisage	  medical	  treatment	  in	  the	  near	  future	  cannot	  be	  followed	  because	  this	  refusal	  is	  based	  on	  an	  ex	  ante	  and	  not	  ex	  post	  ruling.158	  This	  is	  an	  application	  of	  the	  principle	   in	   dubio	   pro	   vita.	   This	   ruling	  has	  been	  much	   criticized,	   because	  the	   application	   of	   this	   theory	   leaves	   room	   for	   physicians’	   paternalism,	   in	  contrast	   with	   the	   spirit	   of	   the	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination	   that	   inspires	   the	  Italian	  Constitution.159	  	   	  The	   Italian	   National	   Bioethics	   Committee	   (NBC)	   has	   underlined	   the	  significance	  of	  advance	  directives	   in	  several	  documents,	  which	  are:	  Bioethical	  
issues	   regarding	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   (1995),	   Advance	   directives	   (2003),	   and	   Dementia	  
and	  Alzheimer:	  ethical	  consideration	  (2014).	  
	  	  	  	  	  158	   A	   typical	   example	   is	   the	   case	   of	   Jehovah’s	  Witnesses’	   ban	   on	   blood	   transfusion.	  Following	  the	  argumentation	  of	  this	  decision,	  which	  is	  based	  on	  the	  interpretation	  of	  Article	   40	   of	   the	   Code	   of	   Medical	   Ethics,	   even	   in	   the	   presence	   of	   a	   prior	   express	  refusal	   a	   doctor,	   faced	   with	   an	   unexpected	   and	   unpredictable	   worsening	   of	   the	  patient’s	   condition	   in	   a	   combination	   of	   circumstances	   that	   do	   not	   permit	   the	  inspection	   of	   actual	   wishes	   and	   if	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   save	   the	   patient's	   life,	   could	  consider	   certain	   or	   highly	   probable	   that	   the	   prior	   rejection	   of	   therapy	   is	   no	   longer	  valid.	  159	   More	   criticisms	   of	   the	   decision	   of	   the	   High	   Court	   of	   Cassation	   no.	   4211	   of	   23	  February	  2007	  can	  be	   found	   in	   the	  paper	  of	  Masoni,	  where	   the	  author	  criticizes	   the	  Court’s	   decision	   by	   highlighting	   the	   contrast	   with	   Article	   32	   of	   the	   Italian	  Constitution,	  Article	  9	  of	   the	  Convention	  of	  Oviedo,	  Article	  38	  of	   the	   Italian	  Medical	  Ethic	  Code	  and	  with	  the	  Advice	  given	  by	  the	  Italian	  National	  Committee	  of	  Bioethics	  on	  December	  2003	  (Masoni	  2009).	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   Among	  them,	  the	  advice	  Advance	  Directives	   is	  entirely	  dedicated	  to	  this	  issue.	  Through	  this	  document,	  the	  NBC	  has	  recognized	  that	  ADs	  are	  not	  just	  an	  instrument	   for	   the	   legitimation	   of	   the	   medical	   treatment,	   but	   also	   a	  fundamental	   human	   right.	   In	   addition,	   ADs	   are	   important	   for	   the	  implementation	  of	  the	  theory	  of	  informed	  consent:	  ADs	  are	  seen	  as	  instrument	  to	   make	   still	   possible	   the	   personal	   relationship	   between	   patient	   and	  physicians,	   although	   the	   patient	   is	   unconscious.	   It	   follows	   that	   the	  unconscious	  patient	  will	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  person	  according	  to	  his/her	  wellbeing	  and	  not	  as	  a	  human	  body	  to	  cure.	  	   Although	   the	   significance	   of	   ADs	   has	   been	   underlined,	   in	   the	   advice	  given	   in	  2003,	   the	  NBC	  has	   adopted	  quite	   a	   conservative	   approach.	   It	   should	  be	  mentioned	  that	  this	  conservative	  approach	  has	  been	  codified	  by	  the	  Bill	  no.	  2350	   and	   the	   proposal-­‐bill	   2229,	   and	   then	   by	   the	   Italian	   Code	   of	   Medical	  Ethics	   of	   May	   2014.	   From	   the	   first	   paragraph,	   the	   NBC	   has	   highlighted	   that	  ADs	  shall	  be	  in	  written	  form,	  are	  time-­‐limited,	  and	  can	  be	  expressed	  only	  after	  the	   physician	   has	   informed	   the	   citizen	   with	   all	   the	   information	   needed.	  Moreover,	   the	   physician’s	   professional	   autonomy	   has	   been	   emphasized	   in	  several	   paragraphs.	   Therefore,	   “directives	   contrary	   to	   law,	   norms	   of	   good	  
clinical	  practice,	  or	  medical	  deontology”	  shall	  not	  be	  applied	  (p.	  9).	  	  	   The	  NBC	  has	  established	  that	  there	  exists	  an	  ethical	  consensus	  that	  ADs	  are	   an	   important	   instrument	   in	   the	   patient-­‐physician	   trust;	   nevertheless,	  there	   exists	   a	   contrast	   between	   law	   and	   medical	   deontology,	   in	   addition	   to	  doubts	  related	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  ADs	  and	  the	  modality	  of	  their	  execution.	  The	  main	   problem	   relates	   to	   their	   ambiguity,	   which	   –	   according	   to	   the	   advice	  
Advance	   Directives	   –	   can	   never	   be	   excluded,	   neither	   in	   cases	   that	   these	  documents	   were	   written	   after	   the	   diagnosis	   of	   the	   disease	   since	   the	   same	  disease	  might	  have	  different	  treatments.	  	  	   Therefore,	   according	   to	   NBC	   (2003),	   ADs	   should	   not	   have	   legally-­‐binding	   force.	   This	   is	   in	   accordance	  with	   article	   9	   of	   Oviedo	   Convention	   and	  with	   section	   62	   of	   its	   Explanatory	   Report.	   This	   is	  why	   the	   final	   version	   of	   it	  substituted	   the	  adjective	   “decisive”	  with	   “previous	  expressed	  wishes	  …	   shall	  be	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taken	   into	   consideration”.	   It	   follows	   that	   a	   patient’s	   previous	   wishes	   should	  not	  be	  considered	  as	  (simple)	  orientations.	  In	  addition,	  physician	  should	  have	  convincing	   arguments	   in	   order	   to	   not	   follow	   a	   patient’s	   directives.	   However,	  physicians	  are	  not	  legally	  bound	  to	  follow	  them.	  	   With	   the	   aim	   to	   decrease	   the	   problem	   derived	   from	   the	   ambiguity	   of	  ADs,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  surrogate	  has	  been	  highlighted.	  Nevertheless,	  in	  the	  advice	  of	  2003,	   it	   	   is	  written	  that	  currently	   this	  role	  has	  been	  “carried	  out,	  or	  should	  
be	  carry	  out”	  by	  the	  patient’s	  family	  (p.8).	  Moreover,	  although	  the	  surrogate’s	  opinion	  has	  an	  ethical	   justification	  since	   the	  patient	  has	  given	  his/her	  power	  to	   the	   surrogate,	   it	   is	   inappropriate	   to	   attribute	   legally	   binding-­‐force	   to	   the	  surrogate’s	  opinion.	  	  	   The	  problem	  related	  to	  ANH	  has	  been	  highlighted	  as	  well.	  In	  the	  advice	  of	  2003,	   the	  committee	  has	  not	   taken	  an	  official	  position	  regarding	   this	   issue	  (a	  position	  that	  has	  been	  taken	  in	  the	  document	  Alimentation	  and	  the	  nutrition	  
and	  hydration	  for	  patients	  in	  a	  persistent	  vegetative	  state	  in	  2005),	  however,	  it	  has	  highlighted	   the	  ethical	  and	  medical	  division	  regarding	   this	   issue.	  While	  a	  group	  of	  bioethicians	  consider	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  ANH	  possible,	  another	  group	  considers	  it	  as	  basic	  care	  and	  therefore	  punishing	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  ANH	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  3.2.1.).	  	  	   It	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   although	   the	   advice	   of	   2003	   is	   quite	  conservative,	   in	  1993,	   in	   the	  document	  Bioethical	   issues	   regarding	  end-­‐of-­‐life,	  the	   NBC	   considered	   ADs	   as	   “orientation	   documents”,	   raised	   doubts	   on	   the	  ethical	  principle	  of	  prospective	  autonomy	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  1.3.),	  and	  stated	  that	  it	  is	  deontologically	  inadmissible	  to	  exclude	  some	  types	  of	  treatments	  through	  ADs	  (by	  including	  both	  ‘living	  wills’	  or	  ‘surrogate	  will’).	  	  	   But,	   in	   2014,	   in	   its	   advice	   Dementia	   and	   Alzheimer:	   ethical	  
consideration,	   the	  NBC	  has	  taken	  quite	  a	   liberal	  approach.	   In	   this	  document	  –	  approved	   by	   all	   the	   members	   in	   unanimity	   –	   it	   is	   stated	   that	   in	   cases	   of	  dementia	   and	   Alzheimer’s	   disease,	   “it	   is	   recommendable	   that	   the	   patient	   use	  
advance	   directives”	   (p.	   22).	   The	   ethical	   principle	   of	   prospective	   autonomy	   is	  seen	  not	  only	  as	  an	  instrument	  to	  legitimize	  medical	  treatment,	  but	  also	  as	  an	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act	   that	   gives	   substantial	   protection	   to	   patient	   rights.	   Since	   the	   citizen	   has	  decided	  to	  write	  ADs,	  it	  derives	  that	  he/she	  has	  personally	  and	  fully	  assumed	  and	   accepted	   the	   risks	   of	   uncertainty,	   contingently,	   and	   precarious	   in	   both	  ethical	  and	  legal	  perspectives.	  	  	   Although	  the	  advice	  of	  2014	  does	  not	  specify	   the	   force	  of	  ADs	  (legally-­‐binding	   force	   or	   advisory	   power),	   for	   the	   first	   time	   the	   physician	   or	   to	   the	  legal	   proxy	   is	   given	   the	   authority	   to	   decide	   about	   the	   power	   of	   the	   patient’s	  previously	   expressed	   wishes.	   Until	   2014,	   the	   NBC	   has	   given	   the	   complete	  authority	  to	  decide	  on	  the	  execution	  of	  ADs	  only	  to	  the	  medical	  community.	  	   So,	   originally	   taking	   a	   completely	   conservative	   approach	   in	   1993,	   the	  NBC,	   in	  2014,	  has	  underlined	  the	  significance	  of	  ADs.	  While	   in	  1993,	   the	  NBC	  did	   not	   accept	   the	   ethical	   principle	   of	   prospective	   autonomy	   and	   considered	  ADs,	  as	  well	  as	  giving	  to	  the	  physician	  the	  power	  to	  decide	  on	  their	  execution,	  as	  inadmissible	  from	  a	  deontological	  approach;	  in	  2014,	  however,	  the	  NBC	  has	  recommended	   the	   application	   of	   ADs	   and	   has	   given	   to	   physicians	   or	   legal	  proxy	  the	  authority	  to	  decide	  the	  significance	  of	  previously	  expressed	  wishes	  by	  the	  patient.	  	  	   Analyzing	  the	  position	  of	  the	  medical	  community,	  it	  should	  be	  said	  that	  the	   two	  main	  medical	  societies	   in	   Italy	  are:	   the	   Italian	  Society	  of	  Anaesthesia	  Analgesia	  Resuscitation	  and	  Intensive	  Care	  (SIAARTI)	  and	  the	  Italian	  National	  Federation	   of	   Associations	   of	   Physicians	   and	   Dentists	   (FNOMCeO).	   The	   two	  main	   documents	   regarding	   ADs	   published	   by	   the	   SIAARTI	   are	   the	   guidelines	  
“End-­‐of-­‐life	   and	   the	   intensivist:	   SIAARTI	   recommendations	   on	   the	  management	  
of	   the	   dying	   patient”	   (2006)	   and	   the	   advice	   regarding	   “End-­‐of-­‐life,	   vegetative	  
state,	   nutrition	   and	   hydration”	   (2009).	   In	   both	   these	   documents	   the	   SIAARTI	  distinguishes	   between	   “sick	   person”	   and	   “dying	   patient”.	   Nevertheless,	   both	  these	  guidelines	  lack	  a	  temporary	  condition	  regarding	  the	  identification	  of	  the	  “dying	  patient”.	  The	  SIAARTI	  could	  have	  applied	  the	  guidelines	  established	  by	  the	   General	  Medical	   Council	   in	  UK	   (2010)	   that	   states	   that	   the	   palliative	   care	  should	   not	   start	   before	   twelve	   months	   from	   the	   predictable	   death	   of	   the	  patient.	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   According	   to	  SIAARTI,	   in	   the	  case	  of	  a	   “sick	  person”,	  medicine’s	  goal	   is	  to	   prolong	   the	   patient’s	   life	   with	   a	   good	   quality	   of	   life	   that	   the	   patient	  himself/herself	   considers	   acceptable;	   however,	   when	   caring	   for	   the	   “dying	  patient”,	  the	  aim	  of	  medicine	  is	  to	  grant	  the	  patient	  a	  respectable	  quality	  of	  life	  during	   his/her	   remaining	   lifetime.	   In	   the	   guidelines	   of	   2006,	   the	   SIAARTI	  emphasized	   the	   importance	  of	   communication	  between	   the	  medical	   staff	   and	  the	   patient,	   or	   his/her	   family	   in	   the	   case	   of	   an	   unconscious	   patient.	   This	  approach	   is	   in	  coherence	  with	   the	  concept	  of	   transitional	  palliative	  care	   (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  2.1.3.).	  	  	   Moreover,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  ‘living	  will’,	  the	  SIAARTI	  has	  made	  a	  distinction	  according	   to	   the	   time	   that	   these	   documents	   were	   written.	   In	   case	   that	  previously	  expressed	  wishes	  have	  been	  written	  after	  the	  patient	  has	  received	  clear	   medical	   and	   clinical	   information	   regarding	   his/her	   diagnosis	   and	  prognosis,	   therefore	   within	   a	   program	   of	   medical	   advance	   planning,	   the	  medical	   staff	   has	   to	   respect	   these	  wishes.	   In	   other	   cases,	  when	   a	   ‘living	  will’	  was	   written	   a	   long	   time	   before	   its	   execution	   and	   without	   having	   clear	  information	  regarding	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  concrete	  disease,	  and	  therefore	  the	  previous	  expressed	  wishes	  are	  written	  in	  general	  terms,	  then	  “the	  decision	  
of	  the	  doctor	  to	  respect	  or	  ignore	  the	  patient’s	  statement	  is	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  
his	   judgment	   of	   the	   appropriateness	   of	   withholding	   or	   withdrawal	   intensive	  
care”	  (p.	  942).	  	   In	   2009,	   the	   SIAARTI	   stated	   –	   in	   accordance	  with	   FNOMCeO	   (2009)	   –	  that	   the	   Italian	   legislator	   should	   establish	   an	   ad	   hoc	   law	   ruling	   ADs	   by	  highlighting	   the	   role	   of	   the	   surrogate.	   In	   addition,	   these	   documents	   can	  contain	   only	   the	   physician’s	   act	   of	   non	   facere	   and	   should	   be	   time-­‐limited.	  Furthermore,	   ADs	   should	   be	   written	   within	   a	   program	   of	   advance	   care	  planning,	   and	   the	   patient	   should	   be	   aware	   of	   the	   medical	   and	   clinical	  consequences	  of	  his/her	  disease	  and	  treatment.	  Moreover,	  ANH	  is	  considered	  a	  medical	  treatment	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  3.2.1.).	  	   This	   approach	   has	   been	   confirmed	   in	   2013,	   with	   the	   last	   document	  focuses	   on	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   care.	   Although	   the	   focal	   point	   of	   this	   document	   is	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intensive	   and	   palliative	   care,	   the	   significance	   of	   ADs	   and	   patient-­‐physician	  trust	  are	  pointed	  out.	  The	  importance	  of	  this	  document	  stands	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  ADs	  and	  care	  planning	  are	  considered	  not	  only	  in	  case	  of	  patient	  with	  terminal	  illness,	   but	   also	   in	   the	   field	   of	   neurology.	  	  	   In	  accordance	  with	   the	  document	  published	   in	  2006,	   the	  active	   role	  of	  the	  patient,	   and	   therefore	   the	  patient-­‐physician	  dialogue	  and	   communication	  have	  been	  highlighted.	   In	  addition,	   the	  role	  of	   the	   legal	  proxies	   (surrogate	  or	  guardian),	   especially	   in	   case	  of	  dementia,	   have	  been	  underlined.	   It	   should	  be	  noted	  that	  in	  case	  of	  patient	  with	  dementia,	  on	  2014,	  the	  NBC	  has	  applied	  the	  same	  approach	  of	  SIAARTI	  in	  2013.	  	  	   However,	  the	  documents	  of	  SIAARTI	  (2006,	  2009,	  and	  2013)	  have	  been	  criticized	   since	   according	   to	   them	   ADs	   should	   be	   taken	   consideration	   and	  should	  not	  have	  legally	  binding	  force,	  especially	  if	  these	  directives	  were	  stated	  outside	  a	  care	  planning	  discussed	  with	  physicians.	  	  	   In	   2014,	   the	   FNOMCeO	   published	   the	   Code	   of	  Medical	   Ethics.	   In	   Italy,	  physicians	  must	  be	  part	  of	  this	  federation;	  otherwise	  they	  cannot	  exercise	  the	  medical	   profession.	   In	   case	   of	   infringements	   of	   its	   norms,	   the	   FNOMCeO	   can	  apply	   disciplinary	   sanctions	   (article	   2).	   Article	   38	   of	   the	   new	   Italian	   Code	   of	  Medical	   Ethics	   states	   that	   ADs	   should	   be	   in	   writing	   and	   that	   these	   future	  directives	   are	   not	   legally	   binding.	   Moreover,	   physicians	   have	   the	   power	   to	  verify	  not	  only	   their	   clinical	   consistency,	  but	  also	   their	   logical	   consistency.	   It	  remains	   unspecified	   what	   steps	   this	   verification	   entails.	   Furthermore,	  physicians	  and	   legal	  proxies	  must	  seek	  the	  patient’s	  best	   interest	  rather	   than	  follow	   the	   patient’s	   wishes.	   The	   article’s	   paternalism	   is	   inherent	   in	   its	  limitation	  of	  ADs	  to	  written	  statements:	  living	  wills	  could	  be	  limited	  to	  written	  form,	   but	   not	   ADs	   in	   general,	   which	   form	   a	   broader	   concept	   of	   statements	  concerning	   individual	   preferences.	   Moreover,	   ADs	   should	   be	   legally	   binding	  and	   not	   only	   of	   advisory	   force.	   In	   addition,	   physicians	   should	   have	   only	   the	  power	   to	   ascertain	   clinical	   consistency	   and	   not	   also	   to	   verify	   the	   logical	  consistency	   of	   a	   living	   will.	   Further,	   physicians	   and	   legal	   proxies	   should	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consult	   the	   patient’s	   wishes	   and	   only	   act	   according	   to	   the	   patient’s	   best	  interest	  if	  those	  wishes	  are	  unclear.	  	   Although	  the	  FNOMCeO	  has	  adopted	  in	  2014	  a	  conservative	  approach,	  it	  should	  be	  mentioned	  that	   the	  previous	  version	  of	   the	  Code	  of	  Medical	  Ethics,	  the	  one	  of	  2006,	  was	  more	   liberal.	   In	   the	  case	  of	  an	  unconscious	  patient,	  “the	  
physician	  must	   take	   into	  account	   the	  previous	   choices	   expressed	   in	  a	   clear	  and	  
documented	  manner”	  (article	  38,	  section	  3).	  This	  version	  is	  similar	  to	  article	  9	  of	   the	   Oviedo	   Convention	   (e.g.,	   see	   Sect.	   2.1.).	   The	   main	   criticisms	   of	   this	  section	  were	  related	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  ADs	  were	  delineated	  with	  ‘living	  will’	  and	  ADs	   were	   connected	   with	   the	   patient’s	   choices	   and	   not	   with	   the	   patient’s	  wishes	  or	  will.	   In	  addition,	  the	  “previous	  choices”	  should	  have	  been	  expressed	  in	   a	   clear	   manner,	   which	   in	   practice	   is	   quite	   rare.	   Moreover,	   the	   role	   of	  surrogate	  (or	  other	  legal	  proxies)	  was	  not	  mentioned.	  Furthermore,	  there	  was	  a	  lack	  of	  procedure	  regarding	  people	  who	  are	  incapable	  of	  writing.	  	  	   Concluding,	   the	   withdrawal	   of	   medical	   treatment	   is	   common,	   also	   in	  Italy	   (Bertolini	   and	   Boffelli	   2007).	   Therefore,	   the	   intervention	   of	   the	   Italian	  legislator	   has	   been	   asked	   for	   not	   only	   by	   the	   jurisprudence,	   but	   also	   by	   the	  bioethical	   and	  medical	   community.	   Both	   these	   communities	   have	   underlined	  the	   importance	  of	   clear	   legal	  norms	  ruling	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  decisions.	  According	   to	  them,	   ADs	   will	   emphasize	   patient	   autonomy	   and	   are	   in	   accordance	   with	  physician’s	   duty	   to	   care.	   In	   addition	   to	   the	   safeguard	   of	   patient	   autonomy,	  both	   these	   communities	   have	   asked	   the	   parliament	   for	   the	   protection	   of	   the	  physician’s	   consciousness	   objection	   (NBC	   2012,	   FNOMCeO	   2009).	   The	  consciousness	   objection	   or	   the	   right	   of	   conscience	   is	   a	   constitutional	   right	  guaranteed	   to	   physicians	   as	   human	   beings	   rather	   than	   as	   medical	   experts.	  Nevertheless,	   the	  medical	  consciousness	  objection	  must	  be	  strictly	  connected	  with	  the	  protection	  of	  other	  fundamental	  constitutional	  rights	  (NBC	  2012).	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2.	   The	   Italian	   bill	   on	   advance	   directives:	   the	   problem	   of	   their	  
limitation	  Article	  3	  of	  Bill	  No.	  2350	  recognizes	  the	  importance	  of	  advance	  directives	  that	  can	   be	   executed	   only	   in	   case	   that	   the	   agent	   is	   permanently	   incapable,	   and	  lacks	   cortical	   and	   subcortical	   brain	   activity.	   According	   to	   the	   Convention	   on	  the	   Rights	   of	   Persons	   with	   Disabilities,	   alimentation	   and	   hydration	   must	   be	  kept	  until	   the	   last	  moment	  of	   life;	  except	   in	  cases	  where	   these	   treatments	  do	  not	   benefit	   the	   patient.	   Further,	   medical	   advance	   declarations	   have	   an	  advisory	  force.	  	   This	   Bill	   states	   that	   ADs	   –	   as	   in	   France	   before	   the	   law	   348	   of	   March	  2015	   (article	  1111-­‐11	  Code	  de	   la	   Santé	  Publique)160	   –	  have	  no	   legally-­‐binding	  force161.	   This	   political	   choice	   could	   be	   explained	   only	   by	   the	   considerable	  influence	   of	   the	   traditional	   Catholic	   approach	   within	   the	   Italian	   political	  parties.	   Catholicism	   has	   been	   considered	   as	   the	   “key	   factor	   explaining	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  160	  The	  previous	  French	  law	  of	  2005–	  as	  in	  Italy	  –	  the	  so-­‐called	  Leonetti	  Law	  came	  as	  a	   reaction	   to	   the	   case-­‐law	   of	   Vincent	   Humbert.	   This	   is	   the	   main	   reason	   why	   the	  French	  law	  focuses	  on	  fixing	  “a	  clear	  framework	  for	  legal	  or	  illegal	  medical	  practices	  at	  the	  end-­‐of-­‐life,	  rather	  than	  a	  framework	  for	  respecting	  patients’	  autonomy”	  (Horn	  2014).	  As	  Leonetti	  stated	   in	  2005,	   the	  aim	  of	   the	  Law	  is	   to	   “ease	  doctors’	   feelings	  of	  guilt”	   (Assamblee	   Nationale	   2008).	   The	   French	   Parliament	   of	   March	   2015	   has	  changed	   this	   policy.	   Currently,	   in	   France,	   ADs	   are	   legally	   binding.	   This	   has	   been	  presumed	  by	  the	  use	  of	  the	  verb	  imposer	  (impose).	  However,	  a	  degree	  of	  the	  Council	  of	   State	   will	   set	   the	   condition	   for	   the	   validity,	   confidentiality	   and	   conservation	   of	  these	  documents.	  	  161	  All	  new	  proposals	  –	  expect	  proposal	  2229	  –	  establish	   the	   legally-­‐binding	   force	  of	  ADs.	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more	   pro-­‐life	   profile”	   (Menaca	   et	   al.	   2012)	   of	   Italian	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   decision-­‐making	  and	  with	  the	  perception	  of	  a	  high	  level	  of	  tolerance	  of	  pain	  within	  the	  Italian	  medical	  community.162	  	   Article	   3,	   section	   1	   states	   that	   ADs	   can	   be	   written	   only	   by	   fully	  competent	   agents163.	   The	   focus	   on	   ADs	   is	   a	   direct	   result	   of	   the	   fact	   that	  individual	   autonomy	  –	  which,	   in	   the	  Western	   countries,	   is	   based	  on	   the	  neo-­‐liberal	  and	  utilitarian	  perspective	  (Woods	  2007)	  –	  requires	  as	  a	  pre-­‐condition	  the	   mental	   capacity,	   which	   in	   palliative	   care	   can	   be	   reduced	   or	   altered	  (Department	   of	   Health	   2008).	   This	   is	   why	   “death	   should	   become	   an	   explicit	  discussion	  point	  when	  patients	  are	   likely	   to	  die	  within	  12	  months”	   (Gardiner	  et	   al.	   2011).	   In	   addition,	   the	   patient’s	   participation	   in	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   decisions	  during	   palliative	   care	   becomes	   more	   tensions	   because	   two	   different	  preferences	  –	  wanting	  control	  over	  life	  and	  wanting	  to	  be	  cared	  for	  	  –	  contrast	  between	  them	  (Seymour	  2004).	  	  	   There	  is	  a	  difference	  between	  the	  legal	  concept	  of	  “competency”	  and	  the	  clinical	  and	  ethical	  concept	  of	  “capacity”.	  To	  be	  competent	  is	  to	  have	  sufficient	  mental	   capacity	   to	   rationality	   fulfil	   tasks.	   This	   is	   a	  matter	   of	   fact,	   not	   of	   law.	  Moreover,	  the	  capacity	  is	  “task	  specific	  so	  individuals	  may	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  162	  In	  Italy,	  terminal	  sedation	  is	  more	  accepted	  than	  euthanasia	  or	  physician-­‐assisted	  suicide	   and	   is	   more	   frequently	   implemented	   than	   in	   other	   European	   countries.	  (Catania	  et	  al.	  2008,	  and	  Miccinesi	  et	  al.	  2006).	  	  163	   It	   should	  be	  noted	   that	  all	   the	  new	  proposals	   –	  expect	  proposal	  1298	  –	  establish	  the	  same	  principle.	  The	  proposal	  1298	  states	  that	  citizens	  over	  16	  years	  old	  can	  also	  write	  an	  AD	  (article	  3,	  section	  1).	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make	  some	  decisions	  but	  not	  others”	  (British	  Medical	  Association	  2007).	  Thus,	  different	  actions	  require	  different	  levels	  of	  mental	  capacity.	  	  	   The	   Italian	   Bill	   requires	   that	   ADs	   can	   be	   written	   only	   after	   complete	  medical	   and	   clinical	   information	   has	   been	   given164.	   This	   has	   raised	   several	  problems	   because	   it	   is	   quite	   impossible	   to	   predict	   all	   the	   possible	   diseases	  that	   entail	   unconsciousness	   and	  all	  medical	   treatments	   that	   could	  be	  used	   in	  these	  cases	  (Holley	  2005).	  Therefore,	  this	  legal	  requirement	  becomes	  more	  of	  a	  formal	  requirement	  –	  which	  increases	  bureaucracy	  –	  with	  no	  applicability	  to	  medical	   practice.	   The	   previous	   discussion	   with	   the	   physician	   could	   be	  appreciated	  in	  case	  of	  chronic	  and	  degenerative	  illnesses.	  In	  case	  that	  the	  new	  Italian	  law	  will	  emphasize	  this	  rule,	  this	  requires	  training	  program	  for	  doctors	  and	   other	   health-­‐care	   professionals.	   This	   could	   entail	   further	   costs	   for	   the	  public	  budget.	  	  	   The	   previous	   contact	   with	   the	   physician	   emphasises	   the	   concept	   of	  relational	   autonomy	   (Epstein	   2013).	   The	   key	   for	   the	   promotion	   of	   patient-­‐physician	   trust	   is	   the	   partnership	   between	   them,	   which	   presupposes	   a	  relationship	  between	  patient	  and	  physician	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  1.2.).	  It	  follows	  that	  ‘living	  wills’	   written	   in	   rehabilitation	   centers	   –	  where	   the	   patients	   have	   had	  	  	  	  	  	  164	   This	   formality	   has	   been	   established	   in	   proposal	   2229	   (article	   3,	   section	   1	   and	  article	  4,	  section	  1).	  Instead,	  the	  proposal	  443	  establishes	  the	  need	  of	  the	  advice	  of	  a	  Noter	  and	  that	  of	  the	  physician	  (article	  13);	  the	  proposal	  1298	  requires	  the	  presence	  of	   two	   witnesses	   (article	   3,	   section	   7);	   and	   the	   proposal	   2264	   states	   that	   the	   ADs	  should	   be	   written	   in	   front	   of	   the	   public	   employer	   of	   the	   Municipality	   Register	   of	  Advance	  Directives	  (article	  2,	  section	  3).	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several	  conversations	  with	  varies	  physicians	  –	  are	  more	  precise	  regarding	  the	  future	  concrete	  medical	  condition.	  This	  model	  has	  recently	  been	  highlighted	  in	  the	  Guide	   published	   by	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe	   on	  May	   2014.	  Differently	   form	  the	   model	   adopted	   in	   the	   USA,	   in	   Europe,	   patient	   autonomy	   is	   not	   the	   only	  value	   that	   the	   bioethical	   community	   considers	   fundamental.	   Other	   values	   –	  such	   as	   ‘solidarity’	   (Manson	   and	   Laurie	   2011)	   and	   physician	   autonomy165	   –	  have	  been	  highlighted	  as	  well.	  	   Also,	   this	   policy	   is	   in	   harmony	   with	   the	   individualist	   model	   of	  autonomy,	   which	   considers	   autonomy	   model	   as	   a	   ‘self-­‐sufficient	   decision-­‐making’	   factor.	  Nevertheless,	  as	  the	  scholars	  of	  ethics	  or	  care	  have	  noted,	   the	  role	  of	  the	  physician	  in	  these	  two	  models	  has	  changed.	  While	  in	  the	  relational	  autonomy	   the	   patient-­‐physician	   trust	   is	   highlighted,	   in	   the	   individualistic	  model	  of	  autonomy,	  physicians	  should	  only	  give	  medical	   information	  and	  not	  interfere	   with	   the	   individual’s	   decision-­‐	   making	   process	   (Walter	   and	   Ross	  2014).	  	  	   The	  Bill	  underlines	  the	  fact	  that	  ADs	  cannot	  include	  requests	  for	  crimes	  such	  as	  homicide	  (article	  575	  P.C.),	  homicide	  by	  request	  of	   the	  victim	  (article	  579	  P.C.)	   or	   aiding	   or	   incitement	   suicide	   (article	   580	   P.C.).166	   This	   policy	   has	  	  	  	  	  	  165	   Doctor	   autonomy	   is	   considered	   so	   important	   in	   Europe	   that	   the	   Portuguese	  legislator	  of	  2012	  has	  codified	  the	  medical	  objection	  in	  the	  law	  ruling	  ADs	  (article	  9	  ,	  Law	  no.	  25	  of	  16	  July	  2012)	  	  	  166	   It	   should	  be	  noted	   that	  contrary	   to	  Article	  1,	   section	  1,	  paragraph	  C),	   in	  Article	  3	  the	   phrase	   “any	   kind	   of	   euthanasia”	   –	   whose	   interpretation	   could	   be	   ambiguous	   –	  does	  not	  appear.	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been	  repeated	   identically	   in	   the	  new	  proposal	  2229	  (article	  3,	   section	  3)	  and	  proposal	  1432	  (article	  1,	  section	  1,	  let.	  e)167.	  This	  is	  in	  harmony	  with	  the	  other	  European	  Legislation	  –	  except	  countries	  that	  allow	  euthanasia	  or	  PAS,	  such	  as	  the	  Netherlands,	  Belgium	  and	  Luxemburg	  (and	  to	  some	  extent,	  Germany)	  (see	  
supra	  note	  95)	  168	  –	  where	  ADs	  can	  impose	  on	  physicians	  a	   legal	  obligation	  of	  “not	   acting”	   or	   to	   withdraw	   medical	   treatment,	   but	   cannot	   include	   an	  obligation	  to	  act.	  	   According	  to	  this	  article	  the	  only	  medical	  treatment	  that	  can	  be	  rejected	  through	   ADs	   are	   experimental	   or	   disproportionate	   treatments169.	   Hence,	   any	  medical	   treatment	   that	   prolongs	   life	   could	   be	   considered	   as	   proportionate	  (Bonsignore	  et	  al.	  2012).	  The	  possibility	  of	  futile	  treatment	  is	  really	  low.	  This	  	  	  	  	  	  167	  The	  proposal	  1432	  prohibits	  euthanasia,	  assistance	  and	  helping	  in	  suicide.	  168	  However,	   it	   should	  be	  underlined	   that	   recently	   the	  German	  High	  Court	   (decision	  of	   25th	   June	   2010)	   has	   gone	   beyond	   the	   traditional	   legal	   distinction	   of	   act	   and	  omission.	   By	   taking	   into	   account	   the	   ethical	   principle	   of	   no	   distinction	   between	  ‘active’	  and	  ‘passive’	  euthanasia	  and	  the	  legal	  principle	  of	  unity	  of	  the	  legal	  system	  –	  not	  only	  in	  a	  horizontal	  approach	  between	  civil	  and	  criminal	  law,	  but	  also	  in	  vertical	  approach	  between	   constitutional	  principle	   and	   law	  –	  has	   stated	   that	   it	   is	   lawful	   the	  case	  of	  detachment	  of	  probe	   from	  the	  health	  care	  proxy.	  The	  German	  High	  Court,	  as	  the	   European	   Court	   of	   Human	   Rights	   in	   the	   famous	   case	   Pretty	   v	   United	   Kingdom,	  justifies	   this	   decision	   based	   on	   Article	   1	   (human	   dignity)	   and	   Article	   2	   (personal	  
freedom)	   of	   the	   German	   Constitution.	   Nevertheless,	   in	   this	   decision,	   the	  High	   Court	  précises	   that	   active	   euthanasia	   and	   any	   kind	   of	   act	   that	   hastens	   death	   without	  palliative	  care	  are	  illegal.	  	  169	  All	   the	  proposals	   –	   except	  proposals	  13	  and	  2229	  –	  do	  not	   establish	  any	   limit	   to	  the	   object	   of	   ADs.	   While	   proposal	   2229	   recognizes	   the	   same	   limitation	   of	   the	  proposal	  2350	   (article	  3,	   section	  4),	   the	  proposal	  13	   states	   that	  medical	   treatments	  that	  protect	  patient’s	  personal	  dignity	  cannot	  be	  withdrawn	  (article	  19,	  section	  2).	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is	   in	   contrast	   with	   the	   newer	   model	   of	   medicine	   where	   patients’	   autonomy	  and	  well-­‐being	  is	  the	  core	  of	  medical	  decisions	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  1.1.).	  Moreover,	   substantial	   criticism	   has	   been	   raised	   of	   the	   last	   section	   of	  article	   3.	   According	   to	   it,	   ADs	   are	   executive	   only	   in	   case	   of	   permanent	  incapacity	   without	   cortical	   and	   subcortical	   brain	   activity170,	   which	   must	   be	  certified	  by	  a	  medical	  commission	  composed	  of	  an	  anaesthetist,	  a	  neurologist,	  a	   specialist	   of	   the	   pathology	   concerned	   and	   the	   physician	   in	   charge	   of	   the	  patient171.	  The	  amended	  Bill	  from	  the	  Chamber	  of	  Deputies	  removed	  the	  role	  of	  coroner	  from	  the	  commission.	  	  Before	  criticizing	  this	  norm	  from	  a	  legal	  point	  of	  view,	  several	  concepts	  –	   such	   as	   brain	   activity,	   comma,	   and	   vegetative	   state	   –	   should	   be	   explained	  from	  a	  medical	  and	  ethical	  prospective.	  As	  it	  is	  well	  known,	  brain	  is	  divided	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  170	   All	   the	   proposals	   –	   except	   proposals	   1432	   and	   2229	   –	   recognize	   the	   patient’s	  incapacity	   as	   the	   only	   requirement	   for	   the	   execution	   of	   ADs.	   This	   policy	   is	   in	  harmony	   with	   the	   ethical	   principle	   of	   patient	   autonomy	   and	   with	   the	   ethical	  definition	  recognized	  by	  the	  majority	  of	  bioethicist.	  While	  proposal	  2229	  establishes	  the	   same	   requirement	   of	   proposal	   2350	   (article	   3,	   section	   1),	   the	   proposal	   1432	  states	   that	   prior	   medical	   instructions	   must	   be	   applied	   only	   in	   case	   of	   irreversible	  incapacity.	  	  171	   Within	   the	   new	   proposals,	   only	   four	   out	   of	   eight	   establish	   an	   internal	   medical	  collegium	   to	   check	   the	   patient’s	   incapacity.	   Proposals	   5	   (article	   10,	   section	   2)	   and	  443	  (article	  14,	  section	  2)	  compose	  this	  team	  with	  three	  physicians:	  the	  neurologist,	  the	   psychiatrist	   and	   with	   a	   physician	   specialized	   in	   the	   patient’s	   pathology.	   The	  proposal	   1142	   (article	   11,	   section	   2)	   also	   includes	   the	   physician	   in	   charge.	   The	  proposal	  2229	  (article	  3,	  section	  5)	  states	  that	  the	  medical	  commission	  is	  composed	  of	   an	   anesthetist,	   a	   neurologist,	   a	   specialist	   of	   the	   pathology	   concerned	   and	   the	  physician	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  patient.	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three	   main	   parts:	   the	   cortex	   (responsible	   for	   our	   human	   intellectual	  existence),	  the	  thalamus	  (regulates	  our	  animal	  existence),	  and	  the	  brain	  steam	  (controls	   our	   vegetative	   functions	   including	   breathing).	   Consciousness	   is	   the	  most	   critical	   moral	   standard	   for	   human	   personhood	   (Cranford	   and	   Smith	  1987);	   it	   follows	   that	   the	  whole	   status	  of	   the	  person	   in	   vegetative	   state	   is	   in	  doubt.	  For	  some	  neurologists	  and	  philosophers,	  that	  give	  a	  high	  importance	  to	  the	   consciousness,	   death	   should	   be	   connected	   with	   the	   idea	   of	   death	   of	   the	  cerebral	  cortex	  (Zullo	  2010).	  However,	  Italy	  –	  like	  the	  other	  western	  countries	  –	  has	  applied	  the	  legal	  definition	  coming	  from	  the	  President’s	  Commission	  for	  the	   Study	   of	   Ethical	   Problems	   in	   Medicine	   and	   Biomedical	   and	   Behavioural	  Research	   of	   1981,	  which	   is	   based	   on	   the	   Havard’s	   study	   of	   1968.	   Therefore,	  the	  person	   is	  dead	  when	   it	  has	  been	  certified	   that	   the	  all	   the	   functions	  of	   the	  encephalon	   are	   irreversible	   (article	   1	   of	   the	   Italian	   law	   no.	   578	   of	   29	  December	  1993).	  Differently	   from	   the	   other	   types	   of	   cells,	   brain	   cells,	   once	   destroyed	  cannot	   be	   replaced.	   When	   a	   person	   suffers	   severe	   brain	   damage,	   he	   or	   she	  could	  end	  up	  in	  a	  state	  of	  coma.	  From	  the	   late	  1950s,	   the	  medical	  community	  generally	   distinguishes	   four	   degrees	   of	   coma:	   coma	   vigile	   (blurring	   of	  consciousness	  and	  intellect),	  coma	  type	  (loss	  of	  relative	  functions),	  coma	  carus	  (loss	   of	   vegetative	   functions),	   and	   coma	   depassé	   (loss	   of	   all	   functions)	  (Mollarei	  and	  Goulon	  1959).	   It	   should	  be	  noted	   that	   the	  degree	  of	  coma	  does	  not	  change	  because	  once	  the	  oxygen	  supply	  is	  restored;	  the	  patient’s	  condition	  is	  static	  (Manson	  and	  Laurie	  2011).	  Regarding	   the	   definition	   of	   vegetative	   state	   –	   except	   problems	  highlighted	   above	   (Sect.	   1.5.1.)	   –	   it	   should	   be	   highlighted	   that	   the	   word	  ‘vegetative’	  fails	  to	  define	  the	  degree	  of	  brain	  damage	  involved.	  Moreover,	  the	  concept	   of	   ‘persistent	   vegetative	   state’	   has	   a	   semantic	   incoherency.	   From	   a	  semantic	   prospective,	   a	   persistent	   state	   is	   a	   state	   that	   persists	   until	   it	   is	  relieved;	   it	   follows	   that	   the	   patient	   does	   not	   have	   a	   possibility	   of	   recovery.	  This	   shows	   the	   medical	   and	   semantic	   contradiction	   because	   while	   from	   a	  semantic	   meaning	   of	   ‘persistent’	   the	   patient	   does	   not	   have	   a	   possibility	   of	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recovery,	   from	   a	   medical	   prospective,	   the	   patient	   in	   a	   persistent	   vegetative	  state	  does	  have	  a	  possibility	  of	  recovery.	  From	  a	   legal	  point	  of	  view,	   this	  section	  has	  had	   three	  major	  criticisms.	  First	   of	   all,	   according	   to	   Italian	  Society	   for	  Anastasia	  Analgesia	  Resuscitation	  and	   Intensive	   Care	   (2011),	   permanent	   unconsciousness	  without	   cortical	   and	  subcortical	   brain	   activity	   is	   not	   a	   matter	   of	   nosology,	   but	   constitutes	   brain	  death	  (Italian	  Society	  for	  Anastasia	  Analgesia	  Resuscitation	  and	  Intensive	  Care	  2011).	   Therefore,	   all	   treatments	   in	   this	   case	   are	   considered	   futile.	   Secondly,	  the	  fact	  that	  ADs	  take	  effect	  only	  in	  case	  of	  permanent	  incapacity	  could	  entail	  problems	  in	  case	  of	  Jehovah	  Witness	  patients	  who	  reject	  blood	  transfusion.	  In	  their	   case,	   incapacity	   is	   not	   permanent,	   but	   temporary.	   Thirdly,	   in	   case	   of	  acceptance	   of	   this	   ‘new’	   legal	   definition,	   the	   commission	   that	   confirms	   the	  patient’s	   incapacity	   must	   be	   include	   a	   coroner	   because	   this	   is	   the	   medical	  branch	  dedicated	  to	  the	  process	  of	  verifying	  the	  causes	  of	  death	  (De	  Luca	  et	  al.	  2012).	  Moreover,	   the	  physician	   in	  charge	  of	   the	  patient	  should	  not	  be	  part	  of	  this	   proceeding	   because	   –	   as	   the	   Guide	   on	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	  
regarding	  medical	   treatment	   in	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   situations	   of	  May	   2014	   (p.	   16)	   has	  stated	   –	   the	   assessment	   of	   the	   patient’s	   incapacity	   should	   be	   assigned	   by	   an	  impartial	  assessor.	  	  If	   the	   Italian	   Legislator	   were	   to	   follow	   the	   German	   model	   –	   where	  advance	   directives	   are	   valid	   independently	   of	   the	   disease’s	   stage	   (article	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1901a,	   section	   3)172	   –	   procedural	   rules	   about	   the	   composition	   of	   the	  medical	  commission	   and	   practical	   problems	   that	   this	   ‘new’	   legal	   definition	   entails	  would	  be	  avoided.	  	  	  	  
2.1.	  	   The	  problem	  of	  withdrawing	  alimentation	  and	  hydration	  through	  
advance	  directives	  The	   Italian	   Bill	   states	   that,	   according	   to	   the	   Convention	   on	   the	   Rights	   of	  Persons	  with	  Disabilities,	   alimentation	  and	  hydration	  must	  be	  provided	  until	  the	  last	  moment	  of	  life,	  except	  in	  cases	  where	  these	  treatments	  do	  not	  benefit	  the	  patient.173	  This	  phrase	  has	  been	  repeated	  in	  the	  proposal	  from	  Ms.	  Roccella	  and	   others	   on	   26	  March	   2014	   (article	   3,	   section	   4).	   The	   problems	   regarding	  the	   withdrawing	   of	   alimentation	   and	   hydration	   through	   ADs	   have	   been	   an	  object	  of	  the	  Italian	  political	  debate.	  Therefore,	  five	  out	  of	  eight	  new	  proposals	  mention	   it	   directly174.	   The	   debate	   regarding	   ANH	   has	   been	   object	   also	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  172	   In	   Germany,	   an	   opposing	   Bill	   proposed	   by	   the	   conservative	   parties,	   limited	   the	  
application	   of	   advance	   directives	   to	   illnesses	   with	   an	   “irreversible	   fatal	   progression”.	  However,	   the	   German	   Legislator	   did	   not	   follow	   this	   version,	   but	   rather	   suggestions	  from	  the	  German	  Bioethical	  Community	  (Neitzke	  2006).	  173	  The	  phrase	  “do	  not	  benefit”	  must	  be	  considered	  in	  medically	  objective	  way.	  This	  is	  why	   Article	   3,	   section	   4	   states	   that	   withdrawing	   artificial	   nutrition	   or	   hydration	  cannot	  “form	  part	  of	  the	  advance	  directive”.	  174	   In	   specific	   proposal	   443	   states	   that	   parental	   alimentation	   and	   hydration	   is	   not	  considered	   as	   futile	   treatment.	   The	   proposal	   1298	   (article	   3,	   section	   1,	   let.	   c))	   and	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Guide	  on	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  regarding	  medical	  treatment	  in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  situations	  of	  May	  2014	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  2.1.3.).	  	   Before	   analyzing	   the	   concept	   of	   ANH	   from	   a	   legal	   perspective,	   these	  norms	   should	   be	   explained	   by	   applying	   medical	   and	   ethical	   approaches.	  Within	   the	   cases	   of	   artificial	   nutrition,	   it	   should	   be	   distinguished	   between	  nasogastric	   feeding	  and	  gastrostomy	   feeding.	  While	   in	   the	   first	   case	   the	   tube	  passes	   through	   the	   nose	   and	   it	   remains	   for	   a	   short	   term,	   in	   case	   of	  gastrostomy,	  the	  tube	  pass	  through	  the	  abdomen.	  This	  difference	  is	  important	  because	   the	   entire	   bioethical	   community	   accepts	   the	   gastrostomy	   feeding	   as	  medical	   treatment,	   but	   some	   doubts	   remain	   regarding	   the	   definition	   of	  nasogastric	   feeding	   as	   such.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   community	   recognizes	   the	  nasogastric	  feeding	  as	  a	  general	  medical	  management	  (Hoppe	  and	  Miola).	  Moreover,	   the	   distinction	   between	   omission	   and	   action	   might	   raise	  some	   ethical	   problems.	   In	   addition	   to	   what	   has	   been	   written	   above	   (Sect.	  2.1.3.),	  in	  Italy,	  the	  National	  Bioethics	  Committee	  has	  underlined	  this	  issue.	  In	  the	  advice	  of	  2008,	  Conscious	  withholding	  or	  withdrawing	  medical	   treatments	  
in	   the	   patient-­‐physician	   relationship,	   the	   NBC,	   instead	   of	   taking	   an	   official	  position,	   highlighted	   the	   division	   among	   its	   members.	   Some	   members	  
	  	  	  	  	  the	  proposal	  2229	  (article	  2,	  section	  1,	  let.	  b)),	  after	  legally	  defying	  the	  notion	  of	  ADs,	  states	   the	   interested	   party	   can	   withdraw	   artificial	   alimentation	   and	   hydration	   or	  alimentation	   and	   hydration	   given	   by	   third	   parties	   through	   ADs.	   The	   proposal	   1432	  establishes	   that	   every	   competent	   person	   can	   withhold	   or	   withdraw,	   even	   artificial	  nutrition,	  through	  ADs	  (article	  1,	  section	  1,	  let.	  f)).	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considered	   –	   from	   an	   ethical	   perspective	   –	   the	   withdrawal	   of	   medical	  treatments	   as	   active	   euthanasia,	   while	   others	   make	   a	   clear	   distinction	  between	   these	   two	   types	   of	  medical	   practice.	   	   The	   fact	   that	   the	  NBC	   has	   not	  taken	  a	  clear	  position	  regarding	  this	   issue	  has	  raised	  doubts	  about	   its	  role	  as	  an	   advisory	   body	   to	   the	   Government:	   twelve	   of	   its	   members	   have	   written	  different	  opinions.	  	  The	   fact	   that	   in	   Italy	   there	   is	   not	   an	   ethical	   consensus	   regarding	   the	  withdrawal	   of	  medical	   treatments	   is	   considered	   very	  problematic.	   In	  USA,	   in	  2008,	  the	  American	  College	  of	  Critical	  Care	  (Truog	  et	  al.	  2008)	  has	  established	  a	   consensual	   statement	   regarding	   the	   withdrawal	   of	   life-­‐sustainment	  treatments.	   These	   three	   principles	   are:	   1)	  Withholding	   and	  withdrawing	   life	  support	  are	  equivalent;	  2)	   there	   is	  a	  distinction	  between	  killing	  and	  allowing	  to	  die;	  and	  3)	   the	  doctrine	  of	   “double	  effect”	   (Sulmasy	  2000,	  Quill	  1997,	  Quill	  	  et	  al.	  1993).	  	   	  It	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   although	   clinicians	   are	   psychologically	   more	  comfortable	  withholding	   treatments	   than	  withdrawing	   them,	   since	   in	   case	   of	  withholding	  there	   is	  a	  passive	  act,	  both	  philosophical	  and	  legal	  analyses	  have	  emphasized	   that	  physicians	   should	  make	  no	  distinction	  between	  withholding	  or	   withdrawing	   medical	   treatments	   (Meisel	   1991).	   The	   medical	   staff	   should	  always	   base	   their	   decisions	   on	   an	   assessment	   of	   its	   benefits	   versus	   burdens	  and	  the	  preferences	  of	  the	  patient:	  it	  follows	  that	  not	  initiating	  or	  stopping	  the	  medical	   treatment	   has	   the	   same	   medical,	   ethical	   and	   legal	   consequences.	  Furthermore,	  sometimes	  the	  value	  of	  a	  treatment	  can	  only	  be	  determined	  after	  a	  trial	  of	   therapy.	   If	   the	  medical	  staff	   is	  reluctant	  to	  withdraw	  therapies,	   they	  might	  make	  a	  premature	  decision	  to	  withhold	  medical	  treatments.	  	  When	   withholding	   or	   withdrawing	   medical	   treatments	   physicians	   are	  not	   killing	   the	   patient,	   they	   are	   allowing	   a	   patient	   to	   not	   be	   treatment	   with	  unwanted	   treatments.	  Barber	  v	  Superior	  Court	   (195	  Cal	  Rptr	  484,	  486)	   is	   the	  first	   reported	   case	   in	   which	   the	   judge	   stated	   that	   withdrawal	   of	   ANH	   is	  allowed,	   and	   physicians	   are	   not	   criminally	   liable	   for	   following	   the	  wishes	   of	  the	  surrogates	  (Geppert	   	  et	  al.	  2011).	  When	  treatments	  have	  been	  withdrawn,	  
	  	  	  	  
	   176	  
care	  must	  continue,	  and	  it	  must	  be	  noted	  that	  while	  before	  it	  was	  thought	  that	  death	   from	   dehydration	   would	   cause	   the	   patient	   unnecessary	   suffering,	   the	  medical	  staff	  has	   testified	   that	  death	  of	  dehydration	   is	  palliative	  (Fine	  2006).	  According	   to	   the	   so-­‐called	   double	   effect	   doctrine,	   there	   exists	   a	   moral	  distinction	  between	   administrating	  doses	   of	  medications	   that	   kill	   the	  patient	  
versus	  giving	  them	  with	  the	  intention	  to	  give	  the	  patient	  a	  good	  quality	  of	  life,	  but	  with	  the	  foreseen	  consequence	  of	  potentially	  shorting	  the	  patient’s	  life.	  	  Continuing	  with	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  Italian	  Bill	  2350,	  article	  3,	  section	  4	  of	  the	  Italian	  Bill	  2350	  has	  received	  a	  lot	  of	  criticism,	  because	  other	  countries	  do	   not	   set	   limits	   to	   the	   object	   of	   advance	   directives.	   There	   are	   three	   main	  criticisms	   of	   this	   section.	   The	   first	   is	   article	   3,	   section	   4	   entails	   an	   incorrect	  interpretation	   of	   article	   25	   of	   the	   Convention	   on	   the	   Rights	   of	   Persons	  with	  Disabilities	  of	  13	  December	  2006	  and	  ratified	  in	  Italy	  by	  Law	  no.	  18	  of	  3	  March	  2009	   (Molaschi	   2012).	   Article	   25	   of	   this	   treaty	   –	   after	   recognizing	   informed	  consent	   by	   people	   with	   disabilities	   in	   paragraph	   d)	   –	   states	   in	   paragraph	   f)	  that	   Parties	   shall	   “prevent	   discriminatory	   denial	   of	   health	   care	   or	   health	  
services	   or	   food	   and	   fluids	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   disability”.	   Article	   25	   of	   this	  Convention	   envisages	   cases	   where	   patients	   with	   disabilities	   ask	   for	   medical	  treatments,	   not	   cases	   when	   patients	   refuse	   them	   through	   instructional	  directives	  written	  when	  they	  were	  of	  sound	  mind.	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   Secondly,	   the	   Italian	  Legislator	  should	  have	  used	  the	  term	   ‘living	  wills’	  and	  not	   the	  general	   concept	  of	  advance	  directives175.	  According	   to	   the	  British	  Medical	  Association,	   it	   is	   the	   living	  will	  –	  not	   the	  broader	  concept	  of	  advance	  directive	  as	  stated	  in	  the	  Italian	  Bill	  –	  that	  is	  the	  formal	  declaration	  written	  by	  a	  competent	  adult	  conveying	  his	  or	  her	  wish	  for	  any	  life-­‐prolonging	  measures	  to	   be	   withheld	   in	   circumstances	   where	   there	   is	   no	   prospect	   of	   recovery	  (British	  Medical	   Association	   1995).	   The	   same	   definition	   has	   been	   applied	   by	  the	  Italian	  National	  Bioethics	  Committee	  (1993).	  	   The	   third	   criticism	   is	   connected	   with	   the	   definition	   of	   nutrition	   and	  hydration.	   From	   a	   clinical	   point	   of	   view,	   nutrition	   and	   hydration	   through	   a	  nasogastric	  tube,	  percutaneous	  endoscopic	  gastrostomy	  (PEG	  feeding)	  or	  total	  parenteral	   nutrition	   is	   not	   considered	   basic	   care,	   because	   the	   methods	   for	  delivering	   them	   are	   “artificial”	   (British	  Medical	   Association	   2007).	   The	   same	  conclusion	   seems	   to	   appear	   also	   in	   the	   Guide	   of	   May	   2014.	   Although	   this	  document	  does	  not	  aim	  to	  take	  an	  official	  position	  regarding	  this	  issue	  and	  its	  goal	  is	  the	  illustration	  of	  the	  public	  debate	  regarding	  the	  limitation	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  care,	   this	  guide	  states	  that	  ANH	  are	  “given	  to	  a	  patient	   following	  a	  medical	  
	  	  	  	  	  175	  All	   the	  proposals	  –	  except	  proposal	  13	  –	  have	  made	  the	  same	  mistake.	   In	  specific	  this	   mistake	   has	   been	   codified	   in:	   proposal	   5	   (article	   1,	   section	   1);	   proposal	   443	  (article	   1,	   section	   1);	   proposal	   1142	   (article	   2,	   section	   1);	   proposal	   1298	   (article	   3,	  section	   1);	   proposal	   1432	   (article	   1,	   section	   1,	   let.	   f));	   proposal	   2229	   (article	   3,	  section	  4);	  and	  proposal	  2264	  (article	  2,	  section	  1).	  Instead,	  proposal	  13	  (article	  18)	  has	   adopted	   the	   phrase	   “personal	   declaration”	   without	   limiting	   them	   in	   written	  declarations.	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indication	   and	   imply	   choices	   concerning	   medical	   procedures	   and	   devices	  (perfusion,	  feeding	  tubes)”	  (Council	  of	  Europe	  2014).	  	   	   	  	   Recently,	   this	   has	   been	   confirmed	   by	   the	   French	   Conseil	   d’État	   in	   its	  ruling	  on	  24	   June	  2014	  and	   from	  the	   last	  ruling	  of	   the	  ECtHR	  of	  5	   June	  2015.	  Nevertheless,	   it	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   although	   the	   patient	   is	   in	   a	   minimally	  conscious	   state	   or	   in	   vegetative	   state	   –	  which	  means	   that	   the	   patient	   cannot	  exercise	  his	  own	  autonomy	  directly	  –	   it	  does	  not	   justify	  by	   itself	   that	  doctors	  should	  withdraw	  artificial	  nutrition	  and	  hydration.	  Physicians	  must	   take	   into	  consideration	   not	   only	   medical	   criteria,	   but	   also	   (and	   mainly)	   the	   patient’s	  previous	   wishes	   and	   preferences.	   In	   case	   that	   there	   is	   no	   ‘living	   will’,	   the	  surrogate	   (and	   the	   patient’s	   family	   and	   relatives)	   should	   be	   involved.	   Only	  where	   the	  patient’s	  ADs	   are	  unknown,	   the	  principle	   in	  dubio	  pro	   vida	   should	  be	  applied.	  	  	  	   The	   classification	   of	   medical	   nutrition	   and	   hydration	   is	   really	  important,	  because	   if	   it	   is	  qualified	  as	  basic	  care,	  physicians	  will	  be	   liable	   for	  homicide	   (article	   575	  P.C.)	   or	   homicide	   by	   request	   of	   the	   victim	   (article	   579	  P.C.).	   The	   Oleari	   Commission,	   formed	   by	   the	   Minister	   of	   Health	   in	   the	   year	  2000,	   stated	   that	   artificial	   nutrition	   and	   hydration	   constitutes	   medical	  treatment.	   Also,	   the	   Italian	   Court	   of	   Cassation	   –	   although	   without	   thorough	  consideration	   –	   stated	   that	   “artificial	   nutrition	   and	   hydration	   through	  nasogastric	  tube	  constitutes	  medical	  treatment”	  (C.	  Cass.	  16	  October	  2007,	  no.	  21748)	   (e.g.	   see	   Sect.	   1.5.1.).	   The	   same	   legal	   reasoning	   has	   been	   adopted	   by	  the	   Italian	   Council	   of	   State	   in	   its	   ruling	   of	   2	   September	   2014,	   no.	   4460	   (par.	  36.2).	  These	  rulings	  are	  based	  on	  the	   international	  background	  of	   the	  case	  of	  Cruzan	   (Cruzan	   v	  Harmon,	  Missouri	   Supreme	  Court,	   760	   SW2d	   408,1988)	   in	  the	  USA	  and	  of	  Bland	  in	  the	  UK	  (Airedale	  NHS	  Trust	  v.	  Brand	  [1993]	  AC	  789).	  	   Even	   from	   a	   medical	   perspective,	   artificial	   nutrition	   and	   hydration	  (ANH)	   is	  considered	  as	  medical	   treatment	  that	  patients	  can	  refuse	  (American	  Dietetic	   Association	   2008,	   Italian	   Society	   of	   Parenteral	   and	   enteral	   nutrition	  2007,	  and	  A.S.P.E.N.	  Board	  of	  directors	  2002).	  The	  same	  result	  was	  given	  by	  an	  empirical	   study	   conducted	   in	   2009–2011	   in	   the	   regions	   of	   Veneto	   and	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Trentino	   Alto-­‐Adige,	   where	   only	   25%	   of	   hospital	   staff	   considered	   artificial	  nutrition	   and	   hydration	   to	   be	   basic	   care	   (Iasevoli	   2013).	   To	   support	   this	  position,	  several	  reasons	  can	  be	  given.	  First	  of	  all,	  generally,	  through	  the	  tube	  that	   transports	   water	   and	   food,	   drugs	   are	   mixed	   too.	   Second,	   a	   medical	  prescription	  is	  required.	  Third,	   for	  applying	  ANH,	  an	  invasive	  technique	  must	  be	   used.	   Fourth,	   a	   medical	   specialization	   regarding	   the	   combination	   of	  different	  types	  of	  drugs	  is	  needed	  (SIAARTI	  2009).	  	   On	   the	   other	   hand	   the	   National	   Bioethics	   Committee	   (2005)	   in	  
Alimentation	   and	   the	   nutrition	   and	   hydration	   for	   patients	   in	   a	   persistent	  
vegetative	  state	  argues	  that	  ANH	  is	  considered	  basic	  care,	   implying	  that	  cases	  of	  its	  withdrawal	  are	  punishable	  as	  active	  euthanasia.	  176	  	  The	  same	  conclusion	  has	   been	   shared	   by	   the	   majority	   of	   its	   members	   in	   Advance	   Directives	  published	   in	   2003.	   Moreover,	   the	   same	   conclusion	   was	   reached	   by	   the	  Commission	   established	   by	   the	   Ministerial	   Decree	   of	   12	   September	   2005,	  which	  compared	  ANH	  with	  personal	  hygiene.	  From	  the	  legal	  perspective,	  article	  3,	  section	  4	  of	  the	  Italian	  Bill	  2350	  is	  not	  in	  harmony	  with	  articles	  3	  and	  13	  of	  the	  Italian	  Constitution	  and	  with	  the	  interpretation	   of	   article	   32	   given	   by	   the	   Italian	   Constitutional	   Court.	   This	  section	  violates	   the	   fundamental	  principle	  of	  equity	  –	  established	   in	  article	  3	  of	   the	   Italian	   constitution	   –	   because	   it	   makes	   a	   distinction	   between	   capable	  	  	  	  	  	  176	  This	  document	  has	  received	  much	  criticism,	  and	  thirteen	  members	  (out	  of	  thirty-­‐five	   in	   total)	   have	   published	   a	   dissenting	   statement	   in	  which	   artificial	   alimentation	  and	  hydration	  were	  considered	  as	  medical	  treatment.	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and	  incapable	  patients	  by	  allowing	  the	  right	  to	  refuse	  medical	  treatment	  only	  to	   the	   first	  group	  (Amato	  2010).	  This	  means	  that	  adults	   lacking	  capacity	  may	  not	  be	  considered	  a	  person	  and	  all	  previous	  wishes	  may	  lose	  validity.	  	  Further,	  article	  13	  of	  the	  Italian	  Constitution	  protects	  personal	  freedom	  in	   general,	   which	   is	   broader	   than	   the	   right	   to	   physical	   health	   established	   in	  article	  32,	   section	  1	  of	   the	   Italian	  Constitution	   (C.	  Cass.	  9	  February	  2010,	  no.	  2847;	   C.	   Cass.	   15	   September	   2008,	   no.	   23676).	   So,	   even	   if	   ANH	   could	   be	  considered	   basic	   care,	   the	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination,	   which	   pervades	   the	  Italian	   Constitution,	   should	   always	   prevail	   (Maltese	   2009),	   because	   medical	  treatment	   has	   to	   protect	   not	   only	   the	   patient’s	   health	   but	   also	   his	   or	   her	  dignity	  (C.	  Cost.	  19	  June	  2002,	  no.	  282).	  Furthermore,	   it	   should	   be	   highlighted	   that	   this	   section	   is	   in	  contradiction	   with	   the	   opinion	   of	   several	   scholars	   and	   with	   a	   part	   of	   the	  Italian	   jurisprudence,	   which	   consider	   patient	   autonomy	   to	   be	   fundamental.	  The	  majority	  of	   Italian	  scholars	   think	   that	   the	   Italian	   legal	   system	  recognizes	  an	  unconditional	  right	  to	  refuse	  medical	  treatment	  (Giunta	  1997,	  and	  Barni	  et	  al.	  1986).	   In	  addition,	  as	  mentioned	  above,	  a	  part	  of	   the	  Italian	   jurisprudence	  states	   the	  priority	  of	   the	   individual	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination	  over	   the	   right	  to	  health	  (C.	  Cass.	  30	  September	  2008,	  no.	  37077;	  C.	  Cass.	  23	  January	  2008,	  no.	  16375;	  C.	  Cass.	  16	  January	  2008,	  no.	  11335;	  C.	  Cass.	  29	  May	  2002,	  no.	  26446;	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C.	  Cass.	  4	  July	  2005,	  no.	  38852),177	  even	  if	  this	  decision	  can	  expose	  the	  patient	  to	   risk	   of	   death	   (C.	   Cass.	   9	   February	   2010,	   no.	   2847;	   C.	   Cass.	   15	   September	  2008,	  no.	  23676).	  Thus	  it	  must	  be	  underlined	  that	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  withdrawal	  is	  not	   to	   put	   an	   end	   to	   life,	   but	   to	   discontinue	   a	   form	   of	   treatment	   which	  was	  refused	   by	   the	   patient	   directly	   –	   through	   the	   ‘living	   will’	   –	   or	   indirectly	   –	  through	  the	  application	  of	  the	  substitute	  judgment	  theory.	  If	   one	   wishes	   to	   avoid	   this	   classification,	   there	   are	   at	   least	   four	  solutions:	  the	  first	  is	  the	  approach	  taken	  in	  the	  Netherlands,	  the	  second	  is	  that	  of	   the	  MCA	   in	  England	   and	  Wales,	   the	   third	   is	   that	   of	   the	   new	  French	   law	  of	  March	  2015,	  and	  the	  fourth	  is	  suggested	  by	  bioethicists.	  	  	  In	   the	   Netherlands,	   feeding	   a	   patient	   through	   a	   tube	   is	   considered	   a	  medical	  act,	  which	  can	  be	  halted	  on	  the	  ground	  of	   its	   ‘senseless’	  nature	  (Kelk	  2005).	   The	   classification	   of	   ANH	   as	   a	   senseless	   medical	   act	   under	   certain	  conditions	   avoids	   the	   ambiguous	   legal	   consequences	   that	   come	   from	   its	  classification	   as	   basic	   care	   or	   medical	   treatment.	   Thus,	   there	   is	   no	   need	   for	  legal	   qualification,	   and	   medical	   consideration,	   based	   on	   current	   medical	  ethical	  standards,	  becomes	  crucial.	  	  The	   MCA	   gives	   the	   agent	   the	   possibility	   to	   include	   in	   his	   or	   her	  treatment	   directives	   the	   refusal	   of	   ANH,	   but	   not	   the	   refusal	   of	   natural	  	  	  	  	  	  177	   However,	   there	   are	   several	   Court’s	   rulings	   that	   argue	   that	   the	   right	   to	   physical	  and	  physiological	  health	  does	  not	  find	  any	  limits	  (C.	  Cass.	  27	  March	  2001,	  no.	  36519;	  C.	  Cass.	  9	  March	  2001,	  no.	  28132).	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nutrition	   and	   hydration.	   Therefore,	  medical	   nutrition	   and	   hydration	   –	  which	  are	  given	  to	  the	  patient	  through	  an	  artificial	  tube178	  –	  can	  be	  refused.	  	  The	   third	   solution	  –	   established	   in	   the	  new	  French	   law	  of	  March	  2015	  (article	  1110-­‐5-­‐1	  CSP)	  –	   states	  directly	   that	  artificial	  nutrition	  and	  hydration	  is	  a	  treatment.	  This	  rule	  codifies	  the	  ruling	  of	  the	  Conseil	  d’État	   	  of	  June	  2014,	  which	   distinguished	   between	   the	   intentionally	   taking	   of	   life	   (PAS	   and	  euthanasia)	   and	   therapeutic	   abstention	   (withdrawing	   of	  medical	   treatment).	  This	  ruling	  is	  based	  on	  the	  lexical	  interpretation	  of	  the	  law	  no.	  2005-­‐370	  of	  22	  April	  2005	  Loi	   relative	  aux	  droits	  des	  malades	   et	  à	   la	   fin	  de	  vie	   (e.g.,	   see	  Sect.	  2.1.2.1.).179	  Therefore,	  in	  case	  of	  withdrawing,	  this	  is	  not	  a	  criminal	  offence	  and	  the	   patient	   should	   receive	   palliative	   care.	   There	   exists	   a	   difference	   between	  care	  and	  treatment	  (e.g.,	  Sect.	  2.1.3.).	  Although	  the	  patient	  can	  refuse	  medical	  treatment,	  care	  should	  continue	  since	   the	  aim	  of	  care	   is	   that	   to	  alleviate	  pain	  and	   to	  make	   the	   patient	   feel	   comfortable,	   also	   in	   the	   last	   stage	   of	   his	   or	   her	  life.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  178“Artificial	   nutrition	   and	   hydration	   refers	   specifically	   to	   those	   techniques	   for	  providing	  nutrition	  and	  hydration	  that	  are	  used	  to	  overcome	  an	  inability	  to	  swallow.	  It	  includes	  the	  use	  of	  a	  nasogastric	  tube,	  percutaneous	  endoscopic	  gastrostomy	  (PEG	  feeding)	  and	  total	  parenteral	  nutrition”	  (British	  Medical	  Association,	  2007)	  179	  The	   law	  no.	  2005-­‐370	  of	  22	  April	  2005	  Loi	  relative	  aux	  droits	  des	  malades	  et	  à	   la	  
fin	  de	  vie	   	  has	  modified	   the	  previous	   law	  no.	  2002-­‐303	  of	  4	  march	  2002	  Loi	   relative	  
aux	  droits	  des	  malades	  et	  à	  la	  qualité	  du	  système	  de	  santé.	  The	  former	  law	  stated	  that	  patients	  have	  the	  right	  to	  refuse	   ‘‘a’’	   treatment	  without	  identifying	  what	  would	  have	  happen	  if	   the	  treatment	  was	  considered	  as	  a	   life-­‐sustaining	  treatments	  at	  the	  end	  of	  life.	  The	  law	  of	  2005	  allows	  for	  the	  refusal	  of	  “every”	  kind	  of	  treatment.	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The	   fourth	   solution	   –	   given	   by	   various	   bioethicists,	   such	   as	   Brock	   –	   is	  that	  physicians	   should	  not	   focus	  on	   the	  abstract	  quality	  of	   artificial	  nutrition	  and	  hydration,	   but	   rather	   answer	   the	  question	   to	  what	   extent	   this	   treatment	  benefits	  a	  specific	  patient	  in	  a	  specific	  condition	  (Brock	  2009).	  	  	  	  
3.	  	   The	  Italian	  Bill	  on	  advance	  directives:	  their	  form	  and	  content	  Article	  4	  of	   Italian	  Bill	  2350	  details	   the	   formalities	   that	  ADs	  must	   contain.	   In	  this	  article	  the	  importance	  of	  complete	  medical	  and	  clinical	  information	  is	  re-­‐emphasized.	   This	   differs	   from	   the	   German	   model,	   where	   citizens	   can	   write	  living	  wills	  even	  without	  preventive	  medical	  information	  (article	  1901a	  BGB).	  The	  Italian	  Bill	  limits	  the	  validity	  of	  ADs	  to	  written	  documents180,	  which	  will	   be	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   the	   patient’s	  medical	   record181.	   This	   is	   in	   contrast	  
	  	  	  	  	  180	   All	   the	   proposals	   –	   except	   proposal	   13	   –	   have	   established	   the	   same	  principle.	   In	  specific	   this	  mistake	  has	  been	  codified	   in:	  proposal	  5	  (article	  1,	  section	  1);	  proposal	  443	  (article	  1,	  section	  1);	  proposal	  1142	  (article	  2,	  section	  1);	  proposal	  1298	  (article	  3,	   section	   1);	   proposal	   1432	   (article	   1,	   section	   1,	   let.	   f));	   proposal	   2229	   (article	   3,	  section	  4);	  and	  proposal	  2264	  (article	  2,	  section	  1).	  Instead,	  proposal	  13	  (article	  18)	  has	   adopted	   the	   phrase	   “personal	   declaration”	   without	   limiting	   them	   in	   written	  declarations.	  In	  addition,	  the	  proposal	  2229	  –	  as	  the	  proposal	  2350	  –	  recognizes	  the	  need	  that	  physician	  must	  sign	  the	  document;	  the	  proposal	  443	  states	  that	  ADs	  can	  be	  written	  only	   in	   front	  of	  a	  Noter	  and	  a	  physician	   (article	  13,	   section	  1);	   the	  proposal	  1298	  emphasizes	  the	  importance	  of	  two	  witnesses	  (article	  3,	  section	  7);	  the	  proposal	  2264	  (article	  2,	  section	  2)	  establishes	  that	  these	  documents	  must	  be	  written	  in	  front	  of	  the	  Municipality	  that	  the	  citizen	  has	  his/her	  own	  residence.	  The	  proposal	  13	  states	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with	   the	   ethical	   principle	   of	   autonomy,	  which	   demands	   that	   expressed	   prior	  choices	  of	  the	  patient	  should	  be	  respected	  whether	  they	  are	  stated	  verbally	  or	  in	  writing,	  in	  an	  official	  legal	  document	  or	  informally.	  The	   Italian	   Parliament	   did	   not	   follow	   the	   French	   or	   German	   models,	  where	   ADs,	   under	   certain	   conditions,	   are	   valid	   also	   in	   oral	   form.	   In	   France,	  oral	  advance	  directives	  are	  valid	  in	  two	  cases	  (article	  1111-­‐17	  CSP).	  The	  first	  case	  –	  which	   takes	   into	   consideration	  people	  who	  are	   incapable	   to	  write	  –	   is	  when	   the	   oral	   statement	   is	   transcribed	   by	   two	   witnesses,	   who	  must	   sign	   it.	  The	   second	   case	   is	   that	   of	   an	   oral	  medical	   declaration	   given	   to	   the	  doctor	   in	  charge,	  who	  must	   record	   it	   into	   the	  patient’s	   case	  history.	   It	   should	  be	  noted	  that	   within	   all	   the	   new	   proposals,	   only	   proposal	   13	   has	   adopted	   the	   same	  policy	  (article	  23,	  section	  1,	  let.	  d)).	  However,	   in	   Germany,	   oral	   declarations	   are	   legally	   binding:	   they	   are	  considered	  as	  treatment	  wishes	  (Behandlungswünsche)	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  specific	  oral	   declaration	   that	   matches	   the	   patient’s	   actual	   medical	   situation,	   or	   as	   a	  presumed	   wish	   (mutmaßlicher	   Wille)	   in	   case	   of	   general	   statements	   (article	  1901b,	  section	  2	  BGB)	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  2.5.1.).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  that	  oral	  declarations	  received	  by	  the	  physician	  or	  clearly	  documented	  through	  video	  registration	  are	  valid	  (article	  23,	  section	  1,	  let.	  d)).	  181	   All	   the	   proposals	   –	   except	   proposal	   443	   and	   1432	   –	   have	   established	   the	   same	  principle.	   In	  specific	   this	  mistake	  has	  been	  codified	   in:	  proposal	  5	   (article	  3,	   section	  2);	  proposal	  13	  (article	  16,	  section	  1);	  proposal	  1142	  (article	  4,	  section	  2);	  proposal	  1298	   (article	   3,	   section	   2);	   proposal	   2229	   (article	   4,	   section	   5);	   and	   proposal	   2264	  (article	  2,	  section	  3).	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The	  insistence	  on	  written	  form	  is	  exceptional	  in	  the	  Italian	  legal	  system	  because,	   as	   recognized	   from	   jurisprudence	   (C.	   Cass.	   27	   January	   2010,	   no.	  1713;	   C.	   Cass.	   1	   April	   2008,	   no.	   8449;	   C.	   Cass.	   2	   May	   2007,	   no.	   10121),	   the	  legal	   system	   is	   based	   on	   liberty	   of	   forms.	   It	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   this	  expectation	  has	  been	  justified	  in	  three	  main	  ways.	  	  First	   of	   all,	   the	   law	   that	   introduced	   the	   notion	   of	   support	   guardian	  (amministratore	   di	   sostegno	   –	   Law	   no.	   6	   of	   9	   January	   2004)182	   requires	   a	  written	   and	   notarized	   document	   in	   the	   case	   of	   personal	   designation183	   of	   a	  guardian.	   Since	   both	   these	   legal	   institutes	   (surrogate	   and	   support	   guardian)	  are	   legal	   proxies	   who	   have	   the	   power	   to	   decide	   in	   case	   of	   patient’s	  unconsciousness,	  it	  derives	  that	  also	  in	  case	  of	  nomination	  of	  a	  surrogate,	  the	  written	   form	   is	   demanded.	   Moreover,	   the	   written	   form	   requires	   a	   higher	  evaluation	  compared	  to	  oral	  declarations,	   it	  gives	  more	   legal	  certainty,	  and	   it	  avoids	   trials	   to	   establish	   the	   patient’s	   wishes.	   Furthermore,	   ADs	   are	  considered	  as	  unilateral	  acts	   that	  produce	  a	   legal	  effect	   in	   the	  non-­‐pecuniary	  
	  	  	  	  	  182	  The	  interpretation	  of	  this	  law	  by	  the	  Italian	  jurisprudence	  will	  be	  examined	  in	  the	  next	  chapter	  of	  this	  thesis.	  183	   There	   is	   a	   difference	   between	   designation	   and	   nomination	   of	   the	   support	  guardian.	   Italian	   jurisprudence	   agrees	   unanimously	   that	   Italian	   citizens	   have	   the	  right	   to	   designate	   their	   care	   guardian	   within	   the	   formalities	   established	   in	   article	  408	  C.C.	  But,	  according	   to	   the	  current	  position	  of	   the	  Court	  of	  Cassation,	   citizens	  do	  not	  have	  the	  right	  to	  nominate	  their	  guardian	  when	  they	  are	  still	  fully	  competent	  (20	  December	  2012,	  no.	  23707)	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  3.4.).	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sphere	   and	   the	   Italian	   system	  has	   always	   established	   to	   them	   the	  writing	  ad	  
substantiam	  –	  the	  contract	  must	  be	  in	  a	  written	  form;	  otherwise	  is	  invalid184.	  	  In	  article	  4,	  section	  2	  the	  Chamber	  of	  Deputies	  has	  added,	  compared	  to	  the	  first	  draft	  approved	  by	  the	  Senate	  in	  2009,	  that	  any	  statements	  of	  intent	  or	  desire	   expressed	   by	   the	   individual	   not	   conforming	   to	   the	   forms	   and	   usages	  established	   by	   this	   law	   have	   no	   value	   and	   cannot	   be	   used	   in	   order	   to	  reconstruct	  patients’	  wishes.	  This	  has	  been	  considered	  as	  a	  political	   reaction	  to	  the	  case-­‐law	  of	  Englaro.	  The	  Italian	  choice	  contrasts	  with	  the	  French	  and	  German	  models,	  where	  agents	   can	   modify	   or	   revoke	   their	   decision	   at	   any	   time	   without	   special	  formalities.	   Specifically,	   in	   France,	   the	  modification	   or	   revocation	   of	   advance	  directives	  can	  be	  made	  even	  by	  simple	  unequivocal	  behaviors	  (article	  1111-­‐18	  CSP).	   Similarly,	   the	   German	   law	   of	   29	   July	   2009	   states	   that	   ADs	   can	   be	  modified	   and	   revoked	   “informally	   at	   any	   time”185	   (article	   1901a,	   section	   1	  BGB).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  184	  Examples	  of	   this	  principle	  are	   the	   recognition	  of	  a	  natural	   child	   (article	  254	  CC),	  its	  legitimacy	  (article	  285	  Civil	  Code),	  and	  the	  choice	  of	  guardian	  (article	  348	  CC).	  185	  The	  revocation	  of	  a	  written	  living	  will	  “at	  any	  time	  without	  formalities”	  has	  always	  been	   recognized	   for	   competent	   patients.	   However,	   it	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   the	  German	   legal	   system	   is	   influenced	   by	   the	   Hegelian	   concept	   of	   “natural	   will”	   which	  means	   that	   any	   expression	   of	   will	   on	   the	   part	   of	   a	   person	   who	   is	   not	   fully	   legally	  competent	  should	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration.	  Furthermore,	  the	  Law	  of	  18	  February	  2013	   (Gesetz	   zur	   Regelung	   der	   betreuungsrechtlichen	   Einwilligung	   in	   eine	   ärztliche	  
Zwangsmaßnahme)	  modifies	   article	   1906	   BGB	   by	   valuing	   “natural	  will”	   even	   in	   the	  case	  of	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  decision-­‐making.	  According	  to	  this	  article,	  even	  if	  the	  patient	  is	  not	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As	   in	   Austria	   (article	   7,	   section	   1,	   law	   of	   8	   May	   2006)186,	   in	   Portugal	  (article	  7,	  section	  1	  law	  of	  16	  July	  2012),	  and	  in	  the	  old	  version	  of	  the	  French	  law	   (article	   1111-­‐11	   CSP)187,	   the	   Italian	   Bill	   limits	   the	   validity	   of	   ADs.	   The	  Italian	   legislator	   extends	   it	   to	  5	   years.	  The	  policy	  has	  been	   justified	  with	   the	  opportunity	  to	  have	  make	  “living	  wills”	  as	  unambiguous	  as	  possible.	  As	  it	  was	  emphasized	  by	  the	  NBC	  (2003,	  p.	  6),	  the	  ambiguity	  of	  ADs	  is	  a	  result	  of	  a	  “the	  	  	  	  	  	  legally	   fully	   competent,	   he	   can	   still	   give	   his/her	   opinion	   regarding	   medical	  treatments	  by	  opposing	   forced	   treatment	  agreed	  between	  a	  guardian	   (or	  surrogate)	  and	   physician	   in	   charge	   of	   the	   patient;	   however,	   this	   article	   does	   not	   state	   how	   an	  incompetent	  patient’s	  opinion	  can	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  when	  his/her	  surrogate	  and	  physicians	   agree	   to	   withhold	   treatment.	   Thus,	   due	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   Law	   of	   18	  February	  2013	  codifies	  the	  Hegelian	  principle	  of	  “natural	  will”	  in	  ADs,	  the	  phrase	  “at	  any	   time	   without	   formalities”	   could	   be	   interpreted	   in	   a	   broader	   way	   –	   probably	  through	   a	   non-­‐originalistic	   interpretation	   –	   by	   giving	   to	   citizens	   who	   are	   not	   fully	  legally	   competent	   (e.g.,	   patient	   with	   dementia	   who	   remain	   alert,	   involved	   in	   their	  situation	   and	   able	   to	   interact	   with	   their	   environment;	   but	   especially	   in	   cases	   of	   a	  patient	   with	   severe	   dementia	   where	   the	   patient’s	   competency	   is	   in	   serious	   doubt)	  the	   possibility	   to	   change	   their	   written	   living	   wills	   through	   oral	   declarations.	  However,	   these	   declarations	   should	   be	   clear	   and	   repeated	   continuously	   by	   the	  incompetent	  patient,	   and	   judges	   should	  have	   good	   reason	   (such	   as	  patient’s	   benefit	  or	  wellbeing	   and/or	   advance	   in	  medical	   discoveries)	   to	   disagree	  with	   the	   guardian	  (or	  surrogate)	  agreement	  with	  their	  physician	  and	  the	  patient’s	  written	  living	  will.	  186	   In	  Austria	  ADs	   could	  be	   legally-­‐binding	  or	   not.	   In	   case	   of	   legally	   binding	  AD,	   the	  interested	   party	   must	   receive	   complete	   medical	   information	   by	   the	   physician	   and	  legal	   information	   by	   the	  Noter.	   In	   addition,	   this	   document	   is	   valid	   for	   five	   years;	   if	  not	   renew	   with	   the	   same	   formalities,	   it	   will	   have	   only	   an	   advisory	   power.	   This	  document	  may	  be	  registered	  in	  the	  Austrian	  Chamber	  of	  Nataries.	  	  187The	   old	   version	   of	   the	   French	   law	   established	   that	   advance	   directives	   have	   a	  validity	  of	  3	  years.	  Nevertheless,	  they	  could	  be	  renewed	  by	  a	  simple	  signature	  of	  the	  existing	  document	   (article	  1111-­‐18	  Code	  de	   la	   Santé	  Publique).	  On	   the	   contrary,	   the	  new	  version	  of	   the	  French	  Law	  of	  2015	  does	  not	  establish	  any	   time-­‐limited	  of	   these	  documents.	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distance,	   psychological	   and	   temporal,	   from	   the	   condition	   that	   AD	   has	   been	  
written	   to	   the	   concrete	   medical	   condition	   that	   it	   should	   be	   executed.”	   	   This	  decision	   is	   in	   harmony	   with	   the	   idea	   of	   some	   scholars	   who	   consider	   the	  renewal	   of	   ADs	   to	   be	   crucial.	   According	   to	   them,	   for	   a	   patient	   who	   has	  undergone	  a	  cure,	   this	   review	  should	  occur	  every	  1–5	  years	   (Erin	  and	  Harris	  1994).	  In	  addition,	  the	  periodic	  renewal	  of	  directives	  make	  it	  possible	  to	  keep	  up	   with	   the	   situation	   encountered.	   The	   Italian	   bill	   requires	   the	   renewed	  document	   to	   be	   completed	   with	   the	   same	   formalities	   as	   the	   original.	   This	  policy	  has	  been	  repeated	  identically	  in	  the	  new	  proposal	  2229	  of	  March	  2014.	  	  It	  seems	  that	  the	  Italian	  Legislator	  has	  adopted	  the	  philosophy	  of	  Derek	  Parfit	  (1994),	  who	  believes	  that	  personal	  identity	  is	  not	  continuous	  over	  time	  and	  place.	  This	  is	  in	  contrast	  with	  the	  Dworkin’s	  theory	  (1986),	  which	  rejects	  the	   idea	   of	   loss	   of	   personal	   identity;	   his	   theory	   has	   been	   adopted	   in	   other	  European	  countries	  that	  do	  not	  limit	  the	  validity	  of	  ADs	  in	  time.	  To	   avoid	   problems	   that	   could	   arise	   from	   the	   long	   time	   that	   can	   pass	  between	  the	  formulation	  of	  ADs	  and	  their	  execution,	  two	  suggestions	  could	  be	  made.	  The	  first	  comes	  directly	  from	  the	  interpretation	  of	  paragraph	  62	  of	  the	  Explanatory	   Report	   on	   the	   Convention	   on	  Human	  Rights	   and	   Biomedicine	   of	  April	   1997188;	   according	   to	   it,	   ADs	   are	   valid	   until	   the	   moment	   there	   is	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  188	   The	   same	   policy	   has	   been	   repeated	   in	   the	   Explanatory	   Report	   on	   the	  Recommendation	  CM/Rec	  (2009)	  11	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  (par.	  180).	  In	  addition	  this	   has	   been	   applied	   in	   England	   and	   Wales	   (article	   25,	   section	   4	   let	   c))	   and	   in	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medical	  discovery	  or	  a	  change	  in	  the	  patient’s	  pathology	  that	  if	  the	  patient	  had	  known	   them,	   would	   have	   changed	   his	   or	   her	   medical	   instructions189.	   The	  second	   solution	   comes	   from	   the	   German	   model,	   where	   Parliament	   has	  resolved	  the	  uncertainty	  of	  personality	  changes	  entailed	  by	  the	  absence	  of	  this	  temporal	  limitation	  by	  giving	  broader	  powers	  to	  the	  surrogate	  (article	  1901a,	  section	   1	   BGB),	   who	   must	   verify	   whether	   instructions	   given	   in	   a	   living	   will	  adequately	  address	   the	  actual	  medical	   situation.	   It	   seems	   that	   this	  policy	  has	  been	   also	   implemented	   by	   the	   new	   French	   policy	   of	   March	   2015	   in	   article	  1111-­‐6,	  section	  2	  CSP.	  Article	   4,	   section	   6	   states	   that	   in	   case	   of	   urgency	   or	   when	   the	   risk	   of	  death	   exists,	   ADs	   are	   not	   applicable.	   No	   other	  Western	   European	   legislation	  has	   so	   limited	   personal	   autonomy.	   This	   section	   is	   not	   only	   in	   contrast	   with	  articles	  3,	  13	  and	  section	  2	  of	  article	  32	  of	  the	  Italian	  Constitution	  (see	  above),	  but	   also	   limits	   the	   application	   of	   this	   law	   in	   cases	   of	   patients	   with	   terminal	  illness	  to	  the	  period	  before	  they	  face	  the	  risk	  of	  death.	  This	  section	  makes	  an	  unethical	   distinction	   between	   adults	   lacking	   capacity	   and	   other	   patients.	  Furthermore,	   the	   legal	   reason	   that	   ADs	   written	   with	   all	   the	   formalities	  established	  in	  this	  bill	  are	  not	  valid	  in	  case	  of	  emergency	  is	  not	  understood.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Austria	   (article	   10,	   section	   1,	   nr.	   1	   of	   8	   May	   2006,	   Patientenverfügungs-­‐Gesetz	   –	  
PatVG),	  189	   This	   seems	   to	   be	   the	  policy	   adopted	  by	   the	  majority	   of	   the	  proposals	   13	   (article	  21,	  section	  1),	  1432	  	  (article	  1,	  section	  1,	  let.	  h)),	  1298	  (article	  3,	  section	  2),	  and	  2264	  (article	  2,	  section	  4).	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Therefore,	  some	  scholars	  have	  considered	  this	  Bill	  ‘useless’	  (Neri	  2010)	  or	   ‘poorly	   reasoned’	   (Guarnieri	   2009)	   because	   the	   Italian	   Code	   of	   Medical	  Ethics	   prohibits	   futile	   treatment,	   and	   this	   bill	   states	   that	   ANH	   cannot	   be	   the	  object	   of	  ADs	   and	   that	  ADs	   cannot	  be	   applied	  when	  a	  patient’s	   life	   is	   at	   risk.	  Hence,	  it	  makes	  no	  sense	  to	  legislate	  on	  ADs	  because	  there	  is	  so	  little	  scope	  to	  apply	  them	  to	  concrete	  medical	  situations.	  	  In	   conclusion,	   the	   Italian	   Parliament	   should	   not	   establish	   such	   a	   rigid	  form	   of	   ADs.	   Oral	   medical	   declarations	   made	   under	   certain	   circumstances	  could	   be	   considered	   valid.	   Furthermore,	   ADs	   should	   not	   be	   time-­‐limited:	  problems	   derived	   from	   the	   long	   time	   that	   could	   pass	   between	   their	  formulation	   and	   the	   time	   they	   carry	   out	   could	   be	   resolved	   by	   taking	   into	  consideration	   the	   model	   established	   by	   the	   Explanatory	   Report	   of	   the	  Convention	  of	  Oviedo	  or	  by	  giving	  an	  extensive	  power	  to	  the	  surrogate.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  an	  ad	  hoc	  law	  ruling	  ADs,	  the	  Italian	  medical	  community	  should	   establish	   clear	   guidelines	   in	   line	   with	   this	   law.	   In	   the	   international	  debate,	   the	   most	   recent	   guidelines	   are	   the	   “Care	   of	   the	   Dying	   Adult”	   in	   UK,	  which	  will	   be	   published	   in	   December	   2015.	   The	   draft	   of	   it,	   published	   at	   the	  end	  of	  July	  2015,	  is	  composed	  of	  67	  points.	  This	  document	  has	  applied	  a	  clear	  normative	   approach	   and	   has	   been	   well-­‐accepted	   by	   the	   medical	   and	   legal	  communities.	   The	   aim	   of	   it	   is	   to	   modify	   the	   Liverpool	   Care	   Pathway.	   These	  guidelines	   have	   underlined	   the	   interdisciplinary	   approach	   in	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   and	  the	   communication	   between	   the	   medical	   staff,	   the	   patient,	   and	   the	   patient’s	  family	  and	  relatives.	  	  	  	  	  	  
4.	  	   The	  appointment	  of	  a	  surrogate	  in	  Italy:	  legal	  comparison	  with	  the	  
Mental	  Capacity	  Act	  of	  2005	  In	  accordance	  with	  article	  6	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Biomedicine	   and	   principle	   4	   of	   Recommendation	   CM/Rec	   (2009)	   11	   of	   the	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Council	   of	   Europe,	   article	   6	   of	   Italian	   bill	   no.	   2350	   recognizes	   the	   possibility	  for	   a	   fully	   competent	   person	   to	   nominate	   a	   surrogate.	   The	   nomination	   of	   a	  surrogate	  highlights	  the	  relational	  approach	  of	  autonomy	  (e.g.,	  see	  Sect.	  1.2.).	  While	   the	   individualist	   model	   will	   consider	   as	   non-­‐autonomous	   the	   person	  who	   relies	   on	   the	   opinions	   of	   others,	   with	   the	   relational	   model	   it	   is	   not	  unreasonable	  for	  a	  patient	  to	  defer	  his	  or	  her	  decision	  to	  another	  person.	  With	  the	  new	  model	  of	  autonomy,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  legal	  proxy	  –	  especially	  that	  of	  the	  surrogate	  –	  is	  accentuated.	  	   This	   is	  not	  the	  first	   time	  that	  the	  Italian	  Parliament	  has	  recognized	  the	  importance	  of	   legal	  proxies	  for	  not	  fully	  competent	  patients.190	  Before	  the	  Bill	  2350,	   the	  NBC	  (2003)	  had	  underlined	   the	   importance	  of	   the	  surrogate,	  being	  the	   subject	  nominated	  by	   the	  patient	  who	  has	   the	  duty	   to	   communicate	  with	  the	  medical	   staff.	   In	   addition,	   this	   possibility	   has	   been	   confirmed	   in	   all	   eight	  other	   proposals	   made	   during	   the	   new	   parliament.191	   The	   importance	   of	   this	  provision	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  creates	  an	  exception	  to	  the	  general	  rule	  –	  also	  common	   in	   the	   other	   Romance	   speaking	   countries192	   and	   in	   England	   before	  	  	  	  	  	  190	   According	   to	   article	   4	   of	   Legislative	   Decree	   no.	   211	   of	   24	   June	   2003,	   clinical	  experiments	   on	   incompetent	   adults	   can	   be	   carried	   out	   only	  with	   the	   consent	   of	   the	  legal	   proxy,	   who	   must	   base	   it	   on	   the	   presumed	   wishes	   of	   the	   incompetent	   adult.	  Furthermore,	  article	  13	  of	  law	  194	  of	  22	  May	  1978	  states	  that	  a	  request	  for	  abortion	  can	  be	  made	  not	  only	  by	  a	  disabled	  woman,	  but	  even	  by	  her	  legal	  proxy.	  191	   It	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   in	   the	   proposal	   no.	   443	   the	   nomination	   of	   a	   surrogate	   is	  presumed.	  192	  In	  France:	  article	  2003	  Civil	  Code;	  in	  Portugal:	  article	  298	  Civil	  Code;	  and	  in	  Spain:	  article	  1732	  Civil	  Code	  
	  	  	  	  
	   192	  
2005193	   –	   that	   power	   of	   attorney	   is	   valid	   only	   while	   the	   donor	   is	   fully	  competent.194	  	   However,	   unlike	   the	   MCA,195	   which	   uses	   the	   change	   established	   by	  principle	  4,	  section	  2	  of	  Recommendation	  CM/Rec	  (2009)	  11,	  196	  neither	  Italian	  bill	   no.	   2350	   nor	   the	   other	   eight	   new	   proposal-­‐bills	   regarding	   end-­‐of-­‐life	  decision-­‐making	  offers	  the	  chance	  to	  nominate	  more	  than	  one	  surrogate.	  This	  could	   create	   difficulties	   when	   the	   only	   surrogate	   cannot	   be	   contacted.197	  
	  	  	  	  	  193	  Article	  1	  of	  the	  Enduring	  Powers	  of	  Attorney	  Act	  of	  26	  June	  1985	  194	   The	   general	   rule	   of	   invalidity	   of	   power	   of	   attorney	   in	   case	   of	   the	   donor’s	  unconsciousness	   comes	   from	   the	   combination	   of	   article	   1389	   and	   article	   1722,	  section	  1	  no.	  4	  of	  C.C.	  195	  Article	  10,	  section	  4	  of	  the	  Mental	  Capacity	  Act	  of	  2005.	  The	  maximum	  number	  of	  lasting	   power	   of	   attorney	   is	   5	   (article	   6	   The	   Lasting	   Powers	   of	   Attorney,	   Enduring	  Powers	  of	  Attorney	  and	  Public	  Guardian	  Regulations).	  196	  Principle	  4,	  section	  2	  of	  the	  Recommendation	  CM/Rec	  (2009)	  11	  of	  the	  Committee	  of	   Ministers	   to	   member	   states	   on	   principles	   concerning	   continuing	   powers	   of	  attorney	   and	   advance	   directives	   for	   incapacity	   (Adopted	   by	   the	   Committee	   of	  Ministers	  on	  9	  December	  2009	  at	   the	  1073rd	  meeting	  of	   the	  Ministers'	  Deputies).	   It	  should	   be	   noted	   that	   England	   is	   the	   only	   country	   within	   Romance-­‐,	   English-­‐	   and	  German-­‐	  speaking	  countries,	  that	  has	  explicitly	  applied	  this	  possibility.	  197	   This	   is	   why	   during	   the	   parliamentary	   discussion	   regarding	   the	   Mental	   Capacity	  Act,	   the	   Joint	   Committee	   decided	   to	   give	   the	   opportunity	   to	   the	   donor	   to	   nominate	  more	   than	   one	   surrogate.	   This	   Committee	   has	   also	   allowed	   the	   judge	   to	   nominate	  more	   than	  one	  deputy	   in	  case	  of	   total	  absence	  of	   the	  surrogate	   (Joint	  Committee	  on	  the	  Draft	  Mental	  Incapacity	  Bill	  2003).	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Moreover,	  two	  or	  more	  surrogates	  may	  be	  the	  solution	  to	  undue	  concentration	  of	  power,	  or	  to	  reduce	  the	  risk	  of	  family	  dispute.198	  	  	   Article	   6	   of	   bill	   2350	   requires	   that	   an	   AD	   giving	   lasting	   power	   of	  attorney	  for	  health	  care	  affairs	  must	  be	  in	  writing	  and	  the	  surrogate	  must	  sign	  it.	  This	  formality	  –	  which	  copies	  the	  English	  model	  –	  has	  been	  confirmed	  in	  the	  draft	  bill	  no.	  2229	  (article	  6,	  section	  1).	  But,	  while	  in	  Italy,	  the	  surrogate	  must	  sign	  the	  AD	  to	  accepting	  the	  role	  of	  attorney	  for	  health	  care	  affairs,	  whereas	  in	  England,	   the	   donee	  must	   sign	   it	   only	   in	   case	   that	   the	   donor	  wants	   to	   refuse	  life-­‐sustaining	   treatment.199	   The	   signature	   in	   the	   ‘surrogate	   will’	   by	   the	  surrogate	  will	  create	  uncertainty	  regarding	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  document	  since	  its	  qualification	  as	  a	  unilateral	  act	  or	  as	  a	  contract	  will	  become	  more	  difficult	  to	   determine.	   This	   qualification	   is	   importance	   because	   the	   infringement	   of	   a	  contract	  has	  stronger	  legal	  consequences	  than	  the	  breach	  of	  a	  unilateral	  act.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  198	   Council	   of	   Europe,	   Explanatory	   report	   Recommendation	   CM/Rec	   (2009)	   11,	   par.	  98.	  	  199	  In	  England,	  ADs	  that	  refuse	  medical	  treatment	  must	  be	  written	  (section	  5.45	  of	  the	  Mental	   Capacity	   Act	   Code	   of	   Practice).	   But,	   in	   case	   of	   withdrawing	   life-­‐prolonging	  treatment,	   the	   living	   will	   must	   be	   in	   written	   form	   and	   signed	   by	   the	   donor	   in	   the	  presence	  of	  a	  witness	  who	  also	  signs	  it,	  or	  acknowledges	  the	  signature,	  in	  the	  donor’s	  presence	   (article	   25,	   section	   5	   and	   6	   Mental	   Capacity	   Act).	   Further,	   in	   the	   case	   of	  withdrawing	  artificial	  nutrition	  and	  hydration	  from	  a	  patient	  in	  persistent	  vegetative	  state	  (PVG)	  –	  a	  patient	  who	  is	   in	  a	  vegetative	  state	  for	  more	  than	  6	  months	  –	  or	   in	  a	  condition	  similar	  to	  PVG,	  a	  declaration	  from	  the	  Court	  must	  be	  sought	  (Airedale	  NHS	  
Trust	  v.	  Brand	  [1993]	  AC	  789).	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   Article	  6,	   sections	  5	  and	  6	   state	   that,	   if	  nominated,	   the	   surrogate	  must	  ensure	  that	  the	  patient	  is	  not	  given	  futile	  medical	  treatment200	  or	  subjected	  to	  therapeutic	  abandonment.	  This	  is	  a	  reinforcement	  of	  the	  principle	  established	  in	  article	  16	  of	  the	  new	  Italian	  Code	  of	  Medical	  Ethics.201	  This	  policy	  is	  a	  result	  long	   bioethical	   discussion	   regarding	   the	   patient-­‐proxy	   relationship.	   The	   core	  of	  this	  relationship	  is	  trust,	  which	  means	  giving	  to	  the	  surrogate	  the	  power	  to	  decide	   with	   some	   exercise	   of	   discretion	   (Baier	   1995).	   Although	   citizens	   are	  aware	  of	  its	  risks	  (Lagerspetz	  1997),	  they	  still	  choose	  to	  trust	  because	  trust	  is	  an	   elementary	   human	   value	   (Baier	   1993).	  With	   the	   aim	   to	   resolve	   problems	  regarding	   the	   interpretation	   of	   patient’s	   preferences	   and	   values,202	   several	  scholars	  have	   suggested	   that	  State	   laws	  are	   liable	   to	   check	  proxies’	   activities	  or	  to	  address	  them	  some	  obligations	  (Kapp	  1999,	  and	  Sabatino	  1999).	  This	   is	  an	   important	   policy	   since	   citizens	   do	   not	   have	   control	   over	   surrogates’	  activities.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  200	   It	   should	   be	   noted	   that,	   contrary	   to	   article	   1,	   section	   1,	   letter	   F,	   in	   article	   6,	   the	  Italian	  parliament	   does	  not	   use	   the	   concept	   of	   ‘extraordinary	   treatment’,	  which	  has	  religious	  connotations,	  and	  has	  been	   increasingly	  rejected	  as	   irrelevant	   to	  decisions	  about	   life	   support,	   at	   least	   in	   secular	   contexts	   outside	   of	   its	   origins	   in	   Roman	  Catholicism	  (Brock	  2009).	  201	   Article	   16	   of	   the	   Italian	   Code	   of	   Medical	   Ethics	   prohibits	   directly	   any	   kind	   of	  medical	   futility.	   Therapeutic	   abandonment	   is	   not	   directly	   mentioned,	   but	   inferred	  from	   an	   interpretation	   of	   article	   3	   –	   which	   establishes	   the	   general	   principle	   that	  should	  guide	  medical	  practice.	  202	  Deciding	  for	  others	  has	  been	  considered	  as	  a	  ‘psychological	  fiction’	  which	  depends	  on	  different	  perceptions	  and	  relationships	  (Tia	  1999).	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Further,	   the	   surrogate	   must	   ensure	   that	   crimes	   such	   as	   homicide	  (article	  575	  Penal	  Code	  –	  P.C.),	  homicide	  by	  request	  of	  the	  victim	  (article	  579	  P.C.)	   or	   aiding	   or	   inciting	   suicide	   (article	   580	   P.C.)	   are	   not	   committed.203	   All	  these	  norms	  are	  confirmed	   in	  proposal	  no.	  2229	  of	  26	  March	  2014	  (article	  6,	  sections	   5	   and	   6).	   However,	   no	   civil	   or	   criminal	   liability	   is	   specified	   for	  surrogates	  who	  overlook	  these	  duties;	  the	  general	  norms	  of	  the	  civil	  and	  penal	  code	   must	   therefore	   be	   used.	   According	   to	   article	   333	   Code	   of	   Criminal	  Procedure	   (C.C.P.),	   citizens	   are	   not	   obliged	   to	   report	   crimes	   established	   in	  article	  575,	  579	  or	  580	  P.C.204	  However,	  according	  to	  article	  331	  C.C.P.,	  medical	  staff	  are	  obliged	  to	  report	  them.	  	   According	   to	   article	   25	   of	   the	   Italian	   constitution	   and	   article	   1	   P.C.	   −	  which	   establish	   the	   principle	   of	   nullum	   crimen,	   nulla	   pœna	   sine	   prævia	   lege	  
pœnali	   −	   in	   these	   cases	   the	   surrogate	   does	   not	   have	   any	   criminal	   liability	   in	  these	   cases.	   If	   this	   bill	   were	   to	   become	   law,	   the	   problem	   for	   Italian	  jurisprudence	   to	   resolve	   is	   whether	   the	   surrogate	   should	   be	   liable	   for	   civil	  damages.	   Although	   most	   of	   the	   Italian	   bioethical	   community	   consider	   ADs	  unilateral	  act	  (Canestrari	  2003),	  since	  article	  6,	  section	  1	  establishes	  the	  need	  for	   the	   surrogate’s	   signature	   and	   article	   6,	   section	   6	   requires	   particular	  
	  	  	  	  	  203	   It	   should	   be	   noted	   that,	   contrary	   to	   article	   1,	   section	   1,	   letter	   C,	   in	   article	   6	   the	  phrase	  ‘any	  kind	  of	  euthanasia’	  –	  which	  might	  be	  ambiguous	  –	  does	  not	  appear.	  204	  Article	  333	  Code	  of	  penal	  procedure	  establishes	  mandatory	  reporting	  for	  citizens	  in	   cases	   of	   crimes	   against	   the	   State	   (article	   364	   P.C.)	   and	   in	   case	   of	   buying	   or	  receiving	  money	  or	  things	  which	  derive	  from	  other	  crimes	  (article	  709	  P.C.).	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diligence	   from	   the	   surrogate	   regarding	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   patient’s	   health	  care	   interests,	  some	   judges	  might	  make	  surrogates	   liable	   for	  civil	  damages	   in	  these	   cases.	   	   This	   will	   increase	   doubts	   in	   this	   area,	   which	   will	   lead	   to	   the	  infringement	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  legal	  certainty.	  As	  it	  is	  known,	  Italy	  is	  not	  part	  of	  the	  common	  law	  legal	  systems.	  It	  follows	  that	  the	  principle	  of	  precedence	  –	  i.e.	   that	   the	   rule	   established	   in	   a	   previous	   legal	   case	   is	   either	   binding	   on	   or	  persuasive	  for	  a	  court	  or	  other	  tribunal	  –	  is	  not	  applied.	  	  	  	  
4.1.	  	   The	  cases	  of	  absence	  of	  a	  surrogate	  Article	   6,	   section	   8	   of	   bill	   no.	   2350	   pays	   particular	   attention	   to	   surrogate	  absence	   by	   highlighting	   the	   importance	   of	   patient’s	   family.205	   This	   policy	   has	  	  	  	  	  	  205	   The	   value	   of	   the	   family	   is	   affirmed	   in	   six	   of	   the	   eight	   new	   proposals.	   In	  chronological	   order:	   1)	   the	  proposal	   no.	   5	   of	   15	  March	  2013	   establishes	   this	   order:	  spouse,	   established	  partner,	   children,	  parents,	   relatives	   till	   the	   fourth	  grade	   (article	  4).	  In	  case	  of	  their	  absence,	  the	  decision	  should	  be	  taken	  form	  the	  ethical	  committee	  of	  the	  hospital	  or	  if	  there	  is	  none,	  by	  the	  primary	  care	  trust	  (azienda	  sanitaria	  locale)	  (article	  8);	  2)	  proposal	  no.	  13	  of	  15	  March	  2013	  states	  that	  physicians	  should	  speak	  with	   a	   patient’s	   relatives	   (article	   9,	   section	  3).	   In	   case	   of	   their	   absence,	   article	   406,	  section	  3	  C.C.	  should	  be	  applied;	  therefore,	  a	  decision	  must	  be	  sought	  from	  the	  Court	  of	   Guardianship	   (article	   9,	   section	   3).	   3)	   Proposal	   no.	   443	   of	   10	   April	   2013	  establishes	  this	  order:	  spouse,	  children,	  established	  partner,	  established	  parents	  and	  relatives	   up	   to	   the	   fourth	   degree	   (article	   3,	   section	   2).	   In	   case	   of	   their	   absence	   the	  decision	   should	   be	   taken	   by	   the	   Court	   of	   Guardianship	   (article	   3,	   section	   2);	   4)	  Proposal	  no.	  1142	  of	  4	  June	  2013	  establishes	  the	  same	  order	  of	  the	  proposal	  no.	  5	  of	  15	  March	  2013	  (article	  5);	  5)	  Proposal	  no.	  2229	  establishes	  the	  same	  order	  as	  bill	  no.	  2350	   (article	   6,	   section	   8);	   6)	   the	   proposal	   no.	   2264	   this	   order:	   spouse,	   stable	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also	   been	   adopted	   in	   other	   Romance	   speaking	   countries206	   and	   in	  Switzerland.207	  An	  automatic	  proxy	  scheme	  would	  be	  more	  congruent	  with	  the	  sense	   of	   fairness	   in	   society	   (Sahm	   2005).	   In	   addition,	   this	   policy	   is	   more	   in	  accordance	   with	   the	   principles	   of	   subsidiarity	   and	   respect	   for	   private	   and	  family	   life,	   which	   should	   be	   considered	   as	   a	   pivotal	   state	   interest	   (Jox	   et	   al.	  2008).	   Furthermore,	   most	   ethicists	   and	   politicians	   prefer	   family	   surrogates	  (Kim	  et	   al.	   2009),	   as	   the	  most	  practical	   and	   cost-­‐effective	   surrogates	   (Probst	  
	  	  	  	  	  partner,	   children,	   parents,	   relatives	   till	   the	   fourth	   grade	   (article	   2).	   In	   case	   of	  conflicts	  the	  Court	  of	  Guardianship	  will	  be	  sought.	  Unfortunately,	  in	  proposals	  5,	  443	  and	  1142,	  which	  establish	  a	  precise	  order,	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  procedural	  norms	  in	  case	  of	  conflict	  between	  children.	  206	   In	   France:	   article	   1111-­‐6	   CSP	   suggest	   that	   a	   surrogate	   could	   be	   a	   parent,	   a	  relative.	   In	   addition,	   in	   case	   of	   absent	   of	   a	   surrogate	   a	   fixed	   order	   has	   been	  established	  in	  article	  1111-­‐13	  CSP	  that	  establishes	  this	  order	  surrogate,	  family,	  living	  wills.	   In	  Portugal,	  article	  11	  states	   that	  employees	  of	   the	  National	  Register	  or	  Heath	  Care	   system	   could	   not	   be	   nominated	   as	   a	   surrogate,	   expect	   they	   have	   a	   family	  relationship	   with	   the	   patient	   (Regula	   as	   diretivas	   antecipadas	   de	   vontade,	  
designadamente	   sob	   a	   forma	   de	   testamento	   vital,	   e	   a	   nomeação	   de	   procurador	   de	  
cuidados	  de	  saúde	  e	  cria	  o	  Registo	  Nacional	  do	  Testamento	  Vital,	  law	  of	  16	  July	  2012);	  and	  in	  Spain:	  article	  9	  states	  that	  if	  the	  patient	  is	  incapable	  and	  there	  is	  an	  absent	  of	  a	   legal	   representative	   –	   even	   a	   surrogate	   –	   informed	   consent	   with	   be	   granted	   by	  virtue	   of	   relationship	   or	   de	   facto	   reasons	   (Básica	   reguladora	   de	   la	   autonomía	   del	  
paciente	   y	   de	   derechos	   y	   obligaciones	   en	   materia	   de	   información	   y	   documentación	  
clínica,	  law	  of	  14	  November	  2002)	  207	   In	  Switzerland,	   in	  case	  of	  absence	  of	  a	  surrogate,	  article	  378	  ZGB	  establishes	  this	  order:	   surrogate,	   person	   nominated	   in	   ‘der	   Vorsorgeauftrag’	   (‘Precautionary	  Mandate’);	   guardian;	   spouse	   or	   registered	   partner;	   person	   living	   in	   the	   same	  household	  if	  he	  regularly	  assist	  the	  incapable	  person;	  children	  if	  they	  regularly	  assist	  the	   incapable	   person;	   parents	   if	   they	   regularly	   assist	   the	   incapable	   person;	   or	  brothers	  and	  sisters	  if	  they	  regularly	  assist	  the	  incapable	  person.	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and	   Knittel	   2001).	   Moreover,	   generally	   family	   members	   are	   nominated	   as	  patient’s	   legal	   proxy	   (Budroni	   2014,	   and	   Cohen-­‐Mansfield	   et	   al.	   1991)208	   and	  most	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   decisions	   are	   made	   by	   family	   members	   (Karasz	   2010).	  Recently,	   the	   Irish	   Supreme	   Court	   has	   underlined	   the	   aspects	   of	   family	  solidarity	  (North	  Western	  Health	  Board	  v.	  W	  (H)	  [2001]	  IESC	  70).	  Further,	  this	  approach	  highlights	  the	  concept	  of	   ‘relational	  autonomy’,	  which	  considers	  the	  person	  as	  part	  of	  a	  society.	  	  	   Unfortunately,	   this	   approach	   has	   some	   disadvantages.	   Firstly,	   the	  traditional	   family	   is	  no	   longer	  common	  in	  Western	  Europe,	  owing	  to	  the	  high	  rate	   of	   divorce	   (ISTAT	   2014).	   Several	   studies	   have	   shown	   that	   family	  dynamics	   strongly	   influence	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   decisions	   (Broom	   and	   Kirby	   2013,	  Hudson	   and	   Payne	   2011,	   Goldberg	   2010,	   and	   Grande	   et	   al.	   2009).	   This	  influence	  depends	   on	   the	   role	   that	   the	   patient	   and	   the	   surrogate	   have	   in	   the	  family	   (King	   2006	   and	   Aoun	   2005).	   In	   addition,	   ‘family-­‐centred	   care’	   largely	  remains	   an	   ideal	   rather	   than	   a	   grassroots	   reality	   (Broom	   and	   Kirby	   2013,	  Hudson	  and	  Payne	  2011	  and	  Grande	  et	  al.	  2009).	  Secondly,	   this	  could	   lead	  to	  an	  opt-­‐out	  system,	  where	  citizens	  do	  not	  nominate	  a	  family	  member	  that	  they	  consider	  not	  to	  be	  in	  line	  with	  their	  personality	  (Jox	  et	  al.	  2008).	  Thirdly,	  since	  the	   law	  would	   already	   have	   pre-­‐established	   an	   order	   of	   proxies	   for	  medical	  decision-­‐making,	  citizens	  would	  lose	  the	  incentive	  to	  write	  ADs.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  208	   For	   instance,	   in	   Germany,	   in	   2009,	   62%	   of	   the	   guardianships	   were	   given	   to	  persons	   inside	   the	   patient’s	   family	   (Bundesministerium	   der	   Justiz	   2009).	   On	   the	  contrary:	  Ginger	  et	  al.	  2006.	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   The	   Italian	   legislator	   could	   follow	   the	   model	   established	   in	   the	   MCA,	  where	  when	   there	   is	  no	   living	  will,	   no	   surrogate	  has	  been	  appointed	  and	   the	  Court	  of	  Protection	  has	  not	  appointed	  a	  deputy,	  treatment	  may	  be	  provided	  to	  an	   adult	   lacking	   capacity	   only	   if	   that	   treatment	   is	   in	   the	   patient’s	   best	  interests.209	   This	   model	   is	   quicker	   and	   avoids	   courts	   judgements	   in	   case	   of	  disagreeing	  family	  members	  in	  the	  same	  degree	  of	  kinship	  (Probst	  and	  Knittel	  2001).	  	   In	   the	   Italian	   Bill,	   the	   absence	   of	   an	   impartial	   authority	   to	   resolve	  disagreement	   between	   surrogate	   and	   physicians	   and	   to	   control	   his	   or	   her	  activity	   has	   been	   noted.	   Regarding	   the	   first	   problem,	   the	   previous	   draft	   of	  2009	   in	   its	   article	   7,	   section	   3	   established	   an	   internal	  medical	   committee	   to	  resolve	   these	   conflicts,	   although	   their	   decision	   would	   not	   have	   been	   legally	  binding	  on	  physicians.	  	  	   	  In	   case	   of	   conflict	   between	   surrogate	   and	   doctors	   two	   different	  solutions	  could	  be	  used.	  The	  first	  is	  to	  resolve	  the	  conflicts	  within	  the	  hospital;	  the	   second	   is	   to	   resort	   to	   a	   ‘specialized’	   judge.	  The	   first	   approach	  provides	  a	  quicker	   decision	   based	   on	   medical	   criteria,	   and	   has	   been	   implemented	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  209	   Contrary	   to	   the	   Italian	   concept	   of	   a	   patient’s	   ‘best	   interest’,	   in	   England,	   this	  concept	  is	  broader	  than	  medical	  interests	  and	  includes	  the	  patient’s	  own	  wishes	  and	  values	   (British	   Medical	   Association	   2007).	   Moreover,	   Part	   1,	   principle	   4	   Mental	  Capacity	   Act	   of	   2005	   states	   that	   physicians	   must	   “so	   far	   as	   reasonably	   practicable,	  
permit	   and	   encourage	   the	   person	   [even	   without	   full	   capacity]	   to	   participate,	   or	   to	  
improve	  his	  ability	   to	  participate,	  as	   fully	  as	  possible	   in	  any	  act	  done	   for	  him	  and	  any	  
decision	  affecting	  him”.	  Additionally,	  they	  must	  considered	  patient’s	  “past	  and	  present	  
wishes”.	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Portugal	   in	   cases	  of	  medical	   objection	   (article	  9	  Portuguese	   law	  no.	   25	  of	  16	  July	  2012)	  in	  addition	  to	  having	  been	  proposed	  by	  SIAARTI	  in	  its	  document	  of	  2006;	  the	  second	  model	  is	  more	  impartial,	  and	  has	  been	  implemented	  in	  Great	  Britain	  and	  in	  Germany.210	  	   Since	   article	   24	   of	   the	   Italian	   Constitution	   has	   recognized	   the	   right	   to	  justice,	   it	   follows	   that	   in	   case	   of	   conflict	   between	   surrogate	   and	   doctors	   a	  judge’s	   ruling	   should	  be	   sought.	  As	   this	   law	  does	  not	  establish	  a	   ‘specialized’	  judge	   to	   decide	   in	   these	   cases,	   a	   judge	   from	   the	   ordinary	   jurisdiction	  would	  take	   the	   decision.	   This	   will	   arise	   two	   main	   issues.	   Firstly,	   in	   end-­‐of-­‐life	  decisions	  where	  ethical,	  legal	  and	  medical	  principles	  are	  involved,	  the	  need	  for	  ‘specialized’	   judge	   is	   fundamental.	   Secondly,	   in	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   situations	   the	  decision	   by	   a	   judge	   needs	   to	   be	   made	   expeditiously,	   and	   the	   ordinary	  jurisdiction	  –	  even	  in	  cases	  of	  summary	  procedures	   introduced	  by	  the	   law	  69	  of	  19	  June	  2009	  –	  is	  too	  overburdened	  to	  do	  so.	  	   Moreover,	   the	   absence	   of	   an	   authority	   to	   oversee	   the	   surrogate’s	  activity	   should	   also	   be	   addressed.	   The	   Italian	   legislator	   could	   consider	   the	  model	   established	   in	   the	  MCA	   of	   2005,	  where	   article	   23	   establishes	   that	   the	  Court	   of	   Protection	   must	   control	   the	   surrogate’s	   activity.	   Only	   a	   judge	   can	  oversee	   the	   surrogate’s	   activity,	   being	   impartial	   regarding	   the	   conflict	  	  	  	  	  	  210	  In	  England	  and	  Wales:	  articles	  45-­‐53	  MCA	  of	  7	  April	  2005;	  in	  Ireland:	  articles	  13-­‐32	  of	  the	  Assisted	  Decision-­‐Making	  (Capacity)	  Bill	  2013;	  In	  Scotland:	  article	  50	  of	  the	  Adults	   with	   Incapacity	   (Scotland)	   Act	   of	   29	   March	   2000.	   In	   Germany:	   article	   1904	  BGB	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between	   the	  surrogate	  and	   the	  physician	   in	  charge,	  and	   the	  decision	  must	  be	  taken	   according	   to	   the	   patient’s	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination	   rather	   than	  medical	  criteria.	  	   The	   establishment	   of	   an	   authority	   to	   resolve	   disagreement	   between	  surrogate	  and	  physicians	  and	   to	  oversee	   the	  surrogate’s	  activity	   is	   important	  for	  three	  main	  reasons.	  Firstly,	  some	  empirical	  studies	  have	  shown	  that	  some	  surrogates	  –	  due	  to	  clinically	  diagnosed	  conditions,	  such	  as	  stress,	  depression,	  and	   anxiety	   –	   could	   themselves	   lose	   their	   mental	   capacity	   (Siegel	   2005).	  Secondly,	   sometimes	   some	   surrogates	   might	   have	   dubious	   motives	   in	   that	  they	  are	  looking	  out	  for	  their	  own	  interests	  rather	  than	  the	  patient’s	  interests	  (Pope	   2012).	   Thirdly,	   since	   the	   surrogate	   must	   sign	   his	   nomination	   and	  particular	  diligence	  has	  been	  required	  by	  him	  the	  principle	  of	  legal	  coherence	  imposes	   that	   an	   impartial	   organ	   should	   resolve	   disagreement	   between	  surrogate	  and	  physicians	  and	  to	  oversee	  the	  his	  activity.	  	  	  
5.	  	   The	   application	   of	   the	   Italian	   law	   no.	   6	   of	   9th	   January	   2004	   in	  
Italian	   Jurisprudence:	   the	  appointment	  of	  a	   support	  guardian	   for	  health	  
care	  decisions	  Although	  Italy	  has	  no	  law	  on	  ADs,	  Italian	  jurisprudence	  has	  protected	  the	  right	  to	   nominate	   a	   legal	   proxy	   for	   health	   care	   affairs	   in	   cases	   of	   future	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unconsciousness	   through	  the	   interpretation	  of	   law	  no.	  6	  of	  9	   January	  2004211	  which	   introduced	  to	   Italian	   law	  the	  role	  of	  support	  guardian	  (amministratore	  
di	   sostegno)	   in	   articles	   404-­‐413	   C.C.	   The	   protection	   by	   the	   Italian	  jurisprudence	   is	   required	   since	   the	   withdrawal	   of	   treatments	   from	  unconscious	   patients	   is	   common	   in	   medical	   practice	   (e.g.	   see	   Sect.	   3.1.).	  Moreover,	   studies	   have	   shown	   that	   Italian	   citizens	   –	   like	   the	   other	   western	  European	   citizens	   –	   prioritize	   quality	   of	   life	   rather	   than	   extension	   of	   life	  (Higginson	   et	   al.	   2014).	   Although	   national	   legislators	   have	   applied	   different	  policies	  (e.g.	  see	  Chap.	  2),	  studies	  based	  on	  citizens’	  preferences	  demonstrate	  that	  only	  a	   small	  minority	   (6%	  of	   the	   interviewees)	  prioritizes	  extending	   life	  rather	  than	  quality	  of	  life	  (57%	  of	  the	  interviewees).	  	   The	   intervention	   of	   the	   2004	   parliament	   aimed	   to	   avoid	   the	   broader	  application	   of	   the	   legal	   discipline	   of	   interdict	   (interdetto)	   and	   of	   inability	  (inabilitato)	   (Vimercati	   2011).	   The	  most	   recently-­‐introduced	   role	   of	   support	  guardian	  must	   be	   distinguished	   from	   the	   others	   according	   to	   its	   function	   of	  giving	   concrete	   assistance,	   rather	   than	   according	   to	   the	   ward’s	   degree	   of	  incapacity	  (C.	  Cass.	  25	  October	  2012,	  no.	  18320;	  26	  October	  2011,	  no.	  22332;	  and	  12	  June	  2006,	  no.	  13584).	  	  	   This	   law	   has	   been	   a	   direct	   application	   of	   article	   13	   (right	   to	   personal	  liberty)	   and	   article	   32	   (right	   to	   health)	   of	   the	   Italian	   Constitution.	   The	  	  	  	  	  	  211	  This	   law	   introduces	   to	   Italian	   law	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   incompetent	  person	  who	   is	  seen	  as	  needing	  personalized	  and	   flexible	  protection,	   including	  protection	  of	  human	  dignity,	  not	  merely	  administration	  of	  the	  person’s	  estate.	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combination	   of	   them	   has	   led	   to	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination	   in	   health	   care.	   These	   rights	   are	   correlated	   together;	   however,	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  differs	  from	  the	  right	  to	  health,	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	   it	   is	  broader	  and	  involves	  patient	  autonomy	  (C.	  Cost.	  15	  December	  2008,	  no.	  438).	  The	  right	   to	  self-­‐determination	   is	  not	   limited,	  because	   in	   the	   Italian	  legal	  system	  no	  law	  imposes	  a	  duty	  to	  live	  (e.g.	  see	  Sect.	  3.1.).	  In	  addition,	  this	  law	   applies	   the	   rules	   established	   in	   the	   Convention	   on	   the	  Rights	   of	   Persons	  with	   Disabilities	   of	   13	   December	   2006,	   ratified	   in	   Italy	   by	   law	   no.	   18	   of	   3	  March	   2009.	   As	   in	   all	   the	   other	   Romance	   speaking	   countries,	   in	   case	   of	  nomination	   by	   a	   judge	   of	   a	   legal	   proxy,	   the	   Italian	   legislator	   has	   adopted	   a	  ‘pluralistic’	  model,	  which	   is	   in	   contrast	  with	   the	   ‘monistic’	  model	   adopted	   in	  Germany	  and	  in	  Austria.	  	  	   The	   main	   characteristic	   of	   this	   non-­‐traditional	   institute	   is	   the	  promotion	  of	  the	  patient’s	  personality.212	  The	  legal	  status	  given	  to	  the	  person	  who	  has	  a	  support	  guardian	  is	  less	  invasive	  (C.	  Cost.	  9	  December	  2005,	  n.	  440)	  than	  the	  status	  of	  interdict	  or	  inability213	  because	  with	  a	  support	  guardian	  the	  ward	  does	  not	   lose	   the	   legal	   competency	   to	   act.	   Furthermore,	   the	   role	  of	   the	  support	   guardian	   is	   general	   and	  elastic,	  whereas	   the	   traditional	   two	   statuses	  
	  	  	  	  	  212	   This	   result	   comes	   from	   the	   interpretation	  of	   article	   405,	   section	  4	   together	  with	  article	  408,	  section	  1	  and	  article	  44	  of	  the	  Execution	  Dispositions	  of	  C.C.	  213	   It	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   the	   status	   of	   interdict	   bars	   the	   person	   from	   acts	   of	  extraordinary	   administration,	   whereas	   the	   status	   of	   inability	   bars	   the	   person	   even	  from	  ordinary	  administrative	  acts.	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are	   rigid	   and	   specific.	   The	  duties	  of	   the	   guardian	  depend	  on	  a	   judge’s	   ruling,	  based	   on	   the	   patient’s	   physical	   and	   psychological	   health	   (C.	   Cass.	   22	   April	  2009,	  no.	  9628).	  	   The	   application	   of	   articles	   404-­‐413	   has	   entailed	   three	  main	   problems.	  1)	  Can	  the	  guardian	  oversee	  the	  ward’s	  health?	  2)	   If	  yes,	  what	   legal	  standard	  should	   the	   guardian	   use	   when	   making	   decisions	   about	   the	   patient’s	   health	  care	  issues?	  3)	  Does	  the	  close	  similarity	  between	  the	  guardian	  for	  health	  care	  issues	   and	   the	   surrogate	   entail	   the	   legal	   recognition	   in	   Italy	   of	   ADs	   giving	  lasting	  power	  of	  attorney	  for	  health	  care	  affairs?	  	   The	   first	   question	   that	   Italian	   jurisprudence	   had	   to	   resolve	   regarding	  the	  application	  of	  the	  role	  of	  support	  guardian	  was	  whether	  it	  had	  standing	  to	  oversee	   the	   ward’s	   health	   care	   issues.	   The	   question	   is	   raised	   by	   a	   literal	  interpretation	   of	   article	   411,	   section	   1,	   which	   does	   not	   mention	   article	   357	  C.C.	   However,	   the	   combination	   of	   article	   404,	   section	   1	   with	   article	   405,	  section	  5	  and	  with	  article	  44	  of	  the	  implementation	  disposition	  of	  C.C.	  entails	  that	  the	  support	  guardian	  has	  the	  attorney	  for	  health	  care	  decisions	  (Gorgoni	  2012).	   Furthermore,	   since	   the	   support	   guardian	   protects	   the	   rights	   of	   the	  ward	   within	   the	   activities	   established	   by	   the	   judge’s	   ruling,	   only	   this	  interpretation	   effectively	   safeguards	   the	   rights	   of	   people	   with	   disabilities,	  recognized	  by	  the	  Convention	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Persons	  with	  Disabilities.	  They	  are	   fully	   competent,	   but	   in	   that	   particular	   moment	   they	   are	   clinically	  unconscious	  or	  lack	  capacity	  to	  take	  care	  of	  their	  health.	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   The	  second	  question	  regards	   the	  standard	  that	  guardians	  should	  apply	  to	  wards’	   health	   care	  decisions.	   The	   guardian,	   as	   the	   surrogate,	   acts	   ‘for’	   the	  ward	   (C.	   Cass.	   16	  October	   2007,	   n.	   21748).214	   The	   lines	   of	   responsibility	   run	  only	  from	  the	  support	  guardian	  to	  the	  court	  or	  from	  the	  guardian	  to	  the	  ward	  without	   a	   reciprocal	   obligation	   towards	   the	   guardian.	   The	   support	   guardian	  must	   not	   be	   considered	   equal	   as	   an	   agent	   (Frolik	   2007-­‐2008).	   If	   the	   agent	  under	  a	  contract	  of	  agency	  must	  consider	  the	  behavior	  of	  a	  reasonable	  person,	  the	   support	   guardian	   must	   consider	   the	   personal	   value	   and	   preferences	   of	  
that	  person	  by	  considering	  the	  narrative	  approach	  of	  his	  identity.	  Thus,	  when	  making	   health	   decision,	   guardians	   are	   expected	   to	   follow	   the	   substituted	  judgment	   doctrine	   (C.	   Cass.	   20	   December	   2012,	   no.	   23707;	   Trib.	   Rome	   10	  March	   2009;	   Trib.	   Modena	   23	   December	   2008;	   Trib.	   Trieste	   17	   December	  2008;	  and	  C.	  Cass.	  16	  October	  2007,	  n.	  21748).	  	  	   The	   third	   question	   relates	   to	   the	   juridical	   debate	   over	  whether	   Italian	  citizens	   have	   the	   right	   to	   nominate	   –	   and	  not	   only	   designate	   −	   their	   support	  guardian	  when	   they	  are	   still	   fully	   competent	   and	   therefore	   support	   guardian	  and	   surrogate	   are	   considered	   identical.	   The	   answer	   depends	   on	   the	  interpretation	  of	  article	  408	  C.C.	  –	  which	  allows	  citizens	  the	  right	  to	  designate	  a	   guardian	   –	   and	   on	   the	  meaning	   given	   to	   the	   pre-­‐condition	   requirement	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  214	   This	   ruling	   was	   considered	   correct	   by	   the	   Italian	   Constitutional	   Court	   	   (C.	   Cost.	  Ordinance	   of	   8	   October	   2008,	   no.	   334).	   The	   High	   Court	   of	   Cassation	   stated	   that	   a	  guardian	   can	   act	   as	   legal	   proxy	   to	   give	  medical	   consent	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   patient,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   tutor	   (in	   case	   of	   interdict).	   Furthermore,	   this	   decision	   introduced	   the	  notion	  of	  substitution	  of	  judgment	  to	  the	  Italian	  legal	  system.	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actual	   incapacity	  –	  which	   Italian	   jurisprudence	  has	  added	   to	   the	   legal	   role	  of	  support	  guardian.	  215	  	   Before	   discussing	   this	   problem,	   a	   premise	   must	   be	   mentioned.	   In	  accordance	   with	   the	   formalities	   of	   article	   408	   C.C.,	   Italian	   citizens	   can	  designate	  –	  through	  the	  so-­‐called	  guardian	  will	  –	  a	  guardian	  to	  look	  after	  their	  health	   affairs.216	   The	   instructions	   given	   in	   the	   ‘guardian	   will’	   are	   legally	  binding	  only	  between	  citizens	  (Frolik	  2007-­‐2008).	  The	  judges	  must	  take	  them	  into	   account;	   they	   can	   only	   dismiss	   a	   designated	   guardian	   with	   serious	  reason.217	   The	   instructions	   given	   by	   the	   citizen	   are	   binding	   on	   the	   guardian,	  but	  not	  on	  the	  judge	  (C.	  Cass.	  22	  April	  2009,	  no.	  9628),	  because	  the	  aim	  is	  for	  the	  judge	  to	  retain	  discretion	  (Bonilini	  2007).	  	  	   Italian	   jurisprudence	  and	  doctrine	   is	  divided	  on	  whether	   citizens	  have	  the	  right	  to	  nominate	  their	  guardian	  when	  they	  are	  fully	  competent.	  According	  to	  a	  part	  of	   Italian	   Jurisprudence	  (Trib.	  Verona	  4	   January	  2011;	  Trib.	  Cagliari	  	  	  	  	  	  215	   For	   Italian	   jurisprudence,	   the	   two	   absolute	   conditions	   for	   the	   nomination	   of	   the	  support	  guardian	  –	  according	  to	  interpretation	  of	  article	  404,	  section	  1	  of	  C.C.	  −	  are:	  the	   patient’s	   state	   of	   incapacity	   (subjective	   requirement)	   and	   the	   inability	   to	   take	  care	  of	  his/her	  own	  health	  (objective	  requirement).	  216	   However,	   the	   ruling	   of	   the	   Tribunal	   of	  Modena	   of	   13	  May	   2008	   states	   that	   even	  absent	   these	   formalities,	   the	   individual	   right	   to	   designate	   a	   guardian,	   accompanied	  by	   certain	   other	   evidence,	   prevails	   over	   the	   rigid	   formalities	   established	   by	   article	  408	  C.C.	   (although	  these	  aim	  to	  protect	   the	  certainty	  of	  a	  person’s	  wishes,	   they	  only	  work	  in	  an	  ideal	  world	  in	  which	  everyone	  writes	  their	  wishes	  with	  a	  lawyer’s	  help).	  217	   ‘Serious	   reason’	   means	   modification	   of	   the	   pathological	   situation	   compared	   to	  what	   the	   want	   had	   been	   imagined	   that	   justified	   a	   change	   of	   his	   wishes	   (Salvatore	  2013).	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14	  December	  2009;	  Trib.	  Florence	  8	  April	  2009;	  Trib.	  Rome	  3	  April	  2009;	  Trib.	  Pistoia	  8	  June	  2009;	  and	  C.	  Appeal	  Florence	  3	  July	  2009,	  no.	  361	  and	  365),	  to	  the	  current	  position	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Cassation	  (C.	  Cass.	  20	  December	  2012,	  no.	  23707),218	  and	   to	  part	  of	   Italian	  Doctrine	   (Balestra	  2011,	  and	  Busnelli	  2011),	  citizens	  do	  not	  have	  the	  right	   to	  nominate	  −	  which	   is	  different	   from	  the	  right	  to	   designate	   −	   their	   guardian	   when	   they	   are	   still	   full	   competent.	   This	  interpretation,	  which	   is	   an	  originalist219	   interpretation,	   is	   a	   direct	   result	   of	   a	  procedural	   interpretation	  of	   the	   law	  (C.	  Cass.	  20	  December	  2012,	  no.	  23707).	  According	   to	   this,	   the	   instructions	  contained	   in	   the	   ‘guardian	  will’	   are	   legally	  binding	  only	  between	  citizens,	  and	  not	  on	  the	  judge.	  	  	   The	  rationale	  of	  the	  institution	  of	  support	  guardians	  is	  to	  give	  effective	  care	  according	  to	  a	  specific	  clinical	  and	  medical	  prognostic,	  because	  this	  is	  an	  	  	  	  	  	  218	  Court	  of	  Cassation	  (section	  I	  civil),	  decision	  of	  20	  December	  2012,	  no.	  23707	  is	  the	  first	   and	   the	   only	   ruling	   from	   the	   Italian	   High	   Court	   of	   Cassation	   about	   the	   legal	  discussion	   if	   a	   competent	   citizen	   could	   nominate	   in	   advance	   a	   guardian	   for	   his/her	  future	  eventual	  unconsciousness.	  This	  decision	  conforms	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  Tribunal	  of	   Trento,	   ruling	   of	   29	   November	   2010	   and	   that	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   of	   Trento,	  ruling	  of	  19	  April	  2011,	  no.	  862.	  219	  Originalist	   theories	   attempt	   to	   link	   interpretation	   to	   the	   time	  when	   the	   law	  was	  enacted.	   This	   style	   of	   interpretation	   brings	   certainty	   into	   law.	   Within	   originalist	  theories	  there	  are	  two	  different	  groups:	  textualism,	  which	  focuses	  on	  the	  meaning	  of	  words,	   and	   intentionalism,	  which	   emphasis	   the	   drafting	   history	   of	   the	   bill.	   The	   first	  group	  would	  say	  that	  the	  Italian	  parliament	  did	  not	  intend	  to	  rule	  on	  ADs	  because:	  1)	  in	   article	   404	   C.C.	   the	   verb	   ‘to	   be’	   is	   in	   the	   present	   tense,	   not	   the	   future;	   2)	   article	  405,	   section	   1	   states	   that	   the	   judge’s	   decree	   takes	   immediate	   effect;	   3)	   article	   408,	  section	  1	  uses	  the	  verb	  ‘to	  designate’	  and	  not	  ‘to	  nominate’.	  The	  second	  group	  would	  say	   that	   the	   Italian	  Legislator	  did	  not	   intend	   to	   legislate	  on	  ADs	  because	  a	  different	  bill	  governing	  ADs	  was	  being	  discussed	  in	  2009	  and	  2011.	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act	  rebus	   sic	   stantibus	   (Corda	  2010).	  A	   judge’s	  decision	   is	  necessary	   to	  verify	  the	  patient’s	   state	  of	   incapacity,	   their	   inability	   to	   look	  after	   their	   own	  health	  and	  the	  suitability	  of	  the	  guardian	  to	  be	  nominated	  (Buffone	  2013).	  Moreover,	  only	  this	  legal	  reasoning	  avoids	  difficulties	  in	  defining	  the	  time	  of	  several	  legal	  publications.220	  	   On	   the	  other	  hand,	   some	  court	  decisions	   (Trib.	  Grosseto	  16	  May	  2012;	  Trib.	  Treviso	  7	  June	  2011;	  Trib.	  Florence	  22	  December	  2010;	  Trib.	  Modena	  14	  May	   2009;	   Trib.	   Prato,	   8	   April	   2009;	   Trib.	  Modena	   23	  December	   2008;	   Trib.	  Modena	   5	   November	   2008;	   Trib	   Bologna	   4	   June	   2008;	   Trib	  Modena	   13	  May	  2008;	   and	   Trib.	   Parma	   2	   April	   2004)	   and	   some	   scholars	   (Gorgoni	   2012,	  Infantino	  2011,	  D’Avack	  2009,	  Pasquino	  2009,	  Rodotà	  2009,	  and	  Sesta	  2008)	  have	   recognized	   the	  possibility	   for	   fully	   competent	   citizens	   to	   ask	   a	   judge	   to	  nominate	   a	   guardian.	   According	   to	   them,	   incapacity	   is	   needed	   for	   the	  production	   of	   legal	   effects	   and	   not	   for	   the	   guardian’s	   nomination.	   This	   legal	  reasoning	   is	  based	  on	   the	   interpretation	  of	   the	  phrase	   ‘even	   if’	   in	  article	  406	  C.C.221	  According	  to	  them,	  although	  this	  might	  be	  a	  forced	  interpretation	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  220	   Legal	   documentation	   that	   must	   be	   completed	   for	   the	   nomination	   of	   a	   guardian	  includes:	  the	  registration	  of	  the	  degree	  in	  the	  Court	  Record	  (article	  3,	  section	  1,	  letter	  b,	  Decree	  of	  President	  of	  Republic	  No.	  313	  of	  14	  November	  2002);	  the	  addition	  to	  the	  Register	   for	  guardians	   (article	  405,	   section	  6	  Code	  of	  Civil	  Procedure	  and	  article	  49	  
bis	  Disposition	  of	  application	  of	  C.C.)	  and	  communication	  to	  the	  Office	  of	  Civil	  Status	  (article	  405,	  section	  7,	  Code	  of	  Civil	  Procedure).	  221	  Article	   406	  C.C.	   states	   that	   citizens	  without	   full	   legal	   capacity	   can	   ask	   a	   judge	   to	  nominate	   a	   support	   guardian.	   The	   use	   of	   the	  world	   ‘even	   if’	   suggests	   that	   a	   person	  with	  full	  legal	  capacity	  could	  ask	  for	  a	  guardian.	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textual	   interpretation,	   it	   is	   the	   only	   interpretation	   that	   fully	   protects	   the	  constitutional	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination.	  	  	   The	   nomination	   of	   a	   surrogate	   when	   the	   person	   is	   still	   competent	  would	   avoid	   problems	   when	   physicians	   need	   to	   make	   a	   quick	   decision	   and	  Courts	   −	   even	   in	   cases	   of	   summary	   judgment	   –	   take	   a	   long	   time	   to	   decide.	  Further,	   this	  non-­‐originalist	   interpretation222	   is	   connected	  with	   the	   idea	   that	  courts	  should	  protect	  fundamental	  rights,	  even	  when	  doing	  so	  goes	  against	  the	  will	  of	   the	   legislature,	  because	  rights	  are	   inherently	  anti-­‐majoritarian	  (Letsas	  2010).	  	   A	   judge	  who	  has	   to	   interpret	   the	   law	  on	   support	   guardian	   should	   take	  into	   consideration	   two	   contrasting	   principles.	   On	   one	   hand,	   the	   magistrate	  should	  protect	   the	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination	   in	  health	   care,	  which	  comes	  as	  an	  interpretation	  of	  article	  13	  and	  32	  of	  the	  Italian	  constitution.	  On	  the	  other,	  the	   judge	   should	   take	   into	   consideration	   the	   literal	   and	   teleological	  interpretation	  of	  articles	  404–413	  C.C.:	  with	   law	  no.	  6	  of	  9	   January	  2004,	   the	  Italian	   parliament	   did	   not	   intend	   to	   legislate	   on	   ADs	   giving	   lasting	   power	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  222	   The	   non-­‐originalist	   interpretation	   means	   that	   these	   are	   rights	   which	   are	   not	  expressly	   mentioned	   in	   the	   text	   but	   which	   it	   is	   proposed	   should	   nevertheless	   be	  ‘read	   into’	   it.	   According	   to	   them,	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination	  should	   be	   not	   theoretical	   and	   illusory:	   thus,	   if	   the	   Italian	   parliament	   failed	   to	  legislate	   on	  ADs	   in	   2009	   and	  2011,	   law	  no.	   6	   of	   9	   January	   2004	  must	   be	   applied	   to	  fulfill	   this	   gap	   and	   to	   protect	   the	   human	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination.	   This	   kind	   of	  approach	   is	   the	   same	   as	   that	   of	   the	   European	   Court	   of	   Human	   Rights,	   which	  inaugurated	  it	  in	  the	  famous	  case	  Golder	  v.	  United	  Kingdom	  (Letsas	  2010).	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attorney	   for	   health	   care	   affairs.	   The	   roles	   of	   surrogate	   and	   support	   guardian	  are	  similar	  but	  not	  equal.223	  	   However,	  with	   the	   aim	   to	   give	   actual	   legal	   protection	  when	   at	   present	  there	   is	   no	   ad	   hoc	   law	   regarding	   ‘surrogate	   wills’,	   a	   guardian	   can	   be	  nominated	   –	   even	   if	   the	   citizen	   is	   fully	   competent	   –	   only	   in	   cases	   of	   future	  programmed	  medical	   treatment	   that	   entails	  unconsciousness	   (Trib.	  Trieste	  3	  July	   2009;	   Trib.	   Parma	   2	   April	   2004;	   and	   Trib.	   Rome	   19	  March	   2004),	   or	   in	  cases	  of	  Jehovah’s	  Witnesses	  for	  blood	  transfusion	  (Trib.	  Bologna	  4	  June	  2008;	  Trib.	  Rome	  21	  December	  2005;	  and	  Trib.	  Vibo	  Valentia	  30	  November	  2005),	  or	  for	   an	   illness	   that	   progressively	   incapacitates	   the	   patient	   (Trib.	   Modena	   16	  September	  2008).	  In	  all	  these	  cases,	  the	  condition	  of	  incapacity	  is	  not	  eventual	  or	   hypothetical,	   but	   almost	   definite.	   This	   legal	   reasoning	   comes	   from	   the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  combination	  of	  article	  407,	  section	  2	  and	  article	  410	  C.C.	  in	   the	   light	   of	   the	   principle	   of	   informed	   consent.224	   Additionally,	   in	   all	   these	  cases,	  patients	  have	   received	  detailed	  medical	   and	   clinical	   information	  about	  	  	  	  	  	  223	   On	   the	   contrary,	   according	   to	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   of	   Florence’s	   decision	   of	   22	  December	   2010,	   where	   it	   is	   stated	   that	   a	   guardian	   is	   the	   most	   appropriate	   legal	  figure	   to	   implement	   an	   AD.	   It	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   the	   surrogate	   –	   and	   not	   the	  guardian	   –	   is	   the	   most	   appropriate	   legal	   figure	   to	   implement	   AD	   because	   in	   a	  ‘guardian	  will’	   the	  instructions	  given	  to	  the	  guardian	  are	  legally	  binding	  only	  for	  the	  guardian	  and	  not	  for	  the	  judge,	  who	  also	  has	  the	  power	  to	  dismiss	  –	  if	  there	  is	  serious	  reason	   –	   the	   guardian	   designated	   by	   the	   citizen	   (C.	   Cass.	   20	   December	   2012,	   no.	  23707).	  	  224	   Informed	   consent	   has	   been	   considered	   as	   a	   constitutional	   right	   through	   the	  interpretation	  of	  articles	  13	  and	  32	  of	  the	  Italian	  constitution.	  (C.	  Cost.	  15	  December	  2008,	  no.	  438)	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the	  consequences	  of	  their	  disease,	  which	  has	  been	  considered	  important	  from	  the	  Italian	  legislator225	  	  	  	   Although	  the	  this	  legal	  reasoning	  goes	  beyond	  a	  literal	  interpretation	  of	  articles	   404–413	   C.C.,	   it	   takes	   into	   account	   the	   constitutional	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination	   without	   confusing	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘guardian	   will’	   with	   the	  ‘surrogate	  will’.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  225	  The	   Italian	   legislator	  has	   considered	   fundamental	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  declarant	  has	  received	   all	   the	   needed	  medical	   information	   before	   he	   or	   she	   states	   in	   advance	   his	  medical	  directives	   (article	  3	  and	  4	  of	   the	  bill	  2350).	   In	   concrete,	   article	  3,	   section	  1	  states	   that	   ‘the	  declarant	  …	  has	   received	  complete	  medical	   information	  …	  expresses	  his	   directions’;	   and	   article	   4,	   section	   1	   states	   that	   ‘the	   declarant	   adult	   after	   the	  provision	  of	  appropriate	  and	  exhaustive	  medical	  information’	  write	  the	  AD.	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Summary	  	  The	   Italian	   situation	   regarding	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   has	   been	   examined	   through	   the	  study	   of	   the	   main	   documents	   published	   by	   the	   bioethical	   and	   medical	  communities,	  the	  main	  rulings	  decided	  by	  the	  jurisprudence,	  and	  the	  analysis	  of	   the	  Bill	   no.	   2350	   and	   the	   new	  proposal-­‐bills	   of	   the	   new	   legislature,	  which	  started	  on	  March	  2013.	  	   Italy	  is	  one	  of	  the	  few	  Western	  European	  countries	  that	  does	  not	  have	  a	  specific	   law	   governing	   advance	   directives.	   The	   intervention	   of	   the	   Italian	  legislator	   has	   been	   asked	   not	   only	   by	   the	   jurisprudence,	   but	   also	   by	   the	  bioethical	  and	  medical	  communities.	  The	  bill	  should	  take	  into	  account	  rulings	  of	   the	   Italian	  Constitutional	  Court	   and	  of	   Italian	   judges,	  who	  up	   to	  now	  have	  substituted	   the	   Italian	   Legislator	   by	   protecting	   in	   individual	   case-­‐law	   the	  patient	   autonomy	   and	   the	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination.	   Moreover,	   the	  experience	   of	   other	   Western	   European	   countries	   should	   be	   taken	   into	  consideration.	   In	   addition	   to	   an	   ad	   hoc	   law	   ruling	   ADs,	   the	   Italian	   medical	  community	  should	  establish	  clear	  guidelines	  in	  line	  with	  this	  law.	  	  	   Until	   then,	   Italian	   judges	   should	   protect	   the	   patient’s	   autonomy	   by	  applying	  the	  current	  laws	  without	  confusing	  the	  legal	  figure	  of	  a	  guardian	  with	  that	  of	   a	   surrogate.	  The	   legal	   roles	  of	   guardian	  and	  surrogate	  are	   similar	  but	  not	   identical.	   Both	   surrogate	   and	   guardian	   must	   decide	   according	   to	   the	  patient’s	   preferences	   and	   values.	   Both	   are	   designated	   by	   the	   patient,	   but	   as	  the	  High	  Court	   of	   Cassation	  has	   ruled,	   only	   a	   judge	   can	  nominate	   a	   guardian	  when	  the	  ward	  is	  unconscious.	  	  	   In	   the	   new	   legislature,	   the	   proposals	   for	   a	   new	  bill	   regarding	   advance	  directives	   comprise	   three	   from	   the	   Senate	   and	   five	   from	   the	   Chamber	   of	  Deputies,	  which	  are	  proposal-­‐bills	  nos.	  5,	  13,	  443,	  1142,	  1298,	  1432,	  2229	  and	  2264.	   It	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   the	   proposal-­‐bills	   5	   and	   1142	   are	   similar.	  Moreover,	   the	   proposal-­‐bill	   2229	   has	   adopted	   the	   same	   paternalist	   and	  conservative	   approach	   of	   the	   bill	   2350.	   In	   addition,	   the	   proposal-­‐bill	   1432	  contains	   only	   one	   article:	   therefore,	   it	   lacks	   several	   procedural	   norms	   and	   it	  makes	   the	   false	  presumption	   that	   the	  European	  Convention	  of	  Human	  Rights	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and	   Biomedicine	   of	   April	   1997	   is	   executive	   in	   Italy.	   Generally,	   all	   the	   new	  proposals	   –	   except	   proposal-­‐bill	   no.	   2229	   –	   have	   adopted	   a	   liberal	   approach	  by	  highlighting	  patient	  autonomy.	  Within	  them,	  the	  proposal-­‐bill	  13	  is	  the	  best	  policy	   to	   protect	   patient	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination	   because	   it	   regulates	   not	  only	  informed	  consent	  and	  advance	  directives,	  but	  also	  advance	  care	  planning.	  	  	   Concluding,	   the	   Italian	   Parliament	   should	   establish	   clear	   rules	  governing	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   issues.	   It	   should	   take	   into	   account	   the	   principle	   of	  patient	  autonomy,	  the	  experience	  of	  different	  western	  European	  countries,	  the	  rulings	   of	   the	   Italian	   judges,	   and	   the	   opinion	   of	   the	   bioethical	   and	   medical	  communities.	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Chapter	  4:	  Conclusions	  
	  
1. The	  importance	  of	  advance	  directives	  in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  decisions	  In	   this	   thesis	   the	   concept	   of	   autonomy	   in	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   decisions	   has	   been	  analyzed	   through	   ethical	   and	   legal	   approaches.	   The	   main	   aim	   of	   it	   is	   to	  demonstrate	   the	   strong	   connection	   between	   ethics	   and	   law	   in	   end-­‐of-­‐life	  decisions	  and	  to	  show	  through	  case-­‐law	  study	  the	  relevance	  of	  moral	  and	  legal	  protection	   of	   the	   patient’s	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination.	   In	   addition,	   it	   has	  evidenced	   the	   basic	   common	   European	   standard	   by	   examining	   some	   of	   the	  most	   important	   documents	   published	   by	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe.	  Moreover,	   it	  has	   investigated	   the	   reasons	   for	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   uniform	   approach	   within	  some	   Western	   European	   countries	   by	   studying	   the	   national	   law	   of	   twelve	  different	  countries.	  	  	  	   The	   significance	   of	   advance	   directives	   and	   the	   legal	   situation	   in	  Romance-­‐speaking	   countries	   (Italy,	   France,	   Portugal,	   and	   Spain),	   English-­‐speaking	   countries	   (Ireland	   and	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   of	   Great	   Britain	   and	  Northern	   Ireland),	   and	   German-­‐speaking	   countries	   (Austria,	   Germany,	   and	  Switzerland)	   has	   been	   studied.	   Particular	   attention	   has	   been	   given	   to	   the	  situation	   in	   Italy,	   Spain,	   France,	   England,	   and	   Germany,	   since	   the	   other	  countries	  in	  this	  survey	  have	  adopted	  a	  similar	  policy	  or	  because	  the	  legal	  and	  ethical	  discussion	  is	  quite	  complex.	  	   In	  particular,	   the	  Portuguese	  parliament	  of	  2012	  used	   the	  Spanish	   law	  of	   November	   2002	   as	   a	   model.	   The	   Italian	   Bill	   no.	   2350	   shares	   its	   political	  motivation	  with	   the	   previous	   version	   of	   the	   French	   law	   of	   2005.	   The	  Mental	  
Capacity	   Act	   recognizes	   similar	   principles	   with	   the	   other	   English-­‐speaking	  countries.	   In	   the	   German-­‐speaking	   countries,	   national	   legislators	   have	  adopted	   the	   same	   political	   approach:	   assuming	   that	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   decisions	   are	  an	   individual	   matter,	   they	   have	   modified	   their	   civil	   codes.	   In	   addition,	   the	  German	  legislator	  in	  2009	  adopted	  a	  quite	  liberal	  approach.	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   The	   situation	   in	   Italy	  has	  been	  examined	   in	  detail,	   since	   the	  bioethical	  discussion	   is	  quite	   complex,	  moving	   from	  a	   complete	  paternalist	   approach	   in	  1993	   to	   a	   liberal	   one	   in	   2014.	   In	   addition,	   the	   new	   Italian	   Code	   of	   Medical	  Ethics	   of	   May	   2014	   adopted	   a	   quite	   paternalistic	   approach,	   particularly	   in	  comparison	  with	  the	  previous	  version	  of	  2006.	  Furthermore,	  none	  of	  the	  eight	  new	  proposal	  bills	  presented	   in	  the	  new	  term	  of	   legislation,	  which	  started	  on	  March	  2013,	  have	  been	  discussed	  by	  the	  permanent	  commissions	  of	  the	  Italian	  Parliament.	  Therefore,	  the	  Italian	  Bill	  2350	  “Provisions	  relating	  to	  therapeutic	  alliance,	   informed	  consent	  and	  advance	  directives	   for	   treatments”	   is	   the	  only	  act	  which	  has	  been	  debated	  by	  the	  deputies	  and	  senators	   in	  different	  texts	   in	  2009	   by	   the	   Senate	   and	   in	   2011	   by	   the	   Chamber	   of	   Deputies.	   Moreover,	  although	  Italy	  is	  not	  part	  of	  common	  law	  system,	  judges	  have	  “created”	  laws	  in	  single	   cases	   because	   they	   have	   been	   called	   on	   to	   strike	   a	   balance	   between	  patient	   autonomy	   and	   the	   patient’s	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination,	   on	   one	   side,	  and	  the	  application	  of	  the	  paternalist	  approach	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  duty	  of	  care,	  on	   the	   other.	   The	   jurisprudence	   has	   interpreted	   constitutional	   rights	   or	   has	  offered	   extensive	   interpretation	   of	   the	   existing	   laws,	   in	   particular	   the	   one	  regarding	  the	  support	  guardian.	  Less	   than	   seventy	   years	   ago,	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   decisions	   were	   considered	   a	  taboo	   subject.	   This	   scenario	   began	   to	   change	   in	   the	   late	   1960s	   in	   the	   USA,	  where	  the	  individualistic	  approach	  is	  more	  common,	  and	  then	  in	  Europe.	  This	  was	   a	   direct	   result	   of	   the	   advance	   in	   medical	   discoveries,	   which	   entailed	   a	  grey	  zone	  between	  life	  and	  death:	  the	  promulgation	  of	   life	  or	  the	  anticipation	  of	  death	  might	  depend	  on	  the	  individual’s	  or	  the	  doctor’s	  decision	  to	  inject	  or	  reject	  life-­‐sustaining	  treatment.	  It	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   there	   is	   no	   other	   field	   like	   biomedicine,	   and	  especially	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   decisions,	   where	   law	   and	   ethics	   are	   so	   closely	  intertwined.	  This	  is	  also	  facilitated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  both	  law	  and	  ethics	  use	  the	  same	  conceptual	   categories:	   rules,	  principles,	   rights,	   and	  procedures.	  Both	  of	  them	   focus	  on	   the	  protection	  of	  patient	  autonomy	  and	  patient	   rights	  and	  not	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on	   ideal	   situations,	   but	   on	   concrete	   medical	   situations.	   The	   work	   of	   the	  ethicist	  is	  both	  framed	  in	  light	  of	  the	  law	  and	  influenced	  by	  it.	  In	   the	   21st	   century,	   ethicists	   are	   chosen	   as	   experts	   by	   courts	   or	   by	  European	   parliaments	   to	   assist	   with	   the	   legal	   regulation	   of	   biomedicine.	  European	   legislators	   have	   highlighted	   the	   close	   relationship	   between	   ethics	  and	   law	  by	  establishing	  bioethical	   committees.	  When	  physicians	  have	   to	  deal	  with	  terminally	  ill	  patients,	  they	  do	  not	  only	  need	  medical	  knowledge	  but	  also	  legal	   and	   ethical	   expertise.	   This	   has	   recently	   been	   confirmed	   as	   well	   by	   the	  Council	   of	   Europe	   in	   the	   Guide	   on	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   regarding	  medical	  treatment	  in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  situations.	  The	  increase	  in	  medical	  discoveries,	  which	  has	  led	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  life-­‐expectancy	  and	  a	  decrease	  in	  sudden	  death,	  has	  stimulated	  national	  legislators	  to	   rethink	   the	   traditional	   legal	   norms	   regarding	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   situations.	  Moreover,	   the	   aspect	   of	   trust	   between	   patient	   and	   physician	   and	   patient	  autonomy	  has	  been	  highlighted.	  	   In	  the	  past,	  death	  and	  the	  process	  of	  dying	  were	  considered	  a	  matter	  of	  private	   decision	   within	   the	   specific	   socio-­‐cultural	   and	   religious	   background;	  today,	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   decisions	   have	   become	   a	   matter	   of	   ethical	   debate	   and	   of	  public	   policy.	   The	   patient’s	   active	   role	   has	   been	   acknowledged	   on	   both	   the	  national	   and	   the	   international	   level.	   The	   bioethical	   communities	   as	   well	   as	  courts	  have	  highlighted	  the	  importance	  of	  ADs.	  	   All	   the	   Romance-­‐,	   English-­‐,	   and	   German-­‐speaking	   countries	   –	  except	  Northern	   Ireland,	   Ireland,	   and	   Italy	   –	   have	   legally	   backed	   ADs.	   Although	   in	  Northern	   Ireland	   there	   is	   no	   law	  on	  ADs,	   the	  bioethical	   community	   is	   asking	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  English	  Mental	  Capacity	  Act	  of	  2005.	  In	  Ireland,	  the	  Assisted	  Decision-­‐Making	  (Capacity)	  Bill	  2013	  and	  the	  Advance	  Healthcare	  
Decision	   Bill	   2012	   are	   under	   public	   consultation.	   As	   stated	   above,	   the	  bioethical	  discussion	  in	  Italy	  is	  quite	  complicated.	  	   The	   patient’s	   active	   role	   has	   been	   acknowledged	   in	   several	  international	  conventions,	  such	  as	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	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(ECHR)	   of	   1950;	   the	   Hague	   Convention	   on	   the	   International	   Protection	   of	  Adults	  of	  13	  January	  2000;	  the	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  of	  2000,	  which	   from	  1	  December	  2009	  has	   the	  same	   legal	  status	  as	  EU	  Treaties;	   and	   the	   United	   Nations’	   Convention	   on	   the	   Rights	   of	   Persons	   with	  Disabilities	   of	   13	   December	   2006.	   In	   addition,	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe	   has	  enhanced	   patient	   autonomy	   in	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   decisions	   through	   the	   European	  Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights	   and	   Biomedicine	   of	   April	   1997,	   the	  Recommendation	  CM/Rec	   (2009)	  11	  of	   the	  Council	   of	   Europe,	   and	   the	  Guide	  on	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   regarding	   medical	   treatment	   in	   end-­‐of-­‐life	  situations	  of	  May	  2014.	  	   In	   recent	   decades	   there	   has	   been	   a	   transformation	   of	   the	   scope	   of	  medicine,	   from	  the	  strict	  medical	  concept	  of	  health	   to	   the	  broader	  concept	  of	  wellbeing,	  where	  shared	  decision-­‐making	  –	  especially	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  program	  of	   care	   planning	   in	   collaboration	   and	   in	   communication	  with	   physicians	   –	   is	  the	   main	   goal.	   This	   has	   been	   highlighted	   on	   both	   the	   national	   and	   the	  international	  level.	  	  	  
2.	  	   Advance	  directives	  within	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  The	   Council	   of	   Europe	   has	   concerned	   itself	   with	   problems	   regarding	   the	  protection	   of	   patient	   autonomy	   in	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   decisions.	   The	  most	   important	  documents	   regarding	   this	   issue	   are	   the	   Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights	   and	  Biomedicine	   (also	   known	   as	   the	   Oviedo	   Convention)	   of	   April	   1997,	  Recommendation	  CM/Rec	   (2009)	  11	  of	  December	  2009	  and	   the	  Guide	  on	   the	  
decision-­‐making	  process	  regarding	  medical	  treatment	  in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  situations	  of	  May	  2014.	  The	  importance	  of	  these	  documents	  was	  recently	  acknowledged	  in	  the	  last	  ruling	  of	  the	  ECtHR	  (Application	  46043/14,	  par.	  59,	  60,	  and	  69).	  	   The	  Oviedo	  Convention	  should	  be	  considered	  a	  lex	  specialis	  of	  the	  ECHR	  of	   1950.	   The	   Oviedo	   Convention	   has	   therefore	   implemented	   the	   ethical	  principles	   of	   autonomy,	   beneficence,	   non-­‐maleficence,	   and	   justice	   –	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established	   in	   general	   in	   the	  ECHR	  –	   in	   the	   biomedical	   field.	   Specifically,	   the	  principle	   of	   autonomy	   –	   established	   in	   Article	   8	   of	   the	   ECHR	   –	   has	   been	  recognized	  in	  Articles	  5	  and	  6	  of	  the	  Oviedo	  Convention.	  Articles	  2	  and	  3	  of	  the	  ECHR,	   which	   recognized	   the	   principles	   of	   beneficence	   and	   non-­‐maleficence,	  have	  been	  transferred	  to	  Articles	  2	  and	  4	  of	  the	  ‘new’	  convention.	  In	  addition,	  the	   Oviedo	   Convention	   has	   added	   the	   principle	   of	   justice	   (Article	   3),	   which	  was	   further	   developed	   in	   Recommendation	   (2003)	   24	   of	   the	   Committee	   of	  Ministers	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  on	  the	  organization	  of	  palliative	  care.	  	   The	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Biomedicine	  is	  the	  first	  international	   legally	   binding	   comprehensive	   multilateral	   treaty	   addressing	  human	   rights	   issues	   in	   biomedicine.	   It	   provides	   basic	   standards	   in	   the	  biomedical	   field	   that	   have	   been	   recognized	   as	   fundamental	   by	   the	   European	  Court	   on	   Human	   Rights.	   In	   addition,	   it	   avoids	   economic	   competition	   in	  biomedical	   research	   and	   stimulates	   public	   debate	   and	   political	   agreement	   in	  the	  field	  of	  biomedicine.	  	   It	  must	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  Oviedo	  Convention	  recognizes	  the	  importance	  of	   advance	   wishes	   through	   Article	   9,	   where	   it	   is	   established	   that	   “the	  
previously	  expressed	  wishes	  relating	  to	  a	  medical	  intervention	  by	  a	  patient	  who	  
is	  not,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  intervention,	  in	  a	  state	  to	  express	  his	  or	  her	  wishes	  shall	  
be	   taken	   into	  account.”	  This	  convention	  does	  not	  specify	  what	  “shall	  be	   taken	  into	   account”	   means.	   The	   only	   interpretation	   of	   this	   phrase	   comes	   from	   its	  Explanatory	  Report,	  which	  states:	  “the	  previously	  expressed	  wishes	  relating	  to	  a	  
medical	  intervention	  by	  a	  patient	  who	  is	  not,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  intervention,	  in	  a	  
state	  to	  express	  his	  or	  her	  wishes	  shall	  be	  taken	  into	  account”	  (par.	  62).	  	   It	   should	  be	  noted	   that	   the	  previous	  version	  of	   the	  Oviedo	  Convention	  used	   the	  word	  decisive,	  but	  since	   this	  adjective	  created	  several	  problems,	   the	  final	   version	   of	   it	   substituted	   this	   term	   with	   the	   version	   “the	   previously	  
expressed	  wishes	   [...]	   shall	   be	   taken	   into	   account.”	  Nevertheless,	   this	   does	   not	  mean	   that	   previously	   expressed	   wishes	   should	   be	   simply	   considered	   as	   the	  patient’s	   orientation.	   In	   addition,	   the	   physician	   should	   have	   convincing	  arguments	  in	  order	  to	  not	  follow	  patient’s	  directives.	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   While	   the	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Biomedicine	  of	  April	  1997	  dedicates	  only	  one	  article	  (Article	  9)	  to	  ADs,	  Recommendation	  CM/Rec	  (2009)	  11	   and	   the	   “Guide	   on	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   regarding	   medical	  treatment	   in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	   situations”	   focus	  on	  ADs	  and	  end-­‐of-­‐life	   situations	   in	  general.	  	  
	  
2.1.	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  The	  application	  of	  Recommendation	  CM/Rec	   (2009)	  11	  of	   the	  
Council	  of	  Europe	  as	  a	  source	  of	  law	  It	   has	   been	   demonstrated,	   by	   giving	   concrete	   examples	   from	   the	   national	  legislation	   of	   twelve	   different	   European	   countries,	   that	   Recommendation	  CM/Rec	  (2009)	  11	  could	  be	  applied	  by	  the	  ECtHR	  as	  a	  source	  on	  which	  to	  base	  its	  decisions.	  Therefore,	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  document	  is	  an	  example	  of	  so-­‐called	  
soft	   law	  does	  not	   influence	   this	  conclusion,	  because	   this	  document	  shows	  the	  common	  European	  principles	  on	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  decisions,	  which	  are	  shared	  by	  all	  the	  English-­‐,	  German-­‐,	  and	  Romance-­‐speaking	  countries.	  	   The	   significance	   of	   this	   recommendation	   lies	   in	   the	   fact	   that	   it	  recognizes	   the	   role	   of	   the	   legal	   proxy	   appointed	   by	   the	   citizen.	   While	   the	  Oviedo	   Convention	   recognizes	   only	   previously	   expressed	   wishes,	  Recommendation	  CM/Rec	  (2009)	  11	  acknowledges	  that	  autonomy	  –	  especially	  if	   understood	   in	   its	   etymological	  meaning	   –	   is	  merely	   an	   ideal.	   Citizens	   have	  difficulties	  in	  foreseeing	  all	  the	  possible	  diseases	  that	  entail	  incapacity	  and	  all	  medical	  treatments	  that	  could	  be	  used	  in	  these	  cases.	  This	  is	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  the	  absence	  of	  medical	  knowledge	  or	  of	  advances	   in	  medicine.	   It	   follows	   that	  the	   power	   of	   attorney,	   especially	   in	   case	   of	   the	   grantor’s	   incapacity,	   is	  fundamental.	  	   The	  human	  person	   is	  a	  subject	   in	  a	  determinate	  environment.	  External	  factors	   –	   especially	   personal	   relationships	   –	   influence	   human	   personality.	  Recommendation	   CM/Rec	   (2009)	   11	   underlines	   these	   influences	   by	  considering	   the	   role	   of	   the	   legal	   proxy.	   Unlike	   Recommendation	   (99)	   4,	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Recommendation	   CM/Rec	   (2009)	   11	   prioritizes	   the	   appointment	   of	   a	  surrogate	   (named	  by	   the	  citizen)	   rather	   than	   that	  of	  a	  guardian	   (chosen	  by	  a	  public	  organ).	  This	   reflects	   the	   trend	   in	   legislation	   towards	  giving	  priority	   to	  the	   establishment	   of	   private	   continuing	   powers	   of	   attorney	   over	   public	  measures.	  	   The	   appointment	   of	   a	   legal	   proxy	   has	   been	   highlighted	   by	   different	  national	   legislators.	   For	   instance,	   in	   Austria,	   the	   legislator	   in	   2006	  modified	  the	  Civil	  Code,	  the	  Allgemeines	  bürgerliches	  Gesetzbuch	  (ABGB),	  only	  regarding	  the	   appointment	   of	   the	   surrogate;	   an	   ad	   hoc	   law	   –	   which	   is	   not	   part	   of	   the	  ABGB	   –	   regulates	   “living	   wills.”	   In	   Germany,	   the	   legal	   proxy	   (Betreuer	   or	  
Bevollmächtigter)	   must	   examine	   whether	   the	   determinations	   made	   in	   the	  living	   will	   correspond	   to	   the	   current	   living	   and	   treatment	   situation	   (Article	  1901a,	   section	  1	  BGB).	   In	  England	  and	  Wales,	  Article	  25,	   section	  2,	   lett.	  b)	  of	  the	   MCA	   2005	   states	   that	   a	   previous	   “living	   will”	   is	   not	   valid	   if	   the	   donor,	  having	  written	  the	  “living	  will,”	  has	  created	  a	  lasting	  power	  of	  attorney	  which	  confers	   authority	   on	   the	  donee	   to	   give	   or	   refuse	   consent	   to	   the	   treatment	   to	  which	   the	   advance	   decision	   relates.	   Recently,	   the	   French	   legislator	   in	  March	  2015	  modified	  Article	  1111-­‐4	  of	  the	  CSP;	  the	  new	  version	  states	  that	  in	  case	  of	  hospitalization,	  it	  is	  proposed	  to	  the	  patient	  to	  appoint	  a	  surrogate.	  	   Also,	   in	   the	   Romance-­‐speaking	   countries,	   national	   legislators	   have	  modified	   their	   civil	   codes	   to	   give	  an	  opportunity	   to	   citizens	   to	   give	  power	  of	  attorney	   to	  others;	   this	  power	   remains	  valid	   even	   in	   case	   the	  grantor	   should	  lose	  his	  or	  her	   full	   competency	   (France,	  Article	  477	  CC;	   Italy,	  Article	  408	  CC;	  Portugal,	  Article	  1175	  CC;	  Spain,	  Article	  1732	  CC).	  Recommendation	  CM/Rec	  (2009)	  11	  established	  several	  principles	  that	  are	   commonly	   shared	   in	   all	   parliaments	   in	   English-­‐,	   German-­‐,	   and	   Romance-­‐speaking	   countries.	   Therefore,	   the	   ECtHR	   could	   apply	   this	   recommendation,	  even	   though	   is	   soft	   law,	   as	   it	   did	   with	   the	   European	   Convention	   on	   Human	  Rights	   and	   Biomedicine	   when	   it	   was	   not	   ratified	   (Application	   no.	   61827/00	  and	   no.	   53924/00)	   or	   with	   Recommendation	   R	   (99)	   4	   (Application	   no.	  44009/05).	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2.2.	  	   Comments	   regarding	   the	   Guide	   on	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	  
regarding	  medical	  treatment	  in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  situations	  of	  May	  2014	  The	   aim	   of	   the	   commentary	   on	   the	   Guide	   on	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	  
regarding	  medical	  treatment	  in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  situations	  (the	  Guide)	  is	  to	  underline	  the	   significance	   of	   this	   document	   in	   turning	   our	   attention	   back	   to	   the	  application	  of	  the	  patient-­‐centered	  approach	  and	  to	  emphasize	  the	  role	  of	  the	  patient’s	   family	   and	   relatives.	   However,	   the	   main	   critiques	   made	   in	   this	  scientific	  work	   regard	   the	   fact	   that	   this	   document	   should	   also	   have	   included	  guidelines	  regarding	  cases	  of	  euthanasia	  or	  PAS.	  In	  addition,	  the	  Guide	  should	  have	  given	  a	  definition	  of	  “vegetative	  state”	  and	  “futile	  treatment.”	  	  	   Although	   this	   Guide	   regards	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   situations,	   euthanasia	   or	   PAS	  are	   not	   covered.	   The	   Guide	   could	   have	   encompassed	   them	   because	   some	  national	  parliaments	  –	  like	  those	  of	  the	  Netherlands,	  Belgium,	  Luxemburg,	  and	  Switzerland	  –	  have	  legally	  regulated	  PAS	  or	  euthanasia.	  Recently,	  in	  November	  2015,	  the	  German	  Parliament	  has	  modified	  Article	  217	  of	  the	  Criminal	  Code	  by	  regulating	   assisted	   suicide.	   It	   follows	   that	   in	   countries	  where	   there	   is	   no	  ad	  
hoc	   legislation	   regarding	   these	   medical	   practices	   –	  but	   nevertheless	   some	  physicians	   are	   practicing	   them	   (illegally),	   since	   they	   would	   like	   to	   relive	  patients	  from	  the	  suffering	  and	  there	  exist	  a	  will	  of	  the	  patient	  in	  that	  regard	  –	  physicians	   do	   not	   have	   any	   guidelines	   to	   follow.	   Therefore,	   physicians	   will	  perform	   them	   according	   to	   their	   personal	   ethical	   convictions.	   This	   increases	  the	   physicians’	   discretion	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   uncertainty	   regarding	   the	  modalities	  of	  these	  practices.	  	   Moreover,	  the	  Guide	  does	  not	  consider	  cases	  of	  vegetative	  state	  or	  what	  “medical	   futility”	  means.	   Since	   the	   focus	   of	   this	  Guide	   is	   on	   helping	   the	   care	  team	   to	   combine	   medical	   information	   with	   ethical	   principles,	   and	   since	  physicians	  have	  to	  deal	  with	  these	  cases	  daily,	  it	  would	  have	  been	  appropriate	  for	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  to	  establish	  guidelines	  or	  give	  definitions	  regarding	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these	   issues	   in	   this	  document.	  Moreover,	   the	  medical	   debate	   regarding	   these	  issues	  was	  recently	  brought	  to	  the	  attention	  in	  the	  case	  law	  in	  Lambert,	  where	  the	  Conseil	   d’État	   and	   then	   the	   ECtHR	   had	   to	   consider	  whether	  withdrawing	  artificial	  nutrition	  and	  hydration	  from	  a	  patient	  in	  a	  vegetative	  state	  should	  be	  deemed	  futile	  treatment.	  	   The	  Guide	   recognizes	   the	   importance	  of	   clinical	   ethics	   committees	   and	  of	   a	   review	   of	   previous	   decisions.	   A	   review	   of	   previous	   decisions	   could	   help	  the	  process	  of	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  situations.	  The	  intention	  of	  this	  review	  should	  not	  be	  to	  control	  the	  work	  done	  by	  the	  care	  team	  but	  to	  assist	  them	  in	  making	  better	  decisions	   in	   the	   future.	   Based	   on	   the	   results	   of	   these	   studies,	   healthcare	  facilities	   could	   organize	   seminars	   or	   training	   programs	   addressing	   the	  complexity	  of	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  decisions.	  	   Furthermore,	   the	   Guide	   pays	   particular	   attention,	   without	   taking	   any	  official	   position,	   to	   the	   ethical	   debate	   regarding	   cases	   of	  withdrawal	   of	  ANH.	  The	   Guide	   does	   not	   take	   any	   official	   position	   regarding	   this	   issue,	   because	  there	   is	   no	   general	   agreement	   among	   the	   member	   States	   of	   the	   Council	   of	  Europe	   on	   the	  withdrawal	   of	   ANH.	   For	   instance,	   French,	   Italian,	   and	   English	  legislators	   have	   ad	   hoc	   rules	   regarding	   this	   issue.	   In	   France,	   ANH	   will	   be	  withdrawn	  –	  after	   applying	   the	   collegial	  proceeding	  established	   in	  Article	  37	  of	   the	   Code	   of	  Medical	   Ethics	   –	   if	   the	   treatment	   has	   no	   effect	   other	   than	   the	  artificial	   prolongation	   of	   life	   (Article	   1111-­‐5-­‐1	   CSP).	   In	   Italy,	   ANH	   must	   be	  maintained	  until	  the	  end	  of	  life,	  except	  in	  cases	  where	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  effective	  in	   providing	   the	   patient	   with	   the	   nutritional	   elements	   necessary	   for	   the	  essential	   physiological	   functions	   of	   the	   body.	   Moreover,	   ANH	   cannot	   be	  withdrawn	   through	   ADs	   (Article	   3,	   section	   3	   Bill	   2350	   repeated	   in	   the	   same	  form	   by	   Proposal	   Bill	   2229	   of	   26	   March	   2014).	   In	   England	   and	   Wales,	   life-­‐sustaining	   treatment	   –	   and	   therefore	   also	   ANH	   –	   can	   be	  withdrawn	   through	  ADs	  if	  that	  is	  stated	  in	  writing	  and	  signed	  by	  the	  donor	  or	  by	  somebody	  else	  in	  the	  donor’s	  presence	  or	  under	  his	   or	  her	  directives	   (Article	  25	  of	   the	  Mental	  Capacity	  Act).	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   Although	   the	   Guide	   does	   not	   take	   any	   official	   position	   regarding	   this	  debated	   bioethical	   topic,	   its	   usefulness	   consists	   in	   underlining	   that	   ANH	  cannot	  be	  qualified	  as	  basic	  care,	  because	  it	  states	  that	  this	  technique	  implies	  choices	  concerning	  medical	  procedures	  and	  devices.	  This	  is	  important	  because	  some	  official	  documents	  –	  such	  as	  Alimentation	  and	  nutrition	  and	  hydration	  for	  
patients	   in	   a	   persistent	   vegetative	   state,	   published	   by	   the	   Italian	   Commission	  on	   Bioethics	   in	   2005;	   or	   the	   conclusions	   published	   by	   the	   Technical	   and	  Scientific	   Commission	   on	   the	   Vegetative	   state	   and	   minimum	   conscious	   state	  established	   with	   the	   Italian	   Ministerial	   Decree	   of	   12	   September	   2005;	   or	  Italian	   Bill	   2350	   or	   Proposal	   Bill	   2229	   –	   recognize	   that	   nutrition	   through	  medical	  machines	  constitutes	  basic	  care.	  	   The	  Guide	   on	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   regarding	  medical	   treatment	  
in	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   situations	   applies	   an	   interdisciplinary	   reasoning	   which	   could	  effect	   the	   decisions	   of	   the	   care	   team	   and	   also	   of	   the	   patient’s	   legal	   proxy,	  family,	   and	   relatives.	   Generally,	   national	   laws	   in	   English-­‐,	   German-­‐,	   and	  Romance-­‐speaking	  countries	  are	  in	  harmony	  with	  these	  guidelines.	  	  
3.	  	   Comparison	   between	   English-­‐,	   German-­‐,	   and	   Romance-­‐speaking	  
countries	  The	   aim	   of	   this	   survey	   is	   to	   understand	   the	   reasons	   for	   the	   absence	   of	   a	  homogeneous	  framework	  in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  decisions	  and	  to	  investigate	  the	  moral	  values	   that	  national	  policies	  have	  protected.	  A	  division	  has	  been	  made	  based	  on	   the	   level	   of	   protection	   of	   patient	   autonomy	   and	   the	   role	   of	   physicians	   in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	   situations.	   As	   a	   result	   of	   the	   application	   of	   these	   criteria,	   the	  Romance-­‐speaking	   countries	   differ	   from	   the	   English-­‐	   and	   German-­‐speaking	  countries,	   since	   in	   the	   first	   group	   of	   countries,	   national	   legislators	   have	   also	  highlighted	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  role	  of	  physicians.	  	   The	   national	   policies	   that	   have	   been	   analyzed	   in	   detail	   are	   those	   of	  Spain,	  France,	  England,	  and	  Germany.	  These	  policies	  have	  been	  considered	  as	  paradigm	   cases,	   since	   the	   other	   countries	   in	   this	   thesis	   take	   a	   similar	   legal,	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ethical,	   or	   political	   approach	   to	   one	   of	   these.	   Although	   all	   these	   countries	  emphasize	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   patient’s	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination,	   in	  Romance-­‐speaking	   countries	   the	   ethical	   principles	   of	   beneficence	   and	   non-­‐maleficence	  are	  legally	  acknowledged	  as	  well.	  	  	   	  	   In	   all	   the	   English-­‐,	   German-­‐,	   and	   Romance-­‐speaking	   countries	  examined,	  ADs	  are	  considered	  an	  instrument	  that	  supports	  a	  broad	  concept	  of	  patient	  autonomy.	  All	  these	  countries	  have	  recognized	  the	  importance	  of	  both	  “living	   wills”	   and	   “surrogate	   wills.”	   Furthermore,	   all	   –	   except	   Ireland,	   Italy,	  and	   Northern	   Ireland	   –	   have	   enacted	   national	   legislation	   on	   end-­‐of-­‐life	  decisions.	  	   In	   Spain,	   measures	   contrary	   to	   the	   lex	   artis	   –	   understood	   as	   “good	  medical	  practices”	  –	  may	  not	  be	  applied.	  Although	  in	  most	  countries	  directives	  against	  “good	  medical	  practices”	  will	  not	  be	  executed,	  the	  Spanish	  Parliament	  has	   explicitly	   specified	   this	   in	   the	   law.	   The	   General	   Council	   of	   Medical	  Colleges,	  which	  represents	  all	  physicians	   in	  Spain,	   is	   responsible	   for	  defining	  the	  meaning	  of	  “good	  medical	  practices.”	  In	  addition,	  prior	  instructions	  that	  do	  not	   correspond	   to	   the	   situation	   the	   “interested	   party”	   considered	   at	   the	  moment	   of	   stating	   them	   are	   not	   executed.	   Since	   the	   law	   does	   not	   define	   the	  person	   responsible	   for	   examining	  whether	   these	   prior	  wishes	   correspond	   to	  the	   current	   living	   and	   treatment	   situation,	   and	   because	   “living	   wills”	   are	  documents	   used	   to	   consolidate	   the	   patient-­‐physician	   relationship,	   it	   can	   be	  concluded	   that	   in	   Spain	   the	   execution	   of	   a	   living	   will	   depends	   on	   the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  physician	  in	  charge.	  	   In	   France,	   under	   the	   influence	   of	   Rousseau’s	   philosophy	   of	   the	   social	  contract,	   physicians	   consider	   themselves	   to	  be	   representatives	  of	   the	   society	  who	  should	  make	  rational	  decisions	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  ill.	  Therefore,	  physicians	  are	  obliged	  to	  do	  everything	  possible	  to	  convince	  the	  competent	  patient	  not	  to	  refuse	   medical	   treatment.	   Moreover,	   French	   law	   prioritises	   a	   physician-­‐centred	   approach	   by	   explicitly	   establishing	   in	   the	   law	   an	   ad	   hoc	   collegial	  procedure	   in	   cases	   involving	   a	   limitation	   or	  withdrawal	   of	   life-­‐sustaining	   or	  life-­‐prolonging	  treatment	  if	  there	  is	  an	  imminent	  risk	  of	  death.	  This	  policy	  has	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been	  confirmed	  by	  the	  legislator	   in	  March	  2015,	  where	  the	  new	  Article	  1111-­‐5-­‐1	  CSP	  establishes	  the	  ad	  hoc	  collegial	  procedure	  in	  the	  case	  of	  withdrawal	  of	  treatments	   that	   do	   not	   have	   any	   benefits	   other	   than	   keeping	   the	   patient	  artificially	   alive.	   Furthermore,	   the	   French	   National	   Medical	   Council	   has	   the	  power	   to	   implement	   the	   French	   Public	   Health	   Code	   through	   its	   Code	   of	  Medical	   Ethics.	   Although	   these	   rules	   are	   primarily	   relevant	   in	   disciplinary	  proceedings,	   the	   French	   Council	   of	   State	   –	   after	   judicial	   review	   –	   can	   adopt	  those	  regulations	  as	  national	  law.	  	   In	   German-­‐	   and	   English-­‐speaking	   countries,	   the	   patient’s	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination	   constitutes	   the	   main	   focus	   of	   national	   legislation.	   End-­‐of-­‐life	  decisions	   are	   considered	   a	   private	   matter,	   and	   a	   court	   decision	   is	   required	  only	  in	  situations	  explicitly	  defined	  by	  national	  laws.	  For	  instance,	  in	  England	  the	   intervention	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Protection	   is	   needed	   only	   when	   there	   is	   a	  conflict	   regarding	   the	  patient’s	  best	   interest	  –	   a	   concept	   that	   in	  England	  also	  refers	   to	   the	  patients’	  past	  and	  present	  wishes	  and	   feelings	  –	  or	   the	  patient’s	  medical	   treatment.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   in	  Germany	   the	  Court	  of	  Guardianship	  is	  required	  to	  rule	  only	  if	  there	  is	  a	  conflict	  between	  the	  legal	  proxies	  and	  the	  physicians	   responsible	   for	   issues	   of	   consent,	   refusal,	   or	   revocation	  of	   former	  consent.	  In	  addition,	  in	  both	  countries,	  judges	  must	  base	  their	  decisions	  on	  the	  patient’s	  previous	  wishes.	  	   All	   the	   Western	   European	   countries	   mentioned	   have	   recognized	   the	  patient’s	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination.	  Nevertheless,	  national	  parliaments	  in	  the	  Romance-­‐speaking	   countries	   have	   adopted	   a	   physician-­‐centred	   approach,	  since	  in	  these	  countries	  physicians	  have	  higher	  obligations	  to	  protect	  patients.	  In	  England	  and	  in	  Germany,	  national	  laws	  do	  not	  rely	  on	  physicians’	  decisions	  and	  confer	  this	  power	  on	  medically	  neutral	  persons.	  In	  those	  countries,	  this	  is	  considered	   the	  best	  way	   to	  protect	  patient	  autonomy	  against	   the	   interests	  of	  physicians,	  who	   in	   the	   past	   have	   been	   criticized	   for	   paternalism.	   Among	   the	  countries	   analysed,	   the	   German	   parliament	   has	   adopted	   the	   most	   liberal	  approach.	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4.	  	   	   Possible	   modification	   of	   the	   Italian	   bill	   regarding	   “advance	  
directives”	  Within	   the	  countries	  surveyed,	   the	   Italian	  situation	   in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  scenarios	   is	  the	  most	  complex	  because	  Italy	  is	  one	  of	  the	  few	  Western	  European	  countries	  that	   lack	   an	   ad	   hoc	   law	   regulating	   ADs.	   Moreover,	   the	   Italian	   bioethical	   and	  medical	   communities	   have	   adopted	   controversial	   positions.	   In	   addition,	   the	  jurisprudence	   has	   filled	   the	   gap	   of	   the	   absence	   of	   legal	   norms	   governing	  advance	  directives	  by	  applying	  constitutional	  rights	  or	  by	  making	  an	  extensive	  interpretation	  of	  existing	  legal	  rules.	  Furthermore,	  Bill	  no.	  2350	  is	  the	  only	  bill	  discussed	  by	  Italian	  senators	  and	  deputies,	  since	  the	  eight	  proposal	  bills	  of	  the	  new	  legislature,	  which	  started	  on	  15	  March	  2013,	  have	  not	  been	  discussed	  yet	  by	  the	  Parliament’s	  permanent	  commissions.	  	   In	  Italy,	   the	  most	   important	  case	   law	  is	  that	  of	  Englaro.	  As	   in	  the	  other	  major	  case	  law	  –	  such	  as	  Schiavo	  and	  Bland,	  and	  recently	  Lambert	  –	  the	  central	  question	  regards	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  sanctity	  of	  life	  and	  quality	  of	  life.	  In	  all	   these	   cases,	   judges	   have	   highlighted	   patient	   autonomy	   by	   giving	   patients	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  according	  to	  their	  values,	  even	  after	  they	  have	  become	  unconscious.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  this	  ruling	  introduced	  in	  Italy	  the	  doctrine	  of	  substitutive	  judgment.	  Moreover,	  the	  same	  legal	  reasoning	  applied	  in	  this	  ruling	  was	  recently	  applied	  by	  the	  Italian	  Council	  of	  State	  in	  its	  ruling	  of	  2	  September	  2014,	  no.	  4460.	  	   Since	   the	   ruling	   regarding	   Eluana	   Englaro,	   the	   Italian	   Parliament	   has	  tried	   to	   pass	   legislation	   on	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   decisions.	   Until	   now,	   Bill	   no.	   2350	  “Provisions	   relating	   to	   therapeutic	   alliance,	   informed	   consent,	   and	   advance	  
directives	   for	   treatments”	   is	   the	   only	   act	   which	   has	   been	   debated	   by	   Italian	  deputies	  and	  senators.	  The	  paternalist	  approach	  of	  this	  bill	  has	  been	  recently	  confirmed	  by	  one	  of	  the	  latest	  proposals	  –	  Proposal	  Bill	  no.	  2229,	  proposed	  by	  Ms.	   Roccella	   and	   others	   on	   26	   March	   2014	   –	   and	   in	   Article	   38	   of	   the	   new	  Italian	  Code	  of	  Medical	  Ethics	  of	  May	  2014.	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   Italy	   should	   have	   a	   specific	   law	   governing	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   decisions.	   This	  need	  has	  been	  highlighted	  by	  both	  the	  bioethical	  and	  the	  medical	  community.	  Moreover,	   recent	   studies	  have	  demonstrated	   that	   Italian	   citizens	   –	   like	  other	  western	   European	   citizens	   –	   prioritize	   the	   quality	   of	   life	   rather	   than	   an	  extension	   of	   life.	   Therefore,	   although	   national	   legislators	   have	   applied	  different	   policies,	   citizens’	   preferences	   and	   values	   in	   regard	   to	   end-­‐of-­‐life	  situations	  are	  similar.	  	   The	   Italian	   Parliament	   should	   adopt	   a	   bioethical	   approach	   based	   on	  informed	   consent	   and	   on	   care	   planning	   where	   the	   patient-­‐physician	   trust	  should	  be	  considered	  essential.	  This	  law	  should	  be	  “reasonable,”	  in	  addition	  to	  governing	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   situations	   by	   paying	   particular	   attention	   to	   patient	  autonomy	   and	   the	   patient’s	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination.	   Moreover,	   this	   law	  should	  reflect	   the	  particular	  cultural	  aspect	  of	   Italian	  society	  and	  should	  also	  examine	   suggestions	   coming	   from	   the	  main	  medical	   scientific	   organizations,	  such	  as	  SIAARTI	  and	  FNOMCeO.	  	   In	   addition,	   the	   law	   should	   take	   into	   account	   the	   rulings	   of	   the	   Italian	  Constitutional	  Court	  and	  of	  Italian	  judges,	  who	  until	  now	  have	  substituted	  the	  Italian	   legislator	   by	   ruling	   on	   individual	   cases	   protecting	   patient	   autonomy	  and	   the	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination.	  Moreover,	  differently	   from	  Bill	   2350,	   the	  law	  must	  not	  be	  a	  political	  reaction	  and	  must	  be	  relevant.	  
	   ADs	  should	  be	  without	  restriction	  in	  time	  or	  object	  and	  must	  be	  applied	  even	   in	   cases	   where	   there	   is	   a	   risk	   of	   death.	   This	   is	   a	   direct	   result	   of	   the	  application	  of	   the	  ethical	  principle	  of	  patient	   autonomy	  and	   the	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination	   in	   healthcare	   treatments,	   which	   is	   recognized	   as	   a	  constitutional	   right	   through	   the	   combination	   of	   Articles	   13	   and	   32	   of	   the	  Italian	   Constitution.	   The	   restriction	   in	   time	   or	   object	  would	   be	   considered	   a	  paternalist	   approach	   that	  would	  not	   be	   consistent	  with	   the	  protection	  of	   the	  patient’s	  wellbeing	  –	  a	  concept	  with	  is	  broader	  than	  the	  patient’s	  health	  –	  and	  would	  compromise	  the	  patient-­‐physician	  trust.	  	   Furthermore,	  particular	  attention	  should	  be	  paid	  to	  the	  different	  uses	  of	  the	   medico-­‐legal	   notions	   of	   “advance	   directive”	   and	   “living	   will,”	   terms	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correctly	  used	  by	  the	  Italian	  National	  Committee	  in	  its	  document	  published	  in	  1993.	   In	   accordance	   with	   the	  Advanced	   Statements	   about	   Medical	   Treatment	  published	   by	   the	   British	  Medical	   Association	   in	   1995,	   it	   is	   the	   “living	  will”	   –	  not	   the	   broader	   concept	   of	   “advance	   directive”	   as	   stated	   in	   the	   Italian	   Bill	   –	  that	   is	   the	   formal	  declaration	  written	  by	  a	   competent	  adult	   conveying	  her	  or	  his	   wish	   for	   any	   life-­‐prolonging	   measures	   to	   be	   withheld	   in	   circumstances	  where	  there	  is	  no	  prospect	  of	  recovery.	  	  	   Also,	   a	   correct	   interpretation	   of	   the	   international	   framework	   –	   the	  Convention	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Persons	  with	  Disabilities	  –	  is	  needed.	  Article	  25	  of	  this	   Convention	   envisages	   cases	   where	   patients	   with	   disabilities	   request	  medical	   treatments,	   not	   cases	   where	   patients	   refuse	   them	   through	   “living	  wills”	  when	  they	  were	  of	  sound	  mind.	  Moreover,	   it	   is	  descriptively	  inaccurate	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  person	  in	  a	  vegetative	  state	  as	  being	  disabled,	  since	  between	  the	  two	  conditions	  there	  are	  more	  differences	  than	  similarities.	  	  	   The	   Italian	   law	   should	   consider	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   majority	   of	   Italian	  physicians	   (SIAARTI	   and	   FNOMCeO),	   Italian	   jurisprudence	   (the	   case	   law	   in	  
Eluana	  Englaro),	  and	  the	  Oleari	  Commission	  (formed	  by	  the	  Minister	  of	  Health	  in	   the	   year	   2000)	   consider	   medical	   nutrition	   as	   medical	   treatment,	   because	  the	  delivery	  method	  is	  artificial.	  This	  principle	  has	  been	  clearly	  established	  by	  the	   British	   Medical	   Association	   in	   its	   document	   of	   2007,	   Withholding	   and	  
Withdrawing	  Life-­‐Prolonging	  Medical	  Treatment	  Guidance	  for	  Decision	  Making.	  In	   addition,	   it	   seems	   that	   the	   same	   reasoning	   has	   been	   recently	   used	   by	   the	  Council	   of	   Europe	   in	   the	   Guide	   on	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   regarding	  medical	   treatment	   in	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   situations	   of	   May	   2014,	   since	   it	   states	   that	  this	   technique	   entails	   choices	   concerning	   medical	   procedures	   and	   devices.	  Moreover,	   the	   medical	   staff	   has	   proven	   that	   death	   due	   to	   dehydration	   is	  palliative.	  	   Solutions	   regarding	   the	   withdrawal	   of	   treatments	   come	   from	   the	  bioethical	   community	   or	   from	   the	   experience	   of	   other	   Western	   European	  countries.	   The	   bioethical	   community	   has	   stated	   that	   physicians	   should	   not	  focus	  on	  the	  abstract	  quality	  of	  ANH,	  but	  should	  rather	  answer	  the	  question	  of	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the	   extent	   to	   which	   this	   treatment	   benefits	   a	   specific	   patient	   in	   a	   specific	  condition.	   	   In	   the	  Netherlands,	   feeding	   a	   patient	   through	   a	   tube	   is	   deemed	   a	  medical	   act,	   which	   can	   be	   halted	   on	   the	   ground	   of	   its	   senseless	   nature.	   The	  classification	  of	  ANH	  as	  a	  senseless	  medical	  act	  under	  certain	  conditions	  avoids	  the	   ambiguous	   legal	   consequences	   that	   come	   from	   its	   classification	   as	   basic	  care	   or	  medical	   treatment.	   Thus,	   there	   is	   no	  need	   for	   legal	   qualification,	   and	  medical	   consideration,	   based	   on	   current	  medical	   ethical	   standards,	   becomes	  crucial.	  	   In	  the	  UK,	  the	  MCA	  gives	  the	  agent	  the	  possibility	  to	  include	  a	  refusal	  of	  ANH	   in	  his	   or	  her	   treatment	  directives,	   but	  not	   a	   refusal	   of	   natural	   nutrition	  and	   hydration.	   Therefore,	   medical	   nutrition	   and	   hydration	   can	   be	   refused.	  Instead,	   the	   new	   French	   law	   of	   March	   2015	   has	   established	   –	   in	   its	   Article	  1110-­‐5-­‐1	   CSP	   –	   an	   ad	   hoc	   collegial	   procedure	   in	   cases	   of	   withdrawal	   of	  treatment	  that	  do	  not	  have	  benefits	  other	  than	  keeping	  the	  patient	  artificially	  alive.	  	   The	  problem	  of	  withdrawing	  ANH	  has	  been	  highlighted	  by	  some	  of	   the	  new	  proposal	  bills.	  While	  Proposal	  Bill	  2226	  has	  adopted	  the	  same	  paternalist	  approach	  as	  BILL	  2350,	  Proposal	  Bills	  1298,	  1432,	  and	  2264	  have	  established	  that	   ANH	   can	   be	   withdrawn.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   Proposal	   443	   states	   that	  parental	  feeding	  is	  not	  deemed	  futile	  treatment.	  This	  proposal	  has	  codified	  the	  controversial	  discussion	  within	  the	  bioethical	  community,	  where	  a	  distinction	  between	  gastrostomy	  and	  nasogastric	   feeding	  has	  been	  underlined.	   It	   should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  entire	  bioethical	  community	  accepts	  gastrostomy	  feeding	  as	  a	   medical	   treatment,	   but	   some	   scholars	   have	   raised	   doubts	   regarding	   the	  definition	   of	   nasogastric	   feeding	   as	   such.	   However,	   these	   scholars	   recognize	  nasogastric	  feeding	  as	  a	  general	  medical	  management.	  	   ADs	  could	  be	  written	  even	  without	  full	  medical	  and	  clinical	  information,	  a	  requirement	  that	  belongs	  more	  to	  the	  world	  of	  bureaucracy	  than	  to	  that	  of	  a	  concrete	  medical	  situation.	  What	   follows	   is	  an	   increased	  public	   trust	   in	   these	  kinds	   of	   documents	   and	   a	   decrease	   in	   the	   public	   expenditure	   regarding	   the	  cost	  that	  physicians	  or	  hospitals	  need	  to	  make	  to	  implement	  this	  policy.	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   Furthermore,	   oral	   medical	   declarations	   made	   under	   certain	  circumstances	   should	   be	   considered	   valid.	   Therefore,	   people	   that	   are	  incapable	  of	  writing	  –	  probably	  for	  physical	  problems	  –	  should	  still	  be	  able	  to	  formulate	   a	   “living	   will.”	   This	   would	   be	   a	   direct	   application	   of	   the	  constitutional	   right	   to	   equal	   treatment	   (Article	   3	   of	   the	   Italian	   Constitution)	  and	   a	   better	   application	   of	   the	   Convention	   on	   the	   Rights	   of	   Persons	   with	  Disabilities	   of	   13	  December	   2006,	   ratified	   in	   Italy	   by	   Law	   no.	   18	   of	   3	  March	  2009.	  Of	  all	  the	  new	  proposal	  bills,	  Proposal	  Bill	  13	  is	  the	  only	  one	  that	  takes	  this	   principle	   into	   account.	   It	   states	   that	   oral	   declarations	   received	   by	   the	  physician	  or	  clearly	  documented	  through	  video	  recording	  are	  valid	  (Article	  23,	  section	  1,	  lett.	  d).	  	   ADs	   should	   not	   be	   time-­‐limited.	   However,	   the	   Italian	   medical	  community	   (SIAARTI	   and	   FNOMCeO)	   has	   underlined	   the	   importance	   of	   a	  revision	   of	   ADs.	   According	   to	   them,	   an	   update	   of	   ADs	   will	   make	   ADs	   less	  ambiguous	   and	   more	   coherent	   with	   the	   current	   medical	   situation	   and	   with	  patient	  wishes.	  Bill	  2350	  and	  Proposal	  Bill	  2229	  have	  codified	  this	  concern	  by	  limiting	  the	  validity	  of	  ADs	  to	  five	  years	  after	  they	  are	  written.	  	   Although	  these	  concerns	  are	  shared,	  they	  should	  be	  a	  suggestion,	  not	  a	  legal	   requirement.	   The	   problems	   derived	   from	   the	   long	   period	   that	   can	   pass	  between	   the	   formulation	   of	   ADs	   and	   their	   execution	   could	   be	   resolved	   by	  taking	   into	  consideration	   the	  models	  derived	   from	  the	  Explanatory	  Report	  of	  the	   Oviedo	   Convention	   or	   from	   German	   and	   French	   laws.	   According	   to	  paragraph	  62	  of	   the	  Explanatory	  Report	  on	   the	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Biomedicine,	  ADs	  are	  valid	  until	  the	  moment	  there	  is	  a	  medical	  discovery	  or	   a	   change	   in	   the	   patient’s	   pathology	   such	   that	   the	   patient	   would	   have	  changed	  his	  or	  her	  medical	  instructions	  had	  he	  or	  she	  become	  aware	  of	  them.	  This	   seems	   to	  be	   the	  policy	   adopted	  by	  Proposals	   13,	   1432,	   1298,	   and	  2264.	  Instead,	  the	  German	  and	  French	  Parliaments	  have	  resolved	  the	  uncertainty	  of	  personality	   changes	   entailed	   by	   the	   absence	   of	   this	   temporal	   limitation	   by	  giving	   broader	   powers	   to	   the	   surrogate,	   who	   must	   verify	   whether	   the	  instructions	  contained	  in	  a	  living	  will	  adequately	  address	  the	  current	  medical	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situation.	   This	   has	   been	   established	   in	   Article	   1901a,	   section	   1	   BGB,	   and	   in	  Article	  1111-­‐6,	  section	  2,	  CSP.	  	   The	   Italian	   legal	   system	   needs	   clear	   rules	   for	   advance	   medical	  declarations.	   The	   law	  must	   consider	   the	   international	   framework,	   as	  well	   as	  domestic	   rulings	   in	   Italian	   jurisprudence,	   without	   forgetting	   the	   ethical	  principle	  of	  autonomy.	  	  
	  
	  
4.1.	  	   Possible	  modification	  of	  the	  Italian	  bill	  regarding	  “surrogate	  wills”	  The	  main	  aim	  of	  this	  paragraph	  is	  to	  highlight	  the	  key	  role	  of	  a	   legal	  proxy	  in	  ascertaining	   the	  medical	  directive	  of	  an	  unconscious	  patient.	  With	   the	  aim	   to	  supporting	   this	   result,	   arguments	   on	   moral	   reasons	   have	   been	   given.	   In	  addition,	   it	   has	   examined	   concrete	   legal	   examples	   established	   in	   the	  legislations	   of	   Germany,	   France,	   and	   England.	   In	   the	   conclusions,	   the	  difference	  between	  the	  legal	  figure	  of	  the	  surrogate	  (the	  legal	  proxy	  appointed	  by	  the	  citizen)	  and	  that	  of	  the	  support	  guardian	  (the	  legal	  proxy	  appointed	  by	  the	   judge	   under	   Article	   404–413	   C.C.)	   in	   the	   Italian	   legal	   system	   has	   been	  explained.	  It	  has	  been	  argued	  that,	  if	  certain	  conditions	  are	  satisfied,	  a	  support	  guardian	  can	  be	  appointed	  even	  if	  the	  citizen	  is	  still	  conscious.	  	   In	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  decisions,	   the	  appointment	  of	  a	   legal	  proxy	   is	  considered	  fundamental.	   Their	   appointment	   should	   be	   considered	   the	   best	   option	   for	  resolving	   well-­‐documented	   problems	   that	   arise	   with	   the	   interpretation	   of	  fixed	   documents	   written	   at	   a	   particular	   time.	   National	   legislators	   and	   court	  rulings	   have	   contemplated	   this	   fact.	   Recently,	   this	   has	   been	   confirmed	   in	  France.	   The	   results	   from	   the	   latest	   empirical	   research	   conducted	   there	   and	  published	   in	   2015	   show	   that	   the	   appointment	   of	   a	   surrogate	   has	   been	  reported	   three	   times	   more	   often	   than	   the	   formulation	   of	   a	   “living	   will.”	   In	  addition,	   the	  new	   law	  of	  March	  2015,	  Loi	  créant	  de	  nouveaux	  droits	  en	   faveur	  
des	  malades	  et	  des	  personnes	  en	  fin	  de	  vie,	  has	  modified	  Article	  1111-­‐4	  CSP	  by	  
	  	  	  	  
	   240	  
establishing	   that	   in	   case	   of	   hospitalization,	   the	   medical	   staff	   must	   ask	   the	  patient	  if	  he	  or	  she	  would	  like	  to	  appoint	  a	  legal	  representative.	  	   The	  Italian	  parliament	  must	  recognize	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  surrogate.	   The	   experience	   derived	   from	   other	   Western	   European	   countries,	  and	   especially	   the	   MCA	   of	   2005,	   should	   be	   taken	   into	   consideration.	   The	  Italian	   law	   should	   offer	   a	   chance	   to	   appoint	   more	   than	   one	   surrogate.	   The	  ability	   to	   appoint	   several	   surrogates	   could	   be	   a	   fair	   solution	   in	   cases	  where	  there	  are	   several	   children	   involved.	   In	  addition,	   two	  or	  more	   surrogates	  may	  be	   the	   answer	   to	   an	   undue	   concentration	   of	   power	   or	   to	   the	   need	   to	   reduce	  the	  risk	  of	   family	  dispute.	  Unfortunately,	  neither	   the	   Italian	  Bill	  no.	  2350	  nor	  the	  other	  eight	  new	  proposal	  bills	  regarding	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  decision-­‐making	  offer	  this	  possibility.	  	   In	   addition,	   specific	   sanctions	   should	   be	   stated	   in	   cases	   involving	  surrogates	   that	   ignore	   the	   obligations	   established	   in	   the	   law.	   Moreover,	   an	  authority	   to	   oversee	   the	   surrogate’s	   activity	   and	   to	   rule	   in	   cases	   of	   conflict	  between	   surrogates	   and	   doctors	   should	   be	   considered.	   The	   establishment	   of	  an	   authority	   empowered	   to	   resolve	   disagreements	   between	   surrogate	   and	  physician	  and	  to	  oversee	  the	  surrogate’s	  activity	  is	  important,	  since	  empirical	  studies	   have	   shown	   that	   some	   surrogates	   –	   due	   to	   clinically	   diagnosed	  conditions,	  such	  as	  stress,	  depression,	  and	  anxiety	  –	  could	  loose	  their	  capacity	  or	  may	  sometimes	  have	  dubious	  motives	  in	  that	  they	  are	  looking	  out	  for	  their	  own	  interests	  rather	  than	  for	  those	  of	  the	  patient.	   In	  case	  of	  conflict	  between	  surrogates	   and	  doctors,	   two	  different	   solutions	   could	   be	   used.	   The	   first	   is	   to	  resolve	   the	   conflicts	   within	   the	   hospital,	   as	   established	   in	   Proposals	   5	   and	  1142	   and	   suggested	   by	   SIAARTI;	   the	   second	   is	   to	   resort	   to	   a	   judge,	   as	  established	   in	   Proposals	   13,	   443,	   1298,	   and	   2264.	   While	   the	   first	   approach	  yields	  a	  more	  expedited	  decision	  based	  on	  medical	  criteria,	  the	  second	  model	  is	  fully	  impartial.	  	   This	   authority	   should	   be	   impartial	   and	   exercised	   by	   a	   judge	   who	   is	  specialized	   in	   this	   field.	   Therefore,	   the	   proceeding	   will	   be	   swifter	   and	   less	  complex	  and/or	  expensive.	   Since	   the	   Italian	  constitution	   recognizes	   the	   right	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to	   justice	   (Article	   24),	   the	   same	   result	   would	   probably	   be	   achieved	   through	  the	  appointment	  of	  an	  external	  expert;	  but	   this	  will	  make	  the	  process	   longer,	  more	   expensive,	   and	   more	   complex.	   It	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   in	   end-­‐of-­‐life	  situations	  the	  decision	  by	  the	  judge	  should	  be	  quick,	  and	  ordinary	  jurisdiction	  –	  even	  in	  cases	  of	  summary	  procedures	  introduced	  by	  Law	  69	  of	  19	  June	  2009	  –	  cannot	  provide	  that.	  	   The	   legal	   roles	  of	  guardian	  and	  surrogate	  are	  similar	  but	  not	   identical.	  Surrogate	   and	   guardian	   alike	   must	   decide	   according	   to	   the	   patient’s	  preferences	   and	   values.	   Both	   are	   designated	   by	   the	   patient,	   but	   as	   the	   High	  Court	   of	   Cassation	   ruled	   in	   2012,	   only	   a	   judge	   can	   appoint	   a	   guardian	  when	  the	  ward	  cannot	  do	  so.	  Moreover,	   the	   instructions	  contained	  in	  the	  “guardian	  will”	  are	  legally	  binding	  only	  between	  citizens;	  the	  judge	  is	  only	  required	  take	  them	  into	  account	  in	  arriving	  at	  a	  decision.	  Additionally	  –	  if	  there	  is	  a	  serious	  reason	  –	  the	  judge	  has	  the	  power	  to	  dismiss	  the	  guardian.	  	   Until	  then,	  Italian	  judges	  should	  protect	  the	  patient’s	  autonomy	  without	  conflating	  the	   legal	   figure	  of	  a	  guardian	  with	  that	  of	  a	  surrogate:	  an	  extended	  interpretation	   of	   Articles	   404–413	   C.C.	   in	   light	   of	   the	   constitutional	   right	   to	  self-­‐determination	   can	   be	   applied.	   When	   citizens	   are	   fully	   competent,	   a	  guardian	  could	  be	  appointed	  −	  and	  not	  only	  designated	  −	  only	  in	  cases	  where,	  in	   the	   near	   future,	   incapacity	   is	   almost	   certain	   and	   patients	   have	   received	  detailed	  information	  about	  the	  medical	  consequences	  of	  their	  disease.	  	  	  
5.	  	   Final	  remarks	  In	   this	   thesis,	   it	   has	   been	   argued	   that	   in	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   decisions	   law	   and	   ethics	  are	  closely	  intertwined.	  Both	  focus	  on	  the	  protection	  of	  patient	  autonomy	  and	  therefore	   on	   the	   patient’s	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination	   in	   concrete	   medical	  situations.	  The	  work	  of	   the	   ethicist	   is	  both	   framed	   in	   light	  of,	   and	   influenced	  by,	  the	  law.	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   On	   the	   European	   level,	   the	   most	   important	   documents	   regarding	   this	  issue	   are	   the	   Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights	   and	   Biomedicine	   of	   April	   1997,	  Recommendation	  CM/Rec	  (2009)	  11	  of	  December	  2009,	  and	  the	  Guide	  on	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  regarding	  medical	  treatment	  in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  situations	  of	  May	  2014.	  	   By	   giving	   concrete	   examples	   from	   the	   national	   legislation	   of	   the	  English-­‐,	   German-­‐,	   and	   Romance-­‐speaking	   countries,	   it	   has	   been	   shown	   that	  Recommendation	   CM/Rec	   (2009)	   11,	   though	   it	   is	   considered	   an	   example	   of	  
soft	   law,	   could	   be	   applied	   by	   the	   ECtHR	   as	   a	   source	   on	   which	   to	   base	   its	  decisions.	  	  	  	   The	   commentaries	   on	   the	   Guide	   on	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	  
regarding	   medical	   treatment	   in	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   situations	   has	   demonstrated	   the	  application	  of	   the	   four	  ethical	  principles	   in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	   issues.	  However,	   it	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  guidelines	  regarding	  euthanasia	  or	  PAS	  be	  included,	  since	  several	   countries	   have	   regulated	   them,	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   several	  studies	   have	   shown	   their	   use	   even	   in	   countries	   where	   there	   is	   a	   lack	   of	  legislation	  or	  where	  these	  medical	  practice	  are	  deemed	  illegal.	  	   By	   focusing	   on	   the	   legal	   situation	   in	   English-­‐,	   German-­‐,	   and	   Romance-­‐speaking	  countries,	  it	  has	  been	  noticed	  that	  in	  all	  them,	  advance	  directives	  are	  considered	  an	  instrument	  that	  supports	  a	  broad	  concept	  of	  patient	  autonomy.	  All	   these	  countries	  have	   recognized	   the	   importance	  of	  both	   “living	  wills”	  and	  “surrogate	   wills.”	   Furthermore,	   all	   –	   except	   Ireland,	   Italy,	   and	   Northern	  Ireland	  –	  have	  enacted	  national	  legislation	  on	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  decisions.	  	  	   Nevertheless,	  between	  these	  countries,	  a	  division	  has	  been	  made	  based	  on	   the	   level	   of	   protection	   of	   patient	   autonomy	   and	   the	   role	   of	   physicians	   in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	   situations.	   The	   result	   is	   that	   all	   the	   policies	   analyzed	   protect	  patient	   autonomy;	   the	   Romance-­‐speaking	   countries	   differ	   from	   the	   other	  groups	   (English-­‐	   and	   German-­‐speaking	   countries)	   in	   that	   the	   national	  parliaments	   of	   the	   Romance-­‐speaking	   countries	   have	   also	   underlined	   the	  significance	  of	   the	   role	  of	  physicians.	   In	  England	  and	  Germany,	  national	   laws	  do	   not	   rely	   on	   physicians’	   decisions,	   giving	   this	   power	   to	   medically	   neutral	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persons.	  In	  those	  countries,	  this	  is	  considered	  the	  best	  way	  to	  protect	  patient	  autonomy	   against	   the	   interests	   of	   physicians,	   who	   in	   the	   past	   have	   been	  criticized	  for	  paternalism.	  Among	  the	  countries	  analysed	  in	  detail,	  the	  German	  parliament	  has	  adopted	  the	  most	  liberal	  approach.	  	   Within	   the	   countries	   surveyed,	   the	   Italian	   situation	   in	   end-­‐of-­‐life	  situations	   is	   the	   most	   complex	   because	   Italy	   is	   one	   of	   the	   few	   Western	  European	   countries	   that	   lack	   an	   ad	   hoc	   law	   regulating	   ADs.	   Moreover,	   the	  Italian	   bioethical	   community	   has	   adopted	   controversial	   positions:	   from	   a	  complete	  paternalist	  approach	   in	  1993	   to	  a	   liberal	  one	   in	  2014.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	  the	  medical	  community	  has	  recently	  adopted	  a	  conservative	  approach	  in	  2014;	   the	  previous	   version	  of	   the	   Italian	  Code	  of	  Medical	  Ethics	   –	   the	  one	  of	  2006	   –	  was	  more	   liberal.	   In	   addition,	   the	   jurisprudence	   has	   filled	   the	   gap	   in	  legal	  norms	  governing	  advance	  directives	  by	  applying	  constitutional	  rights	  or	  by	   offering	   an	   extensive	   interpretation	   of	   existing	   legal	   rules.	   The	   most	  important	  case	  law	  is	  that	  set	  in	  Eluana	  Engalro,	  and	  the	  same	  legal	  reasoning	  has	   recently	   been	   adopted	   by	   the	   Italian	   Council	   of	   State	   in	   its	   ruling	   of	   2	  September	  2014,	  no.	  4460.	  Since	   Italy	   is	  not	  part	  of	   the	  common-­‐law	  system,	  judges	  are	  not	  obliged	  to	  follow	  the	  principle	  of	  precedent.	  	   In	  Italy,	  since	  the	  case	  law	  set	  in	  Eluana	  Englaro,	  the	  Italian	  Parliament	  has	   tried	   to	  pass	   legislation	  on	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  decisions.	  Until	  now,	  Bill	  no.	  2350,	  “Provisions	   relating	   to	   therapeutic	   alliance,	   informed	   consent	   and	   advance	  
directives	   for	   treatments,”	   is	   the	   only	   act	   that	   has	   been	   debated	   by	   Italian	  deputies	   and	   senators.	   The	   paternalist	   approach	   of	   taken	   in	   this	   bill	   has	  recently	   been	   confirmed	   by	   one	   of	   the	   latest	   proposals	   –	   Proposal	   Bill	   no.	  2229,	  proposed	  by	  Ms.	  Roccella	  and	  others	  on	  26	  March	  2014	  –	  and	  in	  Article	  38	  of	  the	  new	  Italian	  Code	  of	  Medical	  Ethics	  of	  May	  2014.	  	   Italy	  should	  have	  a	  specific	  law	  governing	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  decisions.	  The	  law	  should	  take	  into	  account	  the	  rulings	  of	  the	  Italian	  Constitutional	  Court	  and	  of	  Italian	   judges,	   who	   until	   now	   have	   substituted	   the	   Italian	   legislator	   by	  rendering	  individual	  rulings	  protecting	  patient	  autonomy	  and	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination.	   In	   addition,	   the	   experience	   of	   other	   Western	   European	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countries	   should	   be	   taken	   into	   consideration.	   However,	   the	   particularity	   of	  Italian	   medical	   culture,	   which	   underlines	   the	   significance	   of	   role	   of	   the	  medical	  staff	  in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  decisions,	  should	  be	  considered	  as	  well.	   	  	   Until	   then,	   Italian	   judges	   should	   protect	   the	   patient’s	   autonomy	   by	  applying	   the	   current	   laws	   without	   conflating	   the	   legal	   figure	   of	   a	   guardian	  with	  that	  of	  a	  surrogate:	  an	  extended	  interpretation	  of	  Articles	  404–413	  C.C.	  in	  light	   of	   the	   constitutional	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination	   can	   be	   applied.	   Only	   in	  cases	  where,	  in	  the	  near	  future,	  incapacity	  is	  almost	  certain	  and	  patients	  have	  received	   detailed	   information	   about	   the	   medical	   consequences	   of	   their	  diseases	   should	   guardian	   be	   appointed	   −	   and	   not	   only	   designated	   −	   when	  citizens	  are	  fully	  competent.	  	   Nevertheless,	   Italian	   judges	   should	   take	   into	   account	   not	   only	   the	  interpretation	   of	   constitutional	   rights,	   but	   also	   documents	   published	   by	   the	  Italian	  Bioethical	  Committee,	  in	  addition	  to	  reflecting	  on	  the	  suggestions	  from	  the	  main	  medical	  organizations,	  such	  as	  SIAARTI	  and	  FNOMCeO,	  and	  of	  patient	  associations.	   It	  may	  be	   that	   if	   the	   Italian	   legislator	   has	   not	   regulated	   end-­‐of-­‐life	  decisions,	  the	  reason	  for	  this	  gap	  in	  the	  law	  is	  to	  avoid	  ossifying	  normative	  rules,	   subjective	  values,	  and	  ethical	  principles	   that	   in	  society	  are	   flexible	  and	  in	   flux.	   Thus,	   as	   the	   medical	   community	   argues,	   the	   Italian	   parliament	   does	  not	   prefer	   end-­‐of-­‐life	   decisions	   to	   be	   resolved	   simply	   through	   legal	  technicalities	  and	  arguments,	  but	   is	   rather	   looking	   to	   take	   into	  consideration	  the	  role	  of	  culture,	  society,	  family,	  and	  physicians.	  	   The	  possibility	  of	  dialogue	  with	  physicians,	  and	  therefore	  a	  program	  of	  a	   care	   planning,	   is	   aimed	   at	   emphasizing	   the	   patient-­‐physician	   trust.	   In	  addition,	  the	  ability	  to	  have	  the	  medical	  and	  clinical	  information	  regarding	  the	  progress	  of	   the	  disease	  highlights	  patient	  autonomy.	  Moreover,	  since	   identity	  and	   interests	   are	   seen	   as	   dynamic	   and	   continuously	   shaped	   by	   relationships	  with	   other	   people,	   giving	   the	   citizen	   the	   right	   to	   designate	   and	   then	   appoint	  his	  or	  her	  legal	  proxy	  is	  more	  coherent	  with	  the	  new	  approach	  to	  autonomy	  as	  a	   relational	   principle.	   Furthermore,	   this	   approach	   reflects	   the	   results	   of	   the	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new	  European	  legislative	  trend	  towards	  giving	  priority	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  private	  continuing	  powers	  of	  attorney	  over	  public	  measures	  of	  protection.	  	   Until	   now,	   the	   proposals	   for	   a	   new	   bill	   regarding	   advance	   directives	  comprise	  three	  from	  the	  Senate	  and	  five	  from	  the	  Chamber	  of	  Deputies,	  which	  are	  Proposal	  Bills	  5,	  13,	  443,	  1142,	  1298,	  1432,	  2229,	  and	  2264.	   It	   should	  be	  noted	   that	   the	  Proposal	  Bills	  5	   and	  1142	  are	   similar.	  Moreover,	   the	  Proposal	  Bill	   2229	   adopted	   the	   same	   paternalist	   and	   conservative	   approach	   as	   Bill	  2350.	   In	   addition,	   Proposal	   Bill	   1432	   contains	   only	   one	   article;	   therefore,	   it	  lacks	   several	   procedural	   norms	   and	   makes	   the	   false	   assumption	   that	   the	  European	   Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights	   and	   Biomedicine	   of	   April	   1997	   is	  executive	  in	  Italy.	  	   Of	  all	  these	  proposal	  bills,	  Proposal	  Bills	  13	  and	  1298	  should	  be	  pointed	  out.	  Proposal	  Bill	  13	   is	   the	  only	  one	  that	  also	  governs	  advance	  care	  planning,	  which	   underlines	   the	   importance	   of	   communication	   and	   patient-­‐physician	  trust.	   It	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   several	   studies	   have	   shown	   that	   ADs	   written	  within	   advance	   care	   planning	   are	   more	   precise	   and	   coherent.	   Furthermore,	  the	   main	   Italian	   medical	   organizations	   also	   agree	   on	   interpreting	   ADs	   as	  legally	  binding	  if	  they	  were	  stated	  within	  a	  care	  planning	  program.	  	   However,	   the	   confusing	  definition	  of	   surrogates	   in	  Article	  6,	   section	  1,	  must	   be	   noted:	   the	   text	   maintains	   the	   power	   of	   a	   surrogate	   even	   when	   the	  patient	   is	  conscious.	  By	  contrast,	  Proposal	  Bill	  1298	  draws	  a	  clear	  distinction	  between	   “living	   will”	   and	   “surrogate	   will”	   and	   provides	   all	   citizens	   over	   16	  years	  old	  the	  ability	  to	  write	  an	  AD.	  	  	   Proposal	   Bill	   13	   “Norms	   on	   the	   relationship	   of	   care,	   consent,	   medical	  
emergency,	   refusal	   and	   interruption	   of	   care,	   advance	   directives,”	   proposed	   by	  Senators	  Manconi	  and	  Corsini	  on	  15	  March	  2013,	  which	  contains	  25	  articles,	  is	  the	  best	  option	  for	  regulating	  ADs.	  Proposal	  Bill	  13	  not	  only	  governs	  informed	  consent	  and	  ADs	  but	  also	  regulates	  advance	  care	  planning.	  Moreover,	  ADs	  are	  not	   limited	   in	   time;	   the	   document	   does	   not	   contemplate	   the	   principle	   of	   the	  sanctity	  of	  life	  and	  it	  emphasizes	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  patient’s	  wellbeing	  as	  a	  subjective	  view	  of	  health	  by	  the	  citizen	  (Article	  2).	  This	  proposal	  bill	  clearly	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Annex*226	  
	  
Italian	   Bill	   2350	   Norms	   in	   Matter	   of	   Therapeutic	   Alliance,	   Informed	  
Consent	  and	  Advance	  Treatment	  Directives	  as	  approved	  by	   the	  Chamber	  of	  Deputies	  on	  12	  July	  2011.	  
	  
Article	  1	  (Protection	  of	  life	  and	  health)	  	  1.	  The	  present	   law,	  by	   taking	   into	  consideration	   the	  principles	  established	   in	  articles	   2	   [protection	   of	   inviolable	   rights],	   3	   [principle	   of	   equality],	   13	  [protection	  of	  personal	  freedom],	  and	  32	  [protection	  of	  the	  right	  to	  health]	  of	  the	  [Italian]	  Constitution:	  	  a)	   	  recognizes	  and	  protects	  human	   life	  as	  an	   inviolable	  and	  unavailable	  right,	  	  guaranteed	  also	  in	  the	  terminal	  phase	  of	   life	  and	  in	  cases	  when	  the	  person	  is	  no	  longer	  competent,	  until	  death	  is	  verified	  according	  to	  the	  law;	  	  	  b)	   	  recognizes	   and	   protects	   the	   dignity	   of	   every	   person	   as	   a	   priority	   over	  society’s	  interest	  and	  over	  technological	  and	  scientific	  applications;	  	  	  c)	   	  prohibits	   under	   articles	   575	   [homicide],	   579	   [homicide	   by	   request	   of	   the	  victim]	  and	  580	  [aiding	  or	  incitement	  suicide]	  of	  the	  [Italian]	  Penal	  Code	  every	  form	   of	   euthanasia,	   assistance	   or	   aid	   to	   suicide,	   considering	  medical	   activity	  	  	  	  	  	  *	  This	  is	  a	  translation	  into	  English	  of	  the	  Italian	  Bill	  2350	  done	  by	  the	  author.	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and	   assistance	   to	   patients	   exclusively	   aims	   to	   protect	   life	   and	   health	   as	  well	  as	  to	  relieve	  suffering;	  	  	  d)	   	  compels	   doctors	   to	   inform	   patients	   on	   the	   most	   appropriate	   medical	  treatments,	   except	   for	   cases	   established	   in	   article	   2,	   section	   4,	   and	   on	   the	  prohibition	   on	   every	   form	   of	   euthanasia,	   recognizing	   as	   a	   priority	   the	  therapeutic	   alliance	   between	   the	   physician	   and	   the	   patient,	   which	   becomes	  particularly	  significant	  at	  the	  end	  of	  life;	  	  	  e)	   	  recognizes	   that	  no	  medical	   treatment	  can	  be	  performed	  without	   informed	  consent	   as	   established	   in	   article	   2,	   by	   considering	   that	   health	   must	   be	  protected	   as	   a	   fundamental	   individual	   right	   and	   as	   a	   collective	   interest,	   and	  nobody	  can	  be	  obliged	  to	  [receive]	  a	  specific	  medical	  treatment,	  except	  under	  a	   provision	   of	   the	   law	   and	   with	   the	   limits	   imposed	   by	   the	   respect	   for	   the	  human	  person;	  	  f)	   guarantees	   that	   in	   cases	   of	   patients	   at	   the	   end	   of	   life	   or	   in	   a	   condition	   of	  imminent	   death,	   the	   physician	   must	   abstain	   from	   extraordinary	   treatments	  which	  are	  disproportional	   compared	   to	   the	  patient’s	   clinical	   conditions	  or	   to	  the	  objectives	  of	  cure.	  	  2.	   The	   present	   law	   guarantees,	   within	   the	   framework	   of	   those	   interventions	  already	   established	   by	   the	   current	   legislation,	   social	   and	   economic	   policies	  aiming	  to	  take	  care	  of	  patient,	  in	  particular	  of	  people	  who	  are	  incompetent,	  be	  they	  Italian	  citizens,	  foreigners	  or	  stateless	  persons,	  and	  of	  their	  families.	  	  	  3.	   Patients	   mentioned	   in	   letter	   f)	   of	   section	   1	   have	   the	   right	   to	   be	   assisted	  through	   appropriate	   therapy	   against	   pain	   in	   accordance	   with	   palliative	   care	  protocols,	  established	  in	  the	  current	  legislation.	  	  	  
Article	  2	  (Informed	  consent)	  	  1.	   Except	   for	   the	   cases	   established	   by	   law,	   every	   medical	   treatment	   is	  performed	   after	   explicit	   and	   present	   informed	   consent	   given	   freely	   and	  consciously	  by	  the	  patient.	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2.	   The	   expression	   of	   informed	   consent	   is	   preceded	   by	   correct	   information	  provided	   in	   a	   compressible	  manner	  by	   the	  physician	   in	   charge	  of	   the	  patient	  regarding	  the	  diagnosis,	  prognosis,	  scope	  and	  nature	  of	  the	  proposed	  medical	  treatment,	   foreseeable	   benefits	   and	   risks,	   possible	   side	   effects,	   as	   well	   as	  possible	  alternatives	  and	  the	  consequences	  of	  refusal	  of	  treatment.	  	  	  3.	   The	   therapeutic	   alliance	   built	   within	   the	   physician-­‐patient	   relationship	  according	  to	  section	  2	  can	  be	  expressed,	  if	  the	  physician	  considers	  it	  necessary	  or	  if	  the	  patient	  requests	  it,	  in	  a	  document	  on	  informed	  consent,	  signed	  by	  the	  patient	   and	   the	   physician.	   This	   document	   is	   included	   in	   the	   medical	   record	  upon	  request	  of	  the	  doctor	  or	  of	  the	  patient.	  	  	  4.	  The	  patient	  retains	  the	  right	  to	  refuse	  in	  whole	  or	  in	  part	  the	  information	  he	  or	  she	  is	  entitled	  to	  receive.	  The	  refusal	  can	  occur	  at	  any	  moment	  and	  must	  be	  expressed	   in	   a	   document	   signed	   by	   the	   interested	   person	   and	   becomes	   an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  medical	  record.	  	  	  5.	   Informed	   consent	   to	   medical	   treatment	   shall	   always	   be	   revocable,	   also	  partially.	  Such	  a	  revocation	  shall	  be	  noted	  in	  the	  medical	  record.	  	  	  6.	   In	  the	  case	  of	  an	  interdicted	  person,	   informed	  consent	   is	  given	  by	  the	   legal	  tutor	  who	   signs	   the	   document.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   an	   inability	   or	   an	   emancipated	  minor,	   informed	   consent	   is	   jointly	   given	   by	   the	   interested	   person	   and	   the	  curator.	   In	   case	   of	   a	   nomination	   of	   a	   support	   guardian	   where	   the	   decree	   of	  nomination	   establishes	   the	   assistance	   or	   the	   representation	   in	   situations	   of	  health	  care,	  informed	  consent	  is	  also	  given	  by	  the	  support	  guardian	  or	  only	  by	  the	   support	   guardian.	   The	   decision	   of	   these	   subjects	   also	   includes	   the	  provisions	  of	  article	  3	  and	  it	  is	  taken	  with	  the	  sole	  aim	  of	  protecting	  the	  health	  and	  life	  of	  the	  inability.	  	  	  7.	   Informed	   consent	   to	   medical	   treatment	   of	   minors	   is	   given	   or	   refused	   by	  those	   who	   exercise	   parental	   authority	   or	   the	   guardianship	   after	   carefully	  listening	   to	   the	   wishes	   and	   requests	   of	   the	   minor.	   The	   decision	   of	   these	  subjects	   is	   taken	   with	   the	   sole	   aim	   of	   protecting	   the	   life	   and	   the	   psycho-­‐physical	  health	  of	  the	  minor.	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8.	  For	  all	  the	  interdicted	  or	  inability	  the	  health-­‐care	  personnel	  is	  obliged	  to,	  in	  absence	   of	   a	   declaration	   of	   advance	   treatment	   directives,	   operate	   by	   always	  considering	  the	  sole	  aim	  of	  protecting	  the	  life	  and	  health	  of	  the	  patient.	  	  	  9.	  Informed	  consent	  to	  medical	  treatment	  is	  not	  required	  where	  in	  the	  case	  of	  an	  emergency	  there	  is	  a	  acute	  risk	  to	  the	  patient’s	  life.	  	  	  	  
Article	  3	  (Contents	  and	  limits	  of	  the	  advance	  treatment	  directive)	  1.	  In	  an	  advance	  treatment	  directive	  the	  declarant,	  who	  is	  competent	  and	  has	  received	  complete	  medical	  and	  clinical	  information	  with	  regards	  to	  a	  possible	  future	   permanent	   loss	   of	   competency,	   expresses	   orientations	   and	   useful	  information	  for	  the	  physician	  relating	  to	  therapeutic	  treatments	  in	  conformity	  with	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  present	  law.	  2.	  The	  advance	  treatment	  directive	  can	  contain	  an	  explicit	  renunciation	  of	  any	  or	   of	   some	   specific	   forms	   of	   therapeutic	   treatments	   as	   such	   of	  disproportionate	  character	  or	  experimental	  nature.	  3.	  The	  advance	  treatment	  directive	  cannot	  contain	  instructions	  corresponding	  to	   the	   crimes	   proscribed	   by	   articles	   575,	   579,	   and	   580	   of	   the	   [Italian]	   Penal	  Code.	  4.	  Also	   in	   respect	   of	   the	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	   the	  Rights	   of	  Persons	  with	  Disabilities,	  signed	  in	  New	  York	  on	  13	  December	  2006,	  alimentation	  and	  hydration,	   in	   the	   various	   forms	   that	   science	   and	   technology	  may	   provide	   to	  the	   patient,	   must	   be	   maintained	   until	   the	   end	   of	   life,	   except	   in	   cases	   where	  they	   are	   no	   longer	   efficacious	   in	   providing	   the	   patient	   during	   the	   terminal	  phase	   with	   the	   nutritional	   factors	   necessary	   for	   the	   essential	   physiological	  functions	   of	   the	   body.	   They	   shall	   not	   be	   the	   object	   of	   an	   advance	   treatment	  directive.	  5.	  The	  advance	   treatment	  directive	   is	  executive	  when	  the	  person	   is	   in	  a	  state	  of	   permanent	   incapacity	   to	   understand	   the	   information	   regarding	   medical	  treatments	  and	   their	  consequences	  due	   to	  an	  assessed	  absence	  of	   integrative	  cortical-­‐subcortical	   brain	   activity	   and,	   therefore,	   [the	   patient]	   cannot	   make	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decisions	   about	  him	  or	  herself.	   Such	   an	   assessment	   is	   certified	  by	   a	   collegial	  medical	   team	   composed,	   without	   additional	   or	   new	   costs	   for	   the	   public	  finances,	   of	   an	   anesthesiologist-­‐intensive	   care	   doctor,	   a	   neurologist,	   the	  physician	  in	  charge	  and	  a	  specialist	  of	  the	  disease	  affecting	  the	  patient.	  These	  physicians,	   except	   the	   physician	   in	   charge,	   are	   appointed	   by	   the	   directive	  board	   of	   the	  medical	   facility	   where	   the	   patient	   is	   hospitalized	   or,	   in	   case	   of	  necessity,	  by	  the	  relevant	  local	  health	  authority.	  	  
Article	   4	   (Form	   and	   duration	   of	   the	   declaration	   of	   advance	   treatment	  
directives)	  1.	  Advance	   treatment	   directives	   do	  not	   have	   legally-­‐binding	   force,	   [they]	   are	  redacted	   in	  written	   form,	   dated	   and	   signature	   by	   the	   adult	   interested	   party,	  who	  is	  competent	  and	  has	  received	  complete	  medical	  and	  clinical	  information,	  and	  [they]	  are	  collected	  exclusively	  by	  the	  general	  practitioner	  who	  also	  signs	  them.	  2.	   Advance	   treatment	   directives	   shall	   be	   made	   in	   full	   freedom	   and	  consciousness,	   as	   well	   as	   signed	   with	   an	   autograph	   signature.	   Eventual	  declarations	   of	   intents	   or	   orientations	   expressed	   by	   the	   interested	   party	   in	  ways	  different	   from	   the	   forms	  and	  modalities	   established	  by	   the	  present	   law	  have	  no	  value	  and	  cannot	  be	  used	  to	  reconstruct	  the	  patient’s	  will.	  3.	   Unless	   the	   interested	   party	   has	   become	   incapable,	   the	   advance	   treatment	  directive	  is	  valid	  for	  five	  years,	  starting	  from	  the	  date	  of	  the	  drafting	  of	  the	  act	  according	  to	  section	  1,	  after	  which	  it	  loses	  any	  efficacy.	  The	  advance	  treatment	  directive	   can	   be	   renewed	   several	   times,	   in	   the	   same	   form	   and	  modalities	   as	  established	  in	  sections	  1	  and	  2.	  4.	  The	  advance	  treatment	  directive	  can	  be	  revoked	  or	  modified	  at	  any	  time	  by	  the	  interested	  person.	  The	  revocation,	  even	  partially,	  of	  the	  advance	  treatment	  directive	  must	  be	  signed	  by	  the	  interested	  person.	  5.	   The	   advance	   treatment	   directive	   must	   be	   included	   in	   the	   medical	   record	  from	  the	  moment	  it	  assumes	  importance	  from	  a	  clinical	  point	  of	  view.	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6.	   In	   the	   case	  of	   an	  emergency	  or	  when	   the	  patient	   is	   in	  an	   immediately	   life-­‐threatening	  condition,	  the	  advance	  treatment	  directive	  does	  not	  apply.	  	  
Article	  5	  (Assistance	  to	  patients	  in	  a	  vegetative	  state)	  	  1.	  In	  order	  to	  guarantee	  and	  assure	  equitable	  access	  to	  assistance	  and	  quality	  of	  care,	  the	  assistance	  to	  patients	  in	  a	  vegetative	  state	  represents	  an	  essential	  level	   of	   assistance	   according	   to	   the	   modalities	   established	   in	   the	   [Italian]	  Decree	   of	   the	   President	   of	  Ministers	   of	   29	  November	   2001,	   published	   in	   the	  ordinary	   supplement	   of	   the	   [Italian]	   Official	   Gazette	   no.	   33	   of	   8	   February	  2002.	   Healthcare	   assistance	   to	   patients	   in	   a	   vegetative	   state	   or	   affected	   by	  other	  neurological	  conditions	  is	  provided	  through	  hospitals	  or	  residential	  and	  home	   care	   services	   according	   to	   the	   modalities	   provided	   in	   the	   mentioned	  Decree	  of	   the	  President	  of	  Ministers	  and	  the	  agreement	  between	  the	   [Italian]	  Ministry	  of	  Health,	   the	  Regions	  and	  the	  Autonomous	  Provinces	  of	  Trento	  and	  Bolzano	  on	   the	  Guidelines	   for	  assistance	   to	  patients	   in	  a	  vegetative	  state	  and	  minimally	   conscious	   states,	   approved	   by	   the	   Unified	   Conference	   established	  on	  article	  8	  of	   the	   [Italian]	  Legislative	  Decree	  no.	  281	  of	  28	  August	  1997	  and	  following	   amendments,	   during	   the	   meeting	   of	   5	   May	   2011.	   Home	   care	   is,	  generally,	   provided	   by	   the	   local	   health	   authority	  with	   territorial	   jurisdiction	  over	  the	  place	  where	  the	  patient	  in	  a	  vegetative	  state	  is.	  	  	  
Article	  6	  (Surrogate)	  1.	   In	   the	   advance	   treatment	   directive	   the	   declarant	   can	   appoint	   a	   competent	  adult	  as	  surrogate	  who	  accepts	  the	  appointment	  by	  signing	  the	  declaration.	  2.	   The	   declarant	   who	   has	   appointed	   a	   surrogate	   can	   substitute	   him	   or	   her	  according	   to	   the	   same	  modalities	   followed	   for	  his	   or	  her	   appointment	   at	   any	  time	  without	  any	  obligation	  to	  give	  reasons	  for	  such	  a	  decision.	  3.	  The	  surrogate,	  if	  nominated,	  is	  the	  only	  person	  who	  is	  legally	  authorized	  to	  interact	   with	   the	   physician	   and	   is	   assumed	   to	   act	   exclusively	   in	   the	   best	  interest	  of	  the	  patient,	  acting	  always	  and	  solely	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  wishes	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legitimately	   expressed	   by	   the	   patient	   in	   his	   or	   her	   advance	   treatment	  directive.	  4.	   The	   surrogate	   is	   entitled	   to	   ask	   for	   and	   to	   receive	   from	   the	   physician	   any	  information	  on	  the	  state	  of	  health	  of	  the	  declarant.	  5.	  The	   surrogate,	   if	  nominated,	  undertakes	   to	  monitor	   that	   the	  best	  available	  palliative	  treatments	  are	  administered	  to	  the	  patient,	  avoiding	  the	  creation	  of	  situations	  of	  therapeutic	  futility	  or	  therapeutic	  abandonment.	  6.	  The	  surrogate,	  if	  nominated,	  undertakes	  to	  verify	  carefully	  that	  no	  situation	  amounting	   to	   the	   crimes	   established	   by	   articles	   575,	   579,	   and	   580	   of	   the	  [Italian]	  Penal	  Code	  affects	  the	  patient.	  7.	  The	   surrogate	   can	   renounce	   the	   appointment	   in	  writing,	   communicating	   it	  to	  the	  declarant	  or,	  if	  the	  person	  is	  incompetent,	  to	  the	  physician	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  therapeutic	  treatment.	  8.	  In	  case	  no	  surrogate	  has	  been	  appointed,	  the	  tasks	  provided	  in	  sections	  3,	  4,	  5	  and	  6	  of	  this	  article	  are	  undertaken	  by	  the	  patient’s	  relatives	  as	  indicated	  by	  Book	  II,	  title	  II,	  headings	  I	  and	  II	  of	  the	  [Italian]	  Civil	  Code.	  	  
Article	  7	  (The	  role	  of	  the	  physician)	  	  1.	  The	  orientations	   expressed	  by	   the	  person	   in	  his	   or	   her	   advance	   treatment	  directive	   are	   taken	   into	   consideration	   by	   the	   physician	   in	   charge	   who,	   after	  listening	  to	  the	  surrogate,	  annotates	  in	  the	  medical	  record	  the	  reasons	  why	  he	  or	  she	  does	  or	  does	  not	  follow	  them.	  	  	  2.	   In	   case	   the	   physician	   in	   charge	   decides	   not	   to	   follow	   the	   orientations	  expressed	  by	  the	  patient	  in	  the	  advance	  treatment	  directive,	  [he	  or	  she]	  must	  consult	  the	  surrogate	  or	  the	  patient’s	  relatives,	  as	  indicated	  by	  Book	  II,	  title	  II,	  headings	   I	   and	   II	  of	   the	   [Italian]	  Civil	  Code,	   express	   in	  detail	  what	  motivated	  his	   or	   her	   decision	   and	   sign	   the	   medical	   record	   or	   in	   a	   separate	   document,	  which	  is	  annexed	  to	  the	  advance	  treatment	  directive.	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3.	   The	   doctor	   cannot	   take	   into	   consideration	   directions	   that	   are	   meant	   to	  cause	   the	   death	   of	   the	   patient	   or	   are	   in	   conflict	   with	   the	   law	   or	   medical	  deontology.	  The	  orientations	   are	   evaluated	  by	   the	  physician,	   [after]	   listening	  to	   the	   surrogate,	   according	   to	   science	   and	   conscience,	   in	   application	   of	   the	  principle	  of	  the	  inviolability	  of	  human	  life	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  health	  and	  life,	  according	  to	  the	  principles	  of	  precaution,	  proportionality	  and	  prudence.	  	  	  	  
Article	  8	  (Final	  provisions)	  	  1.	   A	   Registry	   of	   advance	   treatment	   directives	   is	   established	   within	   a	   single	  national	   information	   archive.	   The	   holder	   entitled	   to	   the	   processing	   of	   data	  inserted	  in	  this	  archive	  is	  the	  [Italian]	  Ministry	  of	  Health.	  	  	  2.	   By	   regulation	   to	   be	   adopted	   according	   to	   article	   17,	   section	   3,	   of	   [Italian]	  Law	   No.	   400	   of	   23	   August	   1988,	   within	   one	   hundred	   twenty	   days	   from	   the	  date	   of	   entry	   into	   force	   of	   the	   present	   law,	   the	   [Italian]	   Ministry	   of	   Health,	  [after]	   listening	   to	   the	   Guarantor	   for	   the	   protection	   of	   personal	   data,	   shall	  provide	   the	   technical	   rules	   and	   the	   modalities	   of	   access,	   conservation	   and	  consultation	   of	   the	   Registry	   established	   in	   section	   1.	   The	   decree	   also	  establishes	   the	   terms	   and	   forms	   according	   to	   which	   citizens	   can	   write	   an	  advance	  treatment	  directive	  at	  the	  general	  practitioner’s	  office	  and	  register	  it	  [the	  directive]	  at	   the	   local	  health	  authority,	   the	  modalities	  of	   conservation	  of	  advance	   treatment	  directives	  at	   the	   local	  health	  authority	  and	   the	  modalities	  for	   the	   telematic	   transmission	   to	   the	   Registry	  mentioned	   in	   section	   1.	   Every	  information	  concerning	  the	  possibility	  to	  make	  an	  advance	  treatment	  directive	  are	  also	  made	  available	  on	  the	  website	  of	  the	  [Italian]	  Minister	  of	  Health.	  	  	  	  	  	  
